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ABSTRACT 
This research comprises an examination of the 
Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
with respect both to the core concepts which lie at 
the heart of the statutes, and the proces s of implemen- 
tation of the law. The study examines both the emergence 
of the statutory provisions, and their implementation 
in the period through 1981. The law is examined in the 
context of the material factors which constitute women's 
position in the labour force, and an attempt is made to 
evaluate the fit between the legal concepts and the 
material reality. Underlying the research is the broader 
question of how the use of law itself defines or limits 
a particular problem. Some American material is included 
for comparison. 
The first part of the study examines the emergence 
of the legislation and the way in which this process 
shapes the concepts embodied in the law. The study reveals 
some critical problems in the core concepts of the legis- 
lation and a disjuncture between the material reality of 
the female labour force, and the approach to defining 
discrimination and equality. While the concepts are grounded 
in the formalistic and abstracted approach of the law to 
the individual legal subject, it cannot be surmised that 
this fact in itself delimits the capacity of the law to 
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effect social change, since it is not clear that the concepts 
are incapable of reform. Indeed, recent amendments to the 
law suggest that some change is Possible, although the 
degree of change may be limited. 
The second part of the study points to the way in 
which the choice of enforcement and implementation pro- 
cedures affect the impact of the legislation. An empirical 
study of the industrial tribunal adjudication process 
points to some procedural problems which potentially re- 
strict the ability of the individual complainant to prove 
her case and obtain relief. An examination of the powers 
of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), and the EOC's 
record, indicates both a serious weakness in the statutory 
authority with regard to the Commission's ability to secure 
compliance, and an overly cautious approach by-the Com- 
mission to the use of its existing powers. A study of the 
remedy provisions of the legislation points to the limita- 
tions of the individual remedy approach, and the need to amend 
the remedy provisions better to reflect the public policies 
of securing compliance with the law and compensation for 
the victims. 
The study reveals the nexus between the substantive 
concepts of the law and the enforcement procedures. It suggests 
that changes in both areas must be made if the law is more 
adequately to address the economic disadvantage of women workers. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, AND 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In recent years there has been a spate of litera- 
ture dealing with women in the workplace, from economists, 
historians and sociologists, and a burgeoning interest 
in the general question of sex/gender as a category of 
social stratification. This interest has been paralleled 
in the public sphere by increasing attention to women, 
particularly working women, as the object of legislative 
and judicial policy-making. This in turn has focused 
scholarly attention on the content and impact of laws 
establishing or reconstituting employment rights for 
women. The purpose of this study is to provide a critical 
examination of the content and procedures of two British 
statutes, which in a broad sense attempt to provide for 
greater equality between the sexes in the workplace, and 
in so doing to assess the potential effects of the laws. 
In 1970, the British Parliament enacted the 
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Equal Pay Act (EqPA), the first piece of anti-discrimina- 
tion legislation to address the situation of women in 
employment since the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 
of 1919-removed legal barriers. to women's entry into the 
learned professions. The statute which was to come into 
operation at the end of 1975, addressed direct discrimina- 
tion of wages, salaries, and other matters covered by 
the contract of employment, such as shift work allowances, 
fringe benefits, and sick pay schemes. 
During the five years between the passage of the 
EqPA and the date of its implementation, a vigorous 
campaign for a broader anti-discrimination law resulted 
in the enactment of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 
(SDA). With regard to the position of women workers, the 
SDA complemented the EqPA by regulating discrimination in 
the non-contractual aspects of employment, such as access 
to jobs, training, and promotion, and in the terms and 
conditions of employment. The SDA established an Equal 
Opportunities Commission with a statutory duty to enforce 
both pieces of legislation, which came into effect 
simultaneously on 29th December 1975. 
It is these two statutes and the str. uctures and 
processes established to implement them which are the 
subject of this inquiry. At an early stage of the re- 
search the influence of American ideas and institutions 
on the British approach to discrimination legislation 
became clear, but a fully-fledged comparative study. was 
not possible because of constraints of time. The 
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American legislation nevertheless provides a secondary 
focus in the study, and references to the American laws 
are used to illuminate the content and operation of the 
British legislation. 
Specifically the research is designed to examine 
the genesis of the core concepts that lie at the heart 
of the statutes, both substantive and procedural, and 
to evaluate the system of implementation through an 
empirical investigation of the processes of complaint 
adjudication, and administrative enforcement. Such a 
study could be undertaken in a number of ways, and from 
a variety of theoretical perspectives. The purpose of 
this introductory chapter is to specify in more detail 
the central objects of enquiry, the methods and sources 
of data, and the theoreti. cal perspectives which underlie 
both the choice of subject matter for the research, and 
the particular approach adopted. 
Research Objectives and Theoretical Perspectives 
Since the legislation came into effect it has 
been the focus. of considerable criticism and comment, 
although there has been no complete study of the legisla- 
tion incorporating both a critical examination of its 
provisions and a detailed empirical study of the process 
of enforcement. Since the statutory provisions define 
the basic parameters of the legislation, and the process 
of implementation affects both legal meaning and social 
impact, both stages of analysis appear to be essential 
to an understanding of the legislation. The purpose of 
this study is to take a first step towards remedying the 
omission in the literature. In social policy terms, the 
purpose is to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses 
in the legislation. In so doing, I hope the study may 
make a tentative contribution to the debate on the relation- 
ship of legal reform to social change. 
The question of the relationship of law to social 
change is one of the recurrent themes of the history of 
legal thought (Friedman, 1972, p. 19). As intervention 
through legislation has become an increasingly common 
feature of modern life, it has acquired an urgent practical 
and political significance as well as an academic and 
intellectual one. Despite the pervasiveness of legal 
reform, as a route to social and economic change, and 
despite the large and ever-increasing literature on the 
relationship of legal to social change, there is no agree- 
ment as to a theoretical framework for studying legisla- 
tion, and no dominant sociological paradigm. In this 
respect, the area of enquiry perhaps mirrors the sub- 
discipline of the sociology of law itself, which "bears 
very little resemblance to a systematic collection of 
knowledge" (Beirne, 197?, P. 5). 
The divergent approaches which characterize the 
sociology of law can be grouped in terms of two. major 
paradigms: one is defined by "the master paradigms 
bequeathed by the respective epistomologies of Durkheim 
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and Weber" (Beirne, 1977, p. 43) and results in a 
positivist approach to law; the second eschews positivism 
in favour of a materialist analysis of the social produc- 
tion of law and of law as a mode of reproduction of the 
social order. These categories are not monolithic and 
each comprises a diversity of approaches; nevertheless 
the simplification is useful as an initial categorization 
of the field, with respect to the different approaches 
taken to the law-society problematic. 
Within the first category there has been a 
pronounced orientation towards empirical studies which 
lack any explicit theoretical framework (Campbell, 1972, 
P. 5), although Hunt (1982, p. 74) notes some recent 
developments to the contrary. Within the empiricist 
studies of law, the problem is not so much the lack of 
an explicit theoretical framework but the presence of 
an unacknowledged, implicit, theoretical position (Hunt, 
1976, p. 29). The issue is not one of "theory" versus 
"empiricism, " but rather one of which theoretical assumptions 
are operating as a paradigm for analysis. 
Much of the work on equal employment opportunity 
legislation, the vast bulk of which is concerned with 
the American legislation, exemplifies the problems of an 
overly empiricist approach. Much of the work appears in 
legal journals and law reviews, where the emphasis is 
on legal practice, definitional disputes and problems 
of appellate interpretation. Other works attempt to 
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evaluate the impact of a specific law on progress towards 
certain stated objectives, or monitor implementation 
through a case-by-case approach which mirrors the legal 
process. The narrow focus of such studies constitutes 
both their main strength and their most serious failing. 
Empirically derived analyses of particular laws provide 
a wealth of information on specific problems in legal 
implementation which may be of considerable significance 
at the policy level, but they frequently do so without 
sufficient attention to important theoretical questions. 
Concentrating on instrumental effect, for example, may 
result in a failure to examine the symbolic or ideological 
effects which Gusfield (1963) and Carson (1974) have 
demonstrated as an important dimension in the analysis 
of legislation. 
The problem with much of the American literature 
may be summarized as a tendancy to share the same set of 
conceptual operating assumptions as the law itself, a 
defect which is grounded in a positivist epistemology 
which treats legal rules as non-problematic social facts. 
Within the second paradigm, which problematizes 
law itself, and in broad terms addresses the nature of 
legal regulation in capitalist social formations (Beirne 
and Quinney, 1982, p. 6) there has been little attention 
paid to the problem of analysing discrimination law. In 
terms of empirical research, the materialist studies 
appear to be concentrated in two particular areas of 
interest with regard to the nature of legal regulation: 
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criminal law, and the regulation of the economic rela- 
tions of labour and capital. Beirne and Quinney (1982, 
p. 4) point out that in both these areas there has been 
an unfortunate tendency to conceive of law simply as a 
state apparatus that mechanically reflects the interests 
of economically dominant classes. 1, egislation which 
appears contrary to those interests is then explained in 
terms of its functional contribution to the long-term 
stability of the social formation. 
Anti-discrimination legislation poses exactly 
this kind of problem. In one of the few works adopting 
a Marxian perspective for an examination of the British 
anti-discrimination law, Gregory (1979, P. 150) concludes 
that the legislation "is on the statute book in order to 
protect, not threaten, the fundamental structures of 
capitalist society. " Gregory's argument might be more 
convincing if it rested on some empirical demonstration 
of its validity, rather than proceeding ýa priori. 
Gregory asserts that the legislation was enacted because 
"the state" "had to" intervene, but that it "dared not" 
intervene effectively; but these assertions are not 
grounded in an analysis of the events that preceded en- 
actment of the legislation, nor in an examination of the 
policy debates that took place, nor indeed in anything 
other than some general theoretical considerations about 
the role of law in bourgeois society. 
The deficiencies of the study described above 
should not be taken as indicating that a materialist 
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approach to the study of anti-discrimination law is 
necessarily inappropriate nor doomed to failure. Historical 
materialism is concerned to identify the material condi- 
tions for the production of ideology, and to assess its 
relation to other social and political forces (Matthews, 
1979, P. 110). As a method, it thus requires attention 
to historical and structural factors. Attention to these 
factors, in the context of an analysis of the substance 
of the legislation is thus a starting point for this 
study. 
Kingdom (1981, p. 109) points to the importance 
of such factors in her discussion of models of law. She 
points. to the necessity of avoiding the traditional, 
philosophical conception of rights as axiomatic, as 
inalienable possessions owned by virtue of principles 
that transcend prevailing legal and social conditions. 
Rights are not axiomatic, but emergent, constructed and 
defined in the process of political struggle. Thus, an 
analysis of the discrimination legislation must include 
an examination of the nature of the emergent rights 
embodied in the legislation, not only in terms of the 
statute's substantive provisions, but also through an 
examination of the historical process of definition and 
the choices that are implicit in it. Thompson (1975; 1978) 
also emphasizes the role of historical analysis in 
developing an understanding of the law. 
The choice of a materialist paradigm necessarily 
has implications in terms of the factors seen to be 
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essential to the analysis. In concrete terms, it 
necessitates an analysis of the structural and ideo- 
logical constituents of the position of women in the labour 
force; a study of the emergence of the legislation 
focusing on the factors which have influenced the emergent 
definitions at the heart of anti-discrimination legisla- 
tion, and on the 'fit' between legal definitions of a 
problem*and the actuality of the underlying phenomenon; 
and a study of structural and procedural factors in the 
system of enforcement and adjudication, 
The study of implementation is important for a 
number of reasons. Firstp the process of case-by-case 
adjudication depends upon facts as the building blocks of 
law. Thus, the way in which judicial decision-makers 
interpret facts is of prime importance to the question 
of the transformative potential of a particular piece of 
legislation, as well as to an understapding of the 
procedures associated with the adjudication of particular 
cases. Second, the choice of certain kinds of enforcement 
structures rather than others crucially affects the process 
of implementation, and the likely effect of the legisla- 
tion on the area of putative regulation. 
Together, an emergence study and an implementation 
study should constitute a conceptual analysis and critique, 
focusing on the relationship of legal definitions and 
solutions to both the stated objective of the legislation, 
and to the social/economic context from which the legal/ 
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legislative definition emerges. It should also provide a 
means of examining the way in which substance and procedure 
operate to give meaning to law, by focusing on the inter- 
relatedness of conceptual and procedural factors. Pro- 
cedural choices are thus reinstated as a central concern 
in an examination of legislation not only because some 
choices will facilitate enforcement and others hinder it 
but because in this process the meaning of the law is 
constantly defined and re-defined. 
Combining an emergence and implementation study 
in this way makes possible an analysis at two distinct 
levels of conceptualization: the identification of issues 
which might be addressed in the short-term through 
amendments to the law and changes in procedural practices; 
and secondly, an examination of the features of anti- 
discrimination legislation as presently constituted which 
appear less susceptible to amendment or change, since 
they represent core values within juridical and liberal 
ideology. 
Comparing British and American Legislation 
The main object of enquiry for this research is 
the British anti-discrimination legislation. However, at 
an early stage of the research, the influence of American 
models of anti-discrimination policy became clear. For 
this reason I decided that the study would benefit from 
explicit comparisons between the British and American 
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provisions and procedures. However, because of the 
restraints of time and resources, this study is not a 
true example of a fully comparative study. My study of 
the American legislation was less detailed and more 
limited in scope than the study of the British legisla- 
tion; and as such the uses to which it may legitimately 
be put are more limited than if a full comparative study 
had been possible. Since the study is not a fully compara- 
tive one, but one which incorporates a selective use of 
the American material, some discussion of the limitations 
is in order. 
There is an immediate similarity between the 
legislation of the two countries in terms of basic con- 
cepts and structures for enforcement. The fact that 
patterns of women's employment are very similar in each, 
and that their economic and industrial structures are 
comparable, facilitates the use of comparative material. 
Nevertheless, it would be easy to overstate the similarities, 
both as to the legislation itself, and with regard to 
external factors. Some of the differences between the two 
countries which are relevant to a comparative examination 
of the legislation are described briefly here. 
First, the legal systems of the two countries are 
only superficially similar. Despite their sharing of the 
Anglo-American common-law tradition, there are some 
significant differences between the two, particularly 
with regard to the degree of judicial activism and 
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innovation that the courts think appropriate to their role. 
This difference reflects in part the fact that the 
American system of government is not the classic "separa- 
tion of powers" that textbooks sometimes describe, but 
in fact a sharing of powers (Neustadt, 1967). Although 
it is not possible to present a detailed comparison here, 
it should at least be noted that the Federal judiciary 
in the United States, and the Supreme Court in particular 
has historically taken a more explicitly interventionist 
and policy-making role than the British judiciary, and 
at least since the historic decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 1a relatively progressive approach to the 
issues of civil rights and discrimination laws (Chayes, 
1970; Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, ch. 9). The concept 
of indirect discrimination for example, is a judicially 
created one in the United States, whereas in Britain it 
is part of the statutory definition. This difference in 
approach goes beyond the anti-discrimination laws and reflects 
a more general difference in approach to the judicial role. 
It also reflects judicial differences of approach with 
respect to statutory interpretation, and to the admission 
as evidence of social scientific and statistical material 
(Hepple, 1983, P. 74). 
Bureaucratic styles and structure are also differ- 
ent in the two countries, a fact of some importance when 
considering the roles of their respbetive administrative 
enforcement agencies. The incorporation of labour and 
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management interests into the system of administrative 
enforcement of discrimination legislation is not a 
feature of the American system, as it is in the British. 
Furthermore, the United States has a more openly "politicized" 
bureaucracy than Great Britain (Meehan, 1980, p. 8), 
which has implications for the operation and staffing 
of the enforcement agencies and their connections to 
interest and advocacy groups. 
Lastly, there are real difference. s in the operation 
of policy networks between the two countries, a fact 
which also has implications for the implementation of law. 
It is possible in the United States to identify a national 
group of action-oriented civil rights litigation organiza- 
tions which have played a considerable role in developing 
a litigation strategy on something other than an ad hoc 
or random basis. By contrast, comparable British groups 
are few in number and lack the resources of their American 
counterparts. 
These considerable differences between the two 
systems have given rise to the question of whether con- 
cepts borrowed from the United States can successfully 
be transplanted into the British legal, political, and 
administrative context, - because of what Walker (1969) 
referred to as the "diffusion of innovation. " 
2 Unfortunately, 
a more detailed examination of this question is outside 
the scope of this study. I introduce the issue here in 
the manner of a caveat. Despite the interesting 
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possibilities of a full and detailed comparative study, ' 
the constraints of time and resources that a solo researcher 
inevitably faces, led me to settle for a more limited 
examination and incorporation of the American material 
than such a study would require. Thus, I have incorporated 
references to the American legislation where appropriate 
to illuminate the British approach or to illustrate 
alternatives to the ideas and structures incorporated in 
the British statutes. 
In making these detailed references I am aware 
that a partial study of the American legislation may be 
misleading, if it is taken to imply that American 
procedures may be transplanted unproblematically, or at 
all, int-o the quite different legal and political 
institutions of the United Kingdom. Hence, the caveat 
issued here. The comparisons thus point up the limitations 
of a particular approach to an aspect of anti-discrimina- 
tion law, without implying that such a limitation is 
inherent in the nature of the legal form, rather than a 
characteristic of a particular piece of legislation, or a 
particular legal system. 
In order to set the stage for this later incorpora- 
tion of American material, which appears at the point of 
discussion of appropriate issues in the British legisla- 
tion rather than in separate chapters of its own, it will 
be helpful here to describe briefly"the American statutes 
which provide the basis for comparison. Such a 
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description must of necessity be something of 'a simplifica- 
tion, but it will suffice to provide the context for the 
later introduction of American references. 
Public policy governing employment discrimination 
in the United States consists of a diverse collection of 
Federal-, State and local statutes and regulations, some 
broad and comprehensive in scope, others more specific. 
In Federal policy, a basic distinction exists between 
regulations which derive their authority from Congressional 
enactment, and those established by presidential fiat, 
through the issuance of an Executive order. 
Congressional action on employment discrimination 
dates from the enactment of the 1963 Equal Pay Act, passed 
as an amendment to the Fair Iabor Standards Act (FLSA) 
of 1938. The first federal equal pay bill was introduced 
in Congress in 1945, but failed to get the support necessary 
for passage. Similar bills were introduced in every 
session of Congress thereafter, but it was not until 1962 
that hearings were again held on equal pay proposals. 
The 1963 Act prohibited the payment of unequal wages for 
equal work, on the grounds of sex, with respect to workers 
covered by the FLSA, and assigned responsibility for 
enforcement to the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart- 
ment of Iabor. In 1978, this responsibility was trans- 
ferred to the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(EEOC), established as the major enforcement agency for 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: is a 
comprehensive statute which prohibits a broad range of 
discriminatory employment practices. Advocates of women's 
rights had long realized the need for a legal defence 
against the problem of sex discrimination, in employment 
and elsewhere. originally, however, the 1964 Act covered 
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, national 
origin and religion, but not sex. Ironically, the inclusion 
of women as a protected class under the Act was initiated 
in an amendment by a Congressman Opposed to the whole 
endeavour of civil rights legislation. Despite its origin, 
the amendment received enthusiastic support from Congress- 
women, and ultimately received majority support in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
It is Title VII which is of primary concern here. 
It was Title VII which established in the federal system 
the idea of enforcement through an administrative agency 
which provided a model for British policy-makers (see 
chapters six and eight below); and it is in Title VII 
litigation that the difference between American and British 
judicial approaches to remedy is best observed. (See 
chapter nine below. ) Title VII provides in pertinent part 
that it is unlawful: 
.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to ... 
compensation, 3 terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment, because of ... race, colour, 
religion, sex, or national origin: or 
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to limit, segregate, or classify (employees) ... in any way which would deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect (his) status as an employee, because of ... 
race, colour, religion, sex or national origin. 
Other federal and state statutes provide additional 
avenues for the legal redress of race and sex discrimina- 
tion, but they are of considerably less significance in 
terms of the overall litigative effort than Title VII. 
In addition to the federal statutes, Executive Orders 
prohibit discrimination by federal contractors, and are 
enforced by a separate agency, the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance. Finally, the Constitution itself 
provides legal remedies for race and sex discrimination, 
where state action is involved in the denial of equal 
protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In terms of employment discrimination the Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII account for by far the largest 
numbers of actionable claims of sex discrimination. I 
have in the main limited my introduction of American 
material to these two statutes and the structures and 
processes through which they are enforced. I have not 
provided an analysis of the emergence of the American 
legislation, nor a detailed empirical investigation of 
the judicial decision-making process. In a truly 
comparative study such enterprises would have been 
necessary to mirror the study of the British legislation. 
The work here is more limited in scope. It is thus not 
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possible to draw from it the conclusions that a more 
complete study would allow; nevertheless, the comparative 
material, although illustrative only, casts a light on 
the British experience that would otherwise be unavailable. 
Research Methods and Sources of Data 
The nature of the phenomenon under investigation 
necessarily dictates a certain range of research methods. 
Having defined the research objectives in terms of an 
examination of the emergence of key legal concepts, both 
substantive and procedural, and of the structures and 
processes through which the concepts are given meaning 
through implementation, certain methodological choices 
and sources of data are logically implied. 
A study of the central concepts of legislation, 
and an analysis of the implementation and interpretation 
of these concepts through judicial and quasi-judicial 
structures, necessitates a close examination of legislative 
and judicial language. Consequently, the primary research 
method for this study was documentary, with documents 
themselves constituting a phenomenon for investigation 
in their own right,. rather than appearing only as a 
resource for access to an underlying reality (Phillipson, 
1972, P. 81). 
The research mode is primarily qualitative, 
exploratory, and descriptive. Consequently a search 
for causality must necessarily be a limited one. However, 
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a conjectural approach to causality is appropriate as a 
"tentative, qualified, and subsidiary" task of qualitative 
analysis (Lofland, 1971, p. 62). With this caveat in 
mind, I have not hesitated to point tentatively to causes 
and consequences in the processes which are the subject 
of investigation. 
Where quantitative data appear, I have used it 
descriptively. official statistics provide a source of 
information, for example, on the major characteristics of 
women's labour force participation, and on complaints 
to the tribunals and their outcome. I have also used 
statistics on the representation of parties at tribunal 
hearings, derived from a sample of tribunal decisions. 
In this latter case I have suggested conclusions that 
might be drawn from the data, but again with a caveat 
regarding the tentative nature of the conclusions that 
can appropriately be drawn. 
Overall, the research methods reflect a concern 
with the "context of discovery" rather than "the context 
of validation" (Rudner, 1966; Phillipson, 1972), with the 
explication and interpretation of legal meaning, and its 
relationship to the material world which is the subject 
of legal regulation. Specifically, the study is based on 
information derived from a range of sources consonant with 
achieving the objectives of examining both the emergence 
and the implementation of the legislation, in the context 
of an analysis of women's position in the labour market. 
f 
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a) in the labour market 
The analysis of women's position in the labour 
market relies on official statistics to provide an account 
of recent trends in women's labour force participation, 
earnings, and occupational distribution. The analysis 
is also based upon a discussion and critique of selected 
literature. 
b) The emergence of the legislation 
The method of investigation for this section was 
documentary. There are three main sources of data: 
official reports, other sources of primary data, and 
secondary studies. The official reports include Hansard, 
reDorts of official committees, and government publica- 
tions. Other sources of primary information mainly 
comprise reports of the views and proceedings of various 
pressure groups. Reliance on documentary sources for a 
reconstruction of historical events will of necessity 
always involve the problem that the explanation offered 
will be a partial one. The problem is mitigated to some 
extent when, as here, the reports are properly sources of 
data in themselves, -subjects of analysis, rather than 
recreations of shadowy events that may be obscured by 
the words of an official explanation. The focus in this 
section is on the historical emergence of the policy 
response, and the key concepts of the legislation. In 
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this context, documentary methods appear to provide an 
accessible, and an appropriate, source of information. 
c) The system of enforcement 
The study-of implementation focuses on the first 
five years of full implementation of the two statUtes, 
i. e. on the period from 1976-1981. The study relies primar- 
ily upon documentary sources of data, supplemented with 
some interview material. 
official reports and the statues themselves 
constitute the major source of information for the over- 
view of the enforcement system. 
Documentary information in the form of a sample 
of tribunal decisions provides the data for a study of 
tribunal adjudication, and for a discussion of legal re- 
medies. Access to these decisions was facilitated by the 
statutor y requirement that the decisions of Industrial 
Tribunals be written, and that written record be publicly 
available. A complete register of all Industrial Tribunal 
decisions involving claims of sex deiscrimination or un- 
equal pay is available at the headquarters of the EOC, and 
this register was used as a sampling frame. 
The sample covers the years 1977-1981. Tribunal 
decisions for the first year of implementation were ex- 
cluded from the sample on the basis ýhat the first year 
might be expected to provide some aberrational results, 
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purely because of the newness of the statutes, and the 
absence of precedential guidelines from the appellate courts. 
The decisions so chosen provided the basis for an 
empirical investigation of tribunal adjudication through a 
study of the criteria employed in the determination of 
complaints, the arguments adduced, evidentiary issues, and 
the implications of the allocation of the-. burden of proof. 
The written decisions also provide information on the 
composition of the tribunal and the representation of the 
parties. 
The objective in this section of the research was 
not to provide a study of the way in which tribunal pro- 
ceedings are conducted, but of quasi-judicial decision- 
making. Whereas a reliance on documentary methods would 
be inappropriate and inadequate for the former, it is 
apposite for the latter, and provides an invaluable insight 
into both the legal reasoning with which tribunals explain 
and justify their decisions and the configurations of facts 
which appear important to them in applying the laws. It 
should be noted that tribunal decisions are not generally re- 
ported, and are not considered precedent. An analysis of 
case outcomes does not, therefore, constitute an authorita- 
tive guide to the law. Rather it'reflects the ways in which 
specific tribunals, speaking through their chairmen, record 
the legal and factual grounds which justify a particular 
outcome. 
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A third source of documentary data were the 
reported decisions of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, 
and the higher appellate courts*for the period 1976-1981. 
Unlike the decisions of the tribunal, these decisions 
do have precedential value. I have therefore used them 
differently from the tribunal decisions in the sample, 
as reflecting the prevailing legal definition-of the 
statutory provisions. 
Documentary anlaysis also provided the basis for 
an evaluation of the role of the EOC. Official reports 
and the legislation itself provide information on the 
powers of the EOC, and the reasons underlying the choice of 
this form of administrative enforcement. The Annual 
Reports of the EOC constituted a source of data on the 
agency itself, its activities and priorities, and the way 
in which the organizational role is perceived and pre- 
sented to the public. This data was supplemented with material 
obtained in in-depth interviews with the EOC's legal counsel. 
Interviews provided the major source of non-documentary 
information. During the early stages of the research I 
interviewed a small number of complainants, plus lawyers 
and trade union officials interested in the implementation 
of the legislation. A small sample of complainants was 
chosen from those registering complaints with the London 
Industrial Tribunal in a nine-month period in 1979. Trade 
I union officials and lawyers were approached on the basis of 
personal contacts and recommendations, one interview often 
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leading to a suggestion of other individuals interested 
in the operation of the legislation. The information 
gained from these two sets of interviews does not appear 
as a research finding, but was used exclusively in the 
early stages to promote and clarify the researcher's under- 
standing of the dimensions of the legislation and the 
nature of the implementation process. A small number of 
tribunal hearings was observed during the same period, 
for the same purpose. 
(cont I 
Ir 
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The American Legislation 
The study of the American legislation relies on 
the same mix of research methods and data sources as the 
British legislation. The primary source of information 
was documentary: the Congressional Record, official 
committee reports, commission and agency reports, and 
court decisions. Interviews with EEOC personnel, complainants, 
and lawyers supplemented this data. 
IV. Anti-Discrimination Laws: The Literature 
In the first part of this chapter I referred in 
general terms to certain categories into which the 
literature on law and social change and theories of 
legislation might be divided. In this section I discuss 
in more detail some of the literature which deals 
specifically with British anti-discrimination legislation. 
The literature on the American legislation is 
voluminous. I have found some of these studies illuminating 
and helpful, but since they tend to be partial studies, 
dealing only with particular aspects of the legislation, 
I have referred to them at the appropriate point in the 
following chapters, rather than reviewing them here. 
Although fewer in number than the works on the 
American legislation, studies of, and comments on, the 
British legislation also tend in the main to be partial 
studies. These works tend to agree on the fact that 
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the effect of the legislation to date has been limited, 
but proffer different sets of reasons for this fact, 
and differ in the degree to which they see the defects 
as remediable. Where a study deals only with a particular 
aspect of the legislation or the enforcement procedures, 
I have generally discussed it at the appropriate place 
in the text, rather than discussing it here. However, in 
order to give a flavour of the different approaches, I 
have discussed here three articles which evaluate the 
legislation from different perspectives (Coote and Campbell, 
1982; Seear, 1980; Snell et al., 1981) before proceeding 
to a brief discussion of two longer works in this area 
(Chiplin and Sloane, 1982; Creighton, 1979). The work of 
Gregory (19? 9) has been discussed in the first part of 
this chapter. For that reason I do not include it here. 
Coote and Campbell (1982) provide an overview of 
the campaign for equality legislation, and of the effects 
of the law, in their historical account of feminist 
struggles from the late 1960s onwards. They conclude on 
the basis of statistics about the wage gap and occupational 
segregation that the effect has been "feeble" and assert 
that some of the reasons for the lack of effect can be 
found in the laws themselves, and others in the methods 
of enforcement (Coote and Campbell, 1982, p. 104). They 
see the problem as serious "internal weaknesses" in the 
laws, coupled with an implementation machinery that is 
"not designed to give women positive help in obtaining 
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justice--rather the contrary" (Coote and Campbell, 1982, 
p. 117). These weaknesses apparently derive from the 
fact that the "well-meaning liberals" responsible for the 
legislation had as a priority not the closing of loopholes 
and the establishment of the strongest possible means of 
enforcement, but the avoidance of "anything approaching 
a showdown with the entrenched powers of the CBI and the 
TUC" (Coote and Campbell, 1982, p. 115). They also 
assert that patterns of male and female employment are too 
deeply entrenched to be disturbed more-than superficially 
by the legislation alone. 
The problem with Coote and Campbell's analysis is 
that although apparently far ranging, most of their 
assertions are sui generis and lack a grounding in a 
detailed investigation'or the implementation process. 
Nancy Seear (198Z) also provides an overview of 
the main provisions of the legislation and the process 
of implementation. She too concludes that the effect 
of the legislation has been limited, but points to the 
general economic climate, existing organizational structures 
and Dractices, attitudes about the nature of men's work 
and women's work, and ignorance of the legislation, as 
the. factors inhibiting the operation of the law (Seear, 
198'ý, p. 274). Her prognosis is more optimistic than 
that of Coote and Campbell (1982) in that she implies 
that the existing legislation modified only in detail 
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can be made to work, if a greater use is made of the 
existing powers of enforcement, and if more attention is 
paid to working out joint union-management policies at 
the company level (Seear, 198. Z, p. 276). 
A second study pointing to the need for a greater 
use of the qxisting enforcement powers is that of Snell et al., 
(1981), which-draws upon research into the effects of 
the statutes on the employment practices of twenty-six 
organizations. The researchers found some organizations 
clearly in breach of their legal obligations, and fully 
half of them had borderline situations. Only nine of the 
twenty-six had proceeded to full implementation of their 
legal obligations; by contrast fourteen had taken action 
prior to the date of implementation to reduce their 
obligations under the statute. This research confirms, 
by looking at practices within organizations, the con- 
clusions drawn from the persistence of the wage gap and 
occupational segregation by other writers, that the 
effect of the legislation has been limited. 
The precise relationship between the wage gap 
and the existence of a high degree of occupational segrega- 
tion on the one hand, and the limitations of the law, 
on the other, is not one which is commonly addressed in 
the British literature. Rather, it is generally taken 
for granted that the continuing discrepancies between 
men and women workers with regard to these indices 
illustrate the failure of the legislation. The work 
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of Chiplin and Sloane (1982, ID. 
20) is an exception to 
this trend, in that they focus explicitly on the issues 
that arise in measuring discrimination in terms of the 
wage gap. Using studies from both the United States and 
Britain as a source of data, Chiplin and Sloane (1982, p. 1) 
argue that discrimination in earnings is in the order of 
ten per cent, or approximately one-quarter of the total 
wage gap between men and women. Chiplin and Sloane (1982, 
p. 20) note that whatever measure of discrimination is used, 
whether the wage gap, or, for example, following Lazear 
(1978) the growth of income over the working life of the 
individual, even the most favorable studies still leave a 
substantial gap between male and female earnings. 
Although Chiplin and Sloane's analysis of quantita- 
tive measures of discrimination is illuminating, their 
study otherwise founders upon an incomplete understanding 
of the phenomenon of sex discrimination. They assert in 
the conclusion that if discrimination against women were 
removed overnight, the improvement in average female earn- 
ings would be substantial, but that they would still, in 
all probability be only about eighty per cent of male 
earnings, since discrimination is less significant than 
factors "deep rooted in social attitudes and behaviour, 
and which may themselves have economic causes" (Chiplin 
and Sloane, 1982, p. 129). Such an assertion implies 
a peculiarly narrow definition of discrimination, as is 
further demonstrated by an example that Chiplin and 
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Sloane use to illustrate their point. A crucial issue, 
they assert, is the effect of family responsibilities 
on lowering the value of the services which women supply; 
so, they continue, if there was a complete reversal of 
roles between the sexes, average male earnings would be 
less than women's "not because of any discrimination 
practised by women, but simply from the value of the 
services supplied to the labour market" (Chiplin and 
Sloane, 1982, p. 129). There are two problems with this 
analysis. First, the assumption is that discrimination 
is practised by men, rather than by employers or trade 
unions. While the individuals who fill these categories 
may be predominantly male, it is an arguable point whether 
they discriminate only as individuals with discriminatory 
attitudes as Chiplin and Sloane seem to imply or because 
of institutionalized practices and policies which, in 
much of the American discrimination literature, appears 
at least as important as discriminatory attitudes (Peagin 
and Feagin, 1978). Second, and even more importantly, 
Chiplin and Sloane's analysis uncritically postulates 
'value' as an objective category. It is again'arguable 
whether women's responsibility for domestic and familial 
matters results in lower earnings because it lowers the 
value of their services, through interrupted labour force 
participation and part-time work, or whether these char- 
acteristics are negatively assessed because of their 
5 
association with women. If the latter, then Chiplin 
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and Sloane's formulation becomes tautological; they use 
the assumptions of a profoundly discriminatory system to 
explain away discrimination rather than analyzing whether 
it is possible or practicable to change the state of 
affairs, or how to do so. 
Apart from Chiplin and Sloane's work, which focuses 
only tangentially on the legislation qua law, the only 
major study of the British sex discrimination legislation' 
is Creighton's (19? 9) analysis. Creighton provides an 
historical account of the legal remedies for sex discrimina- 
tion, both common law and statutory, an analysis of the 
main provisions of both the EqPA and the SDA, and an 
examination of the enforcement procedures established 
by the legislation. Creighton's study provides an 
interesting account of the development of legal remedies, 
and of the emergence of the legislation. The study is 
overall a useful one, providing a comprehensive overview 
of the legislation, and of some of the problems, substantive 
and procedural, that limit its effectiveness. In particular, 
Creighton points to the limitations of the definition of 
equal Day embodied in the legislation, the procedural 
difficulties from the present allocation of the burden of 
proof, the restrictions on the EOC's enforcement powers, 
and the inadequacy of the remedies provided in the law. 
The present study differs from Creighton's work 
in three ways. First, although I agree with many of 
Creighton's conclusions concerning problems in 
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imt)lementation, I feel that they are inadequately grounded 
in empirical investigation. My study provides an 
empirical basis for confirmation of problems associated 
with the burden of proof, the provision of remedies, and 
the operation of administrative enforcement. Second, 
Creighton's analysis lacks an explicit theoretical frame- 
work, and proceeds without considering the role of law 
itself as a particular approach to defining problems and 
finding solutions to them. Thus, the study explicates 
the meaning of discrimination in terms. of the legal 
provisions of the statute, and the interpretation of the 
courts, but fails fully to provide a sociological analysis 
of the use of these concepts in law, or of their relation 
to the material subjects to which they relate. 
Third, Creighton's study focuses exclusively on 
the British legislation. Because of the influence of 
American policy approaches on the British legislation, 
this study by contrast introduces some material on the 
American legislation and its enforcement, for purposes of 
comDarison. 
Thus, while Creighton's study provides a historical 
account and a thorough explication of the legal provisions, 
my research attempts to provide an account which is more 
explicitly sociological in its analysis of the relation- 
ship between the legislation and the characteristics of 
women's employment in the conteMDorary labour force, and 
which provides a more detailed study of the implementation 
system. 
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This discussion of the literature is necessarily 
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brief, because of the small number of complete studies 
of the legislation. There are, however, numerous works which 
address various aspects of the legislation. I have drawn 
on these studies gratefully, if not uncriticallY, and 
discussed or cited them in the text where appropriate. 
with all its failings I nevertheless hope that this study too 
will shed some light on the nature and operation of anti- 
discrimination legislation, and that its omissions and in- 
adequacies will prompt further investigation into this 
important area of public policy. 
The structure of the study is as follows. In 
chapter two I examine the main characteristics of women 
in the work force and the factors which may be adduced as 
explanations for the primary indices of disadvantage--low 
pay and a high degree of occupational segregation. This 
chapter thus provides an essential background for chapters 
three and four, which examine the emergence of the legisla- 
tion, and for chapter five, which provides a critical 
examination of the core concepts of equality and discrimina- 
tion. Part I of this dissertation thus constitutes an 
emergence study of the legislation, which details the 
historical factors which contributed to the specific form 
of the legislation, and its central concepts, and which 
examines the fit between the legal definitions of the 
problem, and the actuality of gender inequality and dis- 
advantage in the labour force. 
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In Part II the emphasis shifts to an empirical 
study of the main features of the system of enforcement. 
Chapter six provides an overview of the enforcement system, 
and examines the factors which influenced the choice of 
particular structures and processes. Chapters seven, 
eight and nine are concerned respectively with empirical 
investigation of the industrial tribunal system, administra- 
tive enforcement, and legal remedies. Chapter ten provides 
an illustration of the inter-relationship of substance 
and procedure in law, through a discussion of tribunal 
decision-making in two substantive areas of the Equal Pay 
Act. Finally, chapter eleven summarizes the conclusions that 
the study points to, and makes some recommendations both for 
policy changes, and for future studies. 
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NOTES 
1 In Brown v. Board of Education, 34? U. S. 483 
(1954) the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), to hold that 
"separate but equal" school systems for black and white 
violated the Equal Protection clauses. 
2See 
also Meehan, (1980) and Hepple (1983) for a 
discussion of some of the problems associated with trans- 
planting the concepts and structure of American anti- 
discrimination legislation. 
31t 
should be noted that unlike the British SDA, 
Title VII encompasses wage and compensation issues which 
in Britain are only actionable under the EqPA. It is 
thus an inclusive statute for employment discrimination 
purposes. It was amended in 1978 to make clear that the 
statutory definition of sex discrimination includes dis- 
crimination on the grounds of pregnancy. Title VII also 
prohibits other kinds of discrimination, and not just 
sex discrimination, as its terms make clear. 
4For details of the sample, see Appendix A. 
5Chiplin 
and Sloane's analysis here appears to 
be based on the assumptions of human capital theory. This 
approach has been attacked by, for example, Bluestone 
(1977, P. 337), who notes that individuals who suffer from 
low wages have a considerable amount of human capital. 
Hartnett (1978) makes a similar point when she notes that 
women tend to have more qualifications than needed for the 
job, and more education than men in the same job. See 
also Amsden (1980) for further comments on human capital theory. 
PART I 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE 
In recent years, there has been a spate of literature 
dealing with women in the workforce, from economists, 
historians and sociologists, and a growing interest in the 
general question of sex/gender as a category of social 
stratification. It is not at all surprising that working 
women have become the object of so much attention. In the 
period since 1945, there have been some striking changes in 
women's participation in the paid labour force, and the 
question of women's employment rights has been a frequent 
matter of public debate. Co-existent with the dramatic 
changes in the size and composition of the female labour 
force has been the persistence of inequality in the 
workplace. This paradox lies at the heart of much of the 
literature on working women, and must, of course,. constitute 
a major objective of enquiry in any study of anti-discrimi- 
nation or equal employment opportunity legislation. 
The Increase in Women's labour Force Participation 
Perhaps the most remarkable change in the labour force 
of Britain in the period since the end of the Second World 
I 
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War, has been the entry of women into paid work, in 
unprecedented numbers. 
Figures produced by the Department of Employment (DE) 
show that nearly all of the increase in the working 
population of Britain between the early 1950's and early 
1970's can be attributed to the increase in women's 
participation in the labour force. 
Table 1 
Increase in the working Population of Great Britain, by sex, 
1251 and 1971 
Total Working Po 
:R Men Women Women as o -. 
Z 
( 000 S) of Total 
1951 239239 17,798 7,441 32% 
1971 4,827 15,867 8,960 36% 
Index 1951 * 100 
100.6 100.4 120.4 
(Source: D. E. Gazette, and OME Report on Equal Pay) 
Figures for 1980 show that women now constitute 
approximately 42% of the total British workforce (EOC, 
1982). 
This considerable increase in women's participation has 
been achieved through a growth in the number and proportion 
of married women working outside the home, a trend which has 
substantially altered the composition of the female work- 
force, and, indeed, that of the working population as a 
whole. The following tables illustrate this increase in the 
proportion of married women working, and show how, in the 
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thirty years from 1950, rates of participation for married 
and single women have converged. 
Table-21- 
% of women in thg British labour force, by marital status, 
sglected years. 
All women 
1951 34.7 
1961 37.4 
1966 42.2 
1971 42.9 
Married. Single 
21.7 55.0 
29.4 50.6 
38.1 49.2 
42.2 43.7 
(Source: British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstracts, 
and Census of Population) 
In 1981, the DE estimated that the economic activity 
rate of married women around 51.3%, and projections for the 
future suggest that this trend will continue, with married 
women constituting the largest single factor in the growth 
of the labour force. An effect of this increase in 
participation by married women has been a simultaneous rise 
in the number of mothers who work outside the home. one 
effect of the presence of young children is to increase the 
likelihood of part-time employment. In Britainr four out of 
five part-time workers are women, working less than thirty 
hours per week. of women who work part-time, about 90% are 
likely to be married, and about 60% will have dependent 
children. (EOC, 1982). 
To summarize thent the employment statistics show that 
at present, women constitute something in excess of 40% of 
the labour force, with married women accounting for most of 
the increase that has occurred since 1950. This increase in 
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the labour force participation of women, particularly 
married women, requires some explanation. 
As Oppenheimer (1967) points out, most attempts to 
explain changes in the pattern and magnitude of female 
employment have looked either at influences on the supply of 
female labour, or at changes in demand for women workers, or 
at some interaction between the two. Influences on female 
labour supply include demographic changes, and changes in 
conditions of domestic work within the home. Demand side 
explanations emphasize the post-war economic expansion as 
creating new job opportunities for women. 
The 1950's and 1960's were generally a period of 
industrial expansion and rapid capital accumulation. In 
such a period capital must call upon supplementary reserves 
of labour to meet its needs. Such reserves have histori- 
cally included former agricultural workers, immigrants, and 
as the experience of the two world wars indicates, women. 
The increase in the demand for labour in the post-war period 
was not, however, an undifferentiated phenomenon; some 
sectors of the economy were growing much more rapidly than 
others, some were in decline. The area of greatest expansion 
was the tertiary sector, which was by this time already 
established as a prime source of employment for women. 
There was an increase in the numbers of jobs traditionally 
associated with womenland an expansion of the market into 
fresh areas of goods and services. This latter process 
often involved the transferral of work previously performed 
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primarily by women in non-market settings into an. area of 
paid employment*. 
That demand increased in areas traditionally thought of 
as 'women's work', paid or unpaid, would not of itself 
explain all of the increase in women's employment. Women 
have also increased their proportionate representation in 
certain occupations in which men had traditionally been 
employed -- in banking for example. In such an instance, 
there are at least hypothetically, other sources of labour 
that could be called upont but Oppenheimer (1967, p. 255) 
points out: 
a. shortages of male labour cannot always be made up from the ranks of unemployed males. The shortages are 
frequently in areas where the characteristics of the 
average unemployed person ... preclude their 
utilization. 
Unemployed men are not of course the only alternative. 
Labour shortages in specific areas could be met by recourse 
to migrant workers, for example. However, apart from any 
problems in suitability for particular jobs, stemming from 
such factors as language difficultiest immigration has been 
limited in the period under consideration for political 
reasons. 
Thus many of the factors underlying the increased 
demand for labour also point to the likelihood that women 
wou ld be seen as suitable workers to meet this demand. The 
literature of this period, both official and sociological, 
reflects this view of the needs of the economy and of women 
as potentially valuable, economically active members of 
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society. 
1 This literature emphasizes the potential 
contribution of married women in particular since single 
women were already participating in the labour force at 
approximately the same rate as men. If women were to 
provide the necessary increase in the size of the labour 
forcer it could only be achieved through the increased 
participation of married women. 
in terms of the increase in the supply of women 
workers, demographic influences are of obvious importance. 
The basic demographic changes that have occurred during the 
twentieth century that are relevant to this discussion can 
be summarized as a longer life expectancy, a male/female sex 
ratio that has moved closer to unity, more marriages, a 
younger average age of marriage, and a smaller average 
family size. These changes have affected the supply of 
single woment and has made married women's participation in 
the labour force more feasible, since child-bearing and 
rearing is normally compressed in to a fairly narrow band of 
years within the female life cycle. 
That an interaction between supply and demand factors 
should account for women's increased labour force 
participation is logically appealing. That it is also an 
accurate representation of the situation, at least as 
regards older married women entering the workforce, may be 
substantiated by reference to Valerie Oppenheimer's work 
(1967) on this subject which provides a partial empirical 
test of this hypothesis. She analyses the effects of 
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demographic changes and notes the importance of these on the 
numbers of single women available for employment. She also 
posits three different indicators of demand for female 
labour, and shows that in the period 1940 to 1960 demand 
rose, whichever indicator'was used. From an examinatioin of 
the interaction of these demand and supply influences she 
concludes: 
. the evidence. .. indicates that the best ; 
xplanation for the great increases in the work rates 
of older married women is that while the demand for 
female labour has been rising, the supply of the 
traditionally more preferred type of female labour 
[i. e. single young women] was declining. In response 
to this declining supply, demand re-adjusted itself so 
that workers who used to be discriminated against are 
now acceptable. .. (Oppenheimer, 1967, p. 259)2 
In addition to the narrowly economic factors examined 
by Oppenheimer, it is also useful to consider the 
motivational factors which may have encouraged married women 
to enter the labour force, rather than assuming that this 
may be explained in terms of an automatic response to 
changes in the labour force, or changes in the female life- 
cycle. In this context, it would be useful to look at wages 
and material expectations in this period, and also at 
ideological transitions in the representations of women's 
roles. 
Various studies of married women workers have examined 
the reasons women give for being in paid employment. Chafe 
(1972f p. 190 ) cites a study of American women war workers 
who gave 'economic need' and the desire to assist with 
family support as the main reason for wishing to continue on 
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the job in peacetime. In this context, the post-war 
inflation was probably important in shaping women's 
attitudes to paid employment. Rising expectations also 
played a part. A New York Times article in 1951 found that 
'economic need' had come to encompass increased amounts of 
consumer goods and services. A study by the National 
manpower Council of families earning between $6,000 and 
$10,000 indicated that many middle-class wives were working 
outside the home in order to obtain a higher standard of 
living for their families. (Chafe, 1972, p. 190). 
The ongoing impact of inflation and rising expectations 
continued to influence the impetus to paid employment for 
married women. During the 1950's the greatest growth in the 
female labour force in the United States took place among 
women from families with moderate incomes. Chafe notes that 
such women were obviously not just working for 'bread and 
rent money' and cites a 1965 study which showed that two- 
earner families spent 45% more on gifts and recreation, 95% 
more on restaurant meals for husband and wife, and 23% more 
on household equipment than single-earner families 
(Chafe, 1972, p. 21fl. 
other studies from this period show that even where 
financial need was cited as a major reason for undertaking 
paid employment, women were also likely to mention such 
intangible benefits as companionship, and a sense of 
independence and achievement, as motivations. 
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Studies by British social scientists also pointed to 
the isolation of housewives, the desire for company and 
financial independence, as motivations for working outside 
the home. In 1957, Viola Klein carried out a survey of 
working wives. Three out of four of the married women 
workers in her sample gave 'money' as the biggest incentive 
for taking a jobf but that this was not the only incentive 
was indicated by the frequency with which other factors were 
mentioned. In facty just over one-half of the women who 
cite financial necessity as the main incentive stated that 
they would still like a job even if family income were 
larger. Klein's study also pointed to rising expectations 
as to standard of living as the basis for many women's 
labour force participation; interviewees tended to mention 
working for 'extras' such as a car, better clothes, 
holidays. Klein noted: 
To the extent to which these and similar items of 
expenditure become part of people's normal standard of 
living, the 'subsidiary income' contributed by a wife's 
earnings fulfills a need even in a society such as ours 
in which primary poverty has practically vanished 
(Kleinr 1957, p. 1965f p. 89). 
As the economic crisis has deepened in the Western 
world, with the persistence of high rates of inflation, the 
financial pressure on wives to take outside employment has 
increased. Living standards for many families have been 
maintained only through increased labour, as American 
statistics on trends in family income illustrate. During 
the 1970'st incomes of families with more than one wage 
earner showed a relative increase in the region of 6%. On 
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average, wives in paid employment contributed approximately 
25% of family income in 1978; this proportion rises to 38% 
for women in full-time employment (Currie, 1980, p. 14). 
Statistics of this kind would tend to indicate that women 
are no longer entering the labour force to raise living 
standards but to maintain them. Currie et al. 1980j p. 13) 
note in this context that: 
What has happened in fact is an increase in what 
Marxists have termed the rate of exploitation. The 
need for two incomes in most contemporary working 
families means that three jobs are now being done for 
the price of one--two in the paid labour forcer one 
unpaid in the home. 
Currie's statistics describe the contribution to family 
income of working wives in the United States. Studies of 
family income in Britain point to the same conclusion. Data 
from the family expenditure Survey indicate that on average, 
wives' earnings at the end of the 1970's comprised 25% of 
family income, with one in three wives contributing between 
one-third and one-half of total family income (Land, Sept. 
1981, p. 15). 
As to the ideological transitions which have 
accompanied the entry of married women into paid work, Chafe 
(1972) suggests that in the immediate post-war period, the 
impact of inflation and the idea that wives were working to 
help their families helped legitimise the employment of 
married women. Certainly, since the war there have been 
some quite complex transformations in the ideology of 
women's appropriate position in society. 
46 
Immediately following the end of the wary women were 
exhorted to vacate the jobs they had held and return to the 
home. There was a decline in women's employment at this 
point but it was only very temporary. As women's labor 
force participation continued to rise in the 19501s, concern 
over the low birth-ratey and the quality of child-care 
surfaced in official and sociological publications, in such 
a way as to re-assert the importance of women's domestic 
role, and the possibly undesirable effects of married 
women's employment. (Chafer 1977, p. 94). Thus, it would 
seem that there was a gap between what women were actually 
doing (entering the labour force in ever-increasing numbers) 
and the ideological representations of women's proper role 
as reflected in academic and government publications which 
emphasized women's role as wives and mothers. 
In factr the situation was more complex than this. 
Examining publications which deal with women workers points 
to an ongoing process during the 50's and 160's through 
which a particular kind of work role for women was 
legitimised, so that a 'dual role' as wife/mother and paid 
worker is promulgated, as not only tolerable but as bringing 
positive advantages to the economy, to families and to 
individuals. The 'dual role' of combining work and family 
responsibilities occurred at a time when the demand for 
female labour, was high, and could not be met without 
recourse to married women. The literature of the period 
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reflects this need. Klein (1965, p. 82), for example, 
noted: 
With single women being employed today at nearly the 
same rate as menr married women are the only untapped 
labour reserve in our society. It would therefore seem 
imperative to investigate the conditions under which 
this reserve can be drawn upon. 
The particular form that the 'dual role' ideology took 
enabled married women to enter the labour force without 
overt challenges to prevailing ideas about the distribution 
of sex roles or the structure of the family. Thus women 
were encouraged to think of a life cycle in which work 
preceded child bearing and rearing, after which time, these 
responsibilities having been discharged, a return to paid 
employment would be both feasible and desirable. Part-time 
work was advocated as another 'solution' to the competing 
demands of work and family roles. 
This new conception of women's appropriate role in 
society did not emerge fully-fledged in the 19501s. Rather, 
it should be seen as the site of considerable idealogical 
struggle and resistance, in a process which is still 
ongoing. Debates over the desirability and propriety of 
married women's employment have historically provided some 
of the context for initiatives towards extending employment 
rights for women and continue, to do so in a period of job 
scarcity. It should be noted that even at the height of the 
demand for women's labour, the primary emphasis in the 'dual 
role' approach is the structuring of women's lives to take 
into account the possibly conflicting deamnds of child care 
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and paid work, rather than on a restructuring ofthe work 
environment. Such an approach thereby justifies and 
reinforces the tendency to lower pay and lesser oppor- 
tunities for womenr by seeing them as the natural result of 
women's domestic responsibilities, rather than as the 
outcome of specific employment practices and assumptions. 
To summarize, the literature shows a process during the 
1950's and "60's in which both economic factors on both the 
supply-side and demand-side were conducive to the increasing 
participation of married women in paid employmentr in which 
ideological transitions served to legitimate this increasing 
involvement whilst retaining a sense of the primacy of 
women's domestic responsibilities. However, while wo men 
have been increasingly incorporated into the labour force, 
their participation as a group is sharply differentiated 
from that of men with regard to earnings and occupational 
distribution. Women workers remain concentrated in a narrow 
range of occupations characterized more often than not by 
low pay and low status. 
Wo en's Waqes and--the Earninqs GaD 
The wide gap between male and female earnings has 
remained fairly constant, and has even shown signs of 
widening slightly in recent years, despite the introduction 
of the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts. Tables 3 and 
4 illustrate recent trends in male and female earnings, and 
show the degree of variation in the male-female differential 
according to sector of employment. 
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vea siý-wee 
Manlaal workers -Administrative, tecbnical Vational/local 
(all indUstries) clerical (private spctor) ciovgrnmen-t- 
1954 52.9 
1956 51.8 
1958 52.2 
1960 50.0 53.1 65.1 
1962 50.7 53.7 64.4 
1964 49.4 53.5 64.9 
1966 49.6 53.4 63.8 
1968 49.1 52.9 69.9 
(* This category includes administrative, technical and 
clerical workers in national and local government and the 
NHS, and teachers employed by local education authorities) 
(Source: Data recalculated from British Labour Statistics, 
1970). 
In assessing the relative differentials between men and 
women workers in the three broad categories shown above, it 
should be remembered that in 1953, -equal pay for equal work 
was achieved in the teaching professiont and in 1955 the 
non-manual grades of the Civil Service were granted the 
right, in principle, to equal pay, with adjustments to be 
made in seven inýtallmentsr the last in 1961. Despite the 
passage of the EqPA-and its implementation from 1976 
onwards, this differential between occupational sectors, as 
well as between men and women, has remained. 
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Table 4. 
Women's average gross weekly earnings as a% of ments, 
by sector. selected years 1970-1980. 
All mgn and-women Non-manual Manual 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
1970 65.9 48.1 59.5 43.4 52.4 48.9 
1974 64.4 51.4 65.1 49.8 58.5 52.8 
1976 72.1 56.8 66.6 51.3 63.2 59.6 
1978 70.3 57.6 65.9 51.4 62.2 60.9 
1980 69.3 57.8 64.9 51.9 62.3 60.4 
(Source: EOC Fifth Annual Report, 19811 Appendix 7; p. 4). 
In seeking to explain the earnings differential, it 
is necessary to note the effect of hours of work. The fact 
that women on full-time schedules tend to work less overtime 
than men, for a number of reasons, contributes to the 
earnings gap. Table 5 shows the differential between male 
and female earnings, calculated on the basis of hourly, 
rather than weekly or annual, earnings, and excluding the 
effects of overtime. ' Using these calculations, the earning 
gap is narrower than that which is based on a comparison of 
actual earnings over a given period of time. 
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Ta]21-e-ý- 
m Is hqurly earnings as a% of . Inen's, excluding 
i-he efie-Zc--ýzi-ý'ý'f 
1-overt-ime, 
for ful -tim-eýýers, - 
C 
All Workers Non-Manu-41 Manual 
1975 73.0 63.6 68.9 
1976 76.3 66.0 71.8 
1978 75.1 64.4 73.0 
1980 74.7 64.2 72.0 
(Source: New Earnings Survey, 1980, as reported in Labour 
Research, January 1981). 
more significant explanation of the differential is 
the tendency of women workers to be concentrated in lower- 
paying occupations than men* The EOC wryly points out that 
"one of the major causes of the low level of women's pay is 
that they work in low-paid occupations, though it is unclear 
which factor is the cause of the other. " (EOCI 1979, p. 81). 
The Sexual Structure of OccuDztions 
The distribution of women across particular occupations 
is extremely uneven, since certain industries and 
occupations have traditionally constituted "women's work": 
textile and clothing industries, retailing, clerical work, 
personal service work, nursing, and schoolteachingg for 
qxample. This phenomenon of occupational segregation may be 
defined in terms of two distinct but not discrete features, 
horizontal and vertical segregation. 
a) Horizontal Segregation 
Horizontal segregation refers to the distribution of 
workers that results in a concentration of women in certain 
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sectors and occupations, men in others, out of proportion to 
their overall participation in the labour force. one 
measure of horizontal segregation is the degree to which a 
group of workers are concentrated in a relatively small 
number of occupational categories. Another measure can be 
devised by examining the sex ratio of individual occu- 
pations. -In Britain, a recent study showed that three- 
quarters of all women workers were in the service sector, 
and of these woment 59% were employed in only three service 
industries. 1980 statistics show 54.6% of all female manual 
workers employed in catering, cleaning, hairdressing, and 
other personal services. of non-manual women workers, 54.5% 
are employed in clerical and related fieldst and another 
25.1% may be accounted for in the fields of education, 
welfare and health (EOC, 1982, Appendix 7; 3b). 
Other studies have indicated that while the sexual 
structure of individual occupations has changed over timer 
the overall degree of segregation is little changed. In 
fact, some areas show evidence of a trend towards greater 
concentration rather than less. Using data from the British 
population censuses bet ween the years 1901 and 1971, Hakim 
(1978) attempts to evaluate the magnitude of change in 
degree of occupational segregation that has occurred in this 
period. Her findings illustrate the complexity of the 
subject, and the need for specificity rather than broad 
generalizations. There is some evidence of increased 
concentration: 
53 
in 1911 the proportion of women in clerical occu- 
pations, shop assistant and sales work was broadly 
comparable to their contribution to the labour force as 
a whole; by 1971 these occupations had become typically 
feminine. About three quarters of all clerical workers 
were women in 1971 compared to only 21% in 1911 (Hakim, 
1978, p. 1267). 
Furthermore, the proportion of occupations in which 
women comprise 70% or more of the workforce increased 
slightly from 9% in 1901 to 12% in 1971. However, by 
looking at the percentage of women working in occupations 
that were dominated to varying degrees by workers of one 
sexr Hakim finds some decline in the degree of horizontal 
segregation in the period 1901-1961, a trend which was 
reversed from 1961-1971. A further measure of concentration 
shows a gradual decline in the degree of female over- 
representation, defined with reference to women as a 
percentage of the total labour force. She concludes: 
In sumt there has been some degree of change in 
horizontal occupational segregation since the turn of 
the century, although the decline is not as marked as 
might be expected. But the pattern in 1961-1971 decade 
is unclear; the indicators show contradictory 
developments with both some increase and some decrease 
in occupational segregation (Hakim, 1978, p. 1266). 
The one area in which women have most noticeably 
increased their participation in traditionally male- 
dominated employment has been that of the higher 
professional occupations. In the legal profession, for 
example, there has been a small but gradual increase in the 
number of women. In Britain, women were only 2% of 
practising solicitors in 1967/8. This had increased to 6.5% 
by 1977. The proportion of female barristers increased from 
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3.2% in 1955 to 8.7% in 1978 (EOCr March, 1978, pp. 14t 19). 
Although comparatively small numbers of women are involved 
in these changesf the high status of the professions 
concernedf and the potentially high rewards they offer, can 
lead to an exaggeration of the progress towards employment 
equality for women that such inroads represent. Hakim's 
(1978) study is concerned primarily with change over a long 
period. The c ontemporary figures make clear that whatever 
the marginal changes have beenr the broad picture of a high 
degree of occupational segregation remains the same, with 
over 60% of British working women concentrated in ten 
occupations. At the top of this list is clerical work which 
accounts for 17.5% of women workers, followed by retailingr 
typing and secretarial work, cleaning, nursingr teaching, 
food service, clothing and textile work. By comparison, 
male workers are not concentrated in this way in a 
relatively small number of occupations, but perform a wide 
range of jobs, in all sectors of the economy (New Earnings 
Surveyr 1981, Part E). 
b. Vertical Segregation and Skill Labelling 
Vertical segregation refers to the disproportionate 
distribution of workers within an occupation. There is a 
tendency for women to be concentrated in the lower levels of 
the organizational hierarchy. In industrial settings the 
job categories in which women are over-represented are most 
likely to be designated semi-skilled or unskilled, and in 
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the professions women also tend to be concentrated at the 
low-paying end of the scale. 
This tendency for the proportion of women to diminish 
at the higher levels of income, status and responsibility is 
notable even in occupations where women are numerically 
predominant. The case of school-teaching provides a good 
example. In Britaint women in the teaching profession have 
received equal pay for equal work since 1963, and yet the 
average male teaching salary is higher than the average for 
women teachers because of the much greater proportion of men 
in the upper salary bands. 
Table 6. 
Percent digtri]2ution of men and women teachers bv-salarv 
ocale, England and Wales, March. 1978. 
scale 1 2. A Senior 2iLd-. Devutv Head 
TeacbeL Master/ Head jeacber 
Mistress 
Primarv 
Men 13.3 30.9 9.4 0.2 0.4 16.5 29.1 
Women 37.5 42.6 5.0 0.1 0.2 7.9 6.7 
Total 31.9 39.9 6.0 0.1 - 0.3 9.9 11.8 
Secondarv 
Men 22.7 26.1 24.2 15.6 3.4 0.8 3.8 3.2 
Women 41.7 30.5 16.9 5.5 0.9 1.8 2.3 0.8 
Total 30.8 28.0 21.0 11.2 2.3 1.3 3.2 2.2 
(Source: Department of Education, Statistics of Education, 
Vol. 4 1978). 
Vertical segregation also affects women in manual work. 
Hakin (1978) notes a trend towards greater segregation in 
this sector, with men increasingly over-represented in 
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work designated "skilledr" and women contributing an 
increasing share of work labelled "unskilled" and "semi- 
skilled"r which is lower-paid and lower status. The degree 
of segregation is often very marked; for example, in 
Britain, 72% of packers, labellers and related workers are 
women, while 84% of warehousemen and storekeepers are men, 
and in the textile industry 85% of winders and reelers are 
women while 93.5% of dyers are men (Hakim, 1978). nSkill" 
is not of course, an objective category, and some recent 
studies have pointed to the part that sex bias has played in 
the establishment of skill hierarchies in various 
occupations and industries (see e. g, Phillips and Taylor, 
1980). This whole question is a complex one, with far- 
reaching, ramifications in terms of equ al pay and anti- 
discrimination initiatives, particularly in the areas of 
access to jobs in the skill hieTarchyr and of value 
comparisons of male and female jobs. 
__II- 
Economic Explanation's of Women's. La 
The changing labour force participation rate of womenr 
and the persistence of a male-female earnings gap are both 
topics which have been the focus of enquiry for economists 
3 of quite divergent perspectives. Amsden (1980) presents 
the major perspectives as falling into three broad 
categories: the human capital school, the instititutional 
schoolr and perspectives which derive from Marxist 
conceptions and methodology. Si ltanen (1981) similarly 
57 
categories the main perspectives as: human capital theory, 
labour market dualismi and explanations focusse :d on the 
concepts of de-skilling and the reserve army. While the two 
categorizations are not identical, they point to the same 
broad divisions in the literature. one distinction which 
sets the first two categories apart from the third is the 
degree to which human capital theory, and dualist or 
institutional approaches rely on the operation of the labour 
market alone as the basis for their explanations of women's 
position in that market; by comparison what are rather 
imprecisely described as Marxist approaches have in general 
paid more attention to the operation of historical factors, 
and their effect on the labour market, and to the inter- 
relationship of the relations of production with other 
structural and ideological variables. 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to argue 
that pure economic explanations cannot adequately account 
for the particular position that women occupy in the labour 
market, and that social and historical factors must play a 
past in developing a complete analysis of their present 
position. To this end, the section begins with a brief 
overview and critique of the theories of human capital and 
labour market dualismý-before proceeding to a discussýon of 
some of the factors which historically have contributed to 
the way in which women's paid labour is constructed and 
defined. -In discussing the historical and social factors 
and their relation to the position of women in paid 
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employment, I have referred to some of the works which 
exemplify both Amsden's (1980) and Siltanen's (1981) third 
categoryr but I have avoided adopting any of these 
approaches as a theoretical framework. Rather than making 
an argument for one of a number of competing approaches 
within the general rubric of Marxist scholarship, I have 
attempted to use examples of the literature to illuminate 
the factors external to the labour market which are crucial 
to a complete understanding of women's position in the 
labour market. To do more than that is beyond the scope of 
the present work. 
a) Human Capital Theory 
The human capital approach to understanding women's 
position in-the labour market is firmly located within the 
neoclassical economic paradigm. To state it very simplyr 
the main thrust of human capital theory as an explanation of 
wage differentials is through reference to productivity. 
Wages are viewed as a return to investments in human capital 
via the direct relationship between human capital and 
productivity. The analysis proceeeds from the notion of 
investments that individuals make in their productive 
capacity (their human capital) through, for example, 
education and training. These investments have costs, but 
also produce returns in the form of higher wages. The male- 
female wage differential can therefore be explained by 
reference to the differences in human capital investment 
that men and women make. 
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Characteristic of this perspective is the work of Jacob 
mincer, (Mincerr 1962; Mincer and Polachekr 1974). Mincer 
and Polachek's 1974 article provides an example of the 
classic formulation of the human capital perspective. 
Productivity between men and women is said to differ for two 
reasons: first, women on average spend proportionately 
fewer years in the labour force than men; and secondr when 
women are working, the jobs they choose provide them with 
fewer opportunities to gain skills through training. Thus, 
relative to ment women have a lower investment in human 
capital, and their lower wages merely reflect this fact. 
Thus, human captial theory proceeds upon the assumption that 
other things being equal, the economy is indifferent to 
gender. 
Critics have attacked a number of unresolved issues in 
human capital analyses. Amsden (1980) points out that human 
capital theories do not address the question of the extent 
to which low levels of human capital are the cause or effect 
of women's perceived inferior economic position. Blau and 
Jusenius (1976) note that while human capital analysis may 
account for the tendency of women to be in "low-skill 
occupations, they do not account for their concentration in 
a small number of occupations at different levels of skill. 
Bluestone (1977) points out that many of those who suffer 
from low wages and unemployment have a considerable amount 
of human capital. Siltanen (1981) notes that as an 
explanation of inequalityr human capital theory is flawed 
OF"- 
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inasmuch as it does not admit the structural constraints on 
individual choice. Most importantly, perhaps, human capital 
theorists have not been able in this empirical work to 
account for all the variance in male/female earnings. 
Amsden (1980 P. 17) points out that even controlling for job 
experience, Mincer and Polachek (1974) were still unable to 
account for a 20% differential in male and female earnings. 
siltanen (1981) also argues that most empirical analyses 
based on human capital theory do not succeed in explaining 
statistically all of the male-female wage differentials. 
b) Labour Market Dualism 
Theories of labour market dualism attempt to answer the 
question of why in some cases productivity characteristics, 
such as age and experience, are not related to job 
allocation or wages by focussing on the institutional 
characteristics of labour markets. Two of the most 
prominent analyses using variants of this approach are 
Doeringer and Piore's (1971) dual labour market theory, and 
the radical interpretation of labour market segmentation of 
Reich, Gordon and Edwards (1973). 
Dual labour market theory conceptualizes the labour 
force as operating in two quite different labour markets. 
4 
The primary labour market is characterized by jobs with 
relatively high wages, good working conditions, employment 
stability, and chances of advancement. by contrastr jobs in 
the secondary market tend to have low wages and fringe 
benefitsr poor working conditions, high labour turnover, and 
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little chance of advancement. (Doeringer and Piore 1971, p. 
.t al, 
1973t 1980,, p. 233). 165; Reich P 
The primary market is characterized by skill 
specificity and on the job training. Certain jobs act as 
ports of entry for the primary labour market, but once 
access is gained, promotion and wages are then determined by 
the internal labour market. By contrast, secondary markets 
either lack internal labour market structures or have 
underdeveloped ones. 
Where the traditional and radical versions of labour 
market dualism differ is over the incentive forces which 
operate to maintain dual structures. Doeringer and Piore 
(1971) viewed employers as having an incentive to create a 
dual labour market structure both in terms of maximising the 
return on training and investmentr and for reasons of trade 
cycle flexibilityp where the secondary market acts as a 
buffer for the primary (Siltanen 1981 p. 30). Reich at Al 
(1973) see the incentive in terms of the control over the 
labour force which comes from encouraging the development of 
hierarchies which effectively divide the labour force. 
It is the notion of a divided labour force which gives 
dual labour market. theory its special application to the 
analysis of women's wage labour. The characteristics of 
workers in the secondary sector, such as high turnover and 
relatively high rates of absenteeism are 6nes which are 
frequently attributed to women workers. While such 
characteristics are-frequently explained by women's priority 
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of home and family over work, dual labour market theory 
suggests that they may more accurately be explained by 
women's concentration in the secondary sector. As Siltanen 
(1981) points outi, the implication of drawing the 
distinction between the characteristics of work and workerst 
and analysing the relationship between themr is that women's 
decisions about paid employment'may be viewed less as a 
choice between work and family and more as a reflection of 
their structural position. 
While initially appealing, in its recognition of the 
constraints that operate on individual choice, dual labour 
market theory has nevertheless failed to provide a 
convincing analysis of women's labour market position. 
Barron and Norris (1976), for example, specifically 
addressed the relationship between the sexual division of 
labour and the operation of dualism in the British labour 
market. They list the attributes likely to characterize 
se6ondary workers, and argue that the same characteristics 
distinguish women workers from men, in general terms. 
However, Barron and Norris do not advance beyond a 
characterization of female wage labour as the evidence for 
women's concentration in the secondary labour market. 
Beechey (1978) correctly points out that their analysis 
approaches the tautological. 
Siltanen (1981t p. 32) points out that three general 
critiques can be advanced regarding the adequacy of a dual 
labour market explanation of women's position in the labour 
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force: thatonce created., job structures are viewed in fairly 
static terms, which appears to ignore the empirical evidence 
of changes in both markets; that the focus is almost exclu- 
sively on the role of employers in creating and maintaining 
a dual system, which incorrectly ignores the role of organized 
labour's practices and policies; and that the approach does 
not generally address the differences in male and female wage 
labour within the primary and secondary markets, and that when 
it does, it tends to rely on sexism as an explanatory factor. 
Of these three criticisms, the third is from a 
sociological standpoint the most relevant since it points to 
the problem that labour market dualism and human capital 
theory share, which is a tendency to use certain aspects of 
women's labour market position as an explanation ra ther than 
as the phenomenon to be explained. 
The major problem with economic theories of 
discrimination is that they fail to focus adequately on the 
specificity of women's position as workers, and are 
consequently not helpful for the explanation of sex 
discrimination itself. An approach which is more productive 
of such an explanation is one which concentrates- 
historically and sociologically on the constituent factors 
of women's relative economic disadvantage. 
III. The Constituent Factors of Women's Position in the 
Labour Force 
To understand the characteristics features of women's 
position in the labour force - low pay and concentration in 
a few predominantly female occupations - it is necessary 
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briefly to examine the historical context in which this 
configuration has arisen. 
EAY 
The underpayment of women relative to men is not a 
recent phenomenon nor one confined to the industrialized 
economy. Research has shown that where women worked for 
wages in the pre-industrial economy they routinely received 
lower wages than men. Boulding (1976r p. 24) cites examples 
for the fifteenth century that illustrate this fact. 
In 1422 the scholars of Toulouse paid women grape 
pickers half what they paid men who only had to carry 
the full baskets back to the college cellar. The monks 
of Paris did the same. Women construction workers who 
worked side by side with men in building the College of 
Toulouse were paid far less for the same labour. 
Historical accounts of women's work in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries point to the continuing existence 
of this practice, and to the difficulties encountered by 
single women or widows in earning a subsistent living. 
Clark (1969, p. 9) indicates that spinning became the chief 
reserve for married women who were losing their hold on 
other industries but that its return in money value was too 
low to render them independent of other means of support. 
Tilley and Scott (1978 p. 45) cite wages of five sous a day 
for women spinners in France at the end of the seventeenth 
century whereas male weavers earned double that amount. As 
these examples indicate, there was, even in the pre- 
industrial economy, a correlation between a sexual division 
of labour and relatively lower pay for women. 's work, 
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although even where men and women did the same: work, the 
women still received less pay. 
To explain this persistent differential is less easy 
than to describe it but some weight must be given to the 
fact that the family economy, rather than the individual 
wage-earner, constituted the basic economic unit of society. 
Within this unit it seems likely that differences in payment 
to men and women, or children and adults reflected what 
Barrett refers to as "ideological definitions of the basic 
element of food consumption. " (Barrettf-1980, p. 183). 
Assumptions that wages should reflect the relative 
costs of subsistence seem to account in part for the lower 
wages paid women and children during the early period of 
industrialization. Hartmann (1976) emphasizes that the 
effect of the tradition of lower wages for women was 
intensified by the fact that women were less well organized 
than men. She attributes men's superior organizational 
ability to their position as heads of households and heads 
of production units in the pre-industrial system, positions 
re-inforced by the state and religion. As evidence of this 
superior ability she cites the guild system in which men's 
trades were better organized than women's, and also the 
evidence of the rise of male professions and the elimination 
of female ones during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries (Hartman, 1976). 
Whatever the particular explanation for the 
undervaluing. of women's work, what is important to note is 
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that women entered the transition to the wage economy with 
their work already undervalued relative to mens'. Certain 
factors in the nineteenth century transformation of the 
social and economic order served to reinforce the 
phenomenon, particularly the intensification of the sexual 
division of labour and the organization of wage work into 
skill categories which correlate not only with pay-but with 
the gender composition of the work force. Howeverr it 
cannot be too strongly emphasized that both the gender 
division of labour and the prevalence of the practice of 
paying women less than men pre-date the transition to 
capitalism, and are not explained by it, although the pre- 
capitalist and later forms may be differentiated. 
The Sexual Division of LaboUr 
The sexual division of labour must be conceptualized as 
an object to be explained through further analysis rather 
than as a key in itself to the understanding of gender 
divisions (Edholm, Harris and Youngr 1977). Until recently 
it has been acommon practice to accept womens' domestic 
role as given, and to base analyses of womens' role in paid 
employment upon that premise. This approach ignores the 
need to examine the constituent factors in the structure of 
sex inquality. Because some women fulfill the biological 
role of bearing children, and the social role of rearing 
them does not in itself explain why Imep's jobs' and 
'women's jobs'should be rigidly differentiated. 
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introduction of machinery, as a significant strategy for the 
increase of relative surplus value. Thust this detailed 
division of labour, with its attendant effect of Ide- 
skilling' the workforce, must be seen as essential to 
capital accumulation. 
To assert that a differentiated labour force is created 
by the economic requirements of capital accumulation, is not 
however to explain the particular position that women occupy 
in such a labour force. In a recent and influential 
article, Hartmann (1979) argues that Mark's theory of the 
development of capitalism explains the existence of a 
hierarchy of labour in the workforcey but not the processes 
which assign certain groups rather than others to a place. at 
the bottom of the hierarchy. 
Marx's theory of the development of capitalism is a 
theory of the development of 'empty places'. . Just as 
capital creates these places indifferent to the 
individuals who fill them, the categories of Marxist 
analysis ... do not explain why particular people fill 
particular places. Marxist categories, like capital 
itselff are sex-blind. (Hartman, 1979, p. 14). 
The f-Q= that the division of labour takes then must be 
understood through reference to specific historical social 
relations, including those of gender. If the theoretical 
tendency of 'pure' capitalism would have been towards a 
homogenization of labour, and the eradication of arbitrary 
status differences, as Marx arguedt then explanations of 
occupational segregation by sex, and the inferior position 
of women in the workforce must be sought through an 
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examination of gender relations (albeit as mediated and 
transformed in the process of capitalist development). 
5 
Historical accounts of women's work in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries point to the existence of a well 
developed sex-based division of labour in the pre-capitalist 
household. The labour needs of the household defined the 
work roles of all membersr men, women, and children. 
Although the specific form the family economy took might 
differ, it was in all instances based on an interdependence 
of work and residence, of household labour needs, 
subsistence requirements, and family relationships (Tilley 
and Scott, 1978, p. 12). Jobs within the household were 
differentiated as to age and sex as well as training and 
skill. The sexual division of labour began at quite an 
early age. Amongst young children there was often no 
differentiation between the tasks of the two sexesr but as 
they grew olderr girls learned to assist their mothers and 
boys their fathers. Tilley and Scott emphasize the 
dependency of single women, within this system,. noting that 
most single women belonged to households either as 
daughters or servants, and that whatever their age, 
they were regarded as*dependants of the household in 
which they lived and worked. Thutr the only way for a 
woman to achieve a measure of economic security and 
adult status was to marry (Tilley and Scott, 1978F ch. 
2). 
Both urban and rural wives would either share in the 
husband's occupation, performing specific tasks within the 
productive processr or would have occupations of their own. 
Although women were not admitted to independent status 
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within craft gilds, the fact that widows were often capable 
of carrying on the trade formerly practised by a husband 
points to a fairly fluid division of labour. As household 
production gradually became 'capitalized' in the course of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, women's ability to 
practise the craft of their husbands became increasingly 
constrained. Alice Clark describes the impact of this 
process: 
Under family industry the wife of every master crafts- 
man became free of his gild and could share his work. 
But as the crafts became capitalized many journeymen 
never qualified as masters. . As theý journeymen worked 
on their master's premises it naturally followed that 
their wives were not associated with them in their 
worky and that apprenticeship became the only pntrance 
to their trades. (Clarkr 1969, p. 195). 
Girls were seldom if ever admitted as apprentices, 
except in those trades which were practised exclusively by 
women, such as millinery. 
The sexual division of labour was thus well-established 
in the pre-industrial economy in the context of what 
Eisenstein refers to as the "patriarchal structuring of 
sexual reproduction and mothering" (1980, p. 16) i. e., 
within a productive family unit which was hierarchically 
ordered on the basis of sex. 
In her study of women's work in the nineteenth century 
Londonr Alexander (1976) concludes that the sexual division 
of labour in the period she studied reflects an intensifi- 
cation and rigidification of the division of labour in the 
pre-capitalist household. This intensification may be ex- 
plained by reference to a number of factors. As production 
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moved into factories and away from home, a greater separ- 
ation of male and female work occurred than had been the 
case in earlier periods. Where different jobs were per- 
formed by different sexes in the same location, there was a 
greater possibility of some fluidity in the division of 
labour, which was lost in the process of industrialization. 
A second element in the establishment of a more rigid 
sexual division of labour was the development of 'protective 
legislation' which applied only to women and children. Some 
recent interpretations of such legislation have emphasized a 
'capital logic' perspective, central to which is a focus on 
capital's interest in the renewal of labour power, and the 
difficulties inherent in combining waged work with 
reproduction. McIntosh (1978, p. 262) writes, for instance: 
In the nineteenth century, it was a matter of great 
concern to the bourgeoisie that industry was working 
its labourers so hard and paying them so little that it 
exhausted them before the next generation was produced. 
No individual firm would benefit by stopping this but 
the state under pressure from the 'Ten Hours' movement, 
as well as from elements of the bourgeoisie was able to 
restrict hours of work, especially of women and 
children. .. ) 
This analysis implies a contradiction between capital's 
immediate interest in the exploitation of labour, and a 
longer term collective interest in both the daily and 
generational reproduction of labour-power. This contra- 
diction arises in the separation of home and work-place and 
the spread of wage-labour, and historically was met with 
attempts to confirm women's special responsibilities in the 
domestic and reproductive-sphere. 
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other interpretations have stressed the role of male 
workers in initiatives designed to limit women's labour 
force participation. A number of positions may be dis- 
tinguished. As noted above, even in the pre-industrial 
period the practice of paying women lower wages than men was 
well established, and this persisted in the transition to 
industrial capitalism. Women workers therefore represented 
a real threat to male jobs and higher wage rates as they 
could be used as a cheap source of labour. 
_ 
The reaction of 
male workers to this threat was to attempt to exclude women 
from jobs where they would compete with men. That male 
workers with their superior organizational ability should 
have chosen exclusion of womeny rather than organization of 
womenr as the way to defend their own position requires some 
further explanation. Hartmaýn (1976) sees this position as 
the direct result of patriarchy: 
That male workers viewed the employment of women as a 
threat to their jobs is not surprising, given an 
economic system where competition among workers was 
characteristic ... But why their response was to 
exclude women rather than orgazýize them is explained 
not by capitalism but by patriarchal relations between 
men and women: men wanted to assure that women would 
continue to perform the appropriate tasks at home. 
(Hartmann, 1976f p. 29) 
Humpries (1981) refers to this view as a 'patriarchy 
first' position. Men attempt to exclude women from 
participation in the labour force, not only because of the 
real threat of competition for jobs, and lowered wagesf but 
also because of the threat to male authority in*the home 
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that wage-earning wives and children represented. Thus, 
Hartmann (1979, p. 15-16) states: 
While the problem of cheap competition could have been 
solved by organizing the wage-earning women and youths, 
the problem of disrupted family life could not be. 
Men reserved union protection for men and argued for 
protective labour laws for women and children. 
Humphries takes issue with this interpretation since 
she feels it overstates the case for viewing the working- 
class family solely as an agent of social control and as a 
means to male explo itation of female labour power. 
Humphries (1981, p. 4) offers an alternative interpretation 
of the family as "an institution which sometimes united 
working men and women around common interests and promoted 
social obligation. " She notes: 
*. the payment of wages sufficient to maintain a wife 
and children, which Hartmann sees as the material basis 
for working men's exploitation of their wives and 
daughters. . couldr alternativelyr be seen as the (imperfectly realized) historically specific goal of 
working-class men and women struggling in a hostile 
environment for a better life. 
Humphries attempts to put the debate over protective 
legislation on an empirical footing through a study of the 
Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Mines. 
This Commission's report prompted the 1842 Mines Regulation 
Act, which for the first time "limited the exploitation of a 
class of workers on the basis of gender. " By examining the 
statements of colliers and their wivesr Humphries comes to 
the conclusion that: 
. . -. in the coal mining context it cannot be argued that the male hewer was afraid that female competition 
would create unemployment, reduce male wagesy and lower 
the standard of living for all. 
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and that: 
The other strand of the 'patriarchy first' argument 
which derives working men's support for protective 
legislation from their desire to secure and retain 
privileged access to privatized domestic production is 
inconsistent with the reality of collier life. 
(Humphries, 1981F p. 28) 
without further research of this kind into various 
employment contextsy it would be difficult to generalize 
from this one example. As Humphries points out, the coal- 
mining labour process in the 1840's was to a large extent 
one of family labour, and this factor must be taken into 
account when considering the wider applicability of her 
conclusions. 
whatever the particular motivation for the passage of 
protective legislation in specific historical instances one 
factor that should be examined in any account is the 
ideological representation of women's role which made 
feasible their distinctive treatment in law. 'Capital 
logic' interpretations of restrictions on women's 
participation in paid. labour focus on capital's long-term 
need for the reproduction of labour power and hence on women 
as mothers. 'Patriarchy first' interpretations stress the 
way in which men benefit from the domestic labour of women 
and the maintenance of male authority in the home, and the 
emphasis is more on the oppression of women as wives. In 
either case, a complete analysis must include an examination 
of the ideological. basis for a form of regulation which 
treated women (and children) in the labour force quite 
differently from men. 
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Although a thorough investigation of culturcU 
representations of the role of women lies outside the scope 
of this discussion, refererence must be made to the way in 
which the "familial ideology of the emergent bourgeoisie" 
(Barretty 1981, p. 204) was mobilized in support of the 
legal regulation of women's work. Barrett points out that, 
at an ideological level, the nineteenth century bourgeoisie 
secured a hegemonic definition of family life as 'naturally' 
based on close kinship, and properly organized through a 
male breadwinner with financially dependent wife and 
children (Barrett, 1981, p. 204). Such a family structure 
was idealized as a haven of privacy beyond the public realm 
of commerce and industry (Zaretsky, 1976; Foreman, 1977). 
The distinction between the 'private' world of the 
family, and the 'pdblic' domain is an important ideological 
construct which has served to obscure the relationship of 
domestic and waged labour. By equating women with the 
private realm, and by obscuring the relationship of domestic 
and waged laboury the distinction has also served to frag- 
ment women's experience and has had a significant bearing on 
the question of which aspects of that experience are thought 
to be the proper object of legal regulation in particular 
contexts. Eisenstein (1980, p. 19) is right to emphasize 
that although the public/private distinction does not 
originate with bourgeois society, it is redefined by it: 
This distinction is not a development of bourgeois 
society but rather is inherent in the formation of 
state society itself ... The domain of the state has 
always signified public life and this is distinguished 
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in part from the private realm by differentiating men 
and women. . Bourgeois society has its own particular 
way of re-wiring this patriarchal reality; the 
separation and differentiation of men and women. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, this 
differentiation came to take theform of relegating women to 
the private sphere of home and family? (Eisenstein, 1980) 
despite the fact that some women have always worked outside 
the home, out of economic necessity, if nothing else (Land, 
1980f p. 60). This ideological representation was reflected 
in the notion of the "family wage" paid to a male 
breadwinner and sufficient to maintain not only the worker 
himself but his wife and children. 
6 Land (1980, p. 75) 
notes that wage bargaining is often Aill based on the 
implicit assumption that men need higher wages than women 
because they have families to support. 
. 
Furthermore, the public/private distinction has 
continued to affect women's position in paid employment, 
even as married women have been incorporated as a permanent 
feature of the labour force, with accompanying ideological 
transitions in the public perception of women's role. While 
it is now commonly accepted that women will combine 
7 marriage, motherhoodr and paid employmentl the ideological 
representation of the domestic sphere as women's 
responsibility puts women at a disadvantage in the labour 
force through the assumption that their primary interests 
lie elsewhere. In practical terms, the need for married 
women to cope with the material reality of the 
responsibilities of the dual role as presently constructedy 
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The concept of skill resonates for both employers and 
workers, having implications for the control of production 
as well as for income (Braverman, 1974y Edwards, 1979). 
Early craft-based unionsl from which women were generally 
excludedr were self-regulating organizations, limiting 
access to the acquisition of skill as a way of controlling 
entry to the occupation, and thus defending wages and living 
standards. Access to skill was associated with access to 
political organization and occupational self-defence (Coote 
and Campbell, 1982, p. 53). As employers sought to reduce 
their dependance on well-organized and higher paid male 
workers, one strategy was to break down the work of. skilled 
individuals into a series of simplified discrete tasks which 
could be performed by lower paid workersl male or female. 
This process reduced the cost of labour to the employer 
while weakening the control of the skilled worker over the 
process of production tBravermanr 1974). in responsey 
skilled workers attempted to defend their control over 
production, and to prevent the undermining of their earning 
Power. Part of this defence rested on the defence of 
existing skill categories, and their extension to new labour 
processes. 
This defence of skill categories became an integral 
part of the wage bargaining processr and concerned as it is 
With the preservation of differentials, it is shaped by the 
balance of power between different groups of workers, and is 
consequently productive of labour hierarchies within the 
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working class (Campbell and Coote, 1982, p. 54). Phillips 
and Taylor (1980, p. 79) argue that the classification of 
women's jobs as unskilled, and men's as semi-skilled or 
skilled frequently bears little relation to the actual 
amount of training or ability required for them, noting, 
"Skill definitions are saturated with sexual bias. The work 
of women is often deemed inferior simply because it is women 
who do it. .. Far from being an objective economic fact, 
skill is often an ideological category imposed on certain 
types of work by virtue of the sex and power of the workers 
who perform it. " 
Philips and Taylor argue that the coincidence of 
women's labour and unskilled labour in the economy is not to 
be understood solely as the result of discriminatory 
training programmes or the burden on women of domestic 
responsibilities. Rathery the definitions must be seen as 
emerging from the traneformation of jobs under capitalisme 
as part of the process of struggle between capital and 
workers, in which the powers of the workers themselves 
becomes a key factor in shaping and defining the work. In 
this process 
*. craft has been increasingly identified with 
masculinity, with the claims of the breadwinner, with 
the degree of union strength. Skill has been increas- 
ingly defined against women - skilled work is work that 
women don't do. . The perpetuation of sexual hierarchy has been inextricably interwoven with the struggles 
against the real subordination to capital, as claims to 
skilled status have come to rely more and more on the 
sex of the workers and less and less on the nature of 
the job (Phillips and Taylorr 1980f p. 86). 
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The importance of this seminal article is that it 
directs attention to, the problematic elements of definitions 
previously taken for grantedr definitions which are at the 
heart of the wage bargaining process, and which must be 
challenged if equal pay legislation is to have any effect. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to produce an 
historical and sociological account of the position of women 
in the labour force. This enterprise is crucial to a 
critical examination of anti-discrimination legislation 
because of its attempt to identify the constituent factors 
of women's disadvantage as workers. 
The discussion presented here reveals that the salient 
features of women's position in the labour market are: a 
long-standing sexual division of labour, which over time has 
changed somewhat with regard to the areas in which women are 
concentrated, but whichr overallf displays considerable 
stability; a historical tendency for women's pay to be lower 
than that of ment and for jobs which are performed 
_predominantly 
by women to be labelled as unskilled or semi- 
skilledr rather than as skilled work; and an ideological 
representation of women's role in the home and the labour 
force, which continuesf despite transitions over time, to 
assert the private sphere as a primary focus for women, 
regardless of their involvement in paid employment. Thus, 
materially and ideologically women and men stand in very 
different relations to the sphere of paid employment. 
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The question then arises of the capacity of legislation 
to affect these seemingly well-established structures and 
practices, and the values and ideological assumptions that 
accompany them. It must be asked to what extent the anti- 
discrimination legislation is based on an analysis of 
women's position in the labour market that would enable it 
to provide appropriate remedies for the problem it 
postulates. Only by first defining the dimensions of the 
structural position of women as paid workers is it possible 
to initiate a critical inquiry into the adequacy and 
relevance of core concepts and substantive provisions in, the 
public response. 
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See Klein (1965); Ministry of Labour Gazette September, 
1962; National Manpower Council (1957) (American economy), 
for examples. 
2 Klein (1965 asserts the same interaction of supply and 
demand that Oppenheimer tests empirically, to explain the 
movement of married women into the labour force in Britain 
in the same period. 
3 in presenting a brief overview of these perspectives I 
have drawn heavily on the excellent collection of articles 
edited by Alice H. Amsden, The EconoTaics of Women-and Wor-k 
(Penguin, 1980) and on her succinct introduction to the topic 
in that volume. 
4A 
more sophisticated version of the radical approach 
postulates the existence of three rather than two distinct 
labour markets. See Edwards, 1979), Cgntested Terrain. 
5 It should be emphasized here that the argument is not 
that capitalism itself creates the economic oppression of 
women; rather it is that the process of development in 
Western industrial nations has given a specific form to a 
pre-existing gender inequality. 
6 This"Is not to suggest that the ideology of the 
public/private split was the sole reason or motivating force 
behind the demand for the family wage. Rather, the notion 
of the family wage was consistent, with a number of material 
and ideological factors. See Land (1980). 
7 For an illustration of the common acceptance of this 
model, see the results of a survey conducted by a popular 
women's magazine, Options (May 1982, pp. 96-99). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EQUAL PAY ACT 
This chapter and the following one provide an 
account of the development of public policy in the area 
of employment discrimination, as the basis for an 
examination of the substantive and procedural provisions 
of the Equal Pay Act of 1970, (EqPA) and the Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975 (SDA). 
Since both the emergence of legislation and the 
ope, 'ration of legislative process are areas of enquiry 
which have received considerable attention from political 
scientists and sociologists, it is necessary to clarify 
the objectives of this examination and delimit its 
boundaries. The main emphasis in research on the emergence 
of legislation has traditionally included an implicit 
reliance on the paradigms of interest group politics 
(Grace and Wilkinson, 1978, p. 135). Such studies of 
"decision-making" attempt to delineate the relative power 
of various groups of social actors and social groups. 
While it would be incorrect to imply a heterogeneity of 
theoretical and methodological perspectives among studies 
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as divergent as those of Dahl (1961), Bachrach-and Baratz 
(1962) and Lukes (1974), it is fair to say that at a 
broad level of generalization they are all concerned with 
power in policy-making. 
While the approach adopted in this chapter and 
the next one appears to share some characteristics of 
these studies in its laws on the legislative process, 
the emphasis is not on power as such but on the develop- 
ment of the content of the legislation. The intention 
is to examine the way in which the course of development 
of public policy affected the approach -to the issues of 
equality and discrimination that are reflected in the 
statutory provisions. Statutory definitions are not 
established in an ideological or political vacuum; both 
what the law includes, and what it omits evolve in a 
process which extends beyond the policy debates. The 
objective here is to provide a brief outline of that 
process as a means to furthering an understanding of. the 
parameters of the legislation. 
The principle of equal pay for equal work for men and 
women is one that has long been accepted, -but implementation 
of the principle is another matters and one which has been 
altogether more problematic. The right to equal pay and 
the rights to other equalities in employment are correctly 
viewed as being related aspects of the same problem, and since 
the passage of laws addressing just this question, those 
charged with implementing and enforcing the legislation 
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have tended to regard the legislation as a unified whole. 
This should not however obscure the fact that equal pay 
and equal employment opportunity legislation derive from 
very different sources. Equality of pay as a wage issue 
has been around for a long time, although it is only 
comparatively recently that its proponents turned to 
legislation as a way of achieving their objective. The 
idea of legislation to define and protect the rights of 
minorities in employment is a more recent development, 
with roots in the civil rights rather than the labour 
movement. Thus, the concepts which underlie the current 
legislation derive initially from quite distinct traditions. 
For this reason I have chosen to delineate the develop- 
ment of each piece of legislation in a separate chapter, 
before moving on to consider in the concluding chapter 
of Part I the implications of the legislation as a whole. 
There are two major underlying themes in the 
analysis that follows. One is the separation of equal pay 
issues from other equal rights issues. The second i's the 
impact of industrial relations voluntarism on the approach 
to equal pay. 
As early as 1887 the Annual Conference of the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) put on record its support for 
equal pay for men and women for equal work. Male trade 
unionists' support was however more likely to derive from 
the fear of wage-cutting and loss of male jobs as from 
a commitment to equality for women. The demand for 
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equal pay for equal work co-existed for many years in 
the trade union movement with demands for a "family wage', 
which would enable a married man to support a family 
without a wife in the paid labour force (Land, 1980). 
It also co-existed with support for other policies and 
practices that were directly exclusionary of women, such 
as the marriage bar (Banks, 1981), and apprenticeship 
requirements (Hinton, 1973). 
The early years of the twentieth century saw the 
removal of legal disabilities of women in the Sex Dis- 
qualification (Removal) Act, and the granting of the 
franchise. These years also witnessed a coalition of 
feminists and women trade unionists around a broad range 
of social and economic interests. This coalition fell 
apart over the issue of protective legislation (Banks, 
1/981). During these years women in the Civil Service 
waged an intense but unsuccessful campaign for equal pay. 
After 1945, this campaign intensified, and resulted in 
partial success in 1954. The achievement of equal pay 
for non-industrial civil servants was not accompanied 
however by action to remove other inequalities in 
employment such as the marriage bar. 
During the 1960s the campaign for equal pay in 
private industry was transformed into a demand for a 
legislative initiative. This campaign was not linked to 
the demand for a broader equal opportunities bill until 
1969-70.1 
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The result of this focus historically, on equal 
pay in isolation from equal opportunities has been to 
intensify those tendencies in the equal pay legislation 
which require women to be 'like' men in order to qualify 
for legal remedy. Historically the preferred definition 
of equal pay has been for equal work, not for work of 
equal value. Even when the TUC adopted the latter, it 
was very willing to compromise over the definition 
to be adopted in law. Adopting a definition that requires 
that men and women be performing the same or similar 
work in order to qualify for equal pay ignores the reality 
of widespread segregation by sex. If the campaign for 
equal pay had historically been accompanied by a campaign 
for equality of opportunity, it might have been harder 
to ignore that reality. 
The transformation from collective bargaining to 
legal intervention provides the second theme of the 
chapter. Since the major equal pay campaign until the 
mid-1950s was in the public sector, the Government was 
necessarily involved, as an employer. Thus, the campaign 
had a public focus, but did not involve a challenge to 
the prevailing Ivoluntarism' of labour relations. In 
the 1960s, however, with equal pay in the public sector 
a reality, but little progress in the private sector, calls 
for legislation were more frequently heard, at a time when 
government intervention in industrial relations was 
gradually becoming more acceptable to the trade union 
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movement. However, legal intervention in employment 
questions has taken place in Britain within a framework 
which is heavily dependent on the older voluntaristic 
model, and which preserves some of its key factors. This 
fact has had important consequences for the approach to 
the enforcement of the equal pay and sex discrimination 
legislation in Britain. 
Since the themes emerge from a historical examina- 
tion of the equal pay issue, this chapter is arranged 
chronologically. The first section deals with the campaign 
for equal pay in the public sector, the second with the 
development of a policy of legislative intervention, and 
the third with the emergence of a specific piece of 
legislation, in the late 1960s. The final section examines 
the substantive provisions of the statute. 
Equal Pay in the Public Sector 
The public story of the struggle for equal pay is, 
at least until the mid 1950s, the story primarily of 
attempts to establish equal pay in the Civil Service and 
in the teaching profession. In 1900, the British labour 
force was highly segmented by sex (Hakim, 1978), and so, 
despite a certain amount of support for equal pay for 
equal work in the trade union movement, the issue was 
not generally one which was particularly salient for 
large numbers of workers in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Male trade unionists espoused the 
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principle of equal pay as a defence against the threat 
of undercutting by women workers; protective legislation 
and exclusionary apprenticeship practices also served to 
diminish the extent to which women might compete with men 
over jobs or wages. The equal pay issue did come to the 
fore in war-time, when large numbers of women entered 
the labour force to undertake jobs previously performed 
only by men. During both the first and second world 
wars, the trade union movement took up the issue of the 
rate for the job, With renewed fervour, at least in part 
as a guarantee against dilution, and public interest in 
the matter was evidenced in both cases by the appointment 
of commissions to consider the relationship of men's and 
women's pay. However, it was the question of pay in the 
Civil Service and in teaching which provided the most 
constant focus of equal pay activity. 
From 1914, when the Royal Commission on the Civil 
Service cautiously approved the principle of equal pay, 
it. .. insofar as the character and conditions of the 
work performed by women in the Civil Service approximate(s) 
to identity with the character and conditions of the work 
performed by men, " (Equal Pay Campaign Committee, 1949, 
p. 1), constant efforts were made inside and outside 
Parliament to establish "the rate for the job" in the 
public services. That the public sector should have been 
the most significant area of activity is not surprising, 
in light of the composition of its workforce, and then 
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prevailing views on the role of the government in the 
regulation of the wage relation. From before the 
beginning of the century, men and women in the Civil 
Service, and in teaching were engaged in undeniably 
similar work, for which they received different rates of 
remuneration. Arguments about the basic justice of equal 
pay for equal work could be easily applied in these public 
service occupations since the equality of the jobs 
performed was unambiguous. Supporters of the equal pay 
principle also stressed that the government could give a 
lead to industry in this matter by establishing the 
practice of equal pay for its own employees. The report 
of a War Cabinet Committee on the wages of men and women 
stated for example: "That the Government should support 
the application to industry of the principle of 'Equal 
Pay for Equal Work' by applying it with the least possible 
delay to their own establishments .. ." (Equal Pay 
Campaign Committee, 1949, p. 1). In all subsequent dis- 
cussions of equal pay in the public services, it was this 
definition of equal pay for equal work that was adopted 
or assumed. Since men and women civil servants were 
frequently occupied on work that was the same or very 
similar, the adoption of this approach was not perceived 
as problematic. 
Despite periodic pressure in Parliament, no action 
to implement equal pay in the public serviges was taken 
during the 1920s or '30s, the Government pleading the 
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difficult financial situation of the country. Finally 
in 1944, an amendment to the Education Bill which would 
give equal pay to male and female teachers, was passed by 
the House of Commons, despite the opposition of the 
Government. The following day the then Prime Minister 
announced that the governmeni would not accept the verdict 
of the Commons. Regarding the matter as a vote of 
confidence in the Government, the Prime Minister threatened 
resignation if the offending clause were not withdrawn. 
The amendment was withdrawn, but 161 M. P. s then signed a 
motion asking for an enquiry into the whole question of 
the rate for the job in the public services. A month 
later, the Prime Minister announced the setting up of a 
Royal Commission on Equal Pay, to consider, among other 
things, "the existing relationship between the remuneration 
of men and women in the public services" (Cole, 1946, p. 1). 
The Commission was asked to consider the implica- 
tions of the introduction of equal pay, but was not given 
a brief to make specific recommendations. Nevertheless, 
its report implied that women in local government, the 
Civil Service and teaching should receive equal pay for 
equal work. The Commission undertook a factual survey of 
wage rates and differentials in a number of areas of 
employment. The report showed that in the non-industrial 
Civil Service, the maximum of the women's scale for each 
grade was generally 80% of the men's scale, despite the 
fact that the peace-time job structure (as of 1939) 
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was such that three-fifths of all jobs were in grades in 
which both men and women were employed. Women teachers 
in England and Wales also received about 80% of the 
comparable male rate. In local government services, sex- 
based differentials were the norm before January 1945, 
although there were a few exceptional councils where equal 
pay was established. In January 1945, national scales 
for local government salaries were agreed upon, providing 
for equal pay in the administrative, technical and 
professional divisions, but allowing a_20% male/female 
differential in the clerical divisions. 
The Royal Commission's guarded support for 
equal pay was based upon the recognition that the work 
performed by men and women in the public services was 
often directly comparable. Concerning the Civil Service, 
the report noted that ". .. over a big field, men and 
women (are) doing identical jobs, doing them equally well, 
and doing them for unequal pay. The simplicity of these 
conditions is in no other sphere of employment exactly 
reproduced" (Report of the Royal Commission, 1946, para. 
75). In the teaching profession, the Commission held 
that ". .. the work done by men and women is ... on 
the whole equal: 'parallel' in the one-sex schools, 
'equivalent' in the mixed" (Report of the Royal Commission, 
1946, para. 83). 
The majority report thus conditioned its support 
for equal pay in the Civil Service and in teaching on 
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the fact that the jobs done by men and women were 
demonstrably equal. It rejected the introduction of 
equal pay in private industry on the basis that the jobs 
of men and women industrial workers were not capable of 
being compared in this way 
2 (Labour Research Department, 
1946, p. 1). 
Following publication of the Royal Commission's 
report, the Government announced its acceptance of the 
justice of the claim for equal pay but declined to apply 
the principle because of the cost involved, and the 
consequences for the national economy (Equal Pay Campaign 
Committee, 1949, P. 3). 
The Royal Commission's report had included 
tentative estimates of the cost of introducing equal 
pay in the non-industrial public sector, but, in light 
of the government's continuing refusal to establish equal 
pay for its own employees, some of the justifications 
advanced for the maintenance of unequal rates for men and 
women are perhaps more instructive than the estimates 
themselves. This is not to deny that there were no 
financial considerations, but to suggest that they were 
at the very least, compounded by views about working 
women which were decidedly inimicable to the achievement 
of equality. 
The Minutes of Evidence to the Royal Commission 
show for example, the representative of the Treasury 
advancing arguments for the maintenance of the status quo, 
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on the basis of the different needs of men and women. 
There was, apparently, no injustice in paying women as a 
class less than men as a class, because their need was 
less. To illustrate this point, the Treasury spokesman 
offered the following observation: 
*a. there is no injustice in the rates of our 
pay to women ... employing the ordinary fair 
relativity basis, and bearing in mind our view 
.a. that the rates of pay for women in the Civil Service are adequate in themselves, looked' 
at in isolation--if one forgets the male rate-- 
and are equally adequate viewed in relation to 
the men's rate, on our view that current rates 
enable women to maintain a standard of living 
at least as high as that of their male 
collea ues. ... (Minutes of Evidence, 1945, 1445-85. 
Consequently, the Treasury argued. $equal pay for men and 
women would lead to inequities: 
s*. with a woman Civil Servant and a man Civil Servant on the same level, the woman can afford 
to take more expensive holidays than the man. 
She can go abroad. The man has to go and dig 
in his garden or perhaps snatch a week at 
Southend. (Minutes of Evidence, 1945,1449). 
Thus all male employees were presumed to be "breadwinners" 
and all women employees were presumed to be free of 
dependents and working only for their own support. A 
tpurious version of a needs-based theory of wages formed 
the basis of the Treasury argument. To this justification, 
based on the idea of the family wage the Treasury added 
a rationale based on market forces. The Treasury did not 
feel-, 
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9a. able to offer, in the shape of 
money, a higher rate than the market 
even though not offering it involves 
that women in the Civil Service doin, 
same work as men are getting less. 
Evidence, 1945, i463). 
taxpayers 
rate outside, 
the paradox 
g exactly the 
(Minutes of 
In teaching too the pay offered was that considered 
necessary to attract a sufficient number of suitable men 
and women into the profession, and so again market rates 
were at the root of the problem. In 1918 a Departmental 
Committee on teachers pay had stated that ". .. in 
existing circumstances a scale of salaries which is adequate 
for women teachers is not adequate for men" (Equal Pay 
Campaign Committee, 1949, P. 3). 
The combination of a moral argument about women's 
lesser needs with references to the operation of market 
forces in the determination of private sector wages, was 
not likely to be repudiated overnight by decision-makers 
in the Treasury just because the Government, after 1946, 
paid lip-service to the justice of the principle of equal 
pay. When arguments of financial stringency and the 
national interest could be adduced as reasons for delay, 
no other justifications for the status quo were needed 
and no action need be taken. This situation might con- 
ceivably have continued indefinitely, instead of for a 
mere nine years, in the absence of a sustained campaign 
to translate acceptance of the principle into practice. 
This. campaign was conducted inside and outside Parliament, 
by a variety of special interest and labour organizations, 
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operating under the auspices of two rival umbrella groups, 
the Equal Pay Campaign Committee, and the Equal Pay 
Co-ordinating Committee. The first of these was set up 
in 1944, specifically to work for equal pay in the public 
service occupations. It grew out of a group that had 
worked to persuade the government to give equal compensa- 
tion for war injuries to male and female civilians. 
Groups represented on the committee included women's 
professional organizations, like the British Federation of 
Business and Professional Women, the Women's Engineering 
Society, and the British Federation of University Women; 
small women-only unions, like the Association of Assistant 
Mistresses in Secondary Schools and the National Association 
of Women Civil Servants; and specifically feminist groups, 
including the Fawcett Society, the Open Door Council, 
and the Women's Freedom League. The Equal Pay Campaign 
Committee was associated with an Advisory Council, 
consisting of women's and 'mixed' organizations. Both 
the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and the National 
Association of Local Government officers (NALGO) were 
represented on the Advisory Council at different times 
(NUT 1947-1949, and NALGO 1949-1954) but in general support 
for the Campaign Committee from the labour movemeiit was 
not forthcoming, the large public service unions being 
closely associated with the rival Equal Pay Co-ordinating 
Committee (Potter, 1958). 
This organization developed from the Equal Pay 
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Committee of the Staff Side of the National Whitley 
Council. The original committee was expanded to include 
representatives of the NUT, NALGO, and the London County 
Council (LCC) Staff Association. The Staff Side 
representatives on the National Whitley Council had 
pressed the government consistently since the 1920s to 
implement equal pay. Expansion of this committee to in- 
clude representatives of the large public sector unions 
outside the scope of the National Whitley Council meant 
that action for equal pay in the public sector could be 
co-ordinated through an organization which lay within the 
mainstream of the labour movement. The Campaign Committee 
on the other hand, led from its inception by a (Conservative) 
M. P., was explicitly non-partisan with regard to party 
politics, and had its roots in the tradition of equal 
rights feminism (Potter, 1958). 
The two committees were divided over policy issues, 
with the Campaign Committee prepared to accept nothing less 
than the immediate implementation of equal pay, in full, 
whereas the Co-ordinating Committee was prepared to consider 
the implementation of equal pay by gradual stages. Potter 
(1957) notes that, in addition to their policy differences, 
the two organizations also suffered the "mutual suspicion 
of the large and small unions in the same field. " Never- 
theless, while the Government continued to stall over 
equal pay, the two organizations co-operated to a certain 
extent, and both campaigned for equal pay for equal work 
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rather than adopting the 1951 ILO definition of equal 
pay for work of equal value. 
In the trade union movement, considerable support 
for equal pay for equal work co-existed with the reluctance 
of the TUC leadership to press the Labour Government on 
the issue. Support was particularly strong in the Civil 
Service unions who had been involved for nearly thirty 
years in attempts to secure recognition and application 
of the equal pay principle. The experience of the war 
years brought the issue of equal pay for equal work back 
into the limelight for the trade union movement as a whole, 
with widespread substitution of women workers in male 
jobs. Delegates to both the TUC Annual Conferences and 
the Women's Conferences, expressed their support through 
the passage of resolutions favourable to the principle of 
equal pay and critical of the Government's delaying 
3 tactics. The National Women's Advisory Committee was a 
bastion of support for equal pay and urged the TUC leader- 
ship to act on the Conference resolutions forwarded to it. 
4 
The attitudes of the General Council do not seem to have 
reflected the movement as a whole, as expressed through 
conference resolutions and debates. Thus, while avowing 
support for the principle of equal pay, the General Council 
urged the trade union movement to support the policy of 
the Iabour Government which was to delay implementing equal 
pay, in the national interest. 
5 
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Despite the Government's position, there was 
considerable support for equal pay for Government employees 
among Members of Parliament. Since the 1920s supporters 
of equal pay had been able to muster enough Members in 
agreement with them to pass resolutions in the House of 
Commons urging Government action on the question of equal 
pay for its own employees (Equal Pay Campaign Committee, 
1949, pp. 2-3). This support came from members of all 
three major parties. In the elections of 1950,1951, 
and 1955, the Equal Pay Campaign Committee sent ques- 
tionnaires to all candidates asking them to state their 
position on equal pay. After the 1951 election, it was 
able to report that there were 121 M. P. s who had indicated 
that they were prepared to take "active steps" to pursue 
the implementation of the principle (Potter, 1958, pp. 55- 
56). Supporters of equal pay in the House of Commons 
used parliamentary tactics to put pressure on the Govern- 
ment and to publicize the equal pay issue. Questions*in 
the House, helped to keep the issue "live, " as did the 
practice of introducing the subject in general debates. 
On 16 May 1952, the House of Commons, without division, 
passed a motion in favour of equal pay. On "Equal Pay Day, " 
equal pay supporters put down twenty-five questions for 
oral answer before they were informed that no more would 
be accepted, and introduced a private members' bill under 
the Ten Minute Rule; "A Bill to establish the principle 
of Equal Pay" (Potter, 1958, P. 57). 
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Those campaigning on behalf of equal pay for 
government employees could draw upon a number of arguments 
to support their case: basic ideas of fairness and justice, 
the implied recommendations of the Royal Commission, the 
Government's admission of the justice of the claim, and 
international example. Several groups who presented 
evidence to the Royal Commission made reference to the 
fact that equal pay for civil servants and teachers was 
already accepted practice in many countries, and this theme 
was continued in the subsequent campaign. International 
organizations had also pronounced in favour of equal pay. 
After the first World War, the Treaty of Versailles had 
included an equal pay provision, and international organiza- 
tions set up in the wake of World War II, also contained 
declarations on the equal pay principle. In 1948 the 
British Government signed the United Nations Declaration 
of Human Rights, Article 23, of which contained a stipula- 
tion on equal pay. In 1951, the International Labour 
Organization issued Convention 100, with its support for 
equal pay for work of equal value. These international 
examples were used by equal pay activists to strengthen 
the moral case for their campaign and to undermine opponents 
statements about the lack of feasibility in recommending 
implementation. (See e. g., Burton, 1947, Cole, 1946). 
Spokesmen for both Labour and Conservative Govern- 
ments explained their refusal to consider implementing 
equal pay for their own employees by reference to the 
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strain such an act would impose on a delicate economic 
situation. This was the initial reason given for delay, 
after publication of the Royal Commissions report, and 
it was repeated consistently until 1953, on any occasion 
when the issue was raised. That there were severe problems 
in the Dost war economy cannot be disputed. That this 
factor was the sole reason for the long delay is untenable 
as an explanation. Policy-making consists after all in 
more than the tailoring of demands to purely economic or 
financial constraints. What is feasible reflects political 
priorities as well as economic considerations. The 
reluctance of both Labour and Conservative Governments to 
act on the implementation of equal pay was as much a 
question of the low priority of the issue as of the costs 
involved. 
Why the equal pay issue had low priority for the 
governments of the period may be explained by reference 
to the general factor of the. lack of salience of women's 
rights as a political issue in the post-war period, and 
by specific weaknesses in the equal pay campaign which 
derived from this. The early feminist tradition expressed 
both through the suffrage movement and in early women's 
labour organizations never completely died, but during 
the 1930s, 140s and '50s its influence in public life 
was insignificant (Banks, 1981, ch. 11). Feminist issues 
like equal pay were kept alive by the consistent and 
dedicated efforts of women activists, inside and 
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outside the trade union movement, but the question of 
women's rights generally lacked mass appeal or the backing 
of a broad-based movement. Seear (1974, p. 124), notes 
that ". .. it was commonly suggested that only a small 
group of professional women were anxious to alter the 
existing distribution of jobs. The movement as a whole 
lacked mass support and had no political power base. " 
Despite women's contribution to the war effort, the 
prevailing idea of women's proper role in the immediate 
post war period was as wives and mothe rs. The end of the 
war also saw the end of the child-care facilities that 
had existed to encourage women to join the labour force. 
The domestic ideology reasserted itself as evidenced in 
the premises and assumptions underlying the provisions of 
the new welfare state legislation (Allatt, 1979). At a 
period when basic ideas about family, employment, and the 
role of the state were expressed in terms of a traditional 
male breadwinner and female dependent, and when the cause 
of women's rights was espoused only by a small minority, 
it is not surprising that the question of equal pay for 
women in public service occupations was accorded low 
priority status by governments. 
An important corollary of the ideological context 
was the ensuing weakness in the equal pay campaign. 
Despite a good deal of traditional interest group activity, 
there were limits to the amount of pressure that could be 
brought to bear on the Government. During the 1940s 
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the TUC General Council was reluctant to Dursue the 
matter actively, again reflecting the low salience of 
women's issues in the trade union movement as a whole. 
Support for equal pay amongst public service workers was 
not of the kind to be translated into the traditional kinds 
of militant industrial action, a tradition which was at 
the time quite alien to the unions involved. The records 
of the Equal Pay Advisory Council show that on at least 
two occasions the Equal Pay Campaign Committee was asked 
to consider organizing a token strike for equal pay amongst 
women workers. The Campaign Committee asked the constituent 
groups for their opinion and the response was disappointing 
(Potter, 1958, p. 62). The women workers involved were 
not sufficiently organized or determined to bring off 
such an action successfully. Neither were the large 
mixed unions represented on the Equal Pay Co-ordinating 
Committee noted for their strike activity. 
In this context, it is easy to see why the govern- 
ment was able to stall for so long over the public services 
claim even though the matter was a relatively clear one 
involving only equal pay for equal work for some of the 
Government's own employees. There was thus no problem of 
determining comparability and no need for legislation to 
bring about the desired objectives. 
BY 1954, however, the Government's position changed, 
and the Chancellor announced the beginning of negotiations 
about implementation. There are a couple of factors 
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which might explain this reversal. First, an examination 
of the reports of the TUC General Council before and 
after 1951 indicates that the leadership of the trade 
union movement attempted to exert more influence on the 
Government in the latter period than the former. Whereas 
the leadership had declined to do more than pass on 
Conference resolutions to a Labour Chancellor, and had 
excused itself from involvement on the grounds that wage 
bargaining was the province of individual unions, it 
took a more active role in the equal pay campaign after 
the Conservative victory in the 1951 elections. After 1951, 
the General Council met each year with the Chancellor, 
to urge progress towards implementation of equal pay, 
and, in March 1954, made clear that the TUC wanted to 
see equal pay applied not only to civil servants, teachers, 
and local government employees, but also to workers in 
government industrial establishments (Report of the NWAC 
1954). 
In addition to increased pressure from the TUC 
leadership, the Government faced an intensification of 
the equal pay campaign, culminating in "Equal Pay Day" 
in March 1954, when a mass meeting was held in Central 
Hall, two large petitions supporting equal pay were 
presented to Parliament, and a private members bill was 
introduced. 
Finally, Potter (1958, p. 64), plausibly 
attributes the timing of the agreement to begin 
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implementation to ". .. the competition between the two 
major parties as the General Election of 1955 drew near. " 
Newspaper coverage for the period substantiates this 
interpretation. In January 1954, the Labour Party issued 
"Challenge to Britain" in which it set out the priorities 
for a Labour Government, should one be elected. This 
document called for immediate implementation of-equal 
pay in the public services. Later in the month, an 
article in the Manchester Guardian noted that this Labour 
commitment had "speeded the race" for the party credit of 
introducing equal pay (Guardian, Jan. 22,1954). Two 
months later "Equal Pay Day" demonstrated the extent to 
which the equal pay issue enjoyed popular support and in 
May 1954, the Chancellor announced that the Government 
was Prepared to accept some degree of equal pay in the 
current year, and that negotiations would be started with 
the Whitley Council. In January 1955, he announced that 
an agreement had been reached that would be put into 
effect retroactively from the first day of the year which 
would introduce equal pay for equal work in the non- 
industrial civil service by instalments over a period of 
seven years (Potter, 1958, p. 64). 
II. Equal Pay in the Private Sector: The Move Towards 
Legislative Intervention 
The effects of achieving equal pay in the non- 
industrial civil service, through the 1955 plan for 
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gradual implementation, were quite limited and in many 
ways fell short of what had been hoped for or predicted, 
by either supporters or opponents. Some supporters of 
equal pay had hoped that the Government would set an 
example to private employers by applying the principle 
of equal pay in its own establishments. Equal pay in 
the public sector was not limited to the non-industrial 
grades of the civil service: teachers and local government 
workers also achieved equal pay on the same broad terms, 
and the nationalized industries began to move in the same 
direction. Public bodies like the British Transport 
Commission also established schemes for gradual implementa- 
tion. However, the Government expressly excluded industrial 
civil servants from the equal pay agreement on the grounds 
that it was necessary to adhere to the 'fair wage' 
principle and to pay them according to the general practice 
for the trades concerned. outside the non-industrial 
public sector, the impact of the 1955 agreement seems to 
have been minimal, if relative wage differentials are 
examined. In 1960, for example, when progress towards 
equal pay in the public services was nearly complete, 
women in national or local government were earning on 
average 65.1% of men's weekly earnings, compared with a 
figure of 53.1% for women administrative, technical, and 
clerical workers in the private sector. For manual workers 
in all industries women's average weekly earnings were-50% 
6 
of men's. Creighton (1979, p. 126) notes: 
107 
... there is no evidence that the introduction 
of equal pay in the public service has been used 
as the basis of claims for equality in the private 
sector. ... Many civil servants do not have equivalents in the private sector. Of those that 
do, most are either exclusively female preserves 
where comparability does not arise, or else they 
have professional or quasi-professional status 
where there is equal pay anyway. 
Direct comparability was not however the only issue, al- 
though it is certainly the case that the definition of 
equal pay for equal work that formed the basis of the 
public sector limited its application in spheres of 
employment where occupational segregation by sex was 
common. 
In March 1954, the TUC had indicated to the 
Chancellor that it would like to see equal pay extended 
to all government employees, but no attempt was made to 
use the achievements of 1955 as the basis of a further 
campaign to press for this objective. Both the Equal Pay 
Campaign Committee and the Equal Pay Co-ordinating 
Committee disbanded when the agreement for gradual imple- 
mentation of equal pay for the non-industrial grades was 
reached. Parliamentary activity on equal pay also sub- 
sided. There are only two references to equal pay in the 
records of the House of Commons, in the period up to 1964, 
and both of these cases concern points of detail on the 
application of equal pay in the Civil Service. Creighton 
(1979, P. 127)v attributes this lapse in activity to the 
fact that the campaign in the public services was: 
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--- largely an attempt by the middle and 
professional classes to preserve their status 
and standards of living by securing themselves 
the same degree of equality of remuneration within 
the public service as they already enjoyed outside 
it. 
Thus, when parity was achieved, there was no need of 
. 
further action and the campaign fell apart. This diagnosis 
of middle class self interest directed towards limited 
objectives is plausible but only as a partial explanation. 
It is also necessary to consider prevailing attitudes 
towards the means of achieving equal pay to understand 
the apparent hiatus in the second half of the 1950s. 
ILO Convention 100, published in 1951 in support 
of the principle of equal pay f or work of equal value, 
identifies a number of paths to pay parity: national laws 
or regulations, legally established or recognized machinery 
for wage determination and collective bargaining between 
workers and employers (ILO, 1951). Historically, it is 
the last of these methods which has been preferred by 
governments and trade unions in Britain, and not until the 
1960s was their any appreciable shift in opinion towards 
state intervention on equal pay. 
Since equal pay was achieved in the public sector 
through the normal processes of negotiation, with the 
Government involved in the proceedings only as an employer, 
the question of whether legislation was an appropriate or 
desirable way of securing equal pay did not arise, and 
the discussions of the period make little 
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mention of the matter. The TUC came out in favour of 
a legislative solution to the problem of pay inequalities 
in 10,63: earlier instances of support for legislation 
are scattered and represent what was very much a minority 
viewpoint. 
The opposition of the TUC to legislation as a 
means of achieving equal pay derived from its traditional 
reliance on a system of free sectional collective bargain- 
ing, in which wage issues were decided between employers 
and the individual unions concerned, with a minimum of 
interference by any other party. Thus, the Royal Commission 
could state in its report that "not even organized labour 
wants equal pay by government action. " Despite the 
legacy of voluntarism, there were some supporters of 
legislation in the labour movement. The 1944 annual 
Women's Conference passed a resolution calling on the TUC 
and the trade unions organizing women ". .. to press 
by legislation and trade union agreements" for recognition 
of the principle of equal pay. In evidence to the Royal 
Commission the President of the AEU, Jack Tanner, ex- 
pressed a preference for a voluntary approach to equal 
pay, but implied that support for a Government initiative 
might be forthcoming if the voluntary approach failed: 
(Chairman) do I understand that you would 
wish legislative action to be taken by 
the Government as regards industry and 
commerce? 
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(Tanner) No. I think Iwould prefer the Govern- 
ment to adopt equal pay as a principle 
which would be a lead to employers, 
and we would negotiate it through the 
ordinary machinery that exists in the 
industry. Failing the employers 
responding then we might look to the 
Government to do something about it. 
(Minutes of Evidence, 3 Aug. 1945,3422). 
Throughout the 1950S the TUC maintained that the route to 
equal pay lay in greater trade union organization amongst 
women workers, and the negotiation of equal pay through 
collective bargaining. The Report of the National Women's 
Advisory Council to the 1956 Annual Women's Conference 
reports the General Council as stating that the negotiation 
of equal pay in industry and in Government industrial 
establishments was "primarily the responsibility of the 
unions concerned" (NWAC, 1956, P. 7). However, at a 
meeting with the Minister of Iabour in November 1961, 
members of the TUC Economic Committee urged the Government 
to ratify ILO Convention 100. They said that they recognized 
that such an action would entail the passage of legislation 
to ensure the full implementation of equal pay and to 
meet the Convention's criteria, but considered this 
necessary if progress were to be made. The Conservative 
Minister rejected their arguments on the grounds that 
legislation would represent a complete change of policy 
as equal pay had always been regarded as a matter for 
collective bargaining (Ministry of Labour, 28 Nov. 1961). 
Two years later, the need for legislation was formally 
recognized at the Annual Conference of the TUC, which 
ill 
passed a resolution calling for the ratification of 
Convention 100, and for a legislative initiative to 
facilitate the achievement of equal pay within a specified 
period of time (TUC, Annual Conference Report, 1963). 
This change in attitude was indicative of a 
broader change in the attitudes of trade unionists to 
state intervention in industrial relations. Between the 
mid-1940s and the mid-1960s there had been successive 
attempts by Iabour and Conservative governments directly 
to influence the course of wages and sa laries, and the 
legacy of voluntarism had therefore already been modified 
by the reality of government/labour relations in the 
post-war period. 
In addition to this greater receptivity to the 
broad idea of legislative intervention, the equal pay 
issue appears to have been increasing in importance by 
the early 1960s at the same time that studies revealed 
the limited gains achieved through collective bargaining. 
The increasing attention paid to the equal pay 
issue in the trade union movement must be seen as reflective 
of significant changes in the composition of the Dost-war 
labour force. Women accounted for nearly all the post-war 
growth in the labour force, and were concentrated in those 
occupations and industries which were the source of greatest 
growth in trade union membership. Women activists in the 
trade union movement had continued, throughout the 1950s, 
to battle with the TUC leadership on the question of 
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equal pay, and the chances of pressing the equal pay 
issue in the labour movement were probably better than 
they ever had been, with women entering the labour force 
in numbers that were unprecedented for the peacetime 
economy. At the same time, there was evidence from a 
TUG survey of 1960/61 that the traditional reliance on 
collective bargaining as a route to equal pay had resulted 
in little real progress (Workers Educational Association, 
1972, p. 6). 
The transition to support for legislative inter- 
vention in the trade union movement was of crucial im- 
portance, but the degree of transformation should not be 
over-stated. Legislative intervention in this and other 
employment issues was to take place within a specific 
framework, which guaranteed the representation of trade 
union and management interests through the incorporation 
of their personnel, in industrial relations machinery, 
and which enshrined the methods of voluntarism at the 
heart of the new system. 
The movement towards legislation to establish 
equal pay through legislation received a boost when a 
Labour Government was elected in 1964. Banks (1981, p. 218) 
notes that: 
*#. whether because of its sympathy for feminist 
ambitions or its democratic basis, there is little 
doubt that women's groups and auxiliaries had 
much more influence on the policy of the Labour 
Party than similar groups within the two other 
main parties. 
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The party's 1964 General Election manifesto contained a 
commitment to equal pay for equal work as part of a 
'Charter of Rights' for employees. The Queens Speech 
in 1964 did not, however, contain any mention of equal 
pay, and the TUC General Council began almost immediately 
to press the Labour Government to fulfill its campaign 
promise (TUC, 1966, p. 6). The Government's initial 
response to the TUC's request that they move towards 
fulfilling their manifesto promise was that the full 
implementation of equal pay would be a-"task of very 
great magnitude, involving iMDortant and complex economic 
and social issues" (TUC, 1965, P. 3). For the next four 
years there was a good deal of talk about these issues 
and very little progress towards equal pay. In addition 
to the complexity of the issue, a further reason for 
delay was to be found in the over-riding objectives of 
the prices and incomes policy. The government insisted 
that any progress on the equal pay issue must occur 
within the 'ceilings' set by the incomes policy. Despite 
the Labour Party's manifesto commitment to the introduction 
of equal pay spokesmen for the Government constantly 
referred to the problems'of the nation's economic situa- 
tion as an unfortunate but necessary reason to delay 
action on equal pay. Recourse was had to the time-honoured 
method of forestalling action, the establishment of 
committees and working parties to study the question in 
hand. 
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In April 1966, the Minister wrote to representa- 
tives of the TUC and the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) and invited them to meet with him to discuss the 
problems involved in implementing equal pay (TUC, 1967, 
P. 3). In July 1966, members of these organizations met 
with government representatives and agreed to set up a 
tripartite working party on equal pay. The committee was 
given a brief to discuss four problems that the Minister 
of Iabour identified as particularly important: the 
definition of equal pay to be adopted, the method of 
implementation, the cost of introducing equal pay, and 
the timing of its introduction (TUC, 1967, P. 3). 
By the end of 1967, the committee issued its 
recommendations. The conclusions reached by the group 
were that as far as definitions of equal pay were concerned, 
debate could be limited to those offered in the Treaty of 
Rome, and in Convention 100. The group expressed a 
preference for voluntary methods of achieving equal pay, 
subject to the TUC's call for certain minimum conditions 
being laid down, to ensure action. Ethel Chipchase, 
chairman (sic) of the NVIAC explained 
... we much prefer voluntary methods because 
something that is done voluntarily in collective 
bargaining between unions and employers is better 
than something that is iMDosed by legislation. 
On the other hand, we considered that there would 
need to be legislation to give the Government 
powers to bring into line employers who refuse 
to co-operate on a voluntary basis. (Report of the 
NWAC, 1968, p. 7. ) 
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Although, at the request of the Minister, the actual 
report of this working party was not made public, it was 
widely known that there had been considerable disagreement 
between the representatives of the TUC and the CBI, 
particularly over the questions of the definition of equal 
payand the appropriateness of legislation (TUC, 1968, 
P. 7). After completing its initial report, the working 
party was asked to undertake a further study of the cost 
implications for various sections of industry of the 
application of equal pay. The TUC agreed to accept the 
definition of equal pay for equal work as the basis for 
this study, but without prejudice to its stated preference 
for a definition based on equal value (TUC, 1968, P. 7). 
The working party made slow progress with this task, and 
in July 1968 the Secretary of State for Employment asked 
that the matter be treated with greater urgency. 
During 1968, the campaign for equal pay intensified, 
and while the Government continued to insist that progress 
towards equal pay be made within the prices and incomes 
policy, a commitment was given in June 1968, to begin 
talks with both sides of industry to lead to the implementa- 
tion of equal pay in not more than seven years. Since 
this was five years longer than the time scale advocated 
by the TUC, this commitment appeared to represent yet 
another mechanism for delay. one year later, however, 
Barbara Castle, as Secretary of State for Employment gave 
a firm commitment to introduce legislation in the next 
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Parliamentary session. It seems that the National Joint 
Action Campaign for Women's Rights (NJACWER) played a 
crucial role in convincing Mrs. Castle of the need for 
urgent action on equal pay (Lewenhak, 1977, pp. 286-7). 
Evidence published in two reports in 1968, also 
lent weight to the claims of equal pay advocates, by 
illustrating just how disadvantaged women were in the 
labour force. The report of the Donovan Commission, 
although concerned primarily with an examination of trade 
unions and industrial relations, included statistics 
which demonstrated clearly how-women were discriminated 
against in industry. A similar picture emerged from a 
report by the National Council of Labour Women (Labour 
Party, 1968). Banks (1981, p. 222) suggests that the 
fact that 1968 was both Human Rights Year and the fiftieth 
anniversary of the suffrage campaign also served to focus 
attention on equal rights for women as a political issue. 
Supporters of equal pay legislation could also point to 
international examples to strengthen their case for Govern- 
ment action. The United States had introduced federal 
equal pay legislation in 1963, and the various countries 
of the European Economic Community had a number of regula- 
tions designed to comply with the requirements of the 
Treaty of Rome's provisions on equal pay. With the leader- 
ship of both the Labour and Conservative parties committed 
to taking Britain into the EEC, this particular comparison 
carried considerable weight. It also serves to explain 
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the bipartisan nature of the support for equal pay 
legislation, despite a firm preference by the CBI for 
voluntary methods. The Labour Government, at the beginning 
of 1970 had to be approaching the end of its term of 
office, and election considerations doubtlessly blurred 
the lines of the incomes policy, and provided a spur to 
action on an issue which had widespread popular support. 
A rather more Machiavellian suggestion is discussed 
by Blackman (1970, P. 114), who notes that: 
**. there has been some suggestion that the timing of the Equal Pay Bill could play an im- 
portant part in soft-pedalling the demand, which 
was growing, in favour of a minimum wage for all 
workers. 
Blackman asserts that the trade union movement in 
general and the TGWU in particular saw the minimum wage 
as the most important long-term solution to the problem 
of the low-paid workers, who had not benefited from the 
incomes policy in the way the Government had claimed they 
would. Women workers accounted for a large proportion of 
the low-paid. Blackman continues: "Legislation for 
equal pay it is argued will take care. of this group to 
some extent in the next six years and so remove one of 
the Dlanks from under the movement for the minimum wage 
(Blackman, 1970, P. 115). Certainly trade union dis- 
illusionment with the incomes policy was growing by the 
beginning of 1970, and this dissatisfaction was of greater 
significance, the closer the Government came to seeking 
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re-election. This view of the correlation between the 
demands to take action on low pay, and for equal pay, is 
given some credence by subsequent developments in incomes 
strategies. During the 1970s the format of the low pay 
strategy that was developed according to the National Board 
for Prices and Incomes guidelines arguably defused the 
radical potential of the coupling of low pay with women's 
pay. Segal (1982) argues that instead of mobilizing a 
strategy to deal with the symmetry of women and poverty, 
it ratified women's relative position, -by comparing women's 
pay with that of other low-paid women, or concluding that 
the Equal Pay Act would solve the problem. 
The long process which finally resulted in the 
introduction of equal pay legislation in 1970 is not just 
of historical interest. It shaped the attitudes of policy 
makers and the form and content of the legislation in a 
number of ways. First, the long history is almost entirely 
one of trade union involvement, and the issue in the 1960s 
continued to be seen as primarily a collective bargaining 
issue. The move towards legislation was something of a 
last resort, when voluntary methods failed. Second, al- 
though women activists in the trade union movement were 
a militant force for equal pay, the leadership historically 
was prepared to soft-pedal the issue in the interests of 
issues held to be more important. The Iabour Government 
too, while supporting the principle, stalled for six 
years before introducing legislation. These attitudes 
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also indicate a relatively weak commitment. to legislative 
intervention. 
Finally, the long history of equal pay campaigns 
was conducted almost entirely in terms of the concept of 
equal pay for equal work. The original reason for trade 
union support of the principle was the protection of male 
rates of pay, an issue that only arose when men and women 
were employed on the same job. The campaign for equal 
pay in the Civil Service and teaching did not necessitate 
any broader approach than equal pay for equal work since 
men and women in these occupations were demonstrably 
engaged in the same work. Although the trade union move- 
ment adopted the ILO definition of equal pay for work of 
equal value at its 1963 Annual Conference, and argued for 
this definition in the tripartite committee, it does not 
appear to have pressed the issue forcefully on the Labour 
Government, agreeing for example, to work with the narrower 
definition alone for the purpose of estimating the cost 
of implementation. This historical supremacy of the equal 
pay for equal work definition facilitated the adoption of 
a similar, only slightly broader, approach in the statute. 
The extra-Parliamentary history discussed above 
is important as it served to delimit the parameters of 
Parliamentary debate on the issue of equal pay legislation. 
In particular, the discussions which had taken place within 
the tripartite study group had served to identify the 
'sticking points' of the representatives of both the TUC 
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and the CBI. The proposals that the government introduced 
incorporated a series of compromises brought to its attention 
before the Parliamentary debates in the meetings of the 
Committee. As such, the tenor of the debates and the 
fact that the legislation aroused little opposition should 
not serve to obscure the range of possible responses to 
the implementation of equal pay through legislation, nor 
the fact that some very real differences of opinion existed 
on questions of central importance. 
Equal Pay: The Policy Debates in Parliament 
Before the Government introduced its equal pay 
legislation in Parliament, both sides of industry had 
come to accept the principle of such legislation. The 
trade union movement had pressed for the introduction of 
such a statute, whereas the CBI continued to favour 
voluntary methods. Nevertheless, with the Conservative 
party as well as Labour eager to join the European Economic 
Community, and with the attendant need to comply with the 
Treaty of Rome with regard to equal pay, there was little 
serious opposition to the principle of legislation, and 
support for the legislation was forthcoming from all three 
major parties. 
The question of equal pay did not appear in either 
of the Conservative Party's manifestoes, of 1964, or 1966, 
but in a document entitled 'Fair Shares for the Fair Sex' 
published in 1969, the party did pledge-to discuss the 
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issue with trade unions and employers in the life of the 
next Conservative Government. Public opinion polls 
showed an overwhelming majority in favour of equal pay, 
and in this context it is not at all surprising to find 
expressions of support for equal pay legislation from'all 
major parties once the Government had introduced its 
proposals in Parliament. Objections to the idea of equal 
pay were confined to speeches from the Conservative back- 
benches, and even in that quarter represented what was a 
minority viewpoint in the party. Turn out for the debates 
on the equal pay bill was poor; at both the Second and 
Third Readings, speakers commented on the sparse attendance 
in the House. The low turn out illustrates that if there 
were opponents of the legislation among the absentees 
they did not feel strongly enough about the issue to 
participate in the Parliamentary debates. The uncontroversial 
nature of the measure was also reflected in the small 
amount of press coverage it received; the passage of the 
bill through its Committee stage, for example, appears 
to have gone unremarked in the media. 
At the Second Reading of the Bill, the Conservative 
Opposition expressed broad support for the proposals while 
detailing points of criticism that would receive further 
attention at the Committee stage. Speaking for the 
Opposition, Robert Carr outlined his party's major objections 
to specific provisions and omissions in the Bill. He 
listed "the silence of the Bill on the vital question of 
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equality of opportunity in employment, " "the rigidity 
of the timing" for the introduction of equal Pay, points 
of procedural detail, the powers of Ministerial inter- 
vention, in the interim period before implementation, the 
failure of the Bill to remove restrictions on night work 
for women, the Bill's omission of pensions, taxation and 
social services issues, the exclusion of the Armed Services 
from the scope of the Bill's coverage (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 
1970, c. c. 935-940). 
Our general criticism is that the content and 
spirit of the Bill seem to be based too much on 
the proposition that the principal enemy of equal 
pay is the employer. In fact, the main enemies 
to equality of employment opportunity and pay 
for women are convention and male prejudice, both 
conscious and subconscious. (H. E. Debs., 9 Feb. 
1970, c. 940). 
Objections to the legislation in its entirety from two 
Tory backbenchers represented an insignificant minority 
viewpoint which pointed to the ideological chasm between 
the corporate modern Conservatism of the Front Bench, as 
opposed to the entrenched laissez-faire imperatives of 
some of the party's backbenchers. Only two speakers 
expressed opposition to the idea of equal pay or the 
appropriateness of legislation to establish it. The way 
in which those attitudes was expressed illustrates the 
distance between these speakers and the prevailing 
attitudes of the Opposition front Bench on this issue. 
Ronald Bell, for example objected to the proposals on 
the grounds of injustice, expediency, and the' 
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inappropriateness of a legislative solution. Bell out- 
lined his objections in some detail, using arguments 
similar to those set out in the majority report of the 
Royal Commission, some twenty-five years earlier: 
On the ground of injustice, at present there are 
no legal barriers to ... limiting the oppor- tunity or the level of remuneration that a woman 
can receive in any occupation. ... Since there 
are no legal barriers, there is surely a presump- 
tion that the market mirrors the truth. (H. C. Debs., 
9 Feb. 1970, c. 960). 
Bell's arguments on the injustice of the legislation were 
based on assumptions that men's work is-often "worth more" 
than that of women, and that "men carry, and must always 
carry, the main economic burden of the community. " He 
predicted that the result of the bill would be the 
depression of the common rate of pay, leading to a system 
of massive family allowances (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, 
c. 966). This argument is practically identical with 
those advanced by the opponents of equal pay in the 1930s 
and 140s. By 1970, it was, however, an isolated minority 
position. It serves nevertheless to highlight how far 
removed from that traditional position was the Opposition 
Front Bench. Robert Carr for example, addressing the ques- 
tion of the role of legislation, stated: 
It is a legitimate function of the law to put on 
record the judgement of the community about what 
is fair and reasonable. It is also a useful and 
legitimate function of the law in practical terms, 
because law does form opinion and influence 
behaviour. 
Whilst I strongly believe that pay and condi- 
tions of work should be negotiated by collective 
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bargaining and by personal negotiation where 
collective bargaining ... does not apply, and that bargaining should be free of State inter- 
vention, it is right that the bargaining should 
take place within a framework of general rules 
laid down in a code of civil law. (H. C.. Debs., 
9 Feb. 1970, c. 932). 
Similar views on the role of legislation were 
expressed by those speaking on behalf of the Government, 
Labour and Conservative backbenchers, and the spokesman 
for the Liberal party. Speaking for the Government, Barbara 
Castle, Secretary of State for Employment noted that al- 
though there was a role for government intervention in 
establishing equal Day, the extent to which law could be 
useful was limited: "Legislation cannot cover every 
possible development, and in any case it is no part of my 
job to make it unnecessary for women to join a trade 
union. ... This bill does all the law can do" (H. C. Debs., 
9 Feb. 1970, c. 929). In a similar vein Dr. M. Winstanley, 
speaking for the Liberal Party stated: 
The purpose of the bill is to establish a climate 
or to change the climate rather as was the purpose 
of the Race Relations Bill .... It is necessary to change attitudes and to get men at long last to 
regard women as people too .... I accept that the law will not of itself achieve this kind of 
equality ... but having the right law could do 
something. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 992). 
As Dr. Winstanley made explicit, the attitude 
towards the role of legislation expre. ssed by speakers in 
Parliament was essentially the same as that which underlay 
support for legislation in the area of race discrimination. 
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A key characteristic of this approach appears to be a 
symbolic role of public policy as 'putting on record' a 
normative statement of what constitutes reasonable be- 
haviour. It is expected that the role of law will be 
limited, either because the problem is to change attitudes, 
as in Dr. Winstanley's formulation, (and it is assumed 
that it is difficult to change attitudes) or, as implied 
by both the Conservative and Labour spokespersons, because 
some issues must be resolved by the 'normal' Processes of 
collective bargaining. What is implied-here is that 
other methods of achieving an objective are to be preferred 
over legal intervention, which is of necessity limited 
in its impact, in dealing in the difficult area of attitudes 
and opinions. This attitude is reflected particularly in 
the approach to enforcement of the legislation. (See 
Chapter 6 below. ) 
Since there was an apparent multi-party concensus 
on the appropriate role of legislation in this field, it 
is not surprising that the Parliamentary proceedings 
engendered so little opposition or debate. The bill was 
. 
sent to Committee unopposed and without a division in the 
House. 
In Committee, both the Conservative group and the 
Labour left attempted to introduce amendments to the bill, 
and the government accepted some criticisms from each 
side. However, the Bill which was returned to the House 
on Report, and which was given a Third Reading without 
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dissent, was little changed in essentials from the original 
proposals. The definition of equal pay, and the timetable 
for implementation remained the same as those set out in 
the Second Reading. The fact that there was no serious 
challenge on these issues reflects the fact that the 
Government proposals already-represented a compromise 
position between those advocated by the TUC and the CBI. 
Amendments were made in Committee but these were largely 
concerned with the clarification of meaning, and the 
Government did not give way, either to the Opposition, 
or to its own backbenchers on any major points (H. C. Debs., 
22 April 1970, c. c. 543-4,23 April 1970, c. c. 717-752). 
However, its position was sufficiently flexible to engender 
an attitude of mutual respect on both sides of the 
Committee. Speakers of all shades of Parliamentary opinion 
represented on the Committee Daid tribute, at the Third 
Reading, to the way in which the Bill had passed through 
the House. Robert Carr stated that: 
I should like to pay tribute to the Undersecretary 
(of State, for Employment) who has played a leading 
part in Committee and whose great care and construc- 
tive reSDonse to Amendments were so much appreciated. 
(H. C. DAs., 23 April 1970, c. 754). 
Barbara Castle remarked: 
We are all agreed that this has been a remarkable 
occasion in the sense that we had an exceptionally 
harmonious committee stage. There has been no 
blood and thunder, no great clashes, no filibustering, 
just constructive points, many of which we have met. 
(H. C. Debs., 23 April 1970, C. 770). 
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Harold Walker also remarked on the co-operative spirit of 
the Committee, stating: 
*.. improvements 
(in the Bill) reflect the 
constructive efforts ... of both sides of the 
House and both sides of the Committee. Inevitably, 
at times sectional or political interests intruded 
in our discussions and perhaps divided us, but on 
the whole our work has been carried out in a general 
atmosphere of good will ... 
... there have been those ... who felt we were 
not going far enough nor fast enough ... but at the same time there have been some who would have 
preferred a less radical, slower moving set of 
proposals and ... this reinforces the view that 
we probably have the balance about right. (H. C. 
Debs., 23 April 1970, c. 753). 
Renee Short who had proposed changes to strengthen the Bill, 
also spoke of the Committee in favourable terms: 
. the Opposition ... Members on 
alýo played a great part and it was a 
to be with them on that Committee. I 
Bills which go through the House will 
pleasant and amicable passage. (H. C. 
April 1970, c. 757). 
the Committee 
real pleasure 
hope that all 
have such a 
Debs., 2ý 
That the proceedings appeared to be so harmonious 
should not obscure the fact that there were some real 
disagreements over the timing of implementation, and the 
definition of equal pay that was to be adopted. The latter, 
in particular has had significant consequences for the 
subsequent impact of the Equal Pay Act. The issues of 
the timing of implementation, and the definition of equal 
pay, generated discussion in the Parliamentary proceedin', 
-Ts, 
but resulted in few changes in the Labour Government's 
proposals. The fact that the Government had made a 
number of compromises prior to the introduction of its 
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proposals, should not however lead to the impression that 
there were no realistic or viable alternatives to the 
form that the proposals took. 
a) The cost and timing of implementation 
In the initial discussions between the TUC, the 
CBI and representatives of the Government, the question 
of the period necessary to introduce equal pay through 
legislation led to disagreement between the employers's 
representatives and the trades unionists. The CBI felt 
that a period of seven years would be necessary for 
industry to make an orderly adjustment to any equal pay 
legislation, whereas the TUC wanted full implementation 
in two years. The Government saw its own proposed time- 
table as a compromise between these two alternatives. 
At the Bill's Second Reading, Barbara Castle described 
the alternatives that had been put forward, and the 
Government's reason for choosing a period of five years 
for implementation: 
... the TUC has urged me to make the period two 
years, while the CBI has argued ... that in view 
of the economic effect of equal pay on certain 
woman-intensive industries, I ought to allow a 
Deriod of seven years. ... Seven years is too long for women to wait for this basic fact of 
justice. Besides, if we were to enter the 
Common Market, we would be expected to catch up 
more quickly than that with other members of 
the Community. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 923-4). 
The Government rejected the CBVS pro-posal that some firms 
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or industries be exempted from the proposed schedule for 
the introduction of equal pay: 
Ile do not think it necessary ... to exempt 
Darticular firms or industries from this time- ýable to give them a longer breathing space on 
the grounds that the cost to them will be 
higher. ... It is important that the firms 
which have the most catching up to do should not 
be allowed to drag their feet to the detriment of 
firms which are facing up to their social obliga- 
tions. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 925). 
Peter Walker pointed out that there were also technical 
reasons for rejecting the CBI's proposal: 
We think that five years is sufficient time for 
any industry to make this adjustment .... But there is also the technical difficulty that, if 
particular industries or firms were to be exempted 
the Bill would have to lay down criteria for 
selecting them. ... Even if we thought the time scale was inadequate, the technicalities ... 
would forbid such a provision. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 
1970, C. 1031). 
In answer to critics who felt that the five year 
period was too long the Minister resorted to an argument 
based on voluntarism: 
a.. there is nothing to prevent any firm that 
can afford it from negotiating the earlier 
introduction of full equal pay--and nothing to 
prevent any union from pressing it as some already 
have. If the unions are prepared to give women 
higher priority in their wa e claims, no-one will 
be more delighted than I. 
&C. 
Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, 
c. 926). 
That such a course was unlikely was pointed out by Renee 
Short, whose prediction was bourne out by progress towards 
equal pay in the period up to January 19? 6.? Short 
pointed out that: 
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... unless pressure is applied by the Government 
and a lead is given by the Government, employers 
will not readily move towards equal pay. They 
have been content until now to use women as cheaD 
labour in-industry and ... the trade unions haýe 
not applied sufficient pressure to compel them 
to reach equal pay. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, 
c. 988). 
At the Report stage of the Bill, a further attempt was 
made by the advocates of early implementation, to make 
provision for mandatory progress towards equal pay, in 
stages, through the mechanism of Ministerial Orders. Renee 
Short put forward the arguments for this position in debate 
on Amendments 31 and 32. These Amendments were similar 
to ones proposed at the Committee stage, which "would have 
had the effect of bringing forward the operative date to 
1972 from 1975. " These Amendments were not carried in 
Committee, whereupon those Members advocating implementa- 
tion before 1975, sought to establish increased powers 
for the Secretary of State to make Orders requiring progress 
in the interim period. Clause 8 of the Bill set out a 
timetable for such Orders to be made. Renee Short proposed 
instead that the Secretary of State should have the power 
to make these Orders "as and when she feels they are 
necessary instead of being tied to the timetable in the 
Clause, " since "there is always the risk that some employers 
will not implement equal pay in the spirit intended by the 
House but will drag their feet and create difficulties and 
obstacles" (H. C. Debs., 23 April 1970, c. 747). 
The Government spokesman in rejecting the proposed 
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Amendments set out the same arguments as had been heard 
in Committee: 
We resisted the provision of an intermediate stage, 
because we took the view that employers in con- 
junction with the unions should have freedom in 
working out arrangements ... which are suited to the circumstances of the particular industries 
and firms. This flexibility will be lost if an 
intermediate stage is laid down in the Bill as 
firm and mandatory. (H. C. Debs., 23 April, c. 749). 
A second practical point which had to be considered in the 
Government's view was the ability of the industrial 
tribunals to cope with the additional workload engendered 
by the introduction of a mandatory intermediate stage 
(H. C. Debs., ibid. ). 
The Opposition shared the Government's concern to 
maintain flexibility in the implementation of equal pay, 
since "circumstances vary enormously throughout industry, 
and no one pretends that equal pay will not be very ex- 
pensive and inflationary" (H. C. Debs., 23 April 1970, 
750). 
The Government's response to this criticism from 
the Ieft was to propose Amendment 33 to the Bill, which 
made provision for a Ministerial Order to be issued, to 
bring women's rates of pay up to 90% of men's rates by 
the end of 1973. This target of 90% was based upon the 
erroneous belief that "women's rates at present average 
about 80% of men's rates" and that therefore "raising 
the proportion to 90% seems to be a reasonable objective 
if any Order is needed by the end of 1973" (H. C. Debs., 
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23 April 1970, c. 749). This Amendment became law, as 
Section Nine of the Equal Pay Act of 1970. 
The question of the period of implementation was 
linked during the Parliamentary debates to that of the 
cost of introducing equal pay, although the financial and 
economic implications were discussed in a desultory fashion, 
in the absence of reliable or consistent estimates of what 
the costs would be. Cost seems to have appeared as a 
rationale for the timetable for implementation that the 
Government had chosen. The Conservative Front Bench seemed 
more concerned with the question of who should bear the 
cost of introducing equal pay than with estimates of over- 
all costs, whereas the Government's other critics saw the 
cost issue as one that was fundamentally irrelevant to any 
discussion of the implementation of equal pay, except in- 
asmuch as they indicated the magnitude of the problem. 
The Government's estimate of the cost of introduc- 
ing equal pay was an increase of 32 in the national Bill 
for wages and salaries over the five year period it 
proposed for the phasing in of the legislation, "something 
we can certainly assimilate at a time of rising productivity" 
(H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 927). 
Robert Carr for the Opposition Front Bench mentioned 
the question of costs only in the context of some general 
remarks about the need for more accurate estimates than 
those that were then currently available, and the importance 
of achieving equal pay within the confines of a general 
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policy of wage restraint (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 933). 
This reflected the hope that the redistributive effects 
of an equal Day policy might be financed through the 
foregone or withheld wage claims of male workers, rather 
than through an absolute increase in labour costs to 
employers, a point of view which was, understandably, 
badly received by the TUC. Lena Jeger urged immediate 
implementation of the proposals for the Government's own 
employees, stating, "I do not care how much it would cost, 
because the bigger the cost, the bigger has been the 
forced subsidy which underpaid women have been giving to 
industry through the centuries, " (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb 1970, 
c. 970), and in the same vein Dr. Shirley Summerskill 
said: 
We have heard much about the cost of this Bill, 
but is not the cost an indication of how women 
have been exploited, of how they have subsidized 
their employers for so many years? The employers 
should be grateful that the increase is not 
retrospective. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 978). 
Phillip Holland (C. Carlton) remarked: 
I take the view that the forecasts (of cost) 
are irrelevant because I believe them to be 
wholly unreliable .... Even if the forecasts 
were reasonably accurate, I should still regard 
them as an argpment for, rather than against, 
equality of pay ... a substantial difference between men's and women's rates of pay for the 
same work must imply that employers and trade 
unionists alike have taken advantage of the 
weaker bargaining power of women employees. ... (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 980). 
The CBI arrived at an independent assessment of the likely 
costs of introducing equal pay, which they set at 
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between 51k% and 61% of the total national wage and salary 2 
bill. The Government estimate was in the region of 321%. 
It is not possible to account for the discrepancy since 
the CBI did not make public the basis for its investiga- 
tion, nor the way in which it arrived at its figures. 
Speaking for the Government, at the close of the Bill's 
Second Reading, Peter Walker agreed that it was not possible 
to reach a thoroughly reliable accurate assessment of 
the future situation but he added, "Equally, I share the 
view ... that ... whatever its cost. the principle of 
equal pay must be carried out. Cost is not an important 
deterrent" (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 1034). 
In an article on the introduction of equal pay, 
the Economist noted that "Compared with the usual average 
wage increase, the price of equal pay does not look 
unreasonable" (Economist, 31 Jan. 1970). This judgement 
from a conservative and business-oriented journal goes 
some way to illuminating the lack of interest in the 
question of costs evidenced either by the Government or, 
more significantly, by the Conservative party. It is 
also worth noting, to set the issue in context, that 
the Government's estimates for the cost of introducing 
minimum wage legislation amounted to 10% of Gross 
National Product (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 1035). 
The estimated impact on total labour costs of 
the introduction of equal pay depended in fact to a much 
greater extent on the definition of equal pay that 
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was to be used than on the time scale for implementation 
although, interestingly, the impact on costs of a broad 
definition was seldom the focus of discussion, which was 
limited, in any case to the opposing definitions of the 
Treaty of Rome and the ILO, and the particular compromise 
offered by the Government. 
b) Defining equal pay 
Equal pay historically has been defined in one 
of two ways, either with regard to equal work, or with 
regard to work of equal value. The first of these 
definitions is the one which the Treaty of Rome adopted 
and which the trade union movement had historically 
supported; it was this definition that was at the heart 
of the campaign for equal pay in the public sector. By 
the time of the tripartite discussions on equal pay, 
however, the trade union leadership had come to prefer 
the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. 
Equal pay for work of equal value has received 
increasing attention since-ILO Convention 100,1951, which 
used this definition as the basis of its recommended 
approach to equal pay. Equal pay supporters in Britain 
expressed a preference for this definition as the one to 
be embodied in any legislative initiative, but were 
defeated in their efforts. Opposition to the definition 
focused, overtly, on the problems associated with 
establishing comparability. 
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In the debates that took place in Parliament on 
the definition of equal pay, surprisingly little was 
actually discussed. Debate was limited to what were seen 
as the two opposing definitions of the Treaty of Rome, 
and the ! LO, but the ramifications of each were not 
thoroughly explored: there was no serious discussion of 
ways in which an equal value approach might be imple- 
mented, if that were the definition of preference. In 
fact, as in other issues to do with the proposed legisla- 
tion, the Government saw its proposals as a compromise 
between competing alternatives, and displayed little 
inclination to make amendments. Some members of the 
Labour Party, and the spokesman for the Liberals expressed 
a desire to use the equal value approach, but they 
represented a minority groUD. The Conservatives seemed 
to accept the Government's approach to equal pay as a 
reasonable, one, and focused their criticisms on the 
continued existence of protective legislation for women, 
which they regarded as anomalous in the face of Government 
action to introduce equal pay. 
During the Second Reading of the Bill, the 
Secretary of State for Employment gave an explanation 
of how the Government had chosen its approach to the 
question of defining equal pay: 
When my predecessor in this job ... started his discussions with both sides of industry on 
the implementation of equal pay ... it seemed 
as if this problem of definition might prove 
insoluble. 
137 
The CBI was all in favour of the definition 
embodied in the Treaty of Rome: "Equal pay for 
the same work" but the TUC emphatically rejected 
this as inadequate. The TUC wanted the ILO 
Convention definition: "Equal pay for work of 
equal value" which the CBI rejected in turn as 
being far too open-ended and indefinite .... 
"Equal pay for the same work" is so restrictive 
that it would merely impinge on those women, 
very much in the minority, who work side by side 
with men on identical work, while, equally, the ILO 
definition is far from satisfactory. ... The 
phrase "Equal pay for work of equal value" is 
too abstract a concept to embody in legislation 
without further interpretation. ... 
The definitions that we have been offered so far 
have been too restrictive or too vague. ... It is for this reason the Government decided that 
they must look at old definitions afresh. ... (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 915-917). 
The Minister explained that the aim of the Bill was "to 
eradicate discrimination in pay in specific identifiable 
situations. " She proceeded to describe the three situa- 
tions that the Bill would cover. 
The first situation is where men and women are 
doing the same or "broadly similar" work, not 
only in the same establishment but in different 
establishments of the same employer where these 
are covered by common terms and conditions. The 
second is where they are doing jobs ... which have been found to be equivalent under a scheme 
of job evaluation. The third is where their 
terms and conditions of employment are laid down 
in collective agreements, statutory wages orders 
or employers pay structures. 
This three-pronged approach does all that can be 
done in legislation. .. - It gets away from 
abstractions ... and brings equal Day out of the debating room and into recognisable situations 
and into the black and white of pay agreements. 
(H. C. - Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 917). 
Equality was to extend not only to wages, but to "terms 
and conditions of employment, " ". .. women must get 
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equal treatment not only in rates of pay, but in sickness 
and holiday schemes, payments in kind, and any type of 
bonus rates" (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 921). 
Some members of the Labour and Liberal parties 
would have preferred the legislation to use the equal 
value definition. Christopher Norwood, a Labour member 
and a longstanding equal pay activist, expressed dis- 
appointment over the approach embodied in the Government's 
proposals. His own Private D11ember's equal pay bill 
introduced in 1969, had called for "equal pay for equal 
work and for work of equal value" and he felt that a 
definition based on work that was the same or 'broadly 
similar' was "not sufficient" (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, 
c. 1001). Dr. Pilichael Winstanley, a Liberal, referred 
to a confe: ýence on equal pay organized by the Liberal 
Women's Federation which had adopted the equal value 
approach in preference to any other, and stated that: 
We believe that the only acceptable definition 
is the ILO definition. We believe that because 
of its effect on women's work and pay, and for 
economic reasons, the crux of the problem ... is the existence of two almost entirely separate 
labour markets, one for men and one for women, 
with a small overlap area. ... Improved job 
opportunity is more important for women than 
equal Day. ... Equal pay for work of equal 
value aoes not in itself create new opportunities, 
but at least it does not increase the existing 
obstacles. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 996). 
Conservative Members spoke favourably of the 
approach to equal pay contained in the Conservative 
Party's 1947 "Industrial Charter, "but appeared to be 
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satisfied with the Government's definition. Margaret 
Thatcher, for example, who summed up for the opposition, 
offered some comments on this issue. 
I like our own definition in the "Industrial 
Charter"--one rate for the job provided that the 
services rendered and the results achieved by men 
and women are the same. ... Most women would be very happy to be adjudged in the results 
achieved. . Payment by results formed 8.9-,, Z ... oi men's pay, and 121o ... of women's pay. So we are quite used to having payment by 
results as quite a large component of our take- 
home pay. 
Coming to the alternative definition of equal 
pay--equal pay for jobs of equal value--it is 
doubtful whether this definition could ever be 
properly implemented .... It is just not 
possible to have a total job evaluation of all 
jobs done in this country. ... One therefore has to attempt to find some compromise solution. 
(H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 1026). 
Referring to the particular compromise proposed by the 
Government, Thatcher noted that "If it is not quite right 
doubtless it can be amended in Committee" (ibid. ). 
The Conservatives reserved the main thrust of 
their criticism for what they perceived as a contradiction 
in enacting an equal pay bill without removing the 
special protections offered to women by other pieces of 
legislation. Robert Carr, for example, for the Con- 
servative Front Bench, criticised "the failure of the Bill 
to remove some of the present restrictions and inequalities 
affecting the employment of women. " He continued: 
#**I have in mind particular Section 6 of the Factories Act regarding the control of night 
shift working. ... We believe that changes 
should be made, perhaps not in this Bill but 
140 
concurrently, not only in the name of fairness 
*.. but also for the Purpose of achieving the Bill's intentions. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, 
c. 939). 
Similarly, Jill Knight, a Conservative backbencher, 
supported the view that if women wanted equality, then 
they could not at the same time demand special privileges. 
She quoted, approvingly, an article on equal pay from the 
February, 1970, magazine of the Suffragette Fellowship, 
which concluded that "It is little use for women to claim 
equal pay and equal opportunities if they also ask for 
privileges on hours of work and maternity leave, etc ....... 
Knight agreed that: 
It is only just, fair and right for women to adopt 
that attitude in their battles. I do not want to 
claim any special privileges. I want to be judged 
on an equal footing with a man in terms of my 
ability to do a job. (H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, 
c. 973). 
The Government replied that it would be "quite wrong" to 
make passage of the Equal Pay Legislation conditional 
upon a blanket removal of all protective legislation. 
(H. C. Debs., 9 Feb. 1970, c. 922). 
During the Committee stage of the Bill, equal 
value, and job evaluation as a means to determining 
comparability, were discussed at length. Trade union M. P. s 
on the committee led by Renee Short, argued for an equal 
value definition of equal pay, but the Government and 
the Conservatives remained implacably opposed to the 
suggestion that the definition of equal pay should be 
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extended in this way. objections were often couched in 
terms of the impracticable nature of the equal value 
approach, but other statements make clear that the opposi- 
tion was one of substance, as well as procedural diffi- 
culty. 
At one meeting of the Committee, Joan Quennell, a 
Conservative Member, expressed her disagreement with the 
wording of the Clause which set out the grounds for 
determining whether a woman would be eligible for pay 
equal to that of a male worker. She argued that the 
phrase "if, but only if" (employed on the same or similar 
work as a man) built into the Clause an inference that a 
woman's work was not likely to be equal to that of a man, 
and had "a rather offensive connotation. " In answering 
this point, the Under-Secretary of State for Employment 
not only defended the Government's wording but made quite 
clear that it had explicitly rejected any extension of 
equal pay, beyond the limits it had set out in its proposals: 
(the phrase) has been put in very deliberately 
indeed, and its Purpose is to limit the scope of 
the reference to the circumstance in which a 
woman might be regarded as being employed on like 
work. ... Without the words "but only if, " it 
could be argued that there might be circumstances 
other than those described here in which a woman 
could be regarded as employed on like work such 
as if she was employed on work requiring the same 
degree of skill, or even work which was of a 
different nature. (Standing Committee H, 
Official Report, 10th March 1970). 
Although some Labour members pressed the Govern- 
ment unsuccessfully on the equal value definition, they 
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spoke in favour of the Bill's approach at the Third 
Reading. Renee Short described the approach in the 
Government's bill at that point as being "broader and 
better" than the ILO definition "because it provides more 
leeway'. ' (H. C. Debs., 23 Apr. 1970, c. 158). The Con- 
servative spokesman also expressed agreement ... what 
is said in the Bill about broad comparability is on the 
whole right" (H. C. Debs., 23 Apr. 1970, C. 750). 
Thus, the definition that the Government first 
put forward remained essentially unchanged and formed 
the basis for the Equal Pay Act that was passed in 1970, 
with an implementation date of 1976. The definition was 
later to be amended, in 1984, but for the first eight 
years of implementation, it was the 'like work' approach 
which provided the touchstone for the validity of equal 
pay claims under the Act. 
IV. Substantive provisions of the Act 
8 
The main substantive provisions of the Equal Pay 
Act are contained in Section 1, which sets out the require- 
ment of equal treatment for men and women in the same 
employment. 
Under Section 1 (1), employers are required to 
give equal treatment to men and women, as regards terms 
and conditions of employment, for men and women employed 
on "like work, " or on work "rated as equivalent. " Where 
men and women are employed on like work, the statute 
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requires that "the terms and conditions of one sex are not 
in any respect less favourable than those of the other" 
(s. 1 El] a). In situations where men and women are 
employed on work rated as equivalent, the requirement is 
for equal treatment as to terms and conditions whenever 
the terms and conditions of both are determined by the 
rating of their work. Section 1 specifically provides 
that its terms, and those of Section 2, apply equally to 
men and women. 
Section 1 (2) provides that when a woman is 
employed in Great Britain it shall be a term of the 
contract that she shall be given equal treatment with 
men in the same employment. Section 1 (3) provides for 
an implied term of contract to ODerate where a woman is 
employed under a contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of Section 1 (2). 
Section 1 (4) defines 'like work. ' The definition's 
essential elements are employment or work "of the same 
or a broadly similar nature, " where differences, if any, 
"are not of practical importance in relation to terms 
and conditions of emDloyment. " The statute provides a 
guideline to the interpretation of this provision, stating 
that regard shall be had not only to the nature and 
extent of differences, but to the frequency with which 
they occur in practice. 
Section 1 (5) covers equal pay in the context of 
job evaluation, providing that women are to be regarded 
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as employed on equivalent work with men if the jobs have 
been given on equal value in a job evaluation study, or 
would have been given an equal value but for the study's 
setting different values for men and women for the same 
demands made on them, under categories like effort, skill, 
or decision. 
Section 2 (1) sets out the procedures for in- 
dividual enforcement of the Act, through applications 
to industrial tribunals. Section 2 (5) provides for 
arrears of pay in a successful claim to be limited to a 
period of two years before the date on which proceedings 
were instituted. Section 2 (6) sets out a defence to an 
equal pay claim, providing for the employer to show that 
differences complained of are "genuinely due to a material 
difference (other than the difference of sex). " 
Section 3 governs equal pay in the context of 
collective agreements and pay structures providing for 
reference to the Industrial Court (later the Central 
Arbitration Committee) of any collective agreement which 
"contains any provision applying specifically to men only 
or women only, " (S. 3 Ell). The Court is then to amend 
the agreement, to extend to both men and women any 
provisions previously applying only to one sex, in such 
a way as to make the terms no less favourable for either 
sex than before the amendment (S. 3 [4]). Agreements can 
be referred by a party or by the Secretary of State, 
(S. 3 [11). 
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Section 4 mirrors the provisions of Section 3, 
but applies them to wages regulation orders. Section 5 
governs agricultural wage orders specifically. Section 6 
sets out the exclusions from coverage of the Act for 
terms and conditions arising from the operation of 
protective legislation, for special treatment associated 
with maternity or childbirth, and for terms and conditions 
relating to marriage, death, or retirement. 
The remaining sections govern a service Day and 
police pay (Sections 7 and 8 respectively) and progress 
towards implementation in the interim period before 
commencement of the Act (Sections 9 and 10). 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the most salient fact that emerges from 
an examination of the development of public policy in the 
area of equal pay for women is how little attention was 
paid to the question of how inequality in wages between 
men and women arises. Rather than proceeding from a 
critical analysis of the factors which constitute this 
particular exaMDle of gender inequality, public policy 
takes as its starting premise the fact that men and women, 
performing the same or similar jobs, are treated differently 
with regard to pay. To do the former would have required 
at least an understanding of the way in which, historically, 
"women's work" has been undervalued, and of the practices 
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which have sustained this process; an examination of the 
factors which build and sustain occupational segregation 
and an examination of the wage/hours nexus and the way in 
which it operates in the context of women's dual role. 
To proceed from such an examination points the way to a 
different kind of legislative intervention from that which 
constitutes the EqPA. Ultimately, the EqPA rejected the 
notion that women are different from men, that women's 
present position in the labour force is one that is 
specifically determined by their experience as a group, 
distinct from the experience of male workers as a group. 
The focus of the Eq. PA was narrow. For women who are 'like' 
men, in the workplace, it offered equal treatment in the 
workplace, with respect to the terms and conditions of 
employment. As such, the legislation took as given 
the categories of 'men' and 'women' as workers, and 
reconstituted women's 'rights' only to the extent that 
women could demonstrate their similarity to men. 
Second, the legislation was passed as a reSDonse 
to the perceived failure of collective bargaining. Equal 
pay was defined primarily as an industrial relations 
issue, despite the title of the EqPA "An Act to prevent 
discrimination, as regards terms and conditions of employ- 
ment, between men and women. " Thus the interests of the 
TUC and CBI were weighted by the Government in deciding 
upon the major provisions of the Act, and the arbitration 
and grievance structures of the system of industrial 
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relations were incorporated into the Act, as the means 
of implementation. Since the legislation was only 
perceived to be necessary because of the failure of 
collective bargaining to achieve equal pay, the incorporation 
into the Act of an implementation system which guaranteed 
the representation of labour and management interests 
appears to place extraordinary, and perhaps misguided, 
faith in representatives of those groups to penetrate 
the industrial practices which so often denied women 
equal pay. 
Although the EqPA did nothing to address the 
problem of the low wages associated with occupational 
segregation, it was hoped that a broader equal opportunity 
bill might provide something of a remedy. At the time 
of the passage of the EqPA there were calls for the 
statute to be supplemented with legislation to prohibit 
discrimination in employment, an intervention considered 
by feminists to be necessary if the pay legislation were 
not to be counter-productive. Such legislation would also 
further the goal of breaking down the pervasive pattern 
of sex segregation in employment, and would therefore in 
the long term minimize the impact of one of the constituent 
factors in women's pay inequality. The next chapter 
provides an account of the development of public policy 
in this area. 
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NOTES 
1 This is not to suggest that there was no aware- 
ness of the need to link the campaign for equal pay to 
a demand for broader initiatives against discrimination, 
but only that the two were not operationalized together 
in a broad-based campaign until the late 1960s. For 
evidence of the concern of women trade unionists over 
equal opportunities see, for example, the Reports of the 
National Women's Advisory Committee of the TUC, 1947-8, 
1954,1963. Also see Lewenhak 1977, pp. 234-5. 
2 The tendency to equate comparability with 
identicality persisted into the debates over the 1970 
Equal Pay Act, and although modified in the Legislation 
the notion of comparing like with like remained the 
basis of the statute until the 1984 amendment allowing 
claims of equal pay for work of equal value. 
3This 
generalization is based upon a study of 
the Reports of the National Women's Advisory C, ommittee, 
and the Reports and Agendas of the Annual Conference of 
the TUC, for the years 1945-1954. 
.4 See e 
Report of the National Women's Committee 
1948-9,1951, 
A9ý4- 
5The TUC General Council's Economic Committee 
conveyed this response to the National Women's Advisory 
Committee. See e. g., Report of the NWAC, 1947-8. The 
TUC also affirmed its support for the Government's policy 
in its 1947 "Interim Report on the Economic Situation. " 
6See Chapter Two, Table 
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7See the discussion of progress during the interim 
period in the Office of Manpower Economics 1972 report 
on implementation (HMISO, 1972). Also see the study by 
Snell et al. (1981). 
8 This section focuses on the statute as enacted 
in 1970, and not on subsequent amendments to it that 
came into operation in 1984. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 
The emergence of the legislation 
The role of legislation 
The concept of discrimination in the SDA 
Statutory provisions 
The Sex Discrimination Act, enacted a scant five years 
after the EqPAF came into operation on the same day as that 
statuter and was designed to complement it by addressing 
discrimination in the non-contractual aspects of employment 
as well as in other areas such as housing, education and the 
provision of credit. The SDA, however, appears to have 
emerged in a very different context from the equal pay 
legislation. The EqPA represented the legislative 
culmination of a struggle that had been waged continuously 
by groups of women workers, with the sometime support of 
some trade unionists, since the end of the 19th Century. 
ConsequentlYr in defining wage equalitYr and implementing 
the equal pay principle through legislationr the statute 
drew on ideas and concepts which had been defined in prior 
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efforts to implement equal pay through collective 
bargaining, and through debates in the labour movement. By 
contrast, the SDA drew on no such long tradition of trade 
union struggle for equality in the workplace. The movement 
for legislation to positively aid women's campaigns for 
equality emerged simultaneously with the re-emergence of 
feminism as a broad social movement in the 1960's, and while 
the new women's movement could look back on a tradition of 
feminist struggles in the 19th and 20th cen turies, which had 
included a campaign for formal equality before the law, and 
for the elimination of such practices as the marriage bar, 
the new movement and the campaign for sex discrimination 
legislation was in a very real sense discontinuous from 
these past efforts. 
' Nevertheless, the equal rights 
tradition which had informed earlier campaigns made a 
significant contribution to the campaign for a sex 
discrimination bill, and this was the central notion of 
'equal rights, ' the idea that the way in which to remedy 
disadvantage was to require equal treatment, meaning in this 
context, identical treatment. This notion was at the heart 
of the opposition of some feminist groups to protect laws in 
the 1920's and 1930s. The notion that equality requires 
identical treatment is not of course limited to the feminist 
tradition. Rather, attacking the legal disabilities which 
faced women in the 19th and early 20th centuries, equal 
rights feminists drew upon and incorporated a central 
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concept of bourgeois lawt and indeed bourgeois society, that 
of formal equality before the law. 
This significant contribution to the definition offered 
by the SDA came undiluted from the earlier feminist 
tradition. It came also from the more visible influence on 
anti-discrimination legislation--prior state intervention to 
address racial discrimination. Race discrimination law 
provided a second set of independent influences on the 
emergence of the SDAF providing many of the central concepts 
through which anti-discrimination legislation was discussed 
and defined. 
The concepts which were central to the approach to 
discrimination established by the Race Relations Act 
originated for the most part in the United States; they 
informed the passage of race discrimination legislation in 
the UK, and this prior experience of state intervention 
contributed in considerable measure to the way in which sex 
discrimination was perceived in Parliament. In 1964, in the 
United Statest Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibited 
sex discrimination in employment, by adding gender 
discrimination, at the eleventh hour, to a bill designed 
primarily to address race discrimination. Thereafter, in 
the United States, the two forms of discrimination were 
addressed, under Title VIIr in a unitary fashionr defined by 
the same concept of discrimination, enforced through the 
same structures and organizationsr and subject to the same 
remedies. This American experience of implementing sex 
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discrimination under Title VII also provided a direct 
influence on the form and context of sex discrimination 
legislation in Britain. 
In the first part of this Chapter, I examine the 
emergence of anti-discrimination legislation, from the 
initial attempts of private members to introduce 
legislation, through the proposals suggested by the 
Conservative and Labour parties, to the final form in which 
the Sex Discrimination Act reached the statute books in 
1975. In the second part of the chapter the emphasis turns 
to the concept of discrimination that the legislation 
embodies and the assumptions about the role of legislation 
which underlay the public policy process. 
I. The Emergence of the Legislation 
The 1960's saw an upsurge of interest in and activity 
around the issue of equal pay, which culminated in 
Parliament in the passage of equal pay legislation in 1970. 
There were a number of influences operating at the time to 
make the issue a salient one: labour shortages leading to an 
increased demand for women workers, a large rise in women's 
labour force participation, and in their membership of trade 
unions, an increased interest in "women's issues" on the 
part of the major political parties, the publication of 
reports which clearly revealed the disadvantaged situation 
of women workers, the first stirrings of a new feminist 
movement, and a growing acceptance, by the labour movement 
and the governmentr of increasing state intervention in the 
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field of industrial relations. The interest that was 
awakened in women's issues was not concerned solely with the 
achievement of equal pay, but also with the broader question 
of equal rights. The passage of the Equal Pay Act served, 
however, to increase pressure for a more general anti- 
discrimination bill since there was nothing in the EqPA to 
prevent employers from segregating men's and women's jobs to 
evade its 'like work' provisions, or from refusing to hire 
or promote women. There was therefore a not unreasonable 
fear that in the absence of further legislation the EqPA 
might serve to restrict women's opportunities or lead to 
redundancies. 
Although the influence of the emergent women's movement 
was not particularly significant prior to the passage of the 
EqPA, the years between 1970 and 1975 saw a mass campaign 
outside of Parliament in support of proposals for sex 
discrimination legislation. This support was undoubtedly 
influential, in terms of securing support inside Parliament 
for the legislationr and for transforming the issue of equal 
opportunities for women into a major issue of the early 
19701s. 'The rapid growth of the women's movement in the 
1970's ensured that women's issues received public 
attention. Baroness Seear, who introduced a private members 
bill in the House of Lords in 1972 noted that "with women's 
liberation on the scene, the movement for women's rights, 
though still in some circles opposed and deridedr ceased to 
be ignored. " (Seear, 1974., p. 125). 
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Certain events also served as catalysts for change. 
Racial discrimination emerged as a major political issue in 
the United Statesr and, to a lesser extent in Great Britain. 
The arguments which were heard in favor of a pubic policy 
approach to eradicating race discrimination were also 
applied to the case of sex discrimination. Through the 
prior example of legislation in the field of race 
discrimination, the ýTalidity of the idea of legislative 
intervention in this area was largely established. When in 
1964 Title VII of the American Civil Rights Act prohibited 
sex discrimination in employment, to be followed in the 
first year of implementation by a flood of complaints, the 
feasibility of this approach to sex discrimination appeared 
to be proven, through the availability of an accessible 
foreign example. 
However, the American influence, the example of the 
British Race Relations Act and the impact of the new women's 
movementr would not have crystallized into an effective 
campaign unless there was convincing evidence of widespread 
disadvantage to women, which was recognized as 
discrimination. While conditions of unequal pay and 
occupational segregation had changed little over the year, 
what did change in the 1960's and 70's was the degree of 
attention paid to these phenomena, and the way in which they 
were defined. What had been acceptabley if recognized at 
all, now became unacceptabler to some eyes at least. In 
this sense, support for anti-discrimination legislation only 
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reflected material trends that had been developing since 
1945. As women's labour force participation had increased, 
and particularly as the percentage of married women working 
had risen, so, gradually, had attitudes towards women 
working. Since 1945, a process of redefinition of women's 
role had been in progress. Whereas in an earlier era 
married women were expected to be only wives and mothers, by 
the 1960's a process of redefinition was well under way, 
which legitimized a 'dual role' for women, although still 
giving primacy to women's familial roles;. the participation 
of women, particularly married woment in the world of waged 
work was legitimated in a way that it had not been in 
earlier eras. With more women working than ever before, and 
cultural representations of women incorporating this fact, 
it may have been easier, in the 1960's to recognize the 
widespread inequities for what they werer and to attempt to 
address them in the public arena. This process was 
doubtless aided by the evicence that was uncovered in the 
late 1960's and early 1970's of the extent of 
discrimination--in the report of the Donovan Commission, 
(1968), Audrey Hunt's (1970) report for the Department of 
Employment and Productivityr and finally in the evidence 
presented to a House of Lords Select Committee established 
in 1972 to consider a private members bill introduced by 
Baroness Seear. 
The first moves for a legislative remedy for sex 
discrimination came in 1968. Suggestions were made at the 
157 
time of the passage of the Race Relations Act that sex 
discrimination should be added to its provisions, and in the 
same year Joyce Butler attempted for the first time to 
introduce a bill to "establish an anti-discrimination board 
to examine and remove discrimination against women in 
employment, educationt social and public life; and to 
provide for equal pay for work of equal value. " During the 
second reading of the 1975 Sex Discrimination Bill, Joyce 
Butler explained how she had first come to introduce those 
proposals. She stated that the 1967 Christmas Day broadcast 
by the Queen had drawn attention to the position of women in 
society and stressed the need for changes to be made. In 
1968, she tabled an Early Day Motion drawing attention to 
the broadcast, and sent copies to major women's 
organizations for their opinion on what should be done: 
I then heard from a London bus conductress who had been 
refused training as a bus inspector because she had 
never been a bus driver, and. .. could not be a bus driver because her male colleagues opposed it. I 
realized the real weakness of the situation facing 
women in employment and saw a need for a special 
provision to give them redress against sex 
discrimination. As an immediate result, in May 1968,1 
introduced the first anti-discrimination Bill which 
made provisions for an anti-discrimination board to 
which women could refer (H. C. Debs., 26 Marchr 1975, 
c. 589) 
, Toyce Butler's initial bill was introduced four times 
under the Ten Minute Rule, with 
make any progress in the House. 
Hamilton introduced a bill very 
by Joyce Butler in the previous 
Dec., 1971f c. 459). 
some amendments, but did not 
In December, 1971 William 
similar to those introduced 
three years (H. C. Debs, 1 
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The bill dealt with discrimination in employment, 
education and training, in advertisements, and in places of 
public resort. It provided that it should be unlawful for 
any employer to discriminate against women in hiring, terms 
and conditions of work, opportunities for training and 
promotion, or dismissal. Clause two of the bill exempted 
protective legislation from the scope of the bill. 
Employment discrimination was also addressed in clause six 
which made unlawful, discrimination by professional bodies 
and trade unions. 
The bill was to be enforced through a board consisting 
of a chairman and not more than eleven other members 
appointed by the Home SecretarYr which would be known as the 
Anti-Discrimination Board. The board would receive 
complaints of discrimination from those affected by itt or 
from their representatives if authorized in writing by the 
individual concerned. The board would then investigate the 
facts of the matter, and "use their best endeavours, " where 
appropriater to secure a settlement of the differences 
between them and an assurance that further discrimination 
would not occur. The board was given no specific powers to 
require the disclosure of information to assist it in these 
tasks. If the board determined that unlawful discrimination 
had occurred, it would be empowered to take legal 
proceedings against the offender. The right to hear 
proceedings under the bill, to determine damages for 
contravention of its provisions, and to issue injunctionsr 
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was to be vested in the county courts and the High Court of 
Justice. 
This bill was talked out at the Second Reading, and 
lost*for that session. Immediately after the failure of 
this bill, a similar measure was introduced in the House of 
Lordst "to keep up the momentum" (Seear 1974, p. 128). The 
bill passed its Second Reading in the Lords in March 1972. 
Instead of the normal committee stage after the Second 
Readingr it was agreed, following the suggestion of Lord 
Shackleton, leader of the Labour Party in the Lords, to set 
up a special select committee to examine the bill (Seear, 
1974, p. 128). 
2 
Representatives of the press were admitted to the 
sittings of the committeer and their reporting of the 
committee sessions introduced a wide public to considerable 
evidence of widespread discrimination that was presented. 
No less important, according to Baroness Seearr was the fact 
that in the main, press discussion of the issues was 
rational and unemotional. "At least, it seemed, women's 
questions were ceasing to be good for a giggle and were 
handled like any other issue of social and political 
importance. " (Seeart 1974, p. 129). At the conclusions of 
the hearings, every member of the select committee was in 
favour of the introduction of the legislation, testimony to 
the per. suasive power of the evidence heard, since initially, 
some of the members had been undecided or opposed. After 
the unanimous favourable report from the Select Committee, a 
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new bill was drafted by a professional Parliamentary 
draftsman. Re-named the Sex Discrimination Billf this 
proposal was presented to the House of Lords and passed all 
the necessary stages (Seear 1974, p. 129). 
Meanwhiler William Hamilton re-introduced his private 
members bill in the House of Commons and this bill was also 
referred to a Select*Committee. Again, the evidence 
presented was incontrovertible, and the Commons Committee 
also recommended the introduction of legislation (Special 
Report from the Select Committee on the-Anti-Discrimination 
(No. 21 Bill, H. C. Papers 1972-3 No. 333). 
In May 1973, the Conservative Government announced that 
they were in the process of drawing up their proposals for 
legislation to prohibit sex discrimination in employment. A 
consultative document setting out these proposals was 
published in Septembery 1973r(Equal Opportunities for Men 
and Women: Government Provosals fQr LeQislation). 
Before the Heath Government could give effect to these 
proposals, a new Labour administration came to power in the 
General Election of February 1974. In September 1974 the 
Labour Government published a White Paper setting out its 
own proposals for legislation (Equality for Women, Cmnd. 
5724,1974). These proposals formed the basis for debate, 
inside and outside Parliament, on the scope of the proposed 
legislation, the definition of discrimination that the law 
should embody, and the means of enforcement that should be 
adopted. When the Bill was introduced in the House of 
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Commons in March 1975, the proposals had been modified to 
include a concept of '. indirect discrimination' and to allow 
for some measure of 'DOSitivel discrimination. The bill 
received support from all parliamentary parties, although 
amendments were suggested by both Conservatives and some of 
the Labour's own backbenchers. In the main, the Government 
resisted amendments from any source, and the bill that 
became law in November 1975 was essentially the one 
introduced by the Government six months earlier. 
As may be seen from the brief account of the chronology 
of the emergence of the legislation, theseven years between 
1968 and 1975 constitute a period in which there was an 
accelerating process of support for sex discrimination 
legislation. During this period, sex discrimination emerged 
as a political issue worthy of public intervention. 
However, it would be easy to exaggerate the degree of 
consensus that emerged during this period, merely by 
recounting the bare outlines of the process by which a bill 
was put on the statute books. There were real disagreements 
about the role of legislation, the scope that legislation 
should cover, the definition of discrimination that the 
legislation should embody and the structure for enforcement 
that should be established. 
II. The Sex Discrimination Act: The Policy Debates 
The Role of Legislation 
By the time the SDA became law at the end of 19? 5, 
there was little opposition in Parliament to the idea of 
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legislation as an appropriate intervention in the field of 
sex discrimination. Outside Parliamentr the legislation had 
the support of a wide range of women's organizations, and 
the TUCr and media coverage of the proposals had been 
generally responsible. 
As late as 1972 the Conservative Government had opposed 
the use of legislation to address sex discrimination. 
Discussing the private Member's Bill, introduced by William 
Hamiltone Richard Sharplesy Secretary of State for the Home 
Office stated that: 
We support the objective of the removal of 
discrimination against women in every field. . but we do not think that legislation, and particularly the 
Bill now before the House is the right way of bringing 
this about (H. C. Debs, 28 Jan. f 1972, c. 1826). 
Howeverr by Septemberr 1973 the same administration had 
published its own proposals for legislation, which although 
3 limited in scoper and lacking in enforcement powerst showed 
a new acceptance by the Conservative Party of the idea of 
legislative intervention, even if this acceptance came only 
as a result of the clear trend of support for the 
legislation inside Parliament, and amongst the-public. 
By the time that the Labour Government's proposals were 
dabated in Parliament, there was a remarkable concensus 
between the two major parties as to the role of legislation, 
although there were disagreements over particular facets of 
Labour's bill. 
In his initial remarks on the Bill at its second 
reading in the House of Commons Roy Jenkins, the bill's 
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sponsory set out quite explicitly his views on the role of 
legislation in the area, of discrimination: 
**I should like to explain .. both the proper role 
and the inevitable limits of legislation of this kind. 
There are two types of inquality which particularly 
affect the female half of the population: first, the 
less favourable treatment of women than men because 
they are women: secondly the handicaps which result 
from the past unfair treatment of women. The first of 
these disadvantages is amenable to anti-discrimination 
legislation of the sort that we are proposing. The 
second requires positive action to compensate for the 
handicaps inherited from past discrimination (H. c. 
Debs, March 26,1975, c. 512-513). 
This statement is interesting for two related reasons. 
Firsty it is explicitly concerned with equality of 
opportunity rather than equality of outcome, as is made 
clear by the rejection of legal intervention to compensate 
for prior unequal treatment. Second, this view of the 
proper limit of the role of legislation presupposes a 
particular definition of discrimination, one which extends 
to removing negative barriers, but not to positive action to 
remedy or compensate for past disadvantage. 
In this statement the influence of the American equal 
employment opportunity legislation lies below the surface of 
the Home Secretary's remarks. Whilst American ideas on the 
nature of discrimination appear to have had -considerable 
influence on the thinking of those concerned with the 
introduction of British legislation, it is apparent from 
this remark, that the Government's view was that the 
American model of affirmative action to remedy past 
discrimination should not f6rm part of the British approach; 
the limits of law were set at the prohibition of less 
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favourable treatment. Implicit in this remark was a 
distinction between the social concept of discrimination and 
the more limited one which the law could properly address. 
- This approach is predicated on a view of disadvantage 
and inequality which attributes blame for these phenomena to 
prejudicial attitudes: a-conception of a material element in 
the sources of women's inequality is lacking. The view that 
it is mistaken attitudes that are the problem then dictates 
a couple of seemingly logical consequen ces which affect the 
scope and form of possible legislation. The argument runs 
that the role of law is necessarily limited when attitudes 
are at issue, because the law cannot force people to think 
in a particular way, and that a process of graduation and 
conciliation will, for the same reason, achieve the best 
result in the end. Thusf the Home Secretary asserted: 
It would be foolish to pretend that this or any Bill 
can be anything but a beginning to an attack on sex 
discrimination. . which is the most resilient of all forms of discrimination. The Bill is a necessary pre- 
condition for an effective equal opportunity policy but 
it is not a sufficient condition. .. It must be 
accompanied by a profound shift in attitudes and 
actions ... which the Bill can assist but which it will 
not in itself assure. 
(H. C. Debs, March 26f 1975j, c. 525) 
To emphasize the concern with attitudes is not to 
assert that the policy-makers were oblivious to the need to 
also change pratices. Indeedr in its White Paper, "Equality 
for Women, " the Labour Government asserted that the 
objectives of the proposed legislation were "To eliminate 
anti-social practices; to provide remedies for the victim of 
unfair discrimination; and indirectly to change the 
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prejudiced attitudes expressed in discrimination" (Equality 
for Women, 1974, p. 11). The point is rather that the idea 
of 'prejudiced attitudes' permeates thinking on both race 
and sex discrimination, and tends to set up a paradigm in 
which the need to change attitudes dictates a particular 
approach to the possibilities inherent in law, and to the 
means chosen for securing compliance. 
Ian Gilmourr speaking for the opposition Front Bench, 
expressed a similar view of the role of legislation in 
ending discrimination. Because sex discrimination was 
largely a question of discriminatory attitudes, then the law 
could go some wayt but not all of the way to changing those 
attitudes: 
Although the law cannot by itself create new attitudes 
and a different atmospherEto it can help to achieve 
those objectives. .. While social attitudes cannot be 
overturned by legal coercion, they can be shifted 
gradually as more women take their rightful place in a 
non-discriminatory society ... Legislation is necessary because it affects the climate of opinion (H. C. Debs., 
March 26,1975f c. 527). 
These statements reflect the same approach to the 
function of public policy that supported intervention in the 
area of race discrimination. The Race Relations Board's 
concept of the role of public policy in addressing 
discrimination was explicitly echoed by the Labour Party 
Study Group, which conducted a detailed examination of 
discrimination against women. In its 1972 report the group 
argued for "comprehensive legislation against unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of sex" as "the necessary 
precondition for an effective strategy to promote equality 
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of opportunityr treatment and status for women. " The group 
drew upon the first Annual Report of the Race Relations 
Board to support its arguments in favour of legislation. An 
anti-discrimination law, the group asserted, would be "an 
unequivocal declaration of public policy, which would give 
support to those people who did not wish to discriminate but 
felt pressured by peers to do so. - The law would also 
provide redress to the victims of discriminationt thus 
providing for nthe peaceful and orderly adjustment of 
grievances and the release of tensionr"-and it would reduce 
prejudice by "discouraging the behavior in which prejudice 
finds expression. " (Labour Party, 19721 p. 18). 
Such a view of the role of law tends to have particular 
consequences for the approach to enforcement that is chosen. 
Historically, in both the U. S. and the U. K., civil 
proceedings have been preferred over criminal sanctions, and 
considerable emphasis is placed on compliance through 
4 
conciliation rather than coercion. 
This bipartisan, consensual view of the role of law met 
with little opposition, except from some predictable 
hostility from a few conservative backbenchers, opposed in 
principle to legislative intervention in the area of either 
sex or race discrimination. Enoch Powell, for exampler 
stated that the bill would introduce "suspicion, discord, 
doubt and anxietyru into the relations of employer and 
employee: 
Where before there was a perfectly natural relationship 
founded upon common sense and on an understanding that 
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the opportunities were adapted to the different 
propensities and skills which were on offerr in place 
of that there will be introduced discord and envy. 
(H. C. Debsy March 26t 1975, c. 543) 
Ronald Bell saw the Bill as having the purpose of 
"regulating the minds and judgements of the citizens of a 
free society and telling them they may not exercise their 
judgments. " Such regulations could not be countenanced, 
since "equality is a question of fact. It cannot be 
created by legislation. " Bell continued: 
There are no legal impediments to women doing what they 
want or becoming what they wish. All the talk about 
women's rights is wholly misleading, misconceived and 
beside the point. . for 56 years there have been no legal restrictions upon what women could do. There are 
no legal rights which can be given them (H. C. Debsr 
March 26f 1975t c. 588). 
However, attitudes like those of Powell and Bell were 
rare, if strongly held, and did not disturb the all-party 
concensus on the appropriateness of legislationy and the 
role it could legitimately be expected to fulfill. 
The Concept-of Discrimination in-the SDA 
The definition of discrimination in the SDA hinges on 
the idea of less favourable treamtment, on the grounds of 
sex or marital status, and includes the concept of indirect 
as well as direct discrimination. 
Introducing the bill at the Second Reading in the House 
of Commons, the Home Secretary explained why a concept of 
indirect discrimination was necessary: 
Although it will be possible in many instances to infer 
a discriminatory motive from the fact that a person of 
one sex is treated less favourably than persons of the 
other sex, it is essential not to confuse motive with 
effect ... we have come to realise that the Bill would 
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be too narrow if it were confined to direct and 
intentional discrimination. It will apply. .. also to 
a practice which, regardless of motive, is 
discriminatory in its effect on persons of one sex and 
cannot be shown to be justifiable (H. C. Debsr March 26, 
1975, c. 513). 5 
The Home Secretary went on to explain the concept 
through the example of a minimum height requirement, 
unrelated to the needs of a particular job, but with which 
fewer women than men could comply. Such a requirement would 
come within the scope of the proposed legislation. 
An employer should be required to stop carrying on a 
practice which is unjustifiable and has a 
discriminatory effect even if the intention is not that 
it should be discriminatory. (Ibid. c. 514). 
The inclusion of 'unintentional discrimination' in the 
statutory definition represented a change in thinking from 
that indicated in the Labour Governments White Paper of 
September 1974. The Home Secretary attributed this change 
to the criticisms made of the White Paper by women's and 
other organizations. 
The concept of 'indirect discrimination, ' where the key 
element is discriminatory impact rather than intent, derives 
from the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the landmark 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power CO., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). In 
that case the Supreme Court held that facially neutral 
employment policies that disparately affect a protected 
class constitute discrimination under Title VIII although 
the statute itself did not expressly address the issue of 
indirect discrimination. The Court held that absence of 
intent to discriminate is irrelevant isnce "good intent or 
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absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment 
procedures. . that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for 
minority groups and are unrelated to job capacity (Griaqsr 
401r U. S. at 432). The decision in this case had a direct 
effect on British thinking about race discrimination 
(Pollackr 1974r Birdmany 1976). When the Sex Discrimination 
bill was under consideration by a standing committee, a 
government spokesman explained the addition of the indirect 
discrimination concept by explicit reference to Griggs. 
second development in the concept-of discrimination 
in the government's proposals was to make some allowance in 
the Bill for the idea of affirmative action, albeit on terms 
which limited its application to training opportunities 
rather than employment opportunities. Thus, the Minister 
explained: 
*. we have made provisions to allow "positiven or 
affirmative" action to help women to compete for 
employment opportunities on genuinely equal terms with 
men. . this does not amount to "reverse discrimination" where ... a woman is preferred for a job over a qualified man because women have 
traditionally been excluded from that sort of job (H. C. 
Debs, 26 March, 1975t c. 514). 
The Minister acknowledges the contradiction between 
formal legal equality, and the concept of affirmative 
action, but noted: 
*a we should not be so 
of formal legal equality 
practical inqualities be 
prohibit positive action 
on genuinely equal terms 
historical link. (ibid). 
blindly loyal to the principle 
as to ignore the actual and 
tween the sexes, still less to 
to help men and women compete 
and to overcome an undesirable 
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According to this argument, formal legal equality may 
be breached in the interests of 'genuine' equality, but 
there are strict limits to the inroads that can be allowed. 
Affirmative action of the kind associated with the American 
equal employment opportunity legislation, in which not only 
training opportunities but jobs could be made available to 
members of historically disadvantaged groups, was to be 
eschewed. 
In incorporating the concept of indirect 
discriminationr but neglecting the idea of affirmative 
action which had also been legitimized by the American 
Supreme Court, there was a very selective borrowing from the 
United States. Both the borrowing and selectivity are 
consistent themes in British anti-discrimination law, not 
only with regard to the definition of discrimination, but 
6 
also with regard to systems of enforcement. 
The debates in Parliament reflected a considerable 
diversity of opinion over the meaning of equality and the 
concept of discrimination. The spokesman for the 
Conservative Front Bench opposed the inclusion of the 
concept of indirect discrimination, statingr 
&a the concept of "unintentional discriminationn. . seems to be confused and 
confusing ... it is surely difficult enough to legislate in the arena of sensitive human relationships 
where intent is provable, but to obfuscate an already 
difficult subject by introducing this concept is 
regrettable and wrong (H. C. Debsy March 26,1975f 
c. 533). 
The Conservatives also took issue with the Government 
over the question of protective legislation, which the 
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Government intended to keep intact, alongside the Sex 
Discrimination Act. The Conservative Governmentr in its sex 
discrimination proposals, had announced its intention of 
repealing the statutory restrictions on women's employment 
that governed hours of work, overtimer and nightwork, in 
respect of women age eighteen and over. There was 
considerable criticism of this proposal on the ground that 
repeal would leave working women open to undue pressure to 
work overtime, and night shifts. in debating the Sex 
Discrimination Bill, the Conservatives reiterated the view 
that the continued existence of protective legislation was 
incompatible with the introduction of sex discrimination 
legislation, and should be repealed. Ian Gilmour argued 
that: 
There can be no justification in today's conditions and 
in a Bill seeking to end discrimination for the 
Government's continuing restrictions under the 
Factories Act of 1961 and associated legislation, 
relating to hours of employment. .. or. . relating to 
working with moving machinery. . If women are prepared to do the job, they should be allowed to do it. What 
used to be discrimination in favour of women has become 
discrimination against them. .. (H. C. Debs March 26f 1975, c. 534). 
Michael Alison, a Conservative backbencher argued that 
the Bill's provision for maintaining protective legislation 
in the context of equal pay could make the employment of 
women a "net liability" and "not the asset it should be and 
that it has been in the past" (H. C. Debs, March 26,1975, 
c. 602). 
The significance of these comments is that they reveal 
the view that equality demands identity of treatment. This 
172 
approach was not limited to the Conservative Partyr but 
engendered considerable debate, and disagreement within the 
Labour movement. Ian Gilmour, for example, was able to 
support his argument by reference to an article from Labour 
Kegkjyj authored by a Labour candidate. The prevailing view 
of trade unionists was however that women should continue to 
be protected by special legislation until more progress 
towards equality had been achieved, and it was this view 
that prevailed with the Government. Millie Miller (L. 
Ilford North) addressed this issue in her response to the 
bill: 
Women working in industry are not prepared to give up 
protective legislation until they are satisfied with 
the more important changes that are necessary in 
employment protection. Many of the protections which 
apply to working women might well apply to working men 
to the benefit of our society" (H. C. Debsj March 26, 
1975r c. 546). 
The Government did not waver in its intent to retain 
the protective legislation, but neither did it have a view 
of equality which would encompass the issue of. special 
needs. Protective legislation, although retained, was 
viewed as necessary but anomalous, and the newly established 
EOC was given a watching brief, to studyr and make 
recommendations, as to the future prospects of protective 
laws. 
While the Conservative view. seemed to be that the 
definition of discrimination that formed the basis for the 
Bill was too broadt other speakers, from the Labour back 
benches indicated that they would have preferred a broader 
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perspective. Jack Ashley, (L. Stoke on'Trent, South) noted 
that: 
there is no point in providing employment ýpportunities if women are unable to take advantage of 
them. The Government should request every employer of 
more than 10 workers to provide special child-minding 
facilities because if a woman is tied to her home with 
children she will not be able to use all the rights in 
the world (H. D. Debst March 26,1975, c. 543). 
The fact that formal equality of opportunity would 
avail women little without other accompanying social reforms 
had not escaped attention outside of Parliament. The 
Working Women's Charter Organization, for example, called 
for the rate for the joby and a national minimum wage; equal 
opportunity in employment# in education and training; 
removal of all legal and bureaucratic barriers to equality, 
int for example, tenancies, mortgages and taxation; an 
improvement in the provision of fre6 local authority nursery 
places; flexible extended hours to suit the needs of working 
mothers, an increase in family allowances; the extension of 
family planning clinics supply free contraception; and free 
abortion to be readily available (London Newsletter No. 41 
date unknown). In such an approach, equal employment 
opportunity was one important objective in an extensive 
social agenda for the overall improvement of women's 
positions as workers and mothers. The original four demands 
of the Women's. Liberation Movement called for equal pay? 
equal education and job opportunities, free contraception 
and abortion on demand, and free twenty-four hour child-care 
(Coote and Campbell, 1982y p. 24). In 1975 were added the 
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demands for "financial and legal independence" and "an end 
to all discrimination against lesbians, and a women's right 
to define her own sexuality" (Ibid., P. 26). 
Instead of an answer to the demands of the feminists 
and women trade unionists for comprehensive social and 
political reform, the Bill presented in Parliament by the 
Labour Government offered formal equality in employment, 
education, housing and the provision of goods and services. 
Introducing the Billf the Home Secretary acknowledged the 
impact of domestic responsibilities on women's lives, but 
dismissed in one sentence those who criticized the bill for 
failing to address this problem: 
.* extra demands are made on women becauser in 
general, they carry more than their fair share of the 
practical responsibilities of looking after a home, 
children, aged relatives, and need, for example, 
special help to meet the demands of child rearing. But 
these are not problems to be tackled in a Bill which is 
concerned with discrimination and it would be 
misconceived to criticize the Bill for failing to deal 
with a wide range of problems which are to some extent 
inherent in our society. 
(H. C. Debs, March 26F 1975, c. 513) 
Dr. Shirley SummerskillF Undersecretary of State at the 
Home office, reiterated that the Bill could not attempt "to 
tackle the problem of women's role in society, and subjects 
like facilities for child care, family law and the special 
problems facing the one parent family. " (Ibid. #, c. 616) 
However, she held out the hope that once the SDA became law, 
"matters like this will be affected by the influence and the 
propaganda that this legislation will generate. " (Ibid. ) 
175 
In addition to making no effort to encourage practices 
which would facilitate the participation of women with 
domestic responsibilities in the labour force, the Bill also 
exempted from its scope some important areas of legislation 
which reinforced a view of women as primarily wives and 
mothers, as 'dependents' rather than 'breadwinners. ' For 
example, a number of organizations recommended to the 
Government that it should be illegal to discriminate on the 
grounds of marital status as well as sex. The House of 
Lords Select Committee had also recommended this course of 
action. Since the Government itself discriminated against 
large numbers of women, solely on the basis of marital 
status, in taxation and social security matterst this course 
of action was potentially problematic. The Government dealt 
with the issue by exempting social security and taxation 
matters from the Bill, and including a limited provision on 
marital status. Roy Jenkins explained: 
marital status is ... particularly important for the 
. arrangements relating to family support in the 
social security and taxation fields. The White Paper 
made it clear that the Bill could not deal with social 
security, pensions, or taxation matters. They are 
governed by their own legislation, and that is firmly 
the case. But those aspects of marital status which 
are properly within the scope of a Sex Discrimination 
Bill have been dealt with. 
The Minister noted that the Bill proposed to make it 
unlawful to operate a marriage bar, and to treat a married 
man more favourably than a married woman, but that 
To go further would bring into an already fairly 
complicated Bill many other complications relating to 
trifling matters, which are not directly relevant, 
which would not be justified and which would not ease 
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the passage of the Bill (H. C. Debs, March 26,1975, c. 
515). 
The exemption of social security and taxation matters 
from the scope of the Billr and the narrow definition of the 
marital status clause provoked some criticism during the 
Second Reading. Leaving aside criticism from the Tory Front 
Bench, which cannot be taken as more than debating points in 
the light of subsequent Conservative policies, 
dissatisfaction over these clauses stemmed from anti- 
discrimination activists who wished to see a more elaborated 
concept of marital discrimination, and who wanted to see the 
Government's own discriminatory practices in the fields of 
social security, welfarer and taxation brought within the 
purview of the new law. Jo Richardson (L. Barking) pointed 
out that the Bill offered no protection to unmarried people 
treated less favourably than married people, and gave as an 
example the different eligibility of single and married 
women for maternity benefits: 
There is no valid justification for not paying 
maternity benefit to an unmarried woman who becomes 
pregnant . The law must be extended to protect single 
women from unfair discrimination of this type (H. C. 
Debsf March 26r 1975f c. 554). 
Maureen Colquhoun (L. Northampton N) pointed out that 
Marital status is mentioned but not parental or 
single status or that a woman can be considered as the 
principal breadwinner with financial responsibility for 
dependents (H. C. Debs, March 26,1975, c. 600). 
She suggested that the clause dealing with marital 
discrimination be amended in such a way that it would "have 
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more relevance to life as it is lived by women in a real 
world. " (Ibid. ) 
Janet Fookes (C. Plymouthr Drake) voiced concern over 
the exemption of social security and related affairs from 
the Bill, and over the reasons offered by the Government for 
their omission: 
I am not convinced by the argument that some things can 
be taken care of by other Ministers and other Acts of 
Parliament. .. I suspect that the reason is quite different. There is a very great deal of money 
involved in these other departments and I believe there 
is a reluctance to take it on board in case the 
financial repercussions are proved to be more than 
might be thought at first sight (H. C. - Debs, March 26, 
1975, c. 548). 
Lynda Walker (C. Wallasey) also pointed to the problem 
of eligibility for maternity benefit of unmarried women, and 
suggested that the marital discrimination clause be amended 
to take care of this discrepancy. Both Labour and 
Conservative women backbenchers voiced criticisms over 
existing discriminatory practices in the system of taxation, 
and pensions. The Liberal spokesman also addressed these 
points: 
The Bill properly requires an end to commercial and 
industrial discrimination on the grounds of sex. But 
while fiscal administration ... remains outside the 
scope of this legislation ... the Government in the form of the Department of Health and Social Security 
and the Treasury will top the league of discriminators 
(H. C. Debs. r March 26,1975, c. 550) 
Outside Parliament, the National Women's Liberation 
Conference, held in Manchester in April 1975r passed a 
resolution stating that: 
The Women's Liberation Movement protests against the 
term 'Sex Discrimination Bill' being used for what is 
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only a limited equal opportunities Bill. We demand of 
the Government a comprehensive sex discrimination Bill 
so that women are no longer defined as dependents; and 
a Bill that provides for no less than genuine equality 
of treatment under law for both sexes (Coote and 
Campbell 1982y p. 103) 
Certainly the bill before Parliament could not provide 
for genuine 'equality of treatment under the law, ' while 
exempting Government legislation from its provisions. 
Neverthelessr despite the criticisms made of itr the 
proposed legislation received enthusiastic support, even 
from those critical of some of its shortcomings. The 
proposals went further than the private members billf by 
expanding the definition of discrimination to include 
indirect discrimination, and were much more encompassing in 
scope than the Conservative government proposals, which in 
addition to a lack of enforcement powersl and a large number 
of excepted situations, were limited to thet area of 
employment alone. 
Despite some criticisms from both Left and Right, the 
proposals had a fairly easy journey through Parliament. 
Criticisms were made, and minor amendments agreed to, but 
the Bill that became law as the SDA was in all essential 
respects unchanged from its initial form. 
III. Statutory Provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 
The definition of discrimination is contained in Part 1 
of the Act, and includes two approaches to discrimination. 
Direct discrimination occurs when a women is treated "less 
favourably" than a man would be treated "on the grounds of 
her sex. " [1(1)(a)] Indirect discrimination occurs when a 
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requirement is applied equally to men and women, but its 
effect is discriminatory. A discriminatory impact may arise 
where the requirement is "such that the proportion of women 
who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the 
proportion of men who can comply with it, " and where the 
requirement cannot be shown to be justifiable irrespective 
of the sex of the person to which it appliesf and where the 
requirement is detrimental to the woman who cannot comply 
with it. If treatment between individuals varies according 
to marital status, then men and women of the same marital 
status must be compared for the purpose of determining 
whether less favourable treatment has occurred. 
The provisions for defining discrimination apply 
equally to men as well as to women [1(2)(1)]. Specific 
exceptions are made for special treatment "afforded to women 
in connection with pregnancy and childbirth" [1(2)(2)]. 
Discrimination on the grounds of marital status is 
expressly forbidden by the Acty and again discrimination may 
be either direct or indirect. As with discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, direct discrimination occurs when a married 
person of either sex is treated less favourably than an 
unmarried person and indirect discrimination occurs when the 
tbree-part test is met. It should be emphasized that the 
concept of marital status discrimination in the Act is 
formulated expressly in terms of the rights of the married 
not to be treated less favourably than the unmarried. 
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Part II of the Act sets out what constitutes unlawful 
discrimination in employment. It is unlawful to 
discriminate in the arrangements made for determining who 
should be offered employment, in terms on which employment 
is offered, by omitting or refusing to make an offer of _ 
employment (section 6(l)). It is unlawful to discriminate 
in access to opportunities, transfer or training, or in 
dismissal. (Section 6(2)). Private households or employers 
with less than 5 employees are exempt from these 
requirements. Section 7 defines those situations in which 
being a man might constitute a "genuine occupational 
qualification" for a job, and wherer therefore the 
provisions of the SDA would not apply. Section 8 sets out 
the revisions of the EqPA that were included in the SDA. 
The remaining sections are concerned with the coverage of 
the statute, as regards organizations like trades unions and 
vocational training bodies, with the specific application of 
the Act to the police force, the prison service, the 
midwifery profession# and religious organizations, and with 
an amendment to the 1954 Mines and Quarries Act. 
Part VI of the SDA establishes the EOCI and sets out 
its powers and responsibilities (see Chapter 8), Part VII 
sets out the enforcement procedures for individual actions 
(see chapters 6 and 7). 
To summarize then, the Act makes unlawful both direct 
and indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex and 
(married) marital status. It defines the employment 
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situations to which such prohibitions apply, the exceptions 
to the Act, and the enforcement procedures for 
implementation. However, in many respects the Act is as 
much defined by its omissions as by its provisions. Women 
are granted equality of opportunity in a formalistic sense, 
but their treatment under the SDA is at odds with their 
treatment under other statutes which are specifically 
exempted from the Acts coverage. More importantly, women 
are granted equality of opportunity to the extent that they 
can approximate their condition to that of men. In a formal 
sense, the Act is a neutral one which can apply to either 
sex: essentially then it is-a sex discrimination law which 
applies only to ffungendered" individuals, i. e., to those 
aspects of the individual where men and women can be said to 
be alike. The Act bypasses the questions that arise from 
acknowledging that in some real senses men and women are not 
alike by concentrating on formal equality, and requiring 
them to be alike to come within the scope of the law's 
protection. The question of the conceptual adequacy of the 
SDA's substantive provisions is examined more closely in 
Chapter 5, which focusses on the appropriateness of the 
concepts embodied in both the SDA and the EqPA in the 
context of women's structural position in society. 
I 
Banks (19811 p. 153), notes the poverty of scholarship on 
the feminist movement between 1920 and 1960, and asserts 
that with research it is only no beginning to be possible to 
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exPlore and understand the causes of the apparent break in 
continuity. 
2 This account differs from that given by Creighton, (1979) 
Wbich states that the suggestion for referral to Select 
Committee came from the Government. I have chosen to follow 
Baroness Seear's account on the basis of her close 
connection with the events in question. 
3 "Flabby and toothless, " in the assessment of Labour PIP 
Renee Short. (Coote and Campbell, 1982, p. 105). 
4 Despite some broad similarities, there are also quite 
considerable differences between the United States and the 
United Kingdom approaches to enforcement. See Chapter 6 for 
a discussion of enforcement issues generally, and Chapters 8 
and 9 for specific differences in the British and American 
approaches to administrative enforcement and the question of 
remedy. 
5 
The British legislation in its approach to indirect discrimin- 
ation, speaks of practices which have a discriminatory effect, and 
are not "justifiable". The American courts look instead to whether 
the practice is a "business necessity" or whether selection 
criteria are "job-related". It appears from the Parliamentary 
debates that one of the main reasons for the change to the 
concept of justifiability was a fear that courts might interpret 
a test of necessity as making unlawful certain seniority rules 
with a disparate impact on one sex. See, Standing Committee on the 
Sex Discrimination Bill, official Report, April 24 1975, cc 70-71. 
See Chapter 5 below for a further discussion of the justifiability 
test. 
6 See Chapters 6,8 and 9 below. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
OF THE DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical 
analysis of the central concepts of the anti-discrimination 
legislation) by examining some of the assumptions that lie 
beneath the statutory approach to equality and discrimina- 
tion. The focus is on the legal concepts and their rele- 
vance to women's position in the labour force. 
The distinctive features of women's employment, as 
described in Chapter Two, are a high degree of occupational 
segregation by sex, and average earnings which are lower than 
those of men. These characteristics appear to arise not 
only from workplace attitudes and practices, but also from 
the nexus between domestic labour and wage labour which is 
a feature distinguishing women's and men's employment. 
Before proceeding to an examination of the enforcement and 
implementation of the statutes in Part II of this study, it 
is useful to consider the extent to which the core provisions 
recognize and address these characteristics of women's 
employment. 
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The SDA prohibits four kinds of discrimination: direct 
sex discrimination, indirect sex discrimination, marital 
discrimination, both direct and indirect, and victimization. 
The EqPA as originally enacted aimed in general terms at 
bringing into force the policy of equal pay for equal work. 
While the SDA is a complex statutory scheme, drafted in 
detail, the EqPA is in some respects "only an outline". 
(Phillips, J. in National Coal Board v. Sherwin (1978] ICR 
700,703-4 (EAT)). Despite this difference the two statutes 
together provide a single comprehensive code addressing 
sex discrimination in employment, as the tribunals and 
courts have recognized. Thus in Shields v. E. Coomes (Hold- 
ings) Ltd. (19781 ICR 1159,1178, Bridge, L. J. stated "what 
is abundantly clear is that both Acts should be construed 
and applied as a harmonious whole and in such a way that the 
broad principles which underlie the scheme of legislation 
are not frustrated by a narrow interpretation or restrictive 
application of particular provisions. " 
The focus of analysis in the first part of this chapter 
are the broad principles and major provisions of the statu- 
tory scheme, as interpreted by the appellate courts and 
tribunals. 1 
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
The Equal Pay Act 
The short title to the 1970 Act states its objective 
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as being "to prevent discrimination, as regards terms and 
conditions of employment, between men and women". To achieve 
this objective, the Act uses the notion of an "equality 
clause". The terms of a contract under which a woman is 
employed at an establishment in Great Britain is deemed to 
include such a clause under 5.1(1) of the Act. The effect of 
the equality clause is set forth at 3.1(2). Prior to the 
amendment of the section in 1983, the equality clause provided 
that a woman employed on like work with a man-in the same 
employment, or employed on work rated by a-job evaluation 
scheme as equivalent to that of a man in the same employment, 
is entitled to contractual terms which are not less favourable 
than his. The EqPA extends to contractual terms other than 
pay, although it is wage claims which have been the main focus 
of attention under the statute. 
Under the original statutory scheme, a woman had a 
right to equal pay only if she could show that she was on like 
work or on work rated as equivalent to that of a man in the 
same employment. 
2 
In seekinR to establish like or equivalent work, a 
complainant must point to a male comparator. The statute 
left open the question bf whether there was a requirement 
of contemporareity between the complainant and the comparable 
male. In Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, the Court of Appeal held 
that as a matter of English law, a woman was not entitled 
to compare her job with that of a male predecessor (19791 
ICR 785,793. Lord Denning dissented. The Court agreed 
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however that Article 119 of the EEC Treaty raised the same 
issue, and referred the question to the European Court of 
Justice. That court-held that under community law, the con- 
cept of equal work may not be restricted by a requirement 
of contemporaneity. The Court of Appeal then applied this 
determination, holding that a woman can compare her pay with 
that of a man employed on equal work prior to her employment. 
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith [19801 ICR 672) 692-4. 
A second issue relating to the question of the roale com- 
parator is whether the concept of direct diýcrimination 
includes the possibility of comparison with a hypothetical 
male. In Macarthys, the European Court of Justice held that 
such a comparison could not be made as it would be "indirect 
and disguised discrimination" the identification of which Cý 51 
would require "comparative studies of entire branches'of 
industry". (Id. at 690-1, judgment of the ECJ, paras. 14-15). 
Pannick (1985, p. 97) suggests however that the notion of the 
hypothetical male is central to the concept of direct dis- 
crimination in the SDA which de-Fines discrimination as treat- 
ing the complainant, on grounds of her sex less favourably 
than one treats, or would treat a man. Pannick argues that 
as the EqPA and SDA form an interlocking code, the 1970 Act 
could perhaps be interpreted to include the concept of the 
hypothetical male in its approach to direct discrimination. 
There are two stages to the inquiry of whether a woman 
is entitled to equal pay with a man doing like or equivalent 
work. First, the complainant must show that she is employed 
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on work which is of "the same or broadly similar nature" 
to that of a man under section 1(4) or that the work is 
rated as equivalent under section 1(5). 
3 The assessment of 
like work is concerned with the jobs compared between "the 
things done and the frequency with which they are done". 
Shields v. E. Coomes (1Udings) Ltd [19781 ICR 1159,1174, 
per Orr, L. J. Although apparently simple, the drafting 
of section 1(4) has led to some anomalies. If the woman com- 
plainant cannot show like work, she has no legal remedy 
even if the difference in pay between her and the comparable 
male is much greater than the difference in duties would 
appear to justify. As the EAT stated in Electrolux Limited 
v. Hutchinson, [19771 ICR 252,259, "a case is either Within 
or without the Act: there is no half-way house". It is 
also possible that a woman paid less than the male comparable 
may not be entitled under the EqPA to equal pay, if her job 
involves greater skill than the man's because she would 
not be able to meet the statutory requirement of demonstra- 
ting like work. This possibility was suggested by the EAT 
in Waddington v. Leicester Council for Voluntary Service [19771 
ICR 266,268, in which a woman social worker sought equal 
pay with a male social worker whom she supervised. The EAT 
noted that although the woman was, not unnaturally, perturbed 
at being paid less than her subordinate, there were dif- 
ferences between the work performed by the two, as illustrated 
by the fact that the woman was the man's supervisor. The 
EAT remanded the case to the industrial tribunal for recon- 
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sideration in accordance with the law. To countenance a 
disparity in pay where the woman's job involves greater skill 
or responsibility than the man's is clearly contrary to 
the purpose of the Act, and appears to depend on an overly 
narrow and formalistic reading of the statute. 
If a woman proves that she is employed on like work, 
or work rated as equivlent, she is entitled to equal pay un- 
less the employer can show that the variation is due to a 
material factor other than sex under Section 1(3). The onus 
of establishing the defence is on the employer, with the 
burden of proof being the ordinary civil standard of balance 
of probabilities. 
4 
The questions of the kinds of factor on which an employer 
might rely in attempting to establish a section 1(3) defence 
raises the issue of the nature of the concept of discrimina- 
tion that underlies the Act. Unlike the SDA which specifies 
that it covers both direct and indirect discrimination, the 
EqPA is silent on this issue. However, in Clay Cross (Quarry 
Services) Ltd v. Fletcher [1979) ICR 1, the Court of Appeal 
decided a case involving a section 1(3) defence in such a 
way as to indicate that the defence cannot be established 
where the employers pay policy indirectly discriminates 
against women. Clay Cross involved an employer's contention 
that setting wages according to market forces constitutes a 
defence under section 1 (3). The Court of Appeal's reasoning 
in this case can only be read as approving the application 
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of the concept of indirect discrimination to clairps under the 
EqPA although the matter was not directly at issue. (See dis- 
cussion at [19791 ICR 1,5,7,9,12). The question of whether 
the EqPA prohibits indirect discrimination was raised and 
addressed more directly in Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Cloth ing Pro- 
ductions) Ltd. (19801 IRLR 6. 
In Jenkins, the employer paid full time workers a higher 
rate per hour than part-time employees. This practice had 
a disproportionate adverse impact on women, since an over- 
whelming proportion of part time workers, -in 
industry gener- 
ally, and in that firm specifically, were female. The employer 
contended that the difference in the number of hours worked 
was a material difference other than sex. The industrial 
tribunal accepted the employer's argument and dismissed 
the case. 
Mrs. Jenkins appealed to the EAT, relying on Article 
119 rather than the EqPA, as earlier decisions of the EAT 
seemed to foreclose the possibility of success under the 
domestic legislation. (For example, the EAT had found that 
part-time work constituted a genuine material difference under 
S 1(3) in Handley v. Mono 11979) ICR 143 and Durrant v. 
North Yorkshire AHA [19791 IRLR 401). The EAT referred 
the case to the ECJ for a determination of whether Article 
119 of the EEC Treaty would prohibit this kind of discrimina- 
tion. The decision of the ECJ appeared to suggest that the 
employer could defend his pay policy unless the motive was 
to discriminate [19811 ICR 592,613, Judgment of the ECJ, 
para. 15) 
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The EAT concluded however that domestic legislation 
c-ould confer greater rights on employers than EEC law, and 
held that regardless of Article 119, the EqPA prohibits 
indirect discrimination ([19811 ICR 715,723-7). The EAT 
stated two reasons for its conclusion. First, the language 
of the statute suggests that it i. s concerned with the effects 
of discrimination. Second, the EqPA is part of a larger code 
addressing sex discrimination, and should therefore be inter- 
preted consistently with the SDA, which expressly prohibits 
indirect discrimination. Thus, the EAT concluded, a pay 
policy or practice which indirectly discriminates against 
women will not satisfy section 10), irrespective of whether 
the employer intends to discriminate, In Jenkins, since the 
industrial tribunal had not considered the claim in terms 
of indirect discrimination, the EAT remitted the case for a 
consideration of the justifiability of the pay policy, 
whether it was in fact reasonably necessary in order to reduce 
absenteeism and obtain maximum utilisation of plant, as the 
employer suggested. ([19811 IRLR 388). The concept of justi- 
fiability is the test used in the SDA*to assess whether 
there is a legitimate reason for the employer to maintain a 
neutral practice which indirectly discriminates against 
women. The question thus arises of what if any is the dif- 
ference in the defences available to the employer found to 
be discriminating indirectly under the EqPA as opposed to 
the SDA. The EqPA sets up the defence of "material dif- 
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VI 
ference other than sex , but in Jenkins, the EAT appear 
to incorporate the SDA's test of justifiability when the 
issue is one of indirect discrimination. The interpretation 
of the concept of justifiability is discussed in more detail 
below. 
5 Thus, as construed by the EAT , the EqPA prohibits 
both direct and indirect discrimination in contractual terms 
of employment, subject to the necessary demonstration of 
comparability by the complainant, and the defences available 
to the respondent. The SDA also prohibits both direct and 
indirect discrimination, although in the later statute, the 
concepts are derived from explicit statutory provisions 
rather than from judicial consruction as in the case of the EqPA 
The Sex Discrimination Act. 
Under the SDA, a person directly discriminates against a 
woman if they treat her less favourably on the ground of her 
sex than they treat, or would treat a man. Týe complainant 
must therefore demonstrate two things, the less favourable 
treatment itself, and the reason for it. The statute gives 
little guidance on the issue of who is a comparable man for 
the purpose of less favourable treatment, stating only that 
the comparison must be such that "the relevant circumstances 
in the one case are the same, or not materially different, 
in the other" (Section 5 (3)). Stated simply, like must 
be compared with like. The-Court of Appeal has stated that, 
in showing that the less favovrable treatment was because of 
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sex, it is sufficient to show that sex was a substantial 
or important element; it is not necessary to show that sex 
was the sole factor. Owen and Briggs v. James [19821 ICR 
618ý 623,625-6, decided under the Race Relations Act of 1976. 
In applying and interpreting the concepts of direct 
discrimination, the EAT has expressly recognized the dangers 
inherent in relying for guidance on what appear to be natural 
or instinctive feelings. Thus, in Peake v, Automotive Pro- 
ducts Ltd [19771, ICR 450, the EAT stated "no guidance can 
be got from instinctive feelings; rather the reverse" and 
explained that: 
... preconceived ideas of what is fit are at best an uncertain guide and the only sure 
course is to follow the words of the Act in 
accordance with what appears to be its policy. 
Occasionally, no doubt it will produce odd 
results, but they are the price which will 
have to be paid for such a sweeping reform. 
(Ibid. at 483,489) 
Peake concerned an employer's practice of allowing women 
factory workers to leave five minutes earlier than men, 
to avoid their being jostled in the end-of-the-day rush. 
The EAT found that this policy violated the SDA, and its 
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal did not unfortunately, unlike the 
EAT, adopt an approach consistent with the words or the 
policy of the statute. Lord Denning held that "it would be 
very wrong ... if this statute were thought to obliterate 
the differences between men and women or to do away with 
chivalry and courtesy which we expect mankind to give woman- 
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kind" ([19771 ICR 968,973). Lord Justice Shaw similarly 
concluded that the statute was not designed to abolish "every 
instinct of chivalry and consideration on the part of men 
for the opposite sex". (Ibid. at 975)., The Court of Appeal over- 
turned the EAT's finding of discrimination and held that 
different treatment did not violate the statute when based 
on "sensible arrangements", "the interest of safety", or when 
the maxim de minimis non curat lex should apply. 
This approach judicially read into the statute a prin- 
ciple of broad exemptions quite at odds with the statutory 
language and purpose. If followed to its logical conclusion, 
such an approach could render the statute essentially mean- 
ingless. Fortunately, for the continued viability of the SDA 
after Peake, subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeal su, -, - 
aest that the earlier approach has been renounced. In r_3 
Ministry of Defence v. Jeremiah [19801 ICR 13,25, Lord 
Denning admitted that he thought on reflection that the only 
sound ground for the decision in Peake was the de minimis 
rule. While Lord Justice Brandon declined to comment on 
whether the Court of Appeal had been correct in Peake, the 
opinion of the third judge, Brightman, LJ, suggests that he 
was in agreement with Lord Denning, although he did not 
expressly consider Peake. In Gill v. El Vino Co. Ltd., 
[19831 PB 425, the Court of Appeal also cast doubt on the 
validity of the de minimis argument. In Gill, the Court 
of Appeal held that a wine bar unlawfully discriminated 
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against women by refusing to serve them unless they were 
seated at a table, while men could be served either seated, 
or standing at the bar. The Court of Appeal held that the 
de minimis argument had no. application to circumstances such 
as these. In Gill, the judges adopted an approach similar 
to that of the EAT in Peake. Lord Justice Eversleigh, for 
example, emphasized that the correct way to analyse the 
issues was "to take the simple words of the statute and try 
to apply them" (Ibid. at 429). 
The concept of direct discrimination-has raised however 
a number of complex questions which are not easily resoliied 
by resort to the "simple words of the statute". The question 
of discrimination against pregnant women for example is 
one where the words of the statute, simply appliedhave led 
to a bizarre result. In Turley v. Allders Department Stores 
1980 IRLR 4, the EAT held that dismissal of a woman employee 
on the grounds of pregnancy was not sex discrimination, since 
sex discrimination involves the unequal treatment of like 
and like. Since there is no male equivalent of a pregnant 
woman, pregnancy discrimination could not constitute sex 
discrimination. 
The EAT in Turley correctly assumed that the less 
favourable treatment of the woman complainant was on the 
Sround. of her sex. In finding that there was no direct dis- 
crimination however, the EAT concentrated on the second 
part of the test if whether the treatment was less favor- 
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able than that which was or would have been accorded a com- 
parable man. The EAT argued that "you must compare like 
with like, and you cannot [because] there is no masculine 
equivalent [of pregnancy]. (Ibid. at 70). The EAT failed to 
consider section 5(3) which requires the court to determine 
the "relevant circumstances", and whether they could be 
"the same or not materially different" in the case of a 
man. If the EAT had treated these issues as the questions 
of fact which they undoubtedly are, rather than deciding 
that dismissal for pregnancy was not sex discrimination 
as a matter of law, the EAT might have reached a different 
conclusion. If pregnancy is viewed as a medical condition 
which necessitates a leave of -absence, then the issue becomes 
one of whether a male employee with a medical condition 
requiring a leave would also be dismissed. If the answer is 
in the negative, then there is a violation of the statute. 
6 
A similar analyt ical confusion to that appearing in 
Turley is found in Schmidt v. Austidks Bookshops Ltd. [19781 
ICR 85, a case involving the validity under the SDA of an 
employers dress code which required women employees working 
in contact with the public to wear overalls, and skirts rather 
than trousers. Similar male employees were of course 
permitted to wear trousers, and did not have to wear overalls. 
A woman refusing to comply with the policy forbidding female 
employees to wear trousers was dismissed. The EAT held 
that there was no sex discrimination because 
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.i. there was no comparable restriction 
which would be applied to men, equivalent 
to that applied to the women preventing 
them from wearing trousers, which could 
make it possible to lead to the conclusion 
that the women were being treated less 
favourably than the men. (Ibid. at 87-88) 
The EAT further explained that when rules governing 
employees' appearance are at issue, a better approach 
than a garment by garment comparison is "to say that there 
were in force rules .. which applied to men and also applied 
to women, although obviously, women and men being different, 
the rules in the two cases were not the same" (Ibid. ) The 
EAT's decision in Schmidt completely ignores the fact that 
women employees were prohibited from adopting a style of 
dress which is, in contemporary society, completely in 
accordance -With normal standards, whereas men suffered no 
similar restriction. 
As in Turley, -the EAT again in Schmidt misconstrued 
the "relevant circumstances" in determining whether there had C) 
been less favourable treatment. 
Direct discrimination includes less favorable treatment 
of individual women based upon stereotypes about women as a 
group. In Skyrail Oceanic v. Coleman (1981], ICR 864, the 
Court of Appeal held that it was unlawful discrimination for 
an employer to dismiss a woman employee on the assumption 
that her husband, and not she, was the family breadwinner. 
This approach is consistent with the statements made in 
Equality for Women that it would "not generally be permis- 
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sible" under the proposed law "to seek to justify discrimina- 
tion on grounds of sex ... on the basis of assumptions 
or evidence about the general differences between the sexes" 
(1974, paras 16,71). The statute as enacted however contains 
a major exception to the principle that individuals are to be 
treated with reference to their own qualities and character- 
istics, and not those commonly associated with persons of 
their own sex, in section 45 which deals with insurance. Sec- 
tion 45 states that it is not unlawful to practice sex dis- 
crimination in relation to an annuity, life insurance policy, 
accident insurance policy or similar matter involving the 
assessment of risk, if two tests can be met. First, the 
difference in treatment must be based on actuarial or other 
dataJfrom a source on which it is reasonable to rely, and 
secondly, the treatment itself must be reasonable, with regard 
to the data, and to any other relevant factors. 
This statutory exception violates the widely accepted 
principle of anti-discrimination laws that people are to be 
treated without reference to assumptions about the group to 
which they belong. The arguments. of insurers that acturial 
data are factually correct does nothing to mitigate the prob 
lem. As the United States Supreme Court stated when con- 
fronted with the question of whether a discriminatory insur- 
ance scheme violated Title VII "(e)ven a true generalisation 
about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying 
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an individual to whom the generalization does not apply" 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v,. Manhart. 435 
U. S. 702,708 (1978). Further, as the Supreme Court pointed 
out in Manhart) actuarial studies could undoubtedly identify 
differences in life expectancy based on variables other than 
sex, including race or national origin, but the Race Relations 
Act of 1976 does not make the same exception for discrimina- 
tion in insurance as the SDA. As Pannick (1985, p. 195) ob- 
serves; the existence of the Section 45 exception in the SDA 
undoubtedly owes much to the lobbying powers of the insurance 
industry in 1975. It is decidedly anomalous that the 
provision should remain in a statute which prohibits direct 
discrimination against women, including that based on stereo- 
types. 
Initially, the Sex Discrimination Bill of 1975 proposed 
to make unlawful only direct discrimination, the concept 
of discrimination that was at the heart of the Race Relations 
Acts of 1965 and 1968. During Parliamentary consideration 
of the bill however, the definition of discrimination was 
amended to include indirect discrimination. This concept 
is derived from the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401U. S. 424 (1971). Title VII did 
not explicitly prohibit indirect discrimination. The con- 
cept was developed judicially through the Supreme Court's 
liberal construction of Title VII's prohibition against dis- 
crimination "because of" membership in a statutorily pro- 
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tected class. In Griggs, the Supreme Court explained that 
Title VII prohibits not onlydirect intentional discrimina- 
tion, but also "practices that are fair in form but dis- 
criminatory in operation" (Ibid. at 431). The court argued 
that Title VII requl.: c-ed "the removal of artificial, arbi- 
trary and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers 
operate incidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other permissible classification. " 
7 (Ibid. ) In deciding 
whether a challenged practice is discriminatory, the Court 
in Griggs stated "the touchstone is business necessity" (Ibid. ) 
The issue before the court in Griggs was the alleged discrim- 
inatory effect of the employer's requirement of a high school 
diploma or the passing of a standardized general intelligence 
test as a condition of employment. The court found that the 
requirements operated to disqualify black applicants at a 
substantially higher rate than white applicants, and that 
neither requirement was significantly related to successful 
job performance. Thus, the court held there was a violation 
of Title VII. 
The decision in Griggs thus estasblished three elements 
for a showing of indirect discrimination or disparate impact: 
a favourably neutral em ployment practice, with a substantial 
discriminatory impact, which is not a business necessity. 
The test of business necessity is also referred to as a test 
of job-relatedness. (See Griggs at 426. ) 
The U. S. Supreme Court applied the disparate impact 
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theory of discrimination to a sex discrimination suit-. in 
Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U. S. 321 (1976) and in so doing, 
discussed in greater detail than in Griggs the concept of 
job-relatedness. In Dothard, a woman applicant for a position 
as a prison guard was refused employment because she could 
not meet the minimum weight requirement. She challenged the 
requirement udner Title VII. The Alabama Board of Corrections 
defended it on the basis of job-relatedness, arguing that 
the minimum height and weight requirements had a relationship 
to physical strength, which was essential to effective job 
performance. 
Relying on gELMs, the Supreme Court in Dothard noted that 
ther'e must be a "manifest relationship" between the challenged C) 
practice or requirement and the employment in question, and 
that the survive must be "necessary to safe and efficient job 
performance" 433 U. S. at 329 n. 14 I. f the employer can 
demonstrate job relatedness to the satisfaction of the court, 
the plaintiff may still prevail if he or she can demonstrate 
that other, non-discriminatory requirements would equally 
serve the employer's legitimate. interests (ibid. ) . Thus, the 
court held that if the employer's job-related quality, 
physical strength, were bona fide, they could, instead of 
using minimum height and weight requirements, have adopted 
and validated a test for applicants that measured strength 
directly. Such a test, fairly administered, said the Court, 
would have served the employer's legitimate purpose, at the 
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same time as complying with Title VII (Ibid. at 332). Conse- 
quently, the Court held that the challenged requirements 
violated Title VII under the disparate J_mpact theory of 
discrimination. 
In British discrimination law, the concept of indirect 
discrimination was created by statute rather than by judicial 
interpretation. The SDA defines the concept in some detail 
but in terminology ambiguous enough that its effective use 
"still depends on sympathetic judicial interpretation" 
(Pannick, 1985, p. 40). The American model was not adopted 
without some changes however, and where American courts 
have looked to a defence of business necessity or job-rela- 
tedness, the British statute speaks of "justifiability". 
The basic statutory provisions are set out in Section 
l(l)(b) of the SDA. This section establishes that a person 
may be liable for indirect sex discrimination even if there 
was no intent to treat the complainant unfavorably on the 
-round of sex. There are four elements to the concept of 
indirect discrimination: 4here must be a requirement or 
condition applied equally to men and women which has a 
disparate impact on women, which is unjustifiable, irre- 
spective of sex, and which imposes a detriment on the com- 
plainant. 
What constitutes a 'requirement or condition' is not 
at all clear, although the appellate courts have given 
some guidance. In Steel v. Union of Post Office Workers 
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[19751 ICR 181) 188, the EAT, referring to Griggs, suggested 
that Section l(l)(b) is concerned with "a practice" that 
has a disparate impact on women, and is unjustifiable. In 
Price v. Civil Service Commission (19781 ICR 27,30, the 
EAT emphasized that "it is necessary to define with some pre- 
cision the requirement or condition which is called in 
question". Price and Steel provide examples of two different 
kinds of facially neutral practice which may be challenged 
as indirectly discriminatory. In Price, the challenged 
practice, a rule that job applicants had to be under 28 years 
old, had a disparate impact on women due to existing social 
conditions under which it is common for women. to interrupt 
their careers during their 20's to bear and rear children. 
In Steel, the challenge was to a seniority rule which had 
a disparate impact on women who, before the passage of the 
SDA in 1975, were not eligible for the status necessary 
to achieve seniority. Steel demonstrated that the indirect 
discrimination provisions of the statute may provide a means 
of challenging the continuing effects of directly discrim- 
inatory acts which occurred prior to the introduction of the 
1975 Act or which might otherwise be time-barred (Pannick, 
1985, p. 43, n. 62) 
8. 
In order to establish the disparate impact on women 
of a challenged requirement, the complaint must show that it 
is "such that the proportion of women who can comply with it 
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is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can 
comply with it" (S. 1 (1)(b)(i)). The EAT, in Price adopted 
a relatively liberal and common-sense approach to the inter- 
pretation of this provision. In that case, the EAT held that 
whether a person "can comply" with a requirement depends 
not on whether it is theoretically possible for her to do so, 
but whether she can do so in practice. Price [19781 ICR 27, 
31. The EAT, in determining whether a smaller proportion 
of women than men could comply with the challenged age require- 
ment took into account the "current usual behavior of women" 
leaving aside "behavior and responses which are unusual or 
extreme" (Ibid. ). Thus, the EAT rejected the argument that 
women could comply with the condition as easily as men, since 
they are not obliged to bear or rear children. 
9 
Another issue raised by this part of the statutory pro- 
vision is the question of what constitutes the relevant pool 
of men and women for the purposes of determining whether there 
is a disparate impact on men and women as members of their 
respective groups. In Price, the EAT stated that the relevant 
pool of men and women may be less than the total population 
and probably consisted of "qualified men and qualified women" 
(19751 ICR 27,32.10 
Once the question of theappropriate pool of men and women 
is decided, the tribunal must decide whether a "considerably 
smaller" proportion of women than men can comply with the 
challenged condition. The statute itself provides no guidance 
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as to what magnitude of disparity is contemplated in this 
subsection. Pannick (1985, p. 46) suggests that Parliament 
presumably meant to exclude cases where the disparity was 
of no statistical significance. The U. S. Supreme Court has 
spoken of a "substantial" and a "significant" discriminatory 
impact in Griggs and Dothard respectively. In both countires, 
it appears that the precise magnitude of variance required 
will be determined on a case by case basis. (See Pannick, 
1985) p. 46; Schlei and Grossman, 1983, p. 98-99). 
Disparate impact analysis raises the issue of whether the 
employer may successfully defend against allegations of 
indirect discrimination by pointing out that as a whole, it 
appointment criteria or employment practices do not result in 
discrimination against the group in question. In the United 
States this argument is referred to as the "bottom line" 
approach and was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in Con- 
necticut v. Teal. In Teal, black plaintiffs challenged the 
employers requirement of passing a written examination for 
promotion to a particular job, showing that the examination 
excluded black applicants disproportionately. The employer 
argued that the court should consider not just the written 
examination, but the entire promotion process which reflected 
no such disparate impact. A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and concluded that the written exam- 
ination requirement violated Title VII because of its dis- 
parate impact on black applicants. The EAT was faced with 
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a similar argument in Price where a response to a female 
complainant's challenge to its age requirement, the Civil 
Service Commission argued that, despite the requirement, a 
higher number of female applicants than male applicants were 
appointed to the job. The EAT said this was notsignificant, 
since the issue was whether the specific requirement is "more 
disadvantageous to women than men" (Price [19781 ICR at 30). 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates there are some 
basic similarities between the American and the British con- 
cepts of indirect discrimination, asizýic-j apply to the facially 
neutral employment practice, or requirement or condition, and 
in terms of the issue of what constitutes a showing of dis- 
parate impact. The third element in the British statutory 
scheme, however, the question of justifiability, makes a 
significant point of departure from the American model which 
speaks in terms of business necessity and job-relatedness. 
During the Parlimentary debates on the SDA, attempts were 
made to replace the word "justifiable" by the word "necessary" 
in clause l(l)(b)(ii). These attempts to amend the bill were 
defeated in the Standing Committee and in the House of Lords 
(Standing Committee B, 24 April 1975, cc-79-80, H. L. Debs. 
14 July 1979, C. 1020). (See discussion in Chapter 4, note. ) 
Under the SDA as enacted, therefore, if the complainant 
establishes that the challenged requirement has a separate 
impact on women, the burden shifts to the resondent to 
"justify" the practice. Notwithstanding the statutory lan- 
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guage of justifiability, the EAT in Steel interpreted the 
requirement as imposing a strict test on the employer to show 
that the practice was necessary, not merely convenient. The 
EAT said that for this purpose it was relevant to determine 
whether the employer could find some other non-discriminatory, 
method of achieving its objective. The EAT stated expressly 
that it had looked to Griggs for assistance, and the opinion 
in Steel demonstrates that the EAT found the concept of business 
necessity useful. 
The EAT remitted Steel to an industrial tribunal which 
held that the challenged practice of allocating postal walks 
by seniority was not justifiable becase of the pre-1975 dis- 
crimination against women which had placed them in a disadvan- 
taged position as to seniority. In Price, the EAT also remitted 
the case to an industrial tribunal, which applied the strict 
test to find the challenged age requirement unjustifiable, as 
there were other non-discriminatory methods available for the 
employer to achieve the stated objective of a balanced career 
structure within the Civil Service (Pannick, 1985, P. 49). 
Unfortunately, the strict test set out by the EAT in 
Steel and Price has been rendered less stringent in some 
later cases. In Singh v. Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd., the(Scotland) 
EAT' he. Lo r-har- an employer does not need to show that the 
requirement or condition is "absolutely essential", rather 
the test is one of "necessity" so long as the term is "applied 
reasonably and with common sense" ([19791 ICR 554). Singh 
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involved an appeal from the decision of an industrial tribunal, 
in a case brought under the 1976 Race Relations Act that it 
was justifiable for the employer to prohibit employees in a 
confectionary factory from wearing beards, despite the dis- 
parate impact on Sikhs. Using the less stringest test, the 
EAT upheld the industrial tribunal's decision. In a similar 
case the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal a decision 
of the EAT, stating that the justifiability of a chocolate 
manufacturers rule that employees be clean-shaven was a question 
of fact that the industrial tribunal had decided to favour 
of the employer. 'Pansesar v. Nestle Co. Ltd. (19801 ICR 144.11 
The impact of these later decisions of the EAT and Court 
of Appeals is twofold: the initially quite stringent test of 
justifiability as set out in Steel is weakened, effectively 
lessening the burden on the employer of defending the chal- 
lenged practice, while at the same time this complex issue 
is to be treated as a question of fact within the discretion 
of individual industrial tribunal. 
Thus, with precedents such as Singh and Panesar, which 
have upheld clearly discriminatory practices on the flimsiest 
of justificatons, the potential effectiveness of the concept 
of indirect discrimination is weakened. The Court of Appeals- 
refusal to review an industrial tribunal's determination of 
justifiability appears to give considerable discretion to the 
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tribunals, which is likely to hinder the development of uniform 
criteria on this complex and significant issue. 
12 As Hepple (1983, 
p. 83) points out, the problem is ultimately that the Court of 
Appeal expects the tribunal members to be able to conduct a 
process of fact evaluation in an area where there is neither 
a social concensus nor a conceftsus among tribunal members. As 
Browne-Wilkinson J noted, "there is no generally accepted view 
as to the comparative importance of eliminating discriminatory 
practices on the one hand, as against, for example, the profit- 
ability of the business on the other" Clarke v. Eley (IMI) Kynoch 
Ltd. [1982] IRLR 482,487 (EAT). 
If the complainant proves that a requirement or condition 
has a disparate impact on women, and the respondent fails to 
justify it, the complainant must show that the practice was 
to her detriment because she cannot comply with it, in order 
to meet the final element of'section l(l)(b)(iii). 
The statutory language of this final element is vague 
and somewhat ambiguous. During the debates on the enactment 
of the statute, a spokesman for the government explained that 
(cont ' d. ) 
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the language was necessary because there must be a particu- 
lar victim of indirect discrimination (H. C. Debs, 18 June 
1975, cc 1498-2). The EAT has adopted a liberal and common 
sense approach to the construction-of the two parts of this 
subsection, compliance and detriment. In Steel the EAT held 
that it is irrelevant that the complainant might or would have 
been able to comply at an earlier date, stating that the time 
to consider whether there is a detriment is that "at which the 
requirement or condition has to be fulfilled" [19781[ ICR 181, 
186). Similarly, the failure to consider an applicant on 
fair terms constitutes a detriment, the complainant is not 
required to show "but for" the challenged requirement she 
would have been appointed or -promoted (Lustgarten, 1980, p. 51). 
The concept of indirect discrimination is an extremely 
important one, as it moves anti-discrimination law forward 
from a view of discrimination which looks only at motives. 
Nevertheless, as the foregoing discussion. demonstrates, the 
concept is also a complex one and much hinges on the inter- 
pretation of the concept of justifiability. If this concept 
is given too liberal a construction, then the potential effec- 
tiveness of the indirect discrimination provisions of the SDA 
will be significantly undermined. 
In addition to direct and indirect discrimination, 
the SDA also prohibits marital discrimination and victimiza- 
tion. 
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Marital discrimination is defined in section 3 of the Act 
and includes both direct and indirect discrimination on the 
basis of marital status. The concepts of direct and indirect 
discrimination are defined in the same way in the context of 
marital discrimination as they are in the broader context of 
sex discrimination generally. While the proponents of the 
legislation were undoubtedly concerned about the effects of 
marital discrimination, the provýions as enacted are seriously 
flawed, in that the statute only prohibits discrimination 
against married persons, not single ones. -Thus, a person 
denied a job because she is single or divorced would have no 
recourse under the marital discrimination provisions. 
Finally, the statute.. makes it unlawful to discriminate 
by way of victimization, which is defined as treating someone 
less favourably because he or 8he has asserted a right under 
the EqPA or SDA, or has otherwise acted by reference to the 
provisions of those statutes. 
The EqPA and the SDA together thus provide a complex and 
often ambiguous statutory framework for the implementation 
of anti-discrimination principles. 
Both the Equal Pay Act (EqPA) and the Sex Discrimination 
Act (SDA) have been criticized for perceived limitations 
inherent in their provisions. The EOC, for example, proposed 
detailed amendments to the Acts in January 1981. Among other 0 
recommendatons, the EOC suggested amending the scope of Sec- 
tion 1 of the EqPA to admit equal pay for work of equal value, 
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including a concept of indirect discrimination in the EqPA 
to correspond to the similar concept in the SDA, and facilita- 
ting collective enforcement through a broadening of the powers C-3 
of the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) and the EOC itself, 
(EOC, January 1981, pp. 5-6). With regard to the SDA, the EOC's 
recommendations included amending Section 1 to prohibit dis- 
crimination on the group s of family status, and amending Sec- 
tion 48 to facilitate affirmative action in training (EOC, 
January, 1981, pp. 4-5). Other proposals were concerned with 
amending the provisions on, for example, advertising and the 
burden of proof. Apart from the proposal regarding the 
definition of equal pay, the Government has taken no action to 
implement the proposals. 
13 
Useful though the EOC's proposed amendment would un- 
doubtedly be in broadening the scope of-the legislation, the 
primary focus in this chapter is not on the construction of a 
blueprint for specific changes. Rather, it is to examine the 
totality of the concepts of equality and discrimination that 
are at the heart of the legislation, and their consequences in 
terms of both of the legislation's capacity to address the 
material situation of women workers, and of its ideological 
ramifications. 
Two of the most trenchant criticisms of the legislation 
have focused on the definition of equal pay, which requires 
a male comparator engaged in the same or broadly similar 
work, and on the absence of affirmative or positive action 
provisions, with the exception of the limited provision for 
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allowable positive action in training. Underlying these two 
characteristics of the legislation is a notion of equality 
which is essentially individualistic, which predicates 
equality upon th'e comparison of like with like, and which is 
procedural rather than substantive. This critique of the 
content of the statutes can be illuminated by considering 
some different ways of defining the nature of equality. 
Rae (1981,0.20) makes a useful distinction between 
"individual-regarding-, " and'-"bloc-regarding"" equalities. The 
notion of individual-regarding equalities-describes the 
situation in which there is one class of equals, and one 
relation of equality holds among all its members. The princi- 
ple of "one person, one vote" falls within this category as do 
civil rights and civil liberties generally. By contrast the 
concept of bloc-regarding equalities posits a situation in 
which the subjects of equality are divided into two or more 
mutually exclusive categories. Bloc-regarding equality demands 
equality between these sub-classes (Rae, 1981, p. 29). This 
concept allows equality to be structured in such a way as to 
require changes that will equalize discrete groups. (V 
The analytically-distinct concepts that Rae describes 
are often conflated in practice. The British discrimination 
legislation is a case in point. The predominant underlying 
tendency in the legislation is the assumption of one class 
of equals and one relation of equality. It is individual- 
regarding. Thus, discrimination occurs when "a woman" is 0 
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treated less favourably than "a man" or vice versa; thus the 
concept is substantively un-gendered. Although such a 
formulation is undoubtedly appropriate in equalizing civil 
rights between men and women, it is demonstrably of less re- C? 
levance in the regulation of employment discrimination, 
because of the structural components to discrimination which 
operate against women as a group. Wolgast (1980, p. 21) arrive! S: 
at a similar understanding when she asserts that the underlying 
assumption of "egalitarian reasoning", similarity between 
men and women, is inappropriate in some contexts since men 
and women "are not exactly alike, or there would not be 
problem in the first place. " 
To see beyond the limitations of the traditional liberal 
approach to equality, it is useful to return to Rae's notion 
of bloc-regarding equalities. A bloc-regarding equality 
would be based on the existing differentiation of men and women 
into distinct groups unequal in terms of the relationship of 
the group to the labour force. The concept of equal pay for 
work of equal value provides an example of such a bloc-regarding 
equality. It is based on the recognition that in a situation 
characterized by a high degree of occupational segregation by 
sex, equality of pay for women cannot be achieved through 
provisions that require comparison with a man doing identical 
or nearly identical work. 
The issue of positive or affirmative action also provides 
an illustration of the different outcomes that are reached 
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depending upon whether a bloc- or individual-regarding notion 
of equality is adopted as a paradigm. 
It is impossible to discuss any modern anti-discrimination 
legislation without considering the question of affirmative 
action, whether it is referred to by that name, or as positive 
action, or reverse discrimination. The first two descriptions tend 
to be used by proponents of the principle, whereas the latter is 
more frequently found in the literature of opposition. Whatever 
term is used the principle generally involves the reservation for 
members of a defined class of fertain benefits, or the practice 
of treating membership in the class as a positive factor in the 
distribution of benefits. 
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1 have used the terms affirmative 
action and positive action interchangeably here, generally preferring 
the former in discussing the American experience and the latter 
in discussing British approaches. 
The philosophical underpinning of affirmative action as an 
essential component of the anti-discrimination principle is a 
recognition that the continuing effects of past discrimination 
can perpetuate discrimination, if all that is provided as a 
remedy is a neutral prohibition on future discrimination. Accord- 
ing to this viewpoint, the point of affirmative action programs 
is to remedy past discrimination by the provision of temporary 
beneficial measures aimed at groups which are, as a whole, 
disadvantaged vis-a-vis other groups in society. 
opponents of affirmative action reject this theoretical 
underpinning and emphasize both the unfairness of affirmative 
action, in terms of its impact on the groups who are not bene- 
ficiaries, and the practical problems that arise in determining 
the scope of elegibility. Whereas the proponents of affirma- 
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tive action emphasize group disadvantage, the opponents empha- 
size the importance of judging each person--as an individual. 
These general assertions about the affirmative action debate 
can be illustrated by a brief discussion of the American case 
of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 
265 (1978). 
Bakke was a white male applicant for a place at the Uni- 
versity of California's medical school at Davis who complained 
that the school's practice of setting aside sixteen places 
each year to be filled by minorities had discriminated against 
him. Bakke and his supporters thus viewed the schools "affirma- 
tive action" policy as one of "reverse discrimination". The 
case represented a confrontation between two conflicting defi- 
nitions of equality and brought to the United States Supreme 
Court the issue of whether in the interest of group rights 
some individual members of the majority could be 
denied benefits to which they miAht otherwise have access. 
Supporting Bakke, the American Jewish Committee's amicus curiae 
brief araued 0 
If an individual is denied admission to a state 
institution even though he is better qualified 
than others who have been accepted, and if 
the denial is due to the fact that he is not 
a member of a particular racial or ethnic group, 
his personal and individual right to be free 
from discrimination has been infringed. (Drey- 
fuss and Lawrence, 1979, p. 95). 
The attorney for the University by contrast framed the issue 
as being one of 
216 
... whether a state university ... is free voluntarily, to take into account the 
fact that a qualified applicant is black, 
Chicano, Asian, or Native American in order 
to increase the number of qualified members 
of those minority grops trained for the 
educated professions ... professions from 
which minorities were long excluded because 
of generatons of pervasive racial discrim- 
ination. (Ibid. p. 177) 
This intractable dichotomy between individually-defined 
rights and collectively-defined rights is at the heart of the 
debate over affirmative action, and indeed is central to 
any understanding of anti-discrimination law. 
Bakke raised before the U. S. Supreme Court the issue of 
the constitutionality of "benign" race consclious measures. In 
reaching a decision the Justices filed six separate opinions, 
which left manS questions unanswered. Four Justices refused 
to consider the constitutionalquestion and decided the issues 
on the basis of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but 
five justices, a majority of the court affirmed the constitu- 
tionality of race-conscious affirmative action. 
The validity of voluntary affirmative action programs under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was brought before the U. 5, 
Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Webber 
443 U. S. 193 (1979). that case theCourt held that Title 
VII, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
on the grounds, inter alia, of race or sex, does not prohibit 
employers and unions from agreeing upon and implementing a 
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race-conscious affirmative-action plan which reserves 50%_ 
of the places in an in-house training program for black employees. 
In addition to voluntary affirmative action, American 
courts may order affirmative action relief, extending beyond 
individuals to classes of protected persons, as part of their 
broad discretion to fashion relief and bar future discrim- 
ination (Am. Jur 2nd, 1986, Job Discrimination, Section 2343). 
The British legislation by contrast with the American 
law, rejects almost completely the concept of affirmative 
action. Sections 47-49'of the SDA permit but do not require 
some limited positive action with regard to training programs. 
Otherwise, Parliament explicitly rejected the extension of the 
concept to any area such as recruitment or promotion, where 
it might havehad greater substantive effect. The refusal 
to incorporate positive action provisions is consistent 
with the individual-regarding and procedural approach which is 
the prevailing tendency in-the legislation. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some 
provisions in the statutes which are essentially bloc-regard- 
ing and thus the question then becomes one of explaining the 
shift between approaches for particular provisions. Provisions 
in the statutes which breach the notion of simple individual- 
regarding equalities include those prohibiting indirect dis- 
and by judicial extension in the EqPA 
crimination in the SDAýexempting protective legislation 
from the coverage of the SDA, and exempting terms and condi- 
tions conferring special treatment on women by reason of child- 
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birth or related issues from the EqPA. 
The retention of protective legislation occasioned some 
adverse comment from Conservatives during the Parliamentary 
debates on the EqPA and the SDA, but was not the focus for a 
serious political challenge. By contrast, however, the inclu- 
sion of positive action provisions would doubtless have 
provoked serious opposition, both inside Parliament and outside, 
not least because positive action in the sex discrimination 
legislation could have paved the way for similar provisions 
in subsequent race discrimination legislation. 
This analysis is necessarily speculative. In the policy 
debates, the peg on which the rejection of affirmative action 
was hung was the notion of formal equality. 
15 While some positive 
action in training was seen as a move towards "genuine equality", 
affirmative action in terms of access to jobs would amount to 
"reverse discrimination". In the counter-position of "genuine 
equality" and "reverse discrimination, " the dichotomy between 
bloc-regarding and individual-regarding equality, is clear. 
Eaualitv of oonortun4tv for individuals iS eauated with aenuine 
ecruality, whereas JD en, gn ciender-conscious- -. -.. easures u, 4th ziore 
substantive effect would constitute reverse discrimination. This 
view of the proper boundaries of discrimination law mirrors 
that of many American critics of affirmative action. Nathan 
Glazer (1975, p. 201) for example, attacks affirmative, action 
in these terms: 
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Compensation for the past is a dangerous 
principle. It can be extended indefinitely 
and make for endless trouble .... When it is 
established that the full status of equality 
is extended to every individual ... one has done all that justice and equity call for and 
that is consistent with a harmonious multi- 
grouD societ-u. 
In this statement the ideological ramifications of 
individual-regarding equality clearly appear. Not only does 
this approach ignore inequalities between groups, it negates 
their validity. 
As well as involving the distinction between bloc-regarding 
and individual-regarding equalities, the positive action debate 
also involves the distinction between procedural and substantive 
equality, or as Mayhew (1968) describes it, between "equal oppor- 
tunity" and "fair shares" approaches. These two strands of anal- 
ysis are in practice often related but are analytically distinct (Rae, 
1981, ch. 4). By validating af f irmative action in only a very 
range of circumstances, with respect to training the SDA fore- 
closes the possibility of a substantive group-oriented approach 
to remedying past discrimination. It remains unlawful for an 
employer to give favourable treatment, other than in training, 
to women or racial minorities even where an employer volun- 
tarily desires to do so to remedy the effects of past discrimin- 
ation. The omission of any provision for affirmative action 
in the areas of hiring or promotion underlines the limited 
concept of equality which informs the major part of the statu- 
tory code. 
It is not at all likely in the present political cli- 
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mate that proposals for the incorporation into the British 
legislation of an affirmative action approach would be viewed 
favourably by those with the power to make the decision. 
Governmental inaction in the face of the EOC's more modest 
proposals does not augur well for any attempt at strengthening 
the law. 
Even assuming that this were not the case, the uncritical 
incorporation of an affirmative action approach into the SDA, 
would still leave major flaws in the way in which the legislation 
addresses the problem of gender inequality. The origins of the 
sex discrimination legislation lie in race discrimination law, 
in the United States and Britain. one of the assumDtions behind 
the legislation is that the same general concepts are applicable 
to both forms of discrimination, thus ignoring and denying the 
specificity of each. 
In many respects the sex/race analogy is an inadequate one 
in the context of employment discrimination law. The 
(cont ' 
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specificity of women's position in the labour force is not 
shared by minorities)regardless of sex. Thus, the assumption 
that the same concepts of discrimination will adequately 
address the experiences of both groups is based on a spurious 
notion of the similarity of the position these groups occupy, 
as groups, in the labour market. This assumed similarity 
derives from the understanding that both groups are the vic- 
tims of discrimination, but in this context, discrimination 
appears as an abstract category, independent of the social 
practices which constitute the relations between races, or 
between men and women as gendered individuals. 
It is important to emphasize that this distinction 
depends not just upon the fact that women are differentiated 
from men by physiology, but also, and most importantly, by 
the social relations of gender differentiation. 
The discrimination legislation both recognizes this dif- 
ferentiation, in some of its provisions, and denies it by 
relying on abstractions which do not relate to women as gender- 
ed individuals. For instance, S. 2(l) of the SDA provides 
that clauses relating to sex discrimination against women 
are to be read as applying to women. Section'2 (2) provides 
that in applying subsection (1) no account shall be taken of 
special treatment afforded to women in connection with preg- 
nancy or childbirth. These sections were the legal crux of 
the matter in Turley v. Allders Department Stores, 1980.. IRLR 4, 
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in which a majority of the EAT held that dismissal for 
pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination under the 
stat, 
Sex discrimination, they reasoned, involves treating 
men and women unequally, simply because they are men and 
women. When a woman is pregnant she is no longer Just a 
woman; she is a pregnant woman, for which there is no mas- 
culine equivalent. Like cannot therefore be compared with 
like. This reasoning paralles that of the U. S. Supreme 
Court in Gilbert v. General Electric_, 425 U. S. 125 (1976) 
which held that an employee income protection plan that 
covered all temporary disabilities except pregnancy did not 
discriminate on the basis of sex, but only between pregnant 
persons and non-pregnant persons. 
The point here is not however to focus on pregnancy as 
such, but to illustrate some of the contortions of logic that 
arise from a failure to appreciate that equality must some- 
times recognize differences of an unalterable nature. How- 
ever, failure to deal adequately with physiological differ- 
ence is not the only problem in the statutes' approach to 
gender relations. The approach is fundamentally contradictory. 
The legislation insists, for example, on a definition 
of equality which depends at bottom on the similarity of 
women and men, and yet specifically exempts from its coverage 
a whole range of policies and practices which negate the 
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notion of women as independent economic subjects. Thus 
fiscal and social policies continue to be predicated on 
an idealized image of the bread-winning husband and dependent 
wife/mother, which translates into specific practices in 
the tax and social security systems that discriminate against 
women. These practices are left intact under S. 51 of the 
SDA. 
Thus, married men receive an additional tax allowance for 
their wife and this "reflects the assumption that it is a 
married woman's unpaid job to care for chi ldren and that if 
she cannot do so, her husbadd is entitled to financial assis- 
tance for someone else to perform the job. In contrast, a 
woman on her own, even if working is not considered by the 
courts as in need of an allowance for a substitute childminder, " 
(O'Donovan, 1979, pp. 145-6). Similarly, in the social 
security system, Invalid Care Allowance is available to 
married men, single men and women, and more recently exterided 
to friends) who are unable to work because of the need to pro- 
vide constant care. However, this benefit is not payable to 
married women on the assumption that they will be at home 
and available to perform caring dutids without need for com- 
pensation (Millar and Phillips, 1983, p. 420). 
Given the prevailing stereotypes of women presented 
at all levels of society, e. g. , the media and education, 
it is not expected to find the legal system reflecting these. 
Social reality is, however, more complex than these partial 
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representations of women as dependents, as primarily wives 
and mothers, would suggest. As more and more women enter 
the labour force, and as more and more married women simul- 
taneously work inside the labour force and outside of it, 
it is not surprising either to find that discrimination laws 
also approach the issue of women's 'two roles' in contradic- 
tory fashion. 
These observations demonstrate some of the ways in which 
women are not 'like' minorities for the pu rpose of discrimina- 
tion law. The Race Relations Act does not have to exclude 
other legislation from its coverage, because the social 
security and tax systems do not discriminate against racial 
CIO 
minorities as the-y-Va-gainst women. The point of this argument 
is not only to suggest that these exemptions should be 
repealed, it is also to stress the different structural 
position of women as workers as compared with members of 
minority racial groups. 
16 
To return to the issue of affirmative action, the ques- 
tion then can be posed of whether the kinds of affirmative 
action plans developed in the context of ending discrimination 
against racial minorities can also address the problems 
faced by women in the labour force. Quota systems, prefer- 
ential hiring and increased access to promotion and training, 
which are the main features of employment affirmative action 
plans, must go some way to improving the position of women 
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in the work force, as experience in the United States has 
shown. 
17 
Nevertheless, given the particular nature of women's 
relationship to the labour market, because of the nexus 
between waged labour and familial responsibilities, it is 
questionable whether such programmes, if fully implemented, 
could open up opportunities for women in the same way as 
they might for Kmale) minority members, absent some other 
changes concerning women's family role. Such changes were 
dismissed as falling outside the scope of a discrimination 
bill, when they were raised during the Parliamentary debates. 
This perspective is shared by some commentators. Chiplin and 
Sloane (1982, p. 122) for example, noting that it is an 
fluncontrovertable fact" that the majority of women get married, 
and that many raise children, argue "if this pattern is to 
change, it requires the fundamental review of attitudes well 
beyond the scope of any equal opportunity legislation. " 
Arguments of this kind are based upon the assumption 
that if women's family role impinges upon their ability to 
participate fully and equally with men in the labour force, 
then resolution of the problem must occur within the family. 
In this formulation the problem is one of private attitudes 
towards family responsibilities, that place the burden pre- 
dominantly upon women. To regulate private attitudes towards 
domestic responsibilities is clearly outside the scope or 
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capacity of discrimination legislation. Such an argument 
implicitly accepts the limitations of the present definition 
of discrimination legislation and the notion that it must 
operate within the present (male) model of employment patterns 
and practices rather than seeking to change them. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to delineate some 
of the ways in which the discrimination legislation appears 
to be conceptually inadequate, if intended as a serious 
response to women's present position of econonic disadvantage. 
This critique is not intended to suggest that these inade- 
quacies were consciously structured in to the legislation to 
defeat its purpose. Like Lustgarten (1980, p. xiii), I view 
the errors as flowing from errors of perception and analysis, 
timidity, and the influence of constraints imposed by the nor- 
mal workings of the legal system. TO his list I would speci- 
fically add the conceptual confusions arising from the applica- 
tion of a sometimes inappropriate concept of equality. 
Whether these misconceptions could be corrected requires 
an analysis of the feasibility of extending discrimination 
laws in the current political and economic climate. Such a 
speculative endeavour is beyond the remit of this research, 
although, intuitively, such a prospect seems unlikely. What 
appears to be clear, however, is that there is nothing in- 
herent in the legal form itself that would prohibit a less 
abstracted or more substantive approach. Affirmative action, 
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in the United States has shown the possibility of modest 
steps in this direction, within the legal framework of a 
capitalist society. 
Rae (1981, p. 15) points out that conceptualizing 
equality as either bloc-regarding describes only a "struc- 
tural grammar" of equality and does not address the question 
of content. I have argued here that effective changes in the 
law must consistently construct equality upon a recognition 
of gender difference, where appropriate, rather than upon a 
spurious assumption of identicality. Thus, the content of an 
amended law should "gendered" to the degree that such a recog- 
nition of gender difference is necessary to effectuate equality 
of employment opportunity in its broadest sense. A change of 
this kind would necessitate a shift in the law from an essen- 
tially negative perspective, to one that included some elements 
of positive action. 
Finally, the question that must be asked is whether the 
adjudicative form of dispute resolution is suited to the task 
of resolving disputes that arise under anti-discrimination 
law. If it is recognized that an individualistic approach 
to equality is flawed and that an emphasis on specific 
collectively-defined rights is more appropriate, then a major 
area of concern must be what form of arbitration is best 
adopted for the task of implementing that approach. The 
issue may simply be phrased as determining whether adjudica- 
tion between private parties is an optimal or even adequate 
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means of resolving issues of bloc-regarding equality. 
Polanyi (1951) has pointed to the "polycentric" nature 
of many tasks. Fuller (1978) adopts this concept in address- 
ing directly the kinds of social tasks that can properly 
be assigned to courts or other adjudicative agencies, and 
what therefore are the limits of effective legal action. 
Fuller points out that legislative determinations often can 
only become fully effective if they are of such a nature that 
they are suited for judicial interpretation and enforcement, 
and argues that polycentric situations present special problems 
for such a process. 
A polycentric situation is one that involves interacting 
points of influence, and will normally involve many affected 
parties and a somewhat fluid state of affairs (Fuller, 1978, 
p. 307). Thus, an adjudicative decision may have wide and 
unforeseen consequences affecting individuals other than the 
original parties. Fuller notes three possible consequences 
when an attempt is made to deal with an essentially polycentric 
problem through an adjudicative forum. First, the adjudica- 
tive solution may fail, with unexpected repercussions making 
the solution unworkable, so that it is ignored or withdrawn. 
Second., the arbitrator may ignore judicial properties in an 
effort to resolve the issues presented, and third, the 
arbitrator may reformulate the problem so as to make it 
amenable to solution through adjudicative procedures. 
Polycentricity is not of course the only structural 
variable that may affect the limits of adjudication. Eisenberg 
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(1978, p. 424) suggests that the problem of multiple criteria 
cannot be ignored. Thus, the issue appears as one of analysing 
the structural properties of the issues presented for adjudica- 
tion to determine their aptitude for adjudicative resolution. 
While one of the central problems of the present anti-discrim- 
ination legislatIOn is its emphasis on individual rights, changes 
in the direction of a collective definition may not yield the 
desired effect if no attention is paid to the necessity of 
determining appropriate or effective means of enforcement. 
This chapter has focused exclusively-on the conceptual 
limitations of the legislation. This is not to suggest, how- 
ever, that the legislation has-no merit. Some women have 
received higher pay because of the-Equal Pay Act. Others have 
successfully brought claims of sex discrimination. Further- 
more, the principle of using legislation to provide for equal 
employment opportunity is now recognized, in a way that it 
wasnot, prior to the passage of the statutes. Thus, the 
terms of the debate have now shifted, and rather than arguing 
the need for legislation, and the propriety of a legislative 
solution, it is now possible to debate the content of an 
effective discrimination law. 
Meanwhile, the law as it stands offers at least a partial 
solution to discrimination in the labour force. How that 
solution operates in effect depends upon the system of enforce- 
ment and implementation that the legislation establishes. This 
system is the subject of analysis for Part II of this study. 
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NOTES 
1 In discussing the appellate decisions, the analysis is 
directed primarily, at the years 1976-1981, the period covered 
in the empirical study of tribunal decision-making in Part II 
of this dissertation. 
2 In 1982 the European Court of Justice held that the United 
Kingdom was in breach of EEC Directive 75/117 which guarantees 
equal pay for work of equal value without sex discrimination 
Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom (19821 
ICR 579. -The British Government then amended the 1970 Act to 
attempt to comply with Community Law. With effect from January 
1,1984, a woman can also claim equal pay for work of equal value 
with that of a man in the same employment. See Equal Pay Amend- 
ment, Regulations 1983, S. I. no. 1794. 
3 The interpretation of these concepts, and the employer's 
defences under the EqPA is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
10 below. 
4A 
number of problems have 
Section 1(3). Court's and ttib 
difficulty in understanding the 
ers may legitimately rely on to 
other than sex. See Chapter 10 
arisen in the application of 
unals seem to have had some 
kinds of factors which employ- 
establish a material difference 
below. 
5 It should be noted that the EAT in Scotland decided, con- 
trary to the holding of Jenkins, that the 1970 Act did not 
reach indirect discrimination. Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health 
Board, Eastern District [19841 IRLR 88,89-90. 
6 This was the approach taken by the author of the dissent- 
ing opinion in Turley Id, at 71, per Ms. P. Smith. 
7 Griggs involved racial discrimination. The Supreme 
Court fir-st applied the concept of indirect discrimination in 
a sex discrimination suit in Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U. S. 
321 (1977). 
8 The EAT in Scotland held that a case of this kind involved 
issues of direct rather than indirect discrimination Record 
Production Chapel. SOGAT v. Turnbull 16 April 1984, unreported, 
cited in Pannick (1985) p. 34, n. 30 
9 The House of Lords has approved the approach of the EAT 
in Price to the interpretation of the words "can comply" in 
a case brought under the Race Relations Act, Mandla v. Dowell 
Lee (1983) 2AC 548,565-6. 
10 This approach was upheld by the Court of Appeal in a 
race discrimination case, Perera v. Civil Service Commission 
(1983) ICR 428,437. 
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11 
The Appellate Comm-itte-, of the 
that it is a question of fact in each 
justification has been shown. Mandla 
2 AL 548,566-7 per Lord Fraser. 
L2 
The EAT reverted to the Steel test in Hurley v. 
Mustoe [19811 ICR 490, despite Lý ýhand Panesar. 
However in a 1982 case, the Court of Appeal equated "justifiable" 
with "reasonable" Ojutiku v. M. S. C. (19821 ICR 661. 
13See footnote 2. 
14 
For a discussion of these issues see e. g. Alan H. Gold- 
man (1979) Justice and Reverse Discrimination; Ronald Dworkin 
(1977) Takiii-g Rights Seriously; Owen M. Fiss (1971) "A Theory 
of Fair Employment Laws" 38 U. Chi Law Review 235; Nathan Glazer 
(1975) Affirmative Discrimination; Ethnic Inequality and Public 
Policy. 
. 
15 
For a more detailed examination of the language of the 
policy debates, see Chapter Four, below. 
16 The position of minority women will of course be 
conditioned upon both the fact of being female, and upon being 
a member of a minority race or ethnic group. 
17 The 1972 settlement between the EOC and AT & T, for 
example, included an agreement by the employer to upgrade 
50,000 qualified women (10% in management).,, and ý-o place over 
6,000 women in "traditionally male" jobs. See also the 
account of affirmative action programms in ten public utility 
companies, U. S. Department of Labour, (1978), R. and D. 
Monograph 65. 
House of Lords confirmed 
case whether or not 
v. Dowell Lee (1983) 
18 See Chapter Four, above 
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CHAPTER SIX 
OVERVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
In this part of the study, attention turns to the 
mechanisms through which the statutory provisions of the 
anti-discrimination legislation are given force and 
practical meaning. It is important to stress that the 
particular enforcement mechanisms that are chosen by policy 
makers are at least as important as the substantive concepts 
embodied in the law, in determining the particular 
perspective on discrimination that the legislation advances 
and legitimates. It should also be emphasized that the 
substantive concepts in the legal definition of 
discriminationt and the enforcement mechanisms associated 
with them cannot be viewed as having separate and 
independent existences. Ratherr the legislator's underlying 
assumptions about the nature of sex discrimination and the 
role of law colour both the substantive concepts which are 
used to define the parameters of the problem, and the 
enforcement system established as the basis of remedy. 
Thusr. an approach to discrimination which is essentially 
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formalistic, and which incorporates an overt assumption 
about the limits of law in challenging discrimination is 
consonant with an enforcement system which emphasizes 
individual rightsr the provision of remedies coextensive 
with violations, and the processes of conciliation, 
persuasion, and education in preference to litigation. 
In giving specific form to these notions of what 
constitutes appropriate measures for enforcement, policy- 
makers drew upon a number of sources: the experience of 
government intervention under the 1964 and 1968 Race 
Relations Act; American models in the enforcement of anti- 
discrimination legislation; and the existing British 
mechanisms for the mediation of government intervention in 
industrial relations. This combination of factors has 
produced a system which is distinctively legall in the sense 
of the law's specialized institutions and procedures, and in 
the law's unique power of compulsion to affect the 
relationship of private partiest but which is at the same 
time penetrated to a considerable extent by ideas and 
institutions which are uncommon in this distinctively legal 
environment, such as a preference for conciliation, the 
incorporation of lay persons as 'experts, ' and the 
structural representation of interests other than the 
judicial. 
In the particular form that anti-discrimination 
legislation takes, there is a further distinction between a 
traditional common law approach with its emphasis on 
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individual remedies for the violation of individual rights, 
and a public or administrative law approach which can be 
seen in the creation of a new quasi-governmental 
organization, fulfilling in part the role of a regulatory 
agency. Of the two perspectives, the common-law approach is 
predominant in the legislation: individual complaint is the 
primary form of access to remedy, and the actions of the 
regulatory agency are ultimately subject to the injunctive 
power of the courts for enforcement. 
In this chapter, I briefly describe the system of 
enforcement for the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts, 
and examine the roots of the system, in the machinery of 
state interventionr in industrial relationsy in race 
discriminationt and in the models of enforcement provided by 
the experience of the United States. The purpose here is to 
provide an overviewr i. e., schematically rather than in 
depth, of the major concepts which inform the enforcement 
system; and to summarize its important features. Chapter 7 
examines in more detail the structure of private enforcement 
focussing on individual complaints and the tribunal hearing. 
Chapter 8 provides an analysis of administrative enforcement 
by examining the role of the Equal opportunities Commission 
(EOC). Finallyl Chapter 9 concludes the analysis of the 
enforcement system by examining the issues associated with 
the question of remedy. 
The Equal Pay Act established two procedures for 
enforcementr one individual and one collective. An 
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individual may apply to an industrial tribunal, for an award 
of entitlement to equal pay. Once a complaint is filed with 
the central offfice of the industrial tribunalst a copy will 
be forward to the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS)j which has a statutory duty to attempt to 
reach a-settlement between the parties, without recourse to 
a tribunal hearing. If no such settlement is reached, the 
complaint proceeds for a determination on the merits by an 
industrial tribunal. Where unequal pay results from 
discrimination between men and women in a collective 
agreement or pay structure, one of the parties to the 
agreementr but not an individual affected by itt may apply 
to the Central Arbitration Committee for a ruling on the 
removal of the discrimination. 
Under the Sex Discrimination Act, individual 
enforcement in employment cases also lies through an 
application to an industrial tribunal, and is subject to the 
same possibility of intervention by ACAS. In addition to 
providing the individual enforcementr the SDA established, 
the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) with a general duty 
to work towards the elimination of discrimination and to 
promote equality of opportunity between men and women. The 
EOC cannot pursue complaints on its own behalf, 2 but it may 
assist individuals to do so. The commission also has powers 
of investigation, which can result in the issuance of a non- 
discrimination notice, and ultimately the power to seek 
injunctive relief through the courts. 
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These structures derive from two main sources: first, 
British experience in establishing industrial relations 
machinery,, and second, American experience with 
administrative enforcement in the area of race 
discriminationr and subsequent British experience in this 
area. 
I. The Influence of Industrial Relations Structures 
And Concepts 
Commentators have pointed out that, at least until the 
mid-1960'sr the British industrial relations system, and the 
approach to industrial and labour relations law upon which 
it was predicated, was characterized by a high degree of 
informality and Ivoluntarism' (Donovan, 1968; Brownr 1978; 
Anderman, 1979). By comparison with countries like the 
United States and West Germanyr the British system was 
marked by a relative absence of legal intervention (Foxr 
1979). Legislation tended to be limited to protecting the 
right to striker and to ensuring a very basic 'floor of 
rights' for employees (Andermant 1979)f but the main feature 
of the system was a preference for voluntary collective 
bargaining between employers and unions as a way of settling 
labour issues. 
After 1945, successive governments intervened more 
actively in the industrial spherer but the policies pursued, 
and the special institutions developed, were not accompanied 
by powers of legal intervention, but ratherr followed 
traditional boundaries, emphasizing a preference for 
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educationj persuasiont and voluntary methods, even where 
modest sanctions were providedy as in the Factories Acts of 
1959 and 1961 (Fox, 1979, p. 480). 
A change began in the mid-1960's, however, when 
governments began a process of accelerated intervention in 
the field of industrial relations, resulting in the 
establishment of new kinds of machinery and enforcement 
structures, albeit ones established upon the voluntaristic 
premises of the earlier period. This intervention included 
a number of statutes designed to make good some of the 
deficiencies in the achievements of collective bargaining 
that Fox (1979r p. 482) refers to as measures designed to 
enlarge the floor of individual employment rights. This 
sequence of intervention began in 1963 with the Contract of 
Employment Actr which gave employees rights to minimum 
periods of notice and to a written statement of the 
particulars of employment. 
The process of'intervention was given a boost by the 
Donovan Commission 
3 (1968), which made a series of 
recommendations on individual rights, advocating legal 
protection against unfair dismissal, and the creation of 
statutory machinery to adjudicate complaints. The statute 
which best characterizes this 'floor of rights' 1 egislation 
is perhaps the 1975 Employment Protection Act (EPA), which 
extended the protection against unfair dismissal of earlier 
statutesr and guaranteed other statutory rights including 
guranteed wages for workless dayst the right to paid 
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maternity leave with subsequent re-instatement, an increase 
in the minimum required periods of notice, and the right to 
time off the job for trade union duties. 
With the exception of the maternity leave provisions, 
these measures were designed to apply actually, or 
potentiallyr to all employees regardless of race or sex. 
However, the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act, 
together with the Race Relations Act of 1968 and 1976, 
should also be seen as an essential part of this 'floor of 
rights' legislation, although each is designed to apply 
specifically to only limited categories of persons. As with 
other examples of 'industrial' legislationy the statutes 
addressing equal pay, sex and race discrimination, emphasize 
conciliation rather than legal sanctionst and all of the 
statutes display common elements in their enforcement 
procedures. All the statutes also share the characteristic 
that legal intervention is tempered by the voluntaristic 
attitudes of the earlier era, and that the use of law in 
'industrial relations, ' under which category employment 
discrimination is subsumed through the legislative contextr 
is viewed as a last resort should other more conciliatory 
methods fail. This view is expressed succinctly in the 1978 
Annual Report of one of the industrial relations agenciesr 
the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC): 
There is in Great Britain a strong underlying feeling 
that the detailed process of the lawy with inexorable 
logic rarely tempered by wider considerations, is not 
suitable for the day-to-day settlement of a wide range 
of disputes that arise, especially those involving 
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elements of bargaining. (CAC Annual Report 1978, 
p. 12) 
Conciliation 
Successive governments through the twentieth century 
have not only supported an emphasis on settling industrial 
disputes through conciliation and voluntary arbitration, but 
have also provided government concilation machinery to 
facilitate this objective. In 1896, the Conciliation Act 
established conciliation and arbitration machinery in the 
Board of Trade. This machinery was transferred to the new 
Ministry of Labour in 1916, and subsequently to that 
ministry's successors. (ACAS, 1980, p. 24). 
Until 1974, a variety of conciliation services were 
provided in the Department of Employmentr but in that year 
the independent Conciliation and Arbitration Service was 
established on an administrative basis. The following year, 
this organization became the Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) and was established as a 
statutory body under the Employment Protection Act (EPA) of 
1975. 
ACAS has a general duty of promoting the improvement of 
industrial relations and encouraging the extension of 
collective bargýLining. In addition to giving advice on 
industrial relationst issuing codes of practicer and 
assisting in the resolution of industrial disputes, ACAS has 
a responsibility to undertake individual conciliation work 
under a number of statutes including the EqPA and. -the SDA. 
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Under S. 64(l) of the SDAr where a complaint has been 
made under S. 63 of the SDA, or S 2(l) of the EqPAr a copy 
of the complaint will be sent to an ACAS conciliation 
officer, who has a duty "to endeavor to promote a settlement 
of the complaint without its being determined by an 
industrial tribunal. " ACAS has similar responsibilities 
under other 'floor of rights' statutesr and cases brought 
under the EqPA and the SDA represent only a very small 
proportion of the organization's individual conciliation 
workloadr with by far the largest number of complaints 
concerning unfair dismissal. 
The provision of a standing national arbitration 
organization in the field of industrial relations dates back 
to the Industrial Courts Act of 1919. The EqPA as 
originally written gave the industrial court jurisdiction 
over equal pay disputes arising in the context of collective 
agreementst because Barbara Castle, then the Secretary of 
State,, argued#, "The industrial court is clearly the body 
best qualified to deal with disputes about collective 
agreements because of its considerable experience in this 
field. " (H. C. Debst 9 Feb., 1970F c. 920). The Industrial 
Court was replaced in 1971 by the Industrial Arbitration 
Board, which was itself replaced by the Central Arbitration 
Committee, which came into operation in 1976 and took over 
its predecessors' responsibilities, including jurisdiction 
over equal pay disputes in collective agreements. However, 
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as is the case with ACAS, responsibility for the EqPA has 
accounted for only a very small part of the workload of the 
CACt particularly since 1979 when a Court of Appeals 
decision affectively narrowed the scope of the 
organization's jurisdiction by promulgating a very 
restrictive definition of its responsibilities under the 
EqPA. 4 
The origins of the industrial tribunal system are to be 
found in the context of the development of a much broader 
judicial/administrative establishment, which started in the 
nineteenth century, when there was an increase in the volume 
of legislation producedr and a corresponding development in 
the adjudicatory and administrative machinery of government. 
By the first decade of the twentieth centuryp tribunals of 
various kinds were well established as a feature of the 
British political systemr but the real proliferation of 
tribunals came after the Second World War, as governments 
took responsibility for intervention in more and more areas 
of social and economic life. 
Industrial tribunals were initially established under 
Section 12 of the Industrial Training Actr 1964, to 
determine appeals by employers against the assessment of the 
industrial training levy. In 1963, the Council on Tribunals 
had been consulted by the Ministry of Labour on its 
proposals to establish "industrial levy appeals tribunals. " 
The Council advised the establishment of standing tribunals 
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on a regional basis. The Ministry of Labour proposed to 
take as its model the Pensions Appeal Tribunal with the Lord 
Chancellor appointing a national President who would have 
responsibility for establishing individual tribunals as 
appeared necessary. 
In 1964, the Ministry amended its proposals so that 
tribunals would now be established as 'all-purpose bodies, 
incorporating training levy appeals, redundancy payment 
appeals, -and compensation disputest under the same 
jurisdiction. The Council on Tribunals approved of this 
course of action on the ground that it would provide for 
economy of administration and make it easeir to attract 
persons of high calibre to serve on the tribunals. Further, 
the proposed scope of decisions had in common the fact that 
they rested on an understanding of industrial conditions 
(Council on Tribunalsr 1965). 
Since 1964, the scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction 
has expanded enormously, and encompasses the EqPA and the 
employment provisions of the SDA, as well as responsibility 
under the 1975 EPAr the Race Relations Act of 1976, the 
Employment Protection (Consoiidation) Act of 1978 and the 
Employment Act of 1980. In announcing the government's 
intention to use the industrial tribunal system for 
enforcement'of the EqPA, the Secretary of State for 
Employment announced that the aim was to provide a 
means of redress which is speedyt informal, and accessibler" 
and that in the industrial tribunals ". . we have the ideal 
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machinery to handiff explaining that "It is ideal because the 
tribunals are experienced in dealing with employment 
matters, they include representatives of workersf and they 
sit at various centres scattered throughout the country. " 
(H. C. Debs, 7 Feb. r 1970, c. 920). 
Since the 1970 EqPA gave the tribunals jurisdiction 
, over equal pay casest it appeared rational to legislators 
considering the proposals of the Sex Discrimination Bill, to 
extend their jurisdiction to other complaints of sex 
discrimination in employment. There was no opposition in 
Parliament to this aspect of the Government's proposals, 
although concern was expressed over the paucity of women 
members in the industrial tribunals. 
Tribunals consist of a legally qualified chairperson, 
and two lay membersr one drawn from each side of industry. 
The fact that these tribunals are quasi-legal rather than 
fully incorporated into the legal structure is emphasized 
not only by the incorporation of lay members as key 
personnelt but also by the fact that normal rules of civil 
procedure are relaxed for tribunal hearings. 
Decisions of industrial tribunals are not reported, and 
do not constitute precedent. However, the 1975 EPA created 
the Employment Appeals Tribuna 1 (EAT), which hears appeals 
from the industrial tribunals on questions of law, and 
constitutes a superior court of record. From the EAT, 
appeals may be taken to the Court of Appeal, and ultimately, 
to the House of Lords. 
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The Effect of the Industrial Relations Model of Enforcement 
The concepts and structures borrowed from the 
enforcement of industrial legislation have the effect of 
defining the employment aspects of anti-discrimination as a 
particular aspect of 'industrial relations' rather than as 
instances of a phenomenon that must be construed in a much 
broader social context. As an aspect of 'industrial 
relations' the parameters of the problem are thus defined in 
a particular way, a way which focuses exclusively on the 
employment relationship to the exclusion of the social and 
economic factors which operate to produce 'discrimination. ' 
Defining employment discrimination as a subset of industrial 
relations also has consequences for the interests that are 
legitimately seen as needing to be represented in the 
adjudication processr and thus for the composition of 
enforcement and conciliation agencies. Structurallyr the 
major impact of the industrial relations_model has been the 
contribution of enforcement structures and procedures which 
emphasize the redress of individual grievances through a 
system which normatively prefers conciliation to legal 
adjudicationr and which in the initial procedural stages at 
least holds out the promise of informality and ease of 
access. 
5 
However, the industrial relations model for state 
intervention is not the only one that informs the 
enforcement procedures of the anti-discrimination 
legislation. A second major contribution came from ideas 
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about, and experience int the 
- 
enforcement of race relations 
legislationr which drew in turn upon American models of 
enforcement. The influence of these two strands is most 
visible in the idea of a central administrative agency with 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the lawr 
although it also added an independent impetus to the 
emphasis given to conciliation which is at the heart of the 
industrial relations model. 
The Influence of j?, a'ce'--biscrimination Legislation 
In designing the EqPAr the Labour government was able 
to rely entirely on the existing industrial relations 
machinery for enforcement, since the Act was concerned with 
a phenomenon that was approached by legislators purely as an 
industrial relations issue. In designing the SDA, however, 
broader concerns were apparent, and other models provided 
exemplars for a system of enforcement. Directly and'- 
indirectly, the experience of the United states in 
implementing anti-discrimination legislation had 
considerable effect: directly, because since 1964, federal 
law had prohibited sex discrimination in employment under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 6; and indirectlyr because 
earlier American experiences in the enforcement of race 
discrimination legislation provided models for the British 
Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968t which in turn provided 
lessons to those concerned with establishing an enforcement 
system for the new sex discrimination legislation. 
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Early Policy Approaches to Race Discriminatign 
In the United Statest early attempts to outlaw racial 
discrimination depended on criminal penalties. Racial 
discrimination was a criminal offense under many state 
statutes from the time of the Civil wary but such statutes 
fell into disuse because "prejudices penetrated the judicial 
system in the South, with the result that few prosecutions 
were broughtf white judges interpreted the law in favour of 
white defendants, and predominantly white juries were 
unwilling to convict. " (Bindman, 1978, p. 284). 
The first proposals for race discrimination legislation 
in Britain also suggested the use of criminal penalties: a 
series of private members bills introduced in the 19501sr 
all provided for racial discrimination to be made a criminal 
offense. This approach persisted in the proposals which the 
Labour government introduced into iýarliament in April 1965, 
the Labour party having pledged in its 1964 General Election 
manifesto to make race discrimination illegal. 
However, by 1964, supporters of legislative 
intervention were suggesting alternative approaches to 
enforcement which was ultimately to prevail over the use of 
criminal penalties. These approaches too were based on 
American experience. In the United States after 1945f first 
7 in New Yorkr then in some other states, and then in the 
federal system, 'a model of administrative enforcement of 
anti-discrimination law had developed and become the norm. 
Details of the enforcement machinery varied between 
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jurisdictions, but the basic approach established racial 
discrimination as a civil wrong, which could be remedied not 
in regular civil proceedings but through the intervention of 
special administrative agencies. An aggrieved individual 
would complain to a commission which had a duty to 
investigate complaints. If 'probable cause' were found, the 
commission would attempt to reach conciliation between the 
parties. If conciliation was impossible, then the 
commission could convene a public hearing, and, following a 
determination that discrimination had occurred, order an 
appropriate remedy. This model describes the basic approach 
to enforcement embodied in a number of state statutes and in 
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which established the 
Equal Employment opportunities Commission as a first state 
in the discrimination complaints procedure. 
American experience with administrative enforcement 
began to influence British thinking on the subject of race 
discrimination legislation, as early as the 1950's 
8 
although it was not until the introduction of a Government 
bill in 1965 that its practical impact was felt. 
The Race Relations Acts and 1965 and 1968 
In early 1964f the Labour NEC had asked both the Shadow 
Cabinet and the Society of Labour Lawyers to draft proposals 
for race discrimination legislation and although the former 
(in the shape of the Soskice Committee) recommended criminal 
penaltiest (in the context of legislation dealing only with 
incitement and discrimination in public places) the latter 
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(the Martin Committee) advised the incorporation of the 
American practice of administrative enforcement (Hepple, 
1968: 131). Subsequently, a new group which formed around 
some members of the Martin Committee (the Lester group) 
drafted proposals for the establishment of a Statutory 
Commission to deal with discrimination. The proposals aimed 
at achieving compliance without formal proceedingst but with 
the Commission having the back-up of the power of 
investigation, and the authority to enforce its decisions 
through the courts. (Hindellt 1969: 185; Heppler 1968: 131- 
2). 
Although the Government's bill as originally proposed 
established only criminal penaltiesf extensive lobbying by 
the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD)F and the 
Lester group and associates, brought about a transition to a 
system in which race discrimination would constitute a civil 
offense, remediable through conciliation and administrative 
enforcement. This approach formed the basis of the 1965 
Race Relations Actr (which did not include employment in its 
coverage) and the 1968 Act (which did extend to employment). 
Although based on American models, the British system of 
enforcement did however include some significant points of 
departure from these examplars, 
The 1965 Race Relations Act established a Race 
Relations Board (RRB), which, in conjunction with local 
conciliation committees, was given exclusive authority to 
investigate complaints of discrimination; individuals had no 
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right of direct access to the courts. This technique of 
entrusting to an administrative agency the sole right to 
bring proceedings for breach of law was "almost without 
precedent" in British civil law. (Lester and Bindmanj, 1972j,. 
p. 290). In fashioning the RRB the policymakers had drawn 
on the idea of the American regulatory agency rather than 
the British civil law tradition. The new Board was not 
however given the wide range of powers possessed by its 
American counterpartsr and lacked the authority to call 
witnesses to subpoena documentsy to require answers to 
interrogatories or to issue orders. This lack of authority 
was a deliberate strategy chosen by legislators who 
preferred to emphasize the techniques of conciliation, and 
who regarded the grant of enforcement powers as inconsistent 
with the success of such techniques. The Board was not even 
given the authority to pursue legal action, should its 
attempts of conciliation fail. Rather, it was up to the 
Board to make appropriate referrals to the Attorney General 
for the institution of legal proceedings. So ineffective 
was this system of enforcement, that in the three years 
after the passage of the 1965 Act,, no cases of racial 
discrimination reached the courts (Byrne and Lovenduskir 
1978r p. 133). 
In 1967l when there was already pressure afoot to amend 
and reform the 1965 RRA, the RRB and the National Committee 
for Commonwealth Immigrants commissioned a study of the 
working of anti-discrimination legislation in other 
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countries, especially the USA and Canada. The study was 
published as the Street Report, in November 1967, and made 
detailed proposals for the extension of legislation in 
accordance with the lessons to be learned from North 
American experience. Although this study was quite 
influential, a number of compromises were made in drafting 
the new proposals, with the result that there were major 
differences between the enforcement system that became law 
in the 1968 RRA and the North American experience as 
reflected in the Street Report (Lester and Bindman, 1972). 
Dissatisfaction with the 1965 RRA resulted in the 
enactment of a new Race Relations Act in 1968. This Act 
expanded the coverage of its predecessorl but did little to 
improve upon the powers of enforcementl preferring instead 
to continue to encourage the process of persuasion and 
conciliation. However, the 1968 Act enlarged the scope of 
the conciliation process to include the securing of 
individual rights by the reconstituted Race Relations Board 
which could now, if conciliation failedr apply to the Courts 
for damages on behalf of the individual seeking relief. 
Other than the grant of authority to appear in legal 
proceedings, the Board was given no additional powers of 
enforcement, and individual claimants continued to be barred 
from direct access to the courts. 
Thusy although American experience played a crucial 
role in developing the pattern for the enforcement of race 
discrimination legislation in Britain, the impact was 
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limited to the choice of civil over criminal proceedings, 
the emphasis on conciliation, and the idea of the statutory 
commission. - It-did not extend to the conferral on the RRB 
of the kinds of powers enjo yed by its American counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the notion that conciliation was a necessary 
part of enforcement, and the idea of the administrative 
agency were in themselves of considerable importance in the 
subsequent design of the enforcement machinery for the SDA. 
The SDA: The Idea of Administrative Enforcement 
The first concrete attempts to enact sex discrimination 
legislation in Britain came with the introduction in 
Parliament of a series of private members bills between 1968 
and 1973. With regard to the question of a structure for 
enforcementr these bills were in general agreement on the 
need to establish a statutory commisison, an Anti- 
discrimination Board, to which complaints of sex 
discrimination could be referred. These proposals drew 
heavily on the experience of enforcing the 1905 and 1968 
Race Relations Acts. 
However, while stressing conciliation, and 
incorporating the idea of enforcement by an' administrative 
agency, the private members bill also proposed to leave open 
the opportunity for individuals to institute legal 
proceedings on their own behalff independently of the 
proposed Anti-Discrimination Boardr since experience in 
implementing the 1968 RRA had illustrated the problems in a 
? ý, 
system where a single agency had responsibility for sifting 
all complaints. 
The idea of an Anti-Discrimination Boardt and the 
powers that had been proposed for it, came under scrutiny 
whenr in 1972-73? a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
met to consider the Anti-Discrimination (Number 2) Bill. 
The Committee agreed with the general notion of an Anti- 
Discrimination Board, with two important modifications. 
First, the Committee proposed that if attempts at 
conciliation failed, then the case should-be referred either 
to an industrial tribunalf in an employment caser or back to 
the Anti-Discrimination Board itself - thus giving the Board 
a quasi-judicial function. Secondr and equally 
significantly, the Committee recommended that in addition to 
investigating complaints, the Board should play a more 
positive and independent role. in the investigation of 
discrimination in both the public and private sectors. A 
House of Lords Select'Committee considering the proposals 
set out in Baroness Seearls. bill reached broadly similar 
conclu sions about the desirable scope and functions of an 
Anti-Discrimination Board. The Conservative government was 
unwilling to accept the Committee's recommendationsp 
especially with regard to the establishment of an 
organization that would have extensive powers to. investigate 
discrimination on its own initiative. 
In September 1973, howeverr the Conservative government 
produced a consultative document in which it set out its own 
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proposals for sex discrimination. The proposals covered 
discrimination in employmentr but not education, housing or 
the provision of goods and services, and, for enforcement, 
relied on the system of industrial tribunal adjudication 
which was already in place in the provisions of the EqPA. 
The proposals included the ideal of an Equal Opportunities 
Commission, "with the power to conduct wider ranging 
inquiries into the relative positions and opportunities of 
men and women; to publish its findings in the form of 
reports to the Government, and to educate and persuade 
public opinion" (Equal opportunities for Men and Women, 
19731 paragraph 11). Since the organization was envisioned 
as having a purely advisory role, 
9 the whole burden of 
enforcement was to lie with the individual complainants. 
In February, 1974, a General Election brought the 
Labour Party to power and in September 1974, a White Paper 
was published setting out the new Labour Government's 
proposals for. sex discrimination legislation (Equality for 
Woment September, 1974). These. proposals went further than 
those of the previous government in their coverage, which 
extended to issues besides employment, and in their approach 
to enforcement. This White Paper drew upon the Opposition 
Green Paper, Discrimination Against Woment published by the 
Labour Party in 1972. 
In the White Paper the government advocated the 
establishment of an Equal Opportunities Commission which 
Would have more extensive powers than those proposed by the 
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Conservatives. The Labour proposals represented an explicit 
compromise between reliance solely*on individuals for 
enforcement, and on a system in which a state agency was 
solely responsible (as with the RRB). Under the first of 
these options it was felt that the impact of the legislation 
would be relatively slow, and random in its effects. 
Howeverr drawing on the experience of implementing the Race 
Relations Act it was also felt that the option of channeling 
all complaints to a board or commission would lead to a pre- 
occupation within the organization with individual 
complaints, to the detriment of a broader, more strategic 
approach. Consequentlyr-tbe Labour proposal sought to 
maintain the right of direct access to courts or, in 
employment casest tribunalst and combined this right with 
the establishment of a new commission with some significant 
powers of enforcement. 
The Labour Government's Proposals For an Equal OD]Rortunities 
Commissign 
The Labour Governmentr introducing the proposals of the 
White Paper in the House of Commons, explained their 
conception of the role of an administrative enforcement 
agency, stating: 
The Government proposed to set up a powerful Equal 
Opportunities Commission with responsibility for 
enforcing the law in the public interest on behalf of 
the community as a whole. The commission will be able 
to represent indivi 
' 
duals in suitable and significant 
cases but its main role will be strategic; to identify 
and deal with discriminatory practices by industries, 
firms or institutions (H. C. Debs 23 July 1974f c. 1297- 
8). 
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The powers proposed for the new Commission in the White 
Paper included the authority to conduct investigations on 
its own initiative into any area covered by the legislation. 
such investigations could either be broad-ranging or limited 
to a particular organization or establishment. If, as the 
result of such an investigation the Comnission found evidence 
of illegal discrimination, it would have the authority to 
issue a 'non-discrimination' notice,, ordering such 
discrimination to cease. Upon non-compliance with a non- 
discrimination notice, the Commission would have the 
authority to seek legally binding enforcement through the 
Courts. These proposals relating to the power to conduct 
investigations in the absence of an individaul complaint 
drew upon, but were more extensive than, the authority to 
conduct investigations conferred on the Race Relations Board 
by the 1968 Race Relations Act. The Street report had 
recommended that the Board should be able to take the 
initiative in dealing with discriminatory practices, but the 
1968 statute gave only a very qualified power to do so, a 
power which was ordinarily dependent on the existence of an 
identifiable victim. (1968 Race Relations Actr Section 17). 
In order to proceed in the absence of an individual 
complaint the Board had to have reason to suspect that there 
had been unlawful conduct during the prescribed preceding 
period. For conduct to be unlawful, it hadr except in cases 
involving advertisements or incitements to discriminate, to 
affect a particular, indentifiable victim. Thus, it was not 
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enough for the Board to suspect discrimination on the basis, 
for example, of the pattern of employment in a particular 
establishment, unless it also suspected that a particular 
victim had been discriminated against (Lester and Bindman, 
1972F p. 317). The RRB's power to investigate in employment 
matters was further limited by the requirement that the 
Board refer the matter to the Secretary of State for 
Employment before carrying out an investigation. If the 
Sec retary of State was satisfied that suitable voluntary 
industrial relations machinery existed to deal with the 
matter, it would be referred to that body for investigation. 
The investigative powers of the RRB under the 1968 Act 
showed how clearly the scales were tipped in favour of 
caution, persuasionr and conciliation, and how against a 
determined strategy for enforcement. 
10 
The Race Relations Board noted that the section 17 
provisions afforded an "inadequate means" of securing full 
equality of opportunity because of the requirement that the 
Board suspect a specific act of discrimination had occurred 
when 
ea in many instances, a discriminatory situation may be maintained with-few deliberate acts of 
discrimination, because individuals may simply not seek 
the opportunities because they have what they consider 
good reasons to expect rejection. . Failure to identify an unlawful act or acts does not thereforer 
necessarily imply that the situation under 
investigation is not discriminatory (RRBr 1974 in EOC 
1977: P7). 
By contrastj the proposals in the 1974 white Paper did 
r- 
not limit investigations to those situations where a 
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suspected discriminatory act had occurred, but included 
those circumstances where there was suspicion of a pattern 
of possibly illegal conduct. As suchr it represented a more 
forceful approach to enforcement in the public interest, 
particularly since, unlike the situation under the 1968 Act, 
no area covered by the legislation was to be exempt from the 
possibility of investigation. 
Apart from the authority to conduct investigations on 
its own initiative, the Commission proposed in the white 
paper was to have the right to institute legal proceedings 
in respect of discriminatory advertising, to conduct 
research in any field having a bearing upon sex - 
discrimination, to review the operation of the legislation, 
and to advise the Government on any matters relating to the 
legislation. Whilst individuals were to retain the right of 
direct access to courts and tribunals, the Commission was to 
be empowered at its own d-iscretion to support and advise 
individual complainants. 
In March 1975, the Government introduced into 
Parliament its proposed legislations. As far as a system of 
enforcement was concernedr the proposals put before 
Parliament were essentially those authorized in the White 
Paper. The EOC's power to conduct inquiries on its own 
initiative was now formalized into a procedure for formal 
investigations and the Commission was given powers to 
require disclosures of information in the pursuit of such 
investigations. Introducing the bill at its Second Reading 
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the Home Secretary described the proposed system of 
enforcement in some detail: 
ee The Bill goes well beyond the previous Government's proposalsy which would have given no 
enforcement role to the Equal Opportunities Commission, 
and which were, in generalf somewhat lacking in teeth. 
Also# the Bill in some respects*has strengthened what 
was proposed in the September White Paper. 
We propose to set up an Equal opportunities Commission. 
The Commission will be able, on its own initiative, to 
investigate discriminatory practices; for this purposes 
it will have powers to require the production of 
relevant information, and it will be empowered to deal 
with unlawful discriminatory practices by issuing "non- 
discrimination notices" which will require the 
cessation of these practices and will be enforceable by 
the courts by way of injunction (H. C. Debs. r 26 Marchr 1975, c. 521). 
The Commission was also to have the power to assist 
individual complainantst although the Minister noted that 
the Government intended that this power should be reserved 
for "important or significant" cases (ibid. ). In addi. tion 
to the power to assist individuals,. -tbe Commission was given 
direct power of enforcement in three areas where "the public 
interest role predominates. " These areas included 
discriminatory advertisingf. discriminatory instructiont and 
cases involving pressure to discriminate. In such cases, 
the EOC was to be empowered to obtain a court order (Ibid., 
c. 522). 
These proposals reflected not just the experience 
gained in implementing the Race Relations Acts, but also the 
example provided by an American regulatory agencyr the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), established 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A member of 
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the EEOC had given evidence to the House of Lords Select 
Committee, and the general model of American anti- 
discrimination policy was familiar to at least some Members 
of Parliament. Some members, indeed, visited the United 
states in 1975 on a fact-finding mission concerned with the 
issue of race discriminationr and the Home Secretary paid a 
separate visit. However, as was the case with the 
enforcement machinery for the Race Relations Actst the 
proposals in the SDA reflected some aspects of the American 
approachr but not all. The major contribution of American 
public policy was the concept of the statutory commission 
rather than the specific powers and authority of the EEOC. 
11 
conclusion 
The enforcement system is based on ideas and structures 
drawn from the system of industrial relations enforcement in 
Britainr and from the American apprpoach to administrative 
enforcement of anti-discrimination lawsy mediated through 
British experience with the idea of a central enforcement 
agency under the first two Race Relations Acts. 
Of the two influencest it is the former that is the 
most significant, penetrating as it does all aspects of 
employment discrimination enforcement. The industrial 
relations model of enforcement has influenced the structure 
of enforcement, the approach, which emphasizes the 
. conciliation of 
individual claims, and the composition of 
the institutions involved. The effect of this influence is 
to reinforce the notion that employment discrimination is 
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essentially an employment issue, and to de-emphasize the 
broader societal factors which perpetuate women's position 
of relative disadvantage. The influence of the 
American/race discrimination model is apparent in the 
establishment of the EOCr but here too the industrial 
relations model has been influential in determining the 
composition of the Commission. 
The industrial relations model and the American race 
discrimination model have been overlaid upon a basic civil 
law approach to dispute resolution, the impact of which is 
most clearly seen in the appellate structure, the importance 
of precedent, and in the approach to the provision of 
remedies (See Chapter 9). Th6 common-law influence is also 
manifest in the individualistic nature of the enforcement 
system, with industrial tribunal complaints as the primary 
forum for adjudication. 
In borrowing from divergent sourcesy the legislation 
sets up two systems of enforcement, one individual and 
initially quasi-judicial, at the higher levels of appeal, 
fully judicial, and one administrative. The systems are not 
completely separater but operationallyr are so to a large 
extent. Individual access was preserved to prevent the 
problems of overloading that had occurred under the Race 
Relations Acts; but as it stands, the system presents 
problems of its own (see Chapter 7). The idea of 
administrative-enforcement is one borrowed initially from 
the United States; but it is a partial borrowing with 
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significant differences in the powers available to the 
British and American agencies. Generally, the British 
system of administrative enforcement has emphasized 
conciliation and persuasion, but has not provided any 
significant enforcement powers (See Chapter 8). 
In terms of remedies, the system operates firmly within 
a common-law traditionr but remedies are narrowly limited by 
statute (see Chapter 9). 
Each of the remaining chapters focusses in more detail 
upon the operation of a particular aspect of the hybrid 
system of enforcement outlined here. Each aspect, be it 
tribunal adjudication, administrative enforcement, or 
available remedies, presents its own particular intricacies 
and problems. It is useful however in considering these 
factors in detail to remember the genesis of the system of 
implementation, its roots in divergent traditionst and the 
definition of equality and discrimination which is implied 
by the choice of enforcement procedures such as the ones 
detailed here. 
The burden of bringing and proving the complaint is 
thus an individual one, and perhaps more significantly, the 
remedy is also limited to the individual. In such a system, 
change must of necessity be slow. 
Such a system also implies a particular approach to the 
definition of discrimination, andr'at the same time is 
sustained by such a definition. The limiting properties of 
the substantive definition and th e system of implementation 
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are thus self-reinforcing. The approach to discrimination 
in the statutes is a highly individual one; the very 
language of the statutes emphasizes this orientation. More 
importantlyr the debates which preceded passage of the Acts 
gave no hint of an understanding of discrimination as a 
collective or group phenomenony a position which contrasts 
considerably with that of the United States. In this 
context, the preference for individual enforcementr and the 
relatively weak provisions for group remedies in the system 
of implementation are not surprising. The parameters of the 
implementation system are determined to a certain extent by 
the impicit definition of the problem at issue, as well as 
by the external models of enforcement available to public 
policymakers. 
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NOTES 
This provision refers only to direct discrimination. See 
footnote 4 below. 
2 Except with regard to discriminatory advertising, and 
situations involving pressure to discriminate. 
3 The Donovan Commission was formally the Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and Employerst Associations, set up in 1965 
by the Labour Government under the chairmanship of Lord 
Donovan. It issued its report in June, 1968. 
4 R. V. Central Arbitration Committee Ex Parte Hvmac Ltd. 
(1979)r IRLR 641. This case held that the CAC went beyond 
its powers in scrutinizing provisions in collective 
agreements that were indirectly discriminatory. (See Appendix C. ) 
5 It is perhaps ironic that the result of reliance on an 
industrial relations model should be an emphasis on 
individual remedies, rather than collective ones. Howeverr 
this orientation derives from the procedures which developed 
in the context of the 'floor of rights' legislation and is 
properly within the mainstream of British industrial 
relations grievance machinery. 
6 42 U. S. C. s. 2000 e et sea. prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis. of race# coulour, religion, 
national origin or sex. 
7 The New York system is described in Sovern (1966) ch. 3. 
For other examples see Btumrosen (1965) (New Jersey); Mayhew 
(1968) (Massachusetts); Dyson and Dyson (1965) (Kansas). 
8 The Commonwealth Sub-committee of the Labour NEC asked 
two expertsg in 1952j to give advice on sponsoring race 
discrimination legislation. one, Dr. Kenneth Little, urged 
the establishment of administrative machinery similar to the 
American Fair Employment Practices Commission (Hindell, 
1969; 184). 
9 The experience of some American states with purely 
advisory commissions was not encouraging, and had already 
led to a questioning of the worth of commissions lacking 
enforcement powers, in both Britain and the United States. 
See e. g. Sovern (1966), p. 56, Hepple (1968) p. 135. 
10 The system also demonstrates the bargaining power of 
industry, both unions and management, which was able to 
persuade the government, in passing the 1968 Acty to protect 
employment issues from outside intervention by mandating the 
use of existing voluntary industrial relations machinery. 
See discussion in Hepple (1968) p. 4-5. 
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11 The differences between the two commissions are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 8 below. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEMENT: THE TRIBUNAL SYSTEM 
Although the legislation makes some provision for 
collective enforcement, the main emphasis in the enforcement 
system is on the individual complaint. As such, the 
individual enforcement procedures deserve a prominent place 
in any study of the implementation or effects of the anti- 
discrimination legislation. 
A concern with the question of implementation may focus 
either on the meaning of law as interpreted and 
administered, or on the processes and'structures which 
mediate the transformation of a grievance through the 
various stages of legal enforcement to a successful or 
unsuccessful conclusion. In this chapter the focus is on a 
number of important structural and procedural issues which 
emerge from a study of the individual complaint process, 
from the -initiation stage, through the process of possible 
concilation, settlementr or withdrawal, to the tribunal 
hearing itself. 
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Par more complaints are initiated than ever reach a 
tribunal hearing, so it is necessary to consider the factors 
which may explain both the relatively low complaint rate 
under the legislation, and the relatively high drop-out 
rate. These issues are addressed in the first part of the 
chapter. Of the complaints that reach the stage of a 
tribunal hearing, only about one quarter succeed on the 
merits. In the second part of the chapterr I attempt to 
identify factors which may operate at the pre-hearing and 
hearing stages which may contribute to the low success rate, 
independently of the 'merits' of an individual case. To 
undertake this analysis is to recognize that the 
adjudication process involves more than the application of 
legal concepts to a fact situation, but also depends in part 
on the interplay of legal, proceduralf structural and social 
factors within the context of judicial or quasi-judicial 
decision-making. 
COMPLATNTS AND THEIR nT POSTTTON 
It is not possible to discuss the individual complaint 
process outside the context of the number of cases brought, 
and their disposition at various stages of the process. 
The main features of the statistics on individual 
complaints under the anti-discrimination legislation are the 
relatively small number of complaints that are made each 
year, and the even smaller number that proceed to a 
successful resolution by an industrial tribunal. 
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TsIble 7. 
Total Number of Applications under the SDA and EOPA, where 
-a-ction 
has been completed, 1976-1982. 
122-E 1977 1978 1979 
'IM 
1981 
EQPA 1742 751 343 263 91 54 
SDA 243 299 171 178 180 256 
TOTAL 1985 1050 514 441 271 310 
(Source: Annual Reports of the EOC) 
Table 7 shows that although the overall trend has been 
an enormous decline in the number of complaints brought 
since the first year of implementation this decrease is 
nearly all accoýnted for by a fall in the number of equal 
pay applications, with complaints under the SDA remaining 
fairly constant. In 1977, women's average hourly earnings 
reached a peak of 75.5% of men's. Since that time, there 
has been no real improvement in the ratio of men's to 
women's earningsr and equal pay applications have declined 
steadily. The EOC notes that these figures indicate that 
the extent to which individual men and women see the 
Equal Pay Act as providing a remedy worth seeking has 
reached an all-time low. * The figures may also indicate 
that the EqPA has had whatever effect it can be expected to 
have. unless amendments are made to its present scope. 
Againr the EOC notes we remain of the view that 
women's relative earnings have reached a plateau and are 
unlikely to show any significant improvement so long as the 
law remains unaltered. w In this context, it is worth noting 
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that Chiplin and Sloane's (1982) work suggests that limited 
as the impact of the EqPA on earnings appears. to be, the 
reality may be even less encouraging. Chiplin and Sloane 
note the difficulty of isolating the effect of the EqPA 
on earnings from other influences and suggest that some of 
the improvement in the mid 1970s may owe as much to the 
existence of a flat-rate increase incomes policy as to the 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
The low number of applications under the EqPA and SDA 
is emphasized by comparison with complaints arising under 
other pieces of employment legislation. Statistics produced 
by the Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS) show the enormous difference between the numbers of 
complaints raised under the legislation regulating unfair 
dismissal, which comprise about 90% of the agency's 
individual conciliation workload, and the numbers of cases 
arising under the anti-discrimination legislation. 
Table 8 illustrates that equal pay and sex discrimination 
work accounts for only a small percentage of the workload 
which reaches the first of the employment legislation 
enforcement agencies. 
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TabIg-1. 
Complaints received-by ACAS, by year and-tvpe. 
I= 12M 1979 1980 1981 
Unfair Dismissal 38r224 39j289 39rO33 41,925 42j949 
Equal Pay 984 1024 241 81 96 
Sex Discrim. 367 279 264 519 339 
Race Discrim. 206* 507 558 463 503 
*June-December only 
(Source: Annual Reports of ACAS) 
The EOC produces statistics which show the outcome of 
the cases on which action is completed in any given year. 
This information, summarized in Table 9, shows that each 
year somewhere between 50% and 75% of all applications will 
not proceed. to a tribunal hearing for a disposition on the 
merits. For those that do proceed, the success rate is low. 
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Tgble 9. 
Disposition qf complaints brought under the Equal Pay and 
sex Discrimination Acts-, caseg completed, 1276-1981. 
121A 1977 2M IM 1980 2231 
Eaual Pav Act 
Total Cases 1742 751 343 263 91 54 
Completed 
of Which: 
proceeded to 40.7% 48.3% 23.3% 29.7% 28.6% 50.0% 
hearing 
dismissed 28.5% 36.2% 16.3% 24.7% 24.2% 38.9% 
upheld 12.2% 12.1% 7.0% 4.9% 4.4% 11.1% 
Sex Discriminatign Act 
Total Cases 243 299 171 178 180 256 
Completed 
% of Which: 
proceeded to 49.0% 33.6% 39.2% 33.1% 38.3% 34.8% 
hearing 
dismissed 39.1% 26.2%- 31.0% 25.3% 30.6% 28.5% 
upheld 9.9% 7.4% 8.2% 7.9% 7.8% 6.3% 
(Source: EOC 1982, p. 32) 
The cases which do not proceed to a tribunal hearing 
are either withdrawn or settled prior to that stage of the 
adjudication process. Table 10 shows the withdrawal and 
conciliation rates. 
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zable-21. 
butcomes-of applicati ons to industrial tribunals, _1979-198i. 
Equal Pay Act 
1212 12aa 19-U - 
Total Cases 263 91 54 
Conciliated 29 10 9 
settlements 
withdrawals: 
Private Settlements 20 5 1 
Unknown 136 50 17 
Hearings: 
Upheld 13 4 6 
Dismissed 
ti A i i i 
65 
t 
22 21 
gn c sex D scr m na 
Total Cases 178 181 256 
No. of Male 39 62 59 
Applicants 
Conciliated 46 46 53 
Settlements 
Withdrawals: 
Private Settlements 10 8 4 
Unknown 63 57 110 
Hearings: 
Upheld 14 14 16 
Dismissed 45 55 73 
(Source: Annual Reports of the E. O. C., r 1979-1981) 
The low numbers of initial complaints, the high 
withdrawal rate, and the low success rate of cases heard by 
the tribunals all require some explanation. 
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A. The Number of ComDlaints 
There are several possible explanatory factors which 
may lie behind the low complaint rate under the anti- 
discrimination legislation. First, it could perhaps be 
argued that the low complaint rate reflects an underlying 
situation in which there is no discrimination against women, 
where the problem which the legislation was supposedly 
enacted to remedy has been solved. However, official 
statistics show that the male/female earnings gap is still a 
fact of life, and most economists would concede that some of 
this difference is attributable to discriminationt although 
there is some disagreement over the exact proportion. 
Research into employers' attitudes and practices indicates 
that men and women workers are still subject to different 
treatment and expectations in the workplace. In a survey of 
768 establishments with 11 or more workersl conducted under 
the auspices of the EOC and SSRC, 5% of all managers 
interviewed were prepared to admit to breaking the law in 
respect of the introduction of equal pay, and a further 2% 
were unable to say whether the laws was being broken or not 
(EOC Research Bulletinr 1981, F p. 7). As to the SDAj, "... the 
findings of the survey indicate that the Act had only a 
limited impact in all but a minority of establishments" 
(Ibid. p. 9). When asked whether there was an equal 
opportunities policy in operation at the establishment, 40% 
of managers in the survey said there was not. Although 60% 
replied in the affirmative, only 14% said that there was a 
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written equal opportunities policy, and a mere 3% were' 
willing or able to produce a copy of such a policy (Ibid., 
P. 11). 
There can be little doubt that the substantive 
inequality that the legislation purports to address 
continues to characterize womens relative position in the 
labour force. Explanations for the low complaint rate must 
therefore focus on other factors. 
one possible explanation is that women do not perceive 
their work situation as discriminatory. In 1980t the 
Commission of the European Community published the results 
of a survey of women in paid employment in the nine 
countries, which suggests that the perception of 
discrimination is limited by*the gender composition of the 
work environment in which the individual is employed. 
Respondents were asked-to sayr based on their own 
experience, whether it was an advantage or disadvantage to 
be a woman, with respect to eight possible areas of 
employment discrimination. on each of the eight factors, a 
majority of women in all countries thought that there was no 
discrimination at their place of employment; and of all the 
women interviewed, the British respondents felt the least 
disadvantaged on the ground of sex (European Commission, 
1980l pp. 40r 45). The study demonstrated that the single 
most important explanatory variable affec. ting perception of 
discrimination was the gender composition of the working 
environment: "The feeling that discrimination does not 
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exist or that where it does exist it is in the women's 
favour, is the view predominantly of those who work in an 
all-female environment" (Ibid., p. 52). The authors go on 
to state: 
... there are many women who work in an all-female 
environment and, because of this, have no experience 
of, and perhaps little understanding of what it is like 
to be in competition with men in a working environment. 
It is clear that when... the competitive atmosphere 
exists ... awareness of discrimination is much more 
common (Ibid. p. 70). 
In light of this finding, the statistics on 
occupational segregation (see Ch. 2, supra 
significant, and raise the question of the 
of a remedy which relies on individuals to 
complaints in a society where the work fori 
by sex to such a high degree. 
Where discrimination is perceived, it 
are especially 
appropriateness 
initiate 
ce is segregated 
is plausible to 
suggest that women will attempt to use other means of 
redressing grievances rather than making an application to 
an industrial tribunal: formal or informal grievance 
procedures, for exampler or seeking the help of a trade 
union. In such situationsr it is, hypothetically, possible 
that the very existence of the anti-discrimination 
legislation will facilitate a successful resolution of the 
situation, where previously no action would have been taken. 
There is not howeverr any data available on alternative 
modes of dispute resolution in the workplace, their 
incidence and outcomes, or the 'halo effect' of the 
legislation. 
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Even assuming that no other remedies are available, 
individuals may still be reluctantr for a variety of 
reasonsy to use the law, or may be ignorant of the 
availability of a legal remedy. Some of this reluctance may 
be attributed to a general cultural bias against litigation 
as a means of dispute resolution; the number of anti- 
discrimination complaints made in Britain is, for example, 
proportionately much lower than the number of similar 
complaints made each year in the United Statesf which has a 
reputation at least for being a more litigious society. 
Comparing Britain with the United States, Elaine Donnelly 
pointed to the much greater remedies available to 
successsful complainants in the United States, and suggested 
that the remedies provided by the British system are so 
small as to discourage potential applicants from proceeding. 
Donnelly pointed out that in Coleman v. Skyrail Oceanic, 
(1981)1, IRLR (398), the Court of Appeals set damages for 
injury to feelings at h 100. Although at least one 
industrial tribunal has doubled that sum to allow for 
inflationy the Court of Appeals decision sets a basic 
standard which may well lead potential applicants to 
conclude that there is nothing to be gained from bringing a 
1 complaint. 
It has also been suggested thqt reluctance to bring a 
complaint may stem from fear of employer retaliation in 
situations where potential applicants continue to be 
employed by the alleged discriminator. Speaking from her 
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own experience as a lawyer for the EOCr Elaine Donnelly 
stated that an applicant needs to be "a very, very, brave 
woman" to bring a complaint against an employer for whom she 
is still working, since the clause that protects applicants 
against victimisation is often inadequate as a defence 
against employer retaliation. 
2 In the Annual Report for 
1982, the EOC speculates that the high unemployment rate is 
exacerbating this deterrent effect (EOC 1983y p. 1). 
The European Commission's research on the perception of 
discrimination suggests that lack of knowledge of the law, 
or lack of confidence in its capacity to provide an 
effective remedy may be a significant factor in explaining 
the low complaint rate. In the course of the survey, 612 
British women in employment were questioned about the 
existence of anti-discrimination legislation and their 
assessment of its effectiveness. 
Question: Do you know if there are in Britain laws 
which allow women to demand equality of 
treatment with men at work? If yest would 
you say they are applied in practice or not? 
only one in four of respondents answered positive y 
that the laws exist and are applied in practice. 34% 
answered that the laws exist but are not applied in 
practice. 10% answered that no laws exist that provide for 
equality of treatment in the workplace, and 32% had 
insufficient knowledge to answer the question at all. Thust 
four out of ten of all the women questioned either thought 
there were no anti-discrimination laws or did not know 
whether there were or not (European Commissiont 1980, 
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p. 63). If the lack of knowledge exemplified by the 
respondents in this survey is widespread then it has 
significant implications for the enforcement of the equal 
pay and sex discrimination laws through a process of 
individual complaints. It should be noted that the survey 
was conducted at the end of 1979, three years after the 
implementation of the legislation. It is possible that 
knowledge of the legislation may have increased since that 
time, although with the decline in the numbers of cases 
brought it is equally plausible to suggest that knowledge of 
the laws or belief in their efficacy may have remained low. 
Further research in this area would be useful to confirm or 
modify the 1979 findings. 
As to the perceived lack of efficacy of the 
legislation, it is possible that the low complaint rate 
itself generates a lack of confidence in the legislation, 
which in turn reduces the numbers of complaints made. 
Commenting in 1971 on the enforcement of the race 
discrimination legislation, the Race Relations Board warned 
of the development of the same kind of vicious circle in 
which I ... lack of confidence in the Act may initially cause 
a reluctance to complain; this may result in less complaints 
being sustained, which will lead to a further decrease in 
confidence. ' (Race Relations Board, 1971, p. 22) In its 
Fifth Annual Reportr the EOC identifies the same problem: 
There has been an increasing awareness of the 
difficulties facing manyl if not the majority, of 
applicants in presenting individual complaints under 
the SDA ... The. Commission is conceued that the 
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problem ... may have already sapped the resolve of many 
would-be complainants which the Commission believes may 
have contributed substantially to the reduction of the 
number of individual cases under the SDA. As the 
number reduces, so the level of practical awareness of 
the scope of the legislation is also likely to reduce, 
resulting in a vicious circle of decline in confidence 
in the effectiveness of the legislation (EOC 1981, 
p. 4). 
The EOC pointsy amongst other thingst to the difficult 
burden of proof an applicant under the SDA must meet. other 
factors include the lack of assistance and representation 
which may discourage potential applicants at a very early 
stage of the proceedings. In discussing assistance granted 
under s. 75 of the SDAF the EOC notes that: "Several of the 
individuals assisted by the Commission would not have 
proceeded with their cases if the Commission had not 
supported them. 0 (EOC, 1978f p. 8) Unfortunatelyr far more 
requests for assistance are received by the EOC than are 
granted. In 1981, for exampler the Commission received 245 
formal requests for assistance under s. 75, of which 143 
were granted. (EOCr 19821 p. 33) The lack of assistance and 
representation appears to affect the withdrawal rate and the 
success rate of cases heard by industrial tribunals and is 
discussed in more detail below. 
i 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there are a 
number of procedural factors which may contribute to the low 
complaint rate under the anti-discrimination legislation: no 
perception of discrimination, no knowledge of legal 
remediesr a reluctance to use the law or a lack of 
confidence in its effectiveness, and lack of assistance to 
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pursue a complaint. In addition to these problems, however, 
is the more general question of the kind of remedy the law 
providest the problem it defines, and the s olution it 
offers. At the heart of the matter are two critical issues; 
the meaning of equality, as defined in the legislation and 
subsequent judicial interpretations of it, and the 
individualized nature of the solution that-the legislation 
provides. 
B. The Withdrawal Rate of Complaints 
Since the introduction of the equalpay and sex 
discrimination legislation more applications have been 
dropped before reaching an industrial tribunal than have 
proceeded to a disposition on the merits. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible by inspecting the records at the Central 
office of the Industrial Tribunals to determine exactly what 
happened to these cases which are described as 'withdrawn' 
or 'settled, ' since no further details are given. There 
appears to be only one published study of the high 
withdrawal rate, and this is based an a relatively small 
number of cases (Gregory, 1981) This study focusses on the 
role of ACAS conciliation officers as playing a crucial role 
in the early stages of the proceedings. The EOC has also 
commissioned research on the role of the ACAS, the results 
of which are not yet available. 
ACAS was established under the terms of the 1975 
Employment Protection Act as a statutory body under the 
direction of the Council appointed by the Secretary of State 
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for Employment. ACAS has a "general duty to promote the 
improvement of industrial relations" (ACAS, 1977F p. 5), in 
pursuit of which objective its officers are involved in 
arbitration and investigation, advisory work, and collective 
and individual conciliation. It is the agency's individual 
conciliation work that has led to conjecture aboutr and 
criticism of, its role in the implementation of the sex 
discrimination and equal pay legislation. Where individuals 
bring complaints of alleged infringements of. their rights 
under the legislation to the notice of the industrial 
tribunals, the officers of ACAS are required by law to 
attempt to settle such complaints without the need for 
further proceedings: 
... the law imposes on ACAS the duty of trying to settle the complaint without the need for a tribunal hearing 
where the conciliation officer is requested to do so by 
the parties concerned or where he considers that there 
is a reasonable prospect of success. (ACASr 1982, p. 30) 
According to Gregory, the practical effect of this 
statutory obligation is that: 
At a time when the individual most needs sympathetic 
advice and encouragement in pursuing her complaint she 
is instead approached by someone whose main task is to 
avert a tribunal hearing and who has no particular 
interest in whether or not she obtains her legal 
rights. (Gregory, 1981, p. 6) 
In support of this accusation, Gregory points to 
examples of women being urged to accept derisory offers in 
settlement of their claims, of their being given misleading 
and inaccurate information, and of their not being informed 
about the possible assistance they might receive from the 
EOC (ibid. p. 7). A source within the EOC confirmed that 
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there are many instances where ACAS officers fail to inform 
individuals of the role or existence of the EOC (Donnelly 
interview 1982). Gregory also states that ACAS officers 
often made women feel that their complaints were trivial, 
and were sometimes unable to comprehend that an individual 
might be pursuing a complaint as a matter of principle. 
The organization's own view of the process of 
conciliation is a more neutral one: 
.. the task of the conciliation officer is to assist ithe 
parties) to reach a settlement by helping to 
clarify the issues and by drawing attention to the 
relevant legal provisions and case law. He does not 
act as an arbitrator on. the merits of the case nor does 
-he 
, 
recommend a particular settlement. 
(ACASr 1978, p. 29) 
It is difficult to imagine the process by which a 
conciliation officer can 'draw attention' to the relevant 
Iegal provisions and precedents without-at least implying a 
judgement about the merits of the case. What is 
particularly disturbing about the fact that the agency 
expects its staff to clarify issues by discussing the law, 
is that the conciliation officers charged with this 
responsibility are not legally trained or qualified. In 
1981, Gregory found that between 25 and 30 officers were 
responsible for conciliating all equal pay and sex 
discrimination cases throughout the country. Their 
qualification for work in this area of complex legislation 
consisted of two weeks special training in addition to the 
three week-course taken by all conciliation officers 
(Gregory, 1981, p. 7). In 1977, ACAS had 112 conciliation 
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officers specially trained in SDA matters. of these, only 
10 were women (EOCr March 1978, p. 27). 
Conciliation in equal pay and sex discrimination cases 
accounts for only a very small part of ACAS's individual 
conciliation workload, as does intervention in complaints of 
racial discriminationr where the withdrawal rate is 
similarly high. Table 11 shows the withdrawal rates for 
complaints arising under the various statutory provisions 
with which ACAS is concerned. 
Mau-Q-11. 
0 
1978 23% 
1979 23% 
1980 22% 
1981 25% 
F4A MA Race Relations-Act 
29% 36% 28% 
42% 34% 37% 
32% 47% 39% 
23%* 43% 38% 
*Adjusted total which excludes 651 cases forwarded to ACAS 
by the EOC as a result of the Electrolux investigation, all 
of which proceeded to a tribunal hearing. 
(Source: Annual Reports of ACAS). 
The variation that is found in the rate of withdrawal 
as between complaints arising under different statutory 
provisionsf is also found in the conciliation rate. The 
Annual Report for 1 981 notes that: 
The... statistics of individual conciliation show that 
the outcome of conciliation in complaints to industrial 
tribunals varied widely as between complaints alleging 
unfair dismissal and other types of cases. A 
substantially higher proportion of conciliated 
settlements was achieved in unfair dismissal complaints 
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(37 per cent) than in complaints arising under the 
anti-discrimination legislation (19 per cent in 
complaints of racial discrimination and eighteen per 
cent in complaints of discrimination on grounds of sex) 
(ACASr 19821 p. 35). 
Unfortunately, ACAS offers no suggestions as to why the 
chance of a conciliated settlement should be so much higher 
in unfair dismissal cases, and the likelihood of withdrawal 
so much lower. It should be noted that unfair dismissal 
complaints account for over 90% of ACAS's individual 
conciliation workload, whereasr in 198i, complaints under 
race or sex discrimination statutes (including equal pay) 
amounted to only 2% of the total (ACASj 1981, pp. 32r 35). 
Leaving aside any suggestions of racism or sexism to account 
for the differential ratey it seems likely that there is an 
issue of institutional competence involved in the screening 
process, which, taken together with ACAS's statutory duty to 
avert fur-ther proceedings wherever possible, contributes to 
the higher withdrawal and lower conciliation rates in anti- 
discrimination cases. 
From the admittedly small amount of information 
availabler it appears that the problems that have been 
identified in the way in which ACAS performs its obligations 
under the EqPA and SDA may be divided into two categories: 
those arising from the very nature of the organization and 
its statutory function, and those which arise from the way 
in which the organizational objective is presently carried 
out. Problems in the second category--lack of 
qualificationst poor trainingr for example--could be 
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remedied by specific reforms: better and on-going training, 
the appointment of more women officers to deal with women's 
complaints, and perhaps most importantlyr greater public 
accountability. At presentr the organization does not 
publish details of the cases which it settles; information 
on the kinds of settlements agreed upon or the amount of 
compensation in a conciliated case would facilitate stricter 
scrutiny of ACAS's achievements. 
I 
If the agency were to act to facilitate adequate 
monetary compensation in cases where it appeared likely that 
an applicant could establish a prima facie case under the 
legislation, then some of the criticisms of its statutory 
function of averting further proceedings might be mitigated. 
However,, there would still remain a contradiction between 
the imperative to settle individual complaints without 
further use of law and the implementation of legislated 
principle through the judicial decisions of tribunals and 
courts of appeal. 
For ACAS, the imperative is to settle individual 
complaints; but an individual may want to pursue a case even 
where there is only a small chance of success at a tribunal 
hearing. The EOC recognizes the value of pursuing 
'borderline' cases as a way of clarifying the lawl setting 
precedent, and sometimes changing currently accepted 
interpretations of the legislative provisions. For the ACAS 
conciliation officer such goals are not likely to appear as 
valid considerations, nor ones which are legitimated with 
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respect to organizational objectives. The root of the 
problem appears to lie in the fact that ACAS is essentially 
a creature of the predominant industrial relations consensus 
which elevates conciliation and compromise, and implicitly 
denigrates legal intervention as a means of dispute 
resolution for employment issues. The question that must be 
asked is how relevant is the notion of such compromise in 
the context of an equal pay or sex discrimination complaint. 
The nature of the circumstances which give rise to such 
complaints, and the kinds of solution required, are 
essentially different from the kinds of conciliated 
compromise that might be appropriate and acceptable in other 
industrial relations matters. 
C. The Low-SucCess Rate of Complaints at Tribunal Hearings. 
As Table 9 above shows for cases that reach tribunal 
hearings, the likelihood of a successful outcome is low. 
This fact in itself may contribute both to the low initial 
complaint rate and the high withdrawal rate. A number of 
factors may be identified as contributing to the 
difficulties that applicants encounter. 
Some applicants lack assistance in preparing the case, 
or in presenting it before a tribunal. This lack of aid 
intensifies the problems associated with meeting a difficult 
burden of proof, and persuading the tribunal of the 
inferences to be drawn from the facts presented. Decisions 
vary as between tribunals and suggest that some panels are 
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better qualifi'ed than others to adjudicate the facts of a 
discrimination complaint in the ligbt of established law. 
These procedural problems are compounded by the fact 
that the underlying premise of the enforcement procedures is 
that of the tri-partite system of industrial relations. 
only the chairperson of the tribunal is legally qualifiedf 
with the other members being drawn one from each side of 
industry. The rationale for their presence is to provide 
the industrial experience and expertise that is said to be 
so crucial to the operation of an industrial tribunal. 
Whether such experience is relevant tor or appropriate fort 
the determination of a discrimination case is an open 
question, particularly since such cases account for only a 
small part of the tribunals workload, a factor which 
militates against the development of competence in the 
field. on the enforcement procedurest generallyr Nandy 
(1981) concludes that: 
This machinery has to work in a context in which the 
paramount desire is to avoid the undue intervention of 
the law in industrial relations and more positively to 
create an informal climate in which claims can be met 
and disputes settled without excessive legalism. 
(Nandyl 1981f p. 158) 
The practical effect of this theoretical concern to 
avoid 'excessive legalism, ' in adjudicating an area of 
complex and developing law, may be, however, to increase the 
difficulties facing applicants. 
The way in which this concern over excessive legalism 
may translate into particular procedural difficulties for 
tribunal applicants can best be demonstrated by examining 
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some signigicant aspects of the system of industrial 
tribunal adjudication. 
II. THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL ADJUDICATION 
For those complaints that proceed beyond conciliation 
or withdrawal to a formal disposition on the merits, the 
industrial tribunal hearing is the most significant stage of the 
proceedings. only a small proportion of cases go to appeal; 
consequently, for the majority of applicants the tribunal's 
decision is final. The industrial tribunals were consciously 
chosen for the adjudication of equal pay and employment dis- 
crimination complaints as a more appropriate forum than the 
County Courts. The rationale for this choice lay in the special 
characteristics that tribunals are supposed to have -- 
informality, flexibility, and importantly, in the case of 
tribunals operating in the area of labour law, the benefit of 
the industrial experience of the lay members. This latter 
characteristic also reflects the prevailing industrial relations 
concensus, which seeks to minimize legal intervention in 
industrial matters. This choice of forum, and the special 
characteristics that tribunals are supposed to have, has a sig- 
nificant impact on the nature of dispute resolution under the 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
The Composition of Industrial Tribunals. 
Industrial tribunals are organized on a regional basis 
with a Central Office for England and Wales based in London, 
and a Central office for the Scottish tribunals based in 
288 
Glasgow. Each of these organizations is headed by a 
national President appointed by. the Lord Chancellor. Each 
tribunal is an independent judicial body consisting of two 
lay members, and a legally qualified chairperson. The lay 
members are drawn from panels appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Employment after consultation with employers' and 
workers' organizations. The legally qualified member is 
appointed by the Lord Ch. ancellorr in England and Walest and 
by the President in Scotland. Thust in composition, the 
tribunals are firmly in the tradition of the tri-partite 
approach to industrial relations. 
The chairperson must be a barrister or solicitor of at 
least seven years standing, and may be appointed on either a 
full-time or part-time basis. Full-time chairpersons are 
appointed to age 72 whereas part-time appointments are for a 
period of three yearsr with eligibility for reappointment. 
The. vast majori. ty of chairpersons are male, a fact which 
reflects both the general composition of the legal 
professionr and the requirements of seven years service. In 
1977j 70 out of a total of 72 tribunal chairpersons were 
male. out of a stratified random sample3 of 125 hearings 
covering a five year period from 1977-1981, (hereinafater 
'the sample') only 14 were presided over by a chairwoman. 
In 1977, women constituted only 6.5% of practising 
solicitors, and 8.2% of practising barristers. (EOCr March 
1978r p. '14t 19). Although there has been a marked increase 
in the numbers of women entering the legal profession, it 
289 
may be expected that women will remain a relatively small 
minority for some years to come. The seven year rule 
further militates against the development of a pool of 
qualified women lawyers to fill industrial tribunal 
positions, as the EOC has pointed out, by penalizing women 
who have practised for less than seven years, and then 
withdrawn temporarily from the profession for childrearing 
purposes. The Commission recommends that the requirement 
should be reduced to four years professional experience, 
coupled with specialized traini ng in the areas of the 
tribunals' jurisdictiont and that the Lord Chancellor's 
department should do more to pub. licize the fact that these 
posts are open to both men and women (Ibid). 
Women also account for a relatively small proportion of 
lay members of tribunals, although there has been some 
increase in their numbers in recent years as the result of a 
deliberate policy. In a 1974 White Paperr the then 
Government stated: "The number of women appointed to the 
tribunals is being increased. The aim is to have sufficient 
women so that at least. one person of each sex will normally 
be on a tribunal which is hearing a sex discrimination or 
equal pay case. w Table 12 shows the composition of the lay 
membership of the tribunals. 
290 
Table 12. 
Lgv members of the Industrial--Tribunals-and Employment 
Anneal Tribu nal. 
Im 1976 
Total Women X= Totgl Wgmen M= Total WOmen Mall 
industrial 1200 59 1141 2263 494 1769 2298 487 1811 
tribunals 
Employment EAT not in 32 5 27 32 5 27 
Appeals existence 
Tribunal 
(Source: EOC March 1978f Evidence to the Royal Commission 
on Legal Services, p. 27) 
The aim of having at least one woman member at hearings 
of sex discrimination or equal pay complaints appears to 
have been realised to a considerable extent, although the 
sample indicates that 'at least one' woman member seems in 
practice to mean 'only one' woman member in the majority of 
cases. In the sampler only 12 out of 125 hearings were 
conducted by an all male tribunal. The vast majority, 99 
hearings, were conducted by tribunals composed of 2 men and 
1 woman. In all but 2 of these cases the woman present was 
one of the lay members. In just 12 hearings did the women 
members constitute a majority; these were all hearings 
presided over by a chairwoman. Thus the recommendation of 
the White Paper seems to have been realised, but only in the 
most minimal sense. Until women constitute a larger 
proportion of both the available chairpersons and the lay 
panelsr this situation is unlikely to change. 
291 
In its evidence to the Royal Commission on Legal 
Servicesf the EOC recommended that pressure should be put on 
the nominating bodies for the lay panels (the TUC and CBI) 
"to propose as many women as possible. " The Commission also 
made the more radical suggestion that the lay members should 
be chosen in consultation not only with the TUC and CBII but 
also with leading women's organizations. (EOCI March, 1978, 
p. 32). 
The present composition of the tribunals and the 
recommendations that the EOC has made raise a number of 
ýnteresting issues. on a fundamental level, the 
implications of women's under-representation in the legal 
profession appear significantr given the fact that the 
current anti-discrimination measures depend largely upon 
legal institutions and the services of legal professionals 
for their enforcement. in its evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Legal Servicest the EOC remarked: 
.. it-is our impression that if the judiciary included 
more substantial proportion of women it is likely 
that the courts would be able to command greater public 
confidence in those areas which particularly affect 
women... (including). Sex Discrimination Act cases where 
male. tribunal members and chairmen may have 
preconceived notions, albeit unconscious, of women's 
work and women's role in society. 
(EOCr March 1978F p. 32). 
There are two distinct threads to this argument. one 
is that more women should be appointed to the judiciary for 
essentially symbolic reasonst especially in those segments 
of the judicial establishment that are dealing directly in 
areas which particularly affect women. Further, it might 
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properly be regarded as a legitimate role of government to 
give a lead to the community generally in the matter of sex 
discrimination by actively seeking'to appoint qualified 
women to highly visible positions of authority. The second 
thread of the argument is the implicit assumption that the 
appointment of more women. will necessarily and of itself 
have a beneficial effect with the regard to the adjudication 
of matters of concern to woment and that is an assumption 
that requires further examination. It needs to be asked 
what purpose the appointment of more women will fulfill, 
beyond the'symbolic and equitable concerns mentioned 
previously. If the aim is to improve the quality of 
adjudication and eliminate the operation of prejudicial 
sterotypest then it seems unlikely that the fact of gender 
alone will be sufficient to achieve these objectives. What 
is more likely required is not merely the appointment of 
more womenr but of more women with training in the 
complexities of'discrimination law and the inferential 
problems it poses, and/or a background of experience in this 
area. The tribunal system attempts to provide for 
adjudication by people with some experience by including the 
lay members appointed after consultation with both sides of 
industry. The problem with this approach is that the lay 
members may be expected to some extent to represent an 
institutional perspectiver either that of management or 
labor organization. Since the majority of equal pay or sex 
discrimination complaints allege discrimination arising from 
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management practices, sometimes, although infrequently, also 
indicting a trade union, it appears unlikely that the 
inclusion of more women, per se, without any consideration 
of their qualifications other than sex, will automatically 
improve the quality of adjudication in the discrimination 
area. By providing for the inclusion of some lay members 
who are not representatives of industryt the EOC's 
recommendation for nominations from women's organizations 
may be regarded as a step in the right direction. This 
recommendation has not, however, been implemented. 
There is no data available on the attitudes towards 
their work of women tribunal members, nor on whether they 
take a different approach from that of their male 
colleagues. In the majority of cases tribunals appear to 
reach unanimous decisions, so there is apparently no broad 
distinction to be made between the women and men on their 
approach to the interpretation of the law. In the sample, 
only four decisions were non-unanimous; in three of these, 
the two male members of the tribunal reached a majority 
decision, with which the female lay member disagreed. In a 
fifth caset the tribunal reached a unanimous decision, but 
the woman on the tribunal disagreed with the male members' 
views on some issues. The four non-unanimous decisions all 
concerned the determination of what constitutes like work 
for the purposes of the EqPA. In the three cases in which 
the woman member disagreed with the men, the majority 
dismissed the applicant's complaint, whereas the woman 
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member would have upheld it. In a 1979 complaint, for 
exampler a woman accounts assistant claimed equal pay with 
male counterpart. The male majority dismissed the complaint 
in strong termst calling it 'pretextuall and 'verging on the 
frivolous' and fo und that the difference in pay complained 
of was justified by the 'personal equation' as defined by 
the Employment Appeals Tribunal. The woman lay member, 
however, expressed herself as not satisfied with the 
respondent's justification for the differential and would 
have upheld the applicant's complaint (Sohove v. -John Wyg-th 
JLtd). In the fourth case where there was a non-unanimous 
verdict, the two lay memberst one male I one female, split 
from the male chairman to uphold an equal pay claim brought 
by four applicants against the British Steel Corporation in 
1981.4 
The high rate of unanimity raises questions about the 
process of tribunal decision-making, particularly the role 
of the chairperson. Each member of the tribunal is 
theoretically equall but the nature of the task the 
tribunals perform raises a suspicion at least, that in 
practice it is the chairperson who plays a leading role in 
reaching and formulating the decision. The tribunals are, 
after all, adjudicating questions of law as well as fact, 
and in this they are bound by the precedents of the EAT and 
the higher courts of appeal. In such a situation a certain 
amount of deference to the legally qualified member would 
not seem unusual. The charges of 'excessive legalism' that 
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have in recent years been directed at the industrial 
tribunals might indicate amongst other things the dominant 
role of the chairperson. 5 It is the chairperson who writes 
the decision of the tribunal on the basis of notes made 
during the hearing; these notes constitute the only record 
of the proceedings. The chairperson also tends to play a 
more active role in the development of the proceedings than 
other members, with regard to the questioning of witnesses 
and the elucidation of testimony. 
If unanimity is at least in part a. reflection of the 
dom inant role of the chairperson, then there are further 
implications for the proposals to amend the tribunals. 
Bearing in mind the caveat that increasing the number of 
women on tribunals will not automatically improve the 
quality of adjudicationt it nevertheless appears crucial to 
increase the proportion of hearings that are held under the 
guidance of chairwomen, so that women: are better represented 
amongst the leading decision-makers at this important stage 
of an equal pay or sex discrimination complaint. At 
presentr the recommendation that at least one woman be 
included in tribunals hearing discrimination cases means in 
the vast majority of cases that one of the lay members is a 
woman, and the data above shows that statistically the 
probability of lay members disagreeing with the chair is 
very small. Secondlyi, the possibility that proceedings are 
of necessity dominated by the one legally qualified member 
focusses attention again on the training and experience of 
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the lay members. Lay members may be capable of playing a 
more active part in the proceedings and in the process of 
decision-making if they receive specific training in 
discrimination law or were appointed f rom a background in 
discrimination or equal employment opportunity issues. 
At present, the training of tribunal members is a 
haphazard affair. When asked whether tribunals had received 
any guidance or training in respect of the enforcement of 
th. e SDAj, the Lord Chancellor's office replied in the 
negative: 
. the interpretation and application of this, or any Zýher law is a matter for the independent judgement of 
the Courts, and the Lord chancellor (like other 
Ministers) must be careful not to do anything which 
could be construed as an attempt by the executive to 
guide or influence the decisions of the judiciary 
(EOCt March, 1978t p. 28). 
As the EOC pointed out in its evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Legal Services, this reply is predicated on a 
misunderstanding of the purpose of such training. It is 
possible to contemplate training which would assist tribunal 
members in their understanding of discrimination law, on a 
general levely without in any way interfering with the 
independence of the judiciary with regard to adjudication. 
In its submission to the Royal Commission, the EOC argued 
that the provision of such training would not be an 
uprecedented departure, noting that conferences on 
sentencing policy have been available to judges for many 
years, and that in 1975 the Home Secretary announced the 
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establishment of a high level inquiry into the training of, 
and supply of, information to sentencers (EOC 1978r p. 28). 
The objective of appointing lay members with some 
experience specifically in equal employment opportunity 
issues, rather than in the broader area of industrial 
relationst could be achieved in one of two ways: either by 
the appointment of members nominated by groups other than 
the TUC and the CBII or by asking those organizations to 
nominate appointees with this kind of experience. The EOC 
has already proposed extending the power to nominate lay 
members beyond the traditional organizations but its 
suggestion has not been acted upon. However, in the area of 
race rel ations adjudication, the TUC and CBI were asked, 
following the passage of the 1976 Race Relations Actg to 
nominate members with experience in race relations in 
employmentr either those who had served as members of the 
conciliation committees set up under the terms of the 1968 
Act, or individuals who had in some other way gained actual 
experience of the issues involved. According to Lustgartenr 
(1980, p. 196), 69 such individuals had been appointed by 
May 1979r and Presidents of tribunals had been asked to 
assign someone from this pool of members to each hearing on 
a race discrimination complaint. Some change of this kind 
in the tribunals hearing equal pay and sex discrimination 
complaints seems particularly appropriate, in light of the 
fact that tribunal members are not likely to receive 'on the 
job' experience through the hearing of a large numnber of 
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cases. Equal pay and sex discrimination complaints together 
account for only a very small proportion of the tribunal's 
workload, a fact which militates against the individual 
members building up expertise through practice. 
Ultimatelyr it may be true as some writers have 
suggested that industrial tribunals are not the most 
appropriate bodies to adjudicate discrimination cases. 
Certainly, as they are presently constitutedr there appear 
to be grounds for recommending some changes in their 
composition. 
A tribunal's lack of experience or training may be 
manifested in. a misunderstanding of complex issues in 
inference or proof, or in a more basic difficulty in 
appreciating the reality of the kinds of situations which 
the law is mandated to address. At the level of the 
industrial tribunal system as a whole, the deficiencies of 
some tribunal members with respect to training in, and 
experience of the anti-discrimination legislation may 
explain some of the divergence that seems to exist between 
tribunals considering quite similar issues and situations. 
6 
The questions that arise from an analysis of the 
composition of the industrial tribunals imply a whole range 
of related questions about the appropriateness of the 
industrial tribunals for the resolution of complaints of 
discrimination in employment on the grounds of sex (or 
race). The problems that may arise in tribunal adjudication 
of such complaintsy because of the particular composition of 
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the tribunals, may be exacerbated by a lack of 'fit' between 
ýhe expectation that tribunals should proceed informally, 
and the complexities of the legislation that they are 
charged with implementing. 
C. Tribunals, 'Lecalism' and LCSal Representation. 
In 1958,, The Report of the Franks Committee set out a 
number of characteristics of tribunals which, in the 
committee's opiniont made them desirable forums for certain 
kinds of dispute resolution. The Committee asserted that in 
a tribunal a hearing could be conducted with less formality 
and a greater degree of flexibility than is possible in a 
court of law, that tribunals are relatively free from 
technicality, and that their members have the advantage of 
experience and expertise in the substantive area of 
jurisdiction. Tribunals were thus characterized as 
desirable because of the qualities of 'openness, fairness 
and impartialityll which they were alleged to foster. As 
J-A. G. Griffiths remarked in 1959, "this sounds well, even 
if it smacks a little of Calvin Coolidge's preacher who was 
against sin" (Griffiths 1959, p. 127). In recent years, 
however, industrial tribunals have suffered some criticism 
on the grounds that they have departed from this ideal and 
succumbed to "'excessive legalism' in their approach to the 
legislation which they adjudicate. 
It should be noted at the outset of this discussion 
that industrial tribunals are different in some important 
respects from the tribunals which the Franks Committee 
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considered in the 19501s. The latter were concerned in the 
main with adjudicating the relationship between an 
individual and a government department or agency, and there 
was some discussion in Committee whether the tribunals were 
properly considered administrative or judicial structures. 
The present jurisdiction of the industrial tribunals 
involves a different kind of regulation, the resolution of 
claims arising between private parties out of statutory 
provisions. In performing this function the industrial 
tribunals appear much closer to the ordinary courts of law 
than did the tribunals considered by the Franks Committee, 
such as the Pension Appeals Tribunals and the National 
Insurance Tribunals. Thus, if industrial tribunal decision- 
making is considered to have departed from the norm 
established by the Franks Committeer it is in large part 
because the industrial tribunals are in important respects 
quite different from the tribunals that provided the initial 
model of tribunal adjudication. Neverthelessr a number of 
the assumptions that underlay the Franks Committee report 
have rema ined to colour expectations about the functioning 
of the industrial tribunal system. Particularly important 
in this respect is the notion that the laws which' tribunals 
are asked to adjudicate are in some sense more amenable to 
common-sense interpretation than other kinds of law. This 
presumed quality of susceptibility to straightforward 
application provides a rationale both for the informality of 
tribunal proceedings and for the inclusion of lay members 
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with industrial experience. However, Phillips, J., one- 
time President of the EATr argues that this assumption 
handicaps the tribunals sincer "... they are enjoined to be 
informal, and to eschew technicalities and legalism, but are 
at the same time required to cope with an ever-increasing 
complexity of subject matter. " . 
(Phillipsr 1978, p. 137). 
There is a contradiction at the core of tribunal 
adjudication between what industrial tribunals are now 
actually required to do, and the assumptions which led to 
the initial assignment of responsibilities to them. Those 
assumptions have helped to foster the idea that in passing 
employment legislation, Parliament has created a body of law 
which can safely be administered in a discretionary and 
fact-based way, relatively free from the traditional legal 
fetters of judicial procedure and precedent. While the 
industrial tribunals are bound by precedent, they do retain 
procedural features which make them a good deal less formal 
than the county courts. The assumptions about the nature of 
tribunal adjudication together with the fact of procedural 
informality have made it possible for Parliament to ignore 
suggestions that applicants to tribunals should be eligible 
for legal aid for the preparation and representation of 
their complaint. This lack of aid appears to be reflected 
in the fairly small proportion of applicants who do have 
legal representation at the tribunal stage. 
During the Parliamentary debates on the SDAr some 
members expressed their concern that no provision had been 
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made to grant free legal aid to tribunal applicants seeking 
to enforce their rights under an admittedly complex piece of 
legislation. During the Second Reading in the House of 
Commons, for example, Jack Ashley (L. Stoke on Trent) 
pointed to the desirability of legal aid for all applicants 
since I ... at industrial and social security tribunals most 
of those who are not represented fail in their applications. 
The reas-on is that they lack expert guidance and- 
representation" (H. C. Debs., 26 March 1975, c. 537). In 
reply, Shirley Summerskill, for the Government, stated that 
the Chancellor's Legal Aid Advisory Committee had 
recommended the extension of legal aid to all statutory 
tribunals (H. C. Debs. j, 26 March 1975r c. 615). However, 
during the Second Reading in the House of Lords, the 
government spokesman made clear that the government would 
not be following the Advisory Committee's recommendationsy 
for reasons of financial expediencyr noting that "... while 
the Lord Chancellor has considerable sympathy with the 
Advisory Committee's recommendations, and supports in 
principle the extension of legal aid to these tribunals, 
priority cannot be given to this in view of the urgent need 
to improve legal services generally* (H. L. Debs. f 1 July 
1975r c. 188). 
The bill as passed into law made no provision for legal 
aid to cover the costs of- legal representation at an 
industrial tribunal hearing. Thus, the fact that the 
tribunals allowed access to unrepresented individuals 
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together with the Government's desire to limit spending on 
unmet legal need, combined to defeat the possibility of 
legal aid at tribunals for those who would otherwise be 
unable to afford it. Statistics for 1977 show that in the 
entire jurisdiction of the industrial tribunals, one third 
of all applicants, and one half of all respondents were 
legally represented at the hearing of their case. In a 
further 16% of casest applicants were represented by trade 
union officials (Industrial Tribunals Fact Sheetr 1978). 
The evidence suggests that despite the unavailability of 
legal aidt legal representation at tribunal hearings is 
increasing (Hawes and Smith 1981). However, the statistics 
also show thatr in equal pay and sex discrimination cases, 
many applicants appear at tribunal hearings completely 
unrepresented, and only a minority have the help of a 
lawyer. This fact is of some significance since studies of 
other kinds of tribunals have indicated that represented 
individuals are more likely to be successful than the 
unrepresented (Frost and Howardf 1977, ch. 6). This effect 
may be expected to be even stronger in an area of law where 
interpretation depends increasingly on legal precedent, and 
where statistically, the respondent is more likely to be 
represented than the applicant. 
The EOC publishes statistics which indicate the sources 
of assistance on which tribunal applicants rely, but these 
figures do not provide the important corollary information 
which is concerned with the kinds of representation and 
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assistance available to respondents. For this information, 
I have turned to the sample of 125 cases, previously 
referred to. Table 13 illustrates the representation of 
applicantsr by year and type of representation. 
Table 13.. 
Rep resentation of EqPA and SDA aRplicants at 
industrial tribunal hearings, selected years, by type of 
reDresentation. 
1978 
E-QPA 
Self 64 (34.2%) 
Trade union 88 (47.1%) 
solicitor/counsel 31 (16.6%) 
1980 22-U 
13 (50.0%) 9 (33.3%) 
4 (15.4%) 4 (14.8%) 
5 (19.2%) 8 (29.6%) 
MIA 
Self 25 (37.3%) 27 (39.1%) 31 (34.8%) 
Trade union 22 (32.8%) 11 (15.9%) 16 (29.6%) 
Solicitor/counsel 18 (26.8%) 17 (24.6%) 34 (38.2%) 
Other 7 (10.4%) 9 (13.0%) 7 (7.8%) 
Totals do not equal 100% since a residual category, 
representation not knownr has be en omitted. 
(Source: Annual Re ports of the EOC-) 
The total numbers in the table above reflect the 
decline in the-numbers of complaints received and processed 
each yearl as detailed in the previous chapter. The small 
numbers make it difficult to draw firm conclusions from the 
data about trends in representation, but the overall picture 
seems, clear. In both SDA and EqPA complaints, it appears 
that it is normal for about one-third of all applicants to 
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present their case to the tribunal without the assistance of 
any representative. Regardless of the informality, or 
freedom from technicality of tribunal hearings, this low 
level of representation would seem to disadvantage 
applicants in the face of the greater likelihood that 
respondents will be legally represented, which the sample 
seems to indicate, is indeed the case. 
Using the sampler it has been possible to construct a 
picture of the pattern of representation as it applies to 
both sides in a dispute. The types of representation have 
been. classified into three categories: no representation, 
i. e., representation by anyone other than a qualified lawyer 
or barrister, and legal representation. Interpreting these 
categories requires some caution. First, it is easier to 
say of an individual applicant that she acted for herselfr 
than it is to say that of most respondents, leaving aside 
legal fictions about the presonality of corporations. To 
speak of a corporate entity representing itself, for 
exampler is open to a number of possible meanings. on a 
practicallevel I have treated the respondent as having no 
representation where the person handling the dispute for the 
company is a non-specialist in employment or legal matters. 
Thus, as far as respondents are concernedt the category of 
no representation is most likely to occur where the party is 
a small business or one-person operation. 
In most cases where a larger firm is the respondent 
in an equal pay or sex discrimination complaintr the matter 
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is handled by individuals who were not directly concerned in 
the incident which gave rise to the allegations, and who 
have a certain expertise in industrial relations or legal 
matters. The tribunal case may be handled by senior 
management officials, for exampler or staff from the 
personnel department. In any case, where the handling of 
the dispute has been passed out of the department of the. 
individual discriminator to a non-legal department within 
the company, the respondent has been categorized as having 
non-legal representation. The most usualy kind of this 
category of representation arises from the internal 
organization of the company. However, in some cases 
companies have received assistance and representation from 
outside sourcest through employers organizations. These 
cases have also been placed in the second category. The 
third categoryr legal representation, is self-explanatory. 
I have adopted this method of categorizing the 
representation of respondents in an attempt to go beyond 
formalistic labelling and to give a more accurate picture of 
the resources available to each side than would be obtained 
if all help originating from non-legal specialists within a 
company were to be described as 'no representation. ' 
Although such a description may be true in a formal senser 
it serves to ignore and obscure the disparity in resources 
available to an individual applicant acting for herselff and 
a corporate entity acting on its own behalf with all the 
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expertise of management officialst and personnel and 
industrial relations specialists. 
The sample shows a considerable disparity between 
applicants and respondents in the extent to which they rely 
on different kinds of representation. 
none 13 2 5 20 
non-legal 14 15 9 38 
legal 11 19 18 48 
Total 38 36 32 106* 
*Total sample size is 125 decisions, but in 19, the 
representation was unknown for at least one of the parties. 
These cases have been omitted. 
Table 14 shows that there were 25 cases in which the 
applicant had no representation but faced a respondent who 
had either non-legal or legal representation. By 
comparison, there were only 5 cases in which the respondent 
had no representation but faced a represented applicant. 
There were 46 cases, 43.3%r in which the parties were 
1equall in terms of representation: 13 in which neither 
side was representedr 15 in which both had non-legal 
representation, and 18 in which both parties were presented 
by a solicitor or counsel. 
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Respondents had legal representation in 42 cases, and 
applicants in 32. In 18 of these cýses the parties were 
equally matched. Thus, there were 30 cases in which the 
respondent had legal representation, but the applicant did 
not, compared with only 14 in which the applicant had legal 
representation and the respondent did not. Thus, in the 
sample, there were twice as many cases where the respondent 
had legal representation and the applicant did not than vice 
versa. 
Tables 15 and 16 break these figures down to show 
representation for equal pay cases and sex discrimination 
cases as separate totals. 
Reprp. sentation of applicantg and respondents. SDA cas es. 
samRle 1977-1981. 
Respgndent 
Appl icant repres! Dntation 
non-legal leqal Total 
representation 
none 9 5 14 
non-legal 8 35 16 
legal 8 78 23 
Total 25 10 18 53* 
* Total sample of SDA decisions = 65, including 12 where 
representation was not knowng which are excluded from this 
table. 
Out of a total of 53 SDA complaints there were 16 in 
which an unrepresented applicant faced a respondent with 
representation, either non-legal (8) or legal (8)o There 
were only 5 cases in which an unreprepented respondent faced 
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a represented applicant. In 20 cases, the parties were 
'equal' in the sense of having the same kind of 
representation: 9 in which both parties acted on their own 
behalff 3 in which both had non-legal representation, and 8 
in which both had legal representation. Respondents had 
legal representation in 23 cases and applicants in 18. In 8 
of these cases both had legal representation, so there were 
15 in which the respondent had legal representation but the 
applicant did not, compared with 10 in which the applicant 
had a legal representative and the respondent did not. Thus 
in the sample of SDA complaints the ratio of cases where 
respondent had legal representation and the applicant did 
not to cases where the applicant had legal representation 
and the respondent did not was 3: 2. 
Table 16. 
sam le. 1977-1981,. 
none 426 
non-legal 6 12 4 22 
legal 3 12 10 25 
Total 13 26 14 53* 
*Total sample of EqPA cases is 60, including 7 where 
representation is not knownt excluded from this table. 
Out of the total of 53 cases, there were 9 in which the 
applicant had no representation and the respondent had 
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either legal or non-legal representation, but only 2 in 
which the applicant was represented and the respondent not. 
In 26 cases the parties were equally matched in the sense of 
falling within the same category of representation: 4 in 
which both parties were acting for themselves, 12 in which 
both had non-legal representationr and 10 in which both had 
legal representatives. Respondents had legal representation 
in 25 casess and applicants in 14. In 10 of these cases 
both were legally represented. Thus, there were 15 cases in 
which a respondent had legal representation and the 
applicant did notj compared with only 4 in which the 
applicant was the only party with legal representationr a 
ratio of nearly 4: 1. 
Thus, the sample data shows that with regard to the 
question of representation at industrial tribunal hearings, 
there is. a pattern not just of a fairly low level of legal 
representation for applicants but that this is coupled with 
a considerably higher level of representation for 
respondents. Further, by concentrating not just on the 
aggregates for applicants and respondents, but on the 
pattern of representation at each hearing, it is possible to 
show the proprtion of hearings at which there is a disparity 
in representation between the parties. The extent of this 
disparity in the sample cases is summarized in Table 17. 
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Table 17. 
_r-espondents 
at tribunal hearings, sample, 1977-1981. 
Total 25 
SDA 16 
EqPA 9 
Respondent 
Legally rez)resented/ 
aDRlicant not 
Total 30 
SDA 15 
EqPA 15 
AT)Rlicant rep rese nted/ 
resT)ond ent 
5 
not 
5 
2 
14 
10 
4 
The disparities in legal representation between 
applicants and respondents are greater for EqPA cases than 
for SDA complaints, with some of the difference being 
accounted for by a higher degree of non-legal representation 
of applicants in equal pay cases. In the early years of 
implementation of the EqPAj trade union representation 
acco. unted for a high proportion of complaints coming before 
7 the tribunals. 
Although the data is drawn from a fairly small sample 
of complaints it suggests that the disparity in resources 
between the parties at anti-discrimination cases is 
considerable. Regardless of any possible direct effect on 
the outcome of complaints, this degree of disparity may 
affect. an individual's initial willingness to bring a 
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complaint and her subsequent willingness to proceed with it 
beyond the early stages. Howevert studies of other 
tribunals have suggested that there is a correlation between 
representation and success rate (Frost and Howardr 1977)r 
and some commentators have pointed to the quality of 
representation as being crucial in equal pay and sex 
discrimination cases (Coussins, 1976). Certainly the sample 
data points in this direction. Tables 18 and 19 present 
profiles of representation of the parties at hearings of 
successful and unsuccessful complaints. 
Table- 18. 
none 14 23 19 
non-legal 782 17 
legal 9 15 12 36 
Total 30 25 17 72 
(Total sample size for unsuccessful complaints is 82f 
including 10 where representation is not known) 
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Table 19.. 
Representation--of parties to successful compladnts, 
_PqPA 
and SDA. samle. 1977-1981. 
ADr)licant ReDresentation 
Rer)resentation none non-legal legal Total 
of respondent 
none 224 
non-legal 467 17 
legal 245 11 
Total 8 10 14 32 
(Total sample for successful complaints is 38f 
including 6 where representation is not known) 
In the unsuccessful complaintr there were 16 in which 
the applicant had no representation but the respondent had 
either non-legal or legal representation. There were 5 
cases where the respondent had no representation and the 
applicant had some. In the successful cases the comparable 
figures were six where the applicant had no representation 
and 2 where the respondent had no representation, the other 
party having representation of some kind. With regard to 
these figures ýhere appears to be little difference between 
the successful and unsuccessful complaints. (Compare these 
figures with those for the total sample in Table 17). 
Howeverr when the basis for comparison between the two sets 
is the presence or absence of legal representationr there 
does appear. to be a difference. 
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Out of the 72 unsuccessful cases there were 36 in which 
the respondent had a legal representative and 17 in which 
the applicant was so represented. There were 12 cases in 
which both parties had legal representation. Thus, there 
were 24 cases in which both parties had legal 
representationr but the applicant did not, compared with 
only 5 in which the positions were reversed. This is a 
ratio of nearly 5: 1. By contrastr out of 32 successful 
complaints, there were 11 cases in which the defendent had 
legal representation but 14 in which the applicant did. out 
of the three sets of complaints (total, unsuccessful and 
sucessful) this is the only one where the applicant had 
legal representation in a greater number of cases than the 
respondent. In 5 cases the parties both had legal 
-representation, leaving 6 in which the respondent had legal 
representation and the applicant did nott but 9 where the 
applicant was the only party to have legal representation, 
i. e. a ratio of 2: 3. Table 20 summarizes the difference 
between successful and unsuccessful complaints with regard 
to the legal representation of the parties. 
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Table 20.. 
Disparities in le0al representation between-applicants-and 
respondents, EqPA and SDA. samp1g, 1977-1981. 
Total 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Respondent legal 
representation/ 
applicant not 
30 
24 
6 
Applicant legal 
representation/ 
respondent not 
14 
5 
9 
Although the numbers are small, this table seems to 
suggest that the presence or absence of legal representation 
for applicants may. be directly related to their chance of 
obtaining a favourable outcome. The disposition of any 
complaint will depend on a number of factors of which the 
presence or quality of legal representation is only one 
variable. For this reasont some caution should be used when 
interpreting 'success rates' as a measure of the need for 
r epresentation. Variations in the success rate between 
applicants with legal representation and those without may 
reflect only the merits of the caser for exampler and the 
extent to which lawyers are selective about the kinds of 
cases they are prepared to take to tribunal hearings. 
Neverthelessr the data seems to provide some empirical 
foundation for the assertion that representation is 
important, and specificallyr that it is legal representation 
that is most likely to have an affect on outcomes. 
Other commentators have suggested, however, that lay 
advocates may be just as well equipped as lawyers to handle 
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successful tribunal hearings. Coussins (1976) notes that 
*it does not really matter who presents a case to a 
tribunal; a lawyer is not necessarily better than anyone 
else. What counts is whether a person knows the 1 aw and 
knows the ropes of tribunal procedure. n The sample size in 
this study is too small to permit the drawing of any 
definite conclusions on the question of whether it is the 
presence of a qualified legal representative that makes the 
difference or whether it is the skill and training of a 
representative, legal or otherwise. What it does appear to 
show is that in this set of cases the availability of legal 
representation seems to have increased the chance of the 
applicant obtaining a successful resolution of her 
complaint. Whether the benefits of increased representation 
could be achieved through increasing the availability of 
legal aidr or by making more legal help available through 
the EOCr or by providing for the training of 'discrimination 
representatives' to act for applicants at tribunal hearings 
lies outside the scope of this study, although the 
possibilities suggest interesting directions for future 
research. 
If it is to be assumed that the assistance of a trained 
legal representative will have some effect on the chance of 
success at the tribunal hearing, as the sample indicates, 
then there remains the question of how and why this effect 
is achieved. Coussins (1976) pointed to some areas in which 
lay representatives were observed to experience 
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difficultiest at hearings which formed part of a NCCL study 
of the first year of implementation of the legislation. 
Coussins pointed to difficulties in preparing proper 
supporting documentation and in eliciting evidence from 
witnesses. Elaine Donnelly of the EOC outlined in more 
detail why "without somi-e kind of legal help, people have 
practically no hope"of winning their case. ' She pointed to 
the difficult tasks involved in the preparation of the case, 
including knowing how to use circumstantial evidence in 
order to define what information is needed to make a strong 
argument. In order to obtain this evidencer a 
representative must know how to use a s. 74 questionnaire, 
must target the information wanted through discover, and 
must be able to pursue discovery, despite likely 
protestatations of confidentiality on the part of the 
respondent. At the hearing itself, the representative must 
present the applicant's case, and cross-examine skillfully 
to defeat or mitigate the arguments put forward by the other 
side. Most importantlyo,. the representative must be able to 
draw the tribunal's attention to the inferences that can be 
drawn from the evidence. Donnelly sees this last task in 
particular as being specifically a lawyer's job, not just 
that of someone with experience in the area of industrial 
relations (Donnelly interviewy July 1982). 
The complexity of the tasks facing the representative, 
or the unrepresented applicant, will vary according to the 
nature of the complaint involved. Where there is a 
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complaint of sex discrimination in recruitment, for exampler 
the job may be even harder than in a case for equal pay with 
a male co-workerr since the extent to which circumstantial 
evidence must be used may be greater, discovery problems 
harder to surmount, and the drawing of the proper inferences 
of discrimination crucial to the resolution of the issue. 
In any complaint, however, seemingly straightforward, an 
unrepresented applicant must deal wi. th the fact that the 
respondent is very likely to have representation of some 
kindr that she stands a good chance of facing a respondent 
represented by a lawyer, and that the area of law which 
deals with employment discrimination is complex and subject 
to the precedent-setting decisions of the appellate 
hierarchy. 
In the remainder of this chapterr I will focus in more 
detail on the problems of lack of representation and 
assistance, by a closer examination of the work involved in 
preparing a case for hearing, and by examining the issu6 of 
meeting the burden of prooft through the presentation of 
evidence. 
III. PROCEDU- L TSSTJES IN TRIBUNAL RRSOLUTTON OF COMPLAINTS 
A. The Preparation of a Cage for a Tribunal Hearina. 
Some idea of the amount and complexity of the work 
involved in preparing a case for a tribunal hearing can be 
gleaned from a guide prepared by the EOC to assist 
applicants (How to Prepare your own case for an Industrial 
Tribunall EOC, 1979). For example, the guide notes that, 
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having filed an originating application to the Central 
office of the Industrial Tribunals, the applicant must then 
decide what to argue, and what evidence is needed to support 
the argument. This task involves ffcollecting all the facts 
together and fitting them into the legal framework. " For 
help in determining the legal frameworkr the guide points 
the applicant to the Acts themselves, explanatory books on 
the legislation, and advice from the EOC. As to the Acts 
themselves as a source of guidance, members debating the 
provisions of the SDA in Parliament remarked on the 
complexity of the legislation. In the House of Lords, 
Baroness Fisher asked: "Can you picture any woman working a 
capstan lathe. .. trying to understand this Bill, and 
seeing whether she is being discriminated against? (H. L. 
Debs. r 1 Julyr 1975 c. 156). The problem for the unrepre- 
sented applicant in understanding the legal framework lies 
not only in deciphering the unique prose of Parliamentary 
draftsmenj but also in comprehending the meanings that have 
subsequently been given to various sections by appellate 
courts, and then in applying that framework to her own 
particular circumstances. However useful an explanatory 
book may ber it cannot perform the crucial function of 
relating the law to a unique fact situation. 
Furtherl it is a mistake to approach the problem as 
consisting of two discrete tasksr one concerned with the 
collection of facts, and one with fitting them into a legal 
framework. In any potential 'legal problem' the 'facts' and 
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the 'law' enjoy a complex inter-relationship which on the 
most simple level demands that the situation giving rise to 
the dispute be construed in the context of the search for 
legally significant facts. Thus, the applicant must ideally 
understand the parameters of the Parliamentary and judge- 
made law as a precondition for 'collecting all the facts. ' 
Assuming for the moment that the applicant is able to do 
thist she is then presented with a second set of tasks, 
which are concerned with questions of evidence and proof. 
The guide notes that there are five main ways of 
getting evidence: from documents in the applicant's 
possession, from witnessest from documents in the possession 
of the respondent or a third party, from the s. 74 
questionnaire in SDA casess and from the respondent's 
written reply to the industrial tribunal (on form IT3)r 
further details of which may be requested by the applicant. 
All of these methods may present considerable difficulties 
for the applicant. Potential witnesses, for exampler may be 
reluctant to appear, for fear of incurring employer 
hostility. Major problems of access to evidence are likely 
to occur over the discovery of documents in the respondent's 
possession, and the disclosure of information in the 
respondent's control. 
In applying rules governing discoveryt the tribunals 
have considerable discretion to decide what information is 
relevant and necessary for a fair. disposal of the 
proceedings. The question of the discoverability of 
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'confidential' documents reached the House of Lords in the 
case of Nasse v. sBe, (1979) IRLR 465. 
In Nasser the applicant was employed as a clerical 
officer by the SRC. She applied unsuccessfully for 
promotion to the post of Executive officer, and subsequently 
brought a complaint under the SDA alleging marital 
discrimination. In pursuit of her claim she sought 
discovery of confidential reports on herself and two other 
people, who were promoted to the position she was seeking, 
plus discovery of the review boards notes on all those who 
had applied. The SRC disclosed the report on Mrs. Nasse, 
but refused to give her access to the other documents. The 
industrial tribunal upheld Mrs. Nasse's application for 
discovery, as did the EAT. The Court of Appealsr however, 
allowed the SRC's appeal against discovery. Nasse then 
appealed to the House of Lords, where the case was heard 
jointly with another, arising under the Race Relations Act, 
and involving the same issues. The EOC and the Race 
Relations Board both appeared as amicus curiae, a mark of 
the significance those organizations attached to the 
discovery issue. 
The standard for discovery set out by the Lords was 
that chairpersons of tribunals should inspect disputed 
documents to determine whether they are relevant and 
necessary for a fair disposal of the proceedings. The court 
rejected the applicant's contention that relevancy alone was 
a sufficient condition to compel discovery,. and the 
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respondent's position that a pubic interest immunity 
shielded confidential information. In some casesr 
confidentiality might be maintained by excluding irrelevant 
parts of documentsf but once discovery is held to be 
necessary for a fair disposal of the proceedings, there is 
no pubic interest immunity to prevent disclosure. 
Essentially, the standard is a balancing test, in which 
individual tribunals are given the discretion to balance the 
interest in confidentiality against the need for disclosure 
in the interest of justice. Thusr while formally affirming 
the Court of Appeals decision in Nasser the House of Lords 
substantially broadened the applicant's potential access to 
information by laying down the broad principle that, where a 
document is deemed to be necessaryr the. interest in 
maintaining confidentiality must be superseded. However, 
the House of Loros left the tribunals with significant 
discretion in applying the testr both as, to whether there is 
a prima facie case for examining the disputed documentst and 
as to the merits of disclosure of documents that have been 
examined. 
The sample includes two interlocutory decisions on 
discovery, both pre-dating the House of Lords decision in 
Nasse. one case is in fact the original decision in Nasse, 
in which the industrial tribunal ordered the disclosure of 
the disputed docpMents. In setting out the standard on 
which it based its opinion, the tribunal quoted from the 
opinion of Brett L. J. r in the case of Compagnie Financiere 
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v. Peruvian Guang--C-Q. r (1882) 11 QBD 55 at 63, stating that 
every document must be disclosed, "whichr it is reasonable 
to suppose, contains information which mAy - not which must 
- either directly or indirectly enable the party. .. either 
to advance his own case or to damage the case of his 
adversary (including) a document which may fairly lead him 
to a train of inquiry which may have either of these two 
consequences. ' (Nasse y. SRCI London 27 Oct 1977, p. 4) 
Applying this standard to the case in hand, the tribunal 
rejected the notion that the applicant must make an 
affi rmative showing of the way in which the disclosure might 
help her case, notingr 'It is enough for her to show that 
they may fairly lead her to a train of inquiry which may 
enable her either to advance her own case or damage that of 
the respondent and that inspection is genuinely necessary in 
the interest of justice" (Ibid. p 5). Thust the tribunal 
utilized a 'wide open' standard for discovery holding any 
document discoverable if it either was relevant to the case 
of either party or if it might lead to information that was 
so relevant. The House of Lords narrowed the test by making 
it subject to balancing the requirements of disclosure 
against an interest in protecting confidentiality. 
The second case in the sample is a 1978 EqPA complaint 
in which the applicant sought discovery of documents which 
would disclose to her the length of service and salary paid 
to all employees on certain salary scales. The tribunal 
allowed discovery of documents relating to the comparable 
324 
man in the applicant's complaint but not to other employees, 
using the standard of 'relevant and necessary for the fair 
disposal of the proceedings, ' which the House of Lords 
subsequently adopted in Nasse. 
In applying the standard the tribunal examined the 
applicant's burden of proof and the information that would 
be necessary to make out her case: 
If the applicant successfully discharges the burden of 
proving like work, then the burden of proof shifts to 
the respondent to establish under s(l) (5) that the 
variation in the rate of remuneration between the 
applicant's contract and (the comparable man's) 
contract is genuinely due to a material 
difference ... between her case and his. While the Chairman respects the respondent's desire to protect 
the interests of their employees, it is the essence of 
the Equal Pay Act that a comparison be made between the 
terms of employment of a woman and a comparable man and 
for this purpose it is inevitable that employers will 
be required to disclose information sufficient for 
establishing the personal equation ... The Chairman does 
not see how the defence of material difference can be 
fairly tested without making available to the applicant 
full details of (the comparable man's) terms of 
, employment 
(Wilkinson v. Butterworth and Co. r London C. r 27 Nov. 1978f p. 1-2). 
The question of discovery and disclosure is of enormous 
importance in litigating an equal Pay or sex discrimination 
complaint, as these examples showl as it is usually the 
respondent who controls most of the information necessary to 
establish the complaintr and the applicant who bears the 
burden of proof. The significance of the issue for both 
parties is reflected in the extent to which it recurs in the 
reported case law. Lustgarten (1980, p. 220) notes that the 
claim of confidentiality to avoid disclosure is the single 
issue which has generated the largest amount of reported 
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case law under both the sex discrimination and race 
relations legislation. 
The significance of the discovery issue further 
emphasizes the need for adequate preparation, and 
representation during the preparation stages of the 
complaint. The kind of information that is requested,, and 
the applicant's response to any reluctance to disclose on 
the part of the respondent will crucially affect the kind of 
evidence that the applicant is able to muster in support of 
her case at the tribunal hearing. The unrepresented 
applicant is likely to be disadvantaged both in terms of her 
knowledge of what information is necessary to make a 
persuasive showing at the hearing, and in her ability to 
pursue this information in the face of respondent refusal. 
At the very least a disputed request for disclosure will 
result in some delay andr if the applicant persists and 
knows how to proceed, in the necessity for an additional 
interlocutory hearing before the complaint can proceed on 
the merits. 
The prior Problem of deciding what information to seek 
from the respondent is one in which the unassisted applicant 
is likely to face some difficulty even before she reaches 
any problems in procuring such information. In a SDA 
complaint an applicant may request certain information from 
the respondent by using as (74) (1) (a) questionnaire. The 
questionnaire includes some prewritten questions but also 
makes provision for the applicant to enter her own 
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additional questions under Q. 6. The EOC guide notes that 
this question is "an opportunity to collect the information 
you will need to prepare your case" and gives examples of 
the kinds of question that might usefully be included. A 
lawyer with the EOC recently commended that if used properly 
a s. 74 questionnaire could lead to a good deal of relevant 
information but noted that its usefulness is limited by an 
EAT ruling that ordinary rules of discovery apply to its 
use. Thus, an applicant cannot use the questionnaire to 
determine what kind of information the- respondent has in 
his possession, as this kind of 'fishing' is prohibited 
under rules relating to discovery (Donnelly interview, 
1982). 
These examples of potential preparation difficulties 
are included to illustrate some of the problems that 
appliacnts may face. They may provide some insight into the 
high withdrawal rate of complaints, noted in the previous 
chapter. They may provide a partial explanation of the 
relatively high failure rate of complaints that reach a 
tribunal hearing. They certainly illustrate how difficult 
may be the task of preparation if undertaken by an-applicant 
who lacks informed assistance or representation. 
B. The Burden of Proof 
The availability of access to information has direct 
bearing on a second major procedural hurdle, the ability of 
the applicant to meet the býurden of proof required by the 
legislation. 
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The required burden of proof differs as to the two 
Acts. The EqPA requires that an applicant establish that 
she is being treated less favorably with regard to pay than 
a comparable man, i. e., a man engaged in the same or broadly 
similar work as the applicant. The burden then shifts to 
the employer to prove that the variation here is to establish 
comparability, the similarity of her work with that of 
the man with whom she claims equal pay. 
Under the SDA, the burden of proof is rather different. 
To prove direct discrimination, the applicant must establish 
that she has been treated less favorably than another, because 
of sex or marital status. 
8 The whole burden is on the applicant 
to establish, on the balance of probabilities, not just a 
difference in treatment, but also to convince the tribunal 
that the variation arose from considerations prohibited 
by the SDA. 
In Equality for Women, the White Paper that preceded 
the introduction of a government sex discrimination bill 
into Parliament, the proposals provided for the applicant to 
make an initial showing that the respondent had acted to her 
detriment in circumstances suggesting that the reason was sex 
or marital discrimination, and'for the burden of proof to 
shift to the respondent to show that the applicant was not 
treated less favorably on that basis. At the Billb Second 
Reading in the House of Lords, Baroness Fisher of Rednal noted 
that there had been a change from the proposal outlined in the 
White Paper, and that the proposed burden of proof now 
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appeared to be inconsistent with that set out in the EqPA. 
(H. L. Debs. r 1 July 1975, c 154). 
She drew attention to the possible effect of the shift 
in the burden of proof on applicants: "For any woman to 
bring a case before a tribunalespecially a working class 
woman - will be a major personal achievement, for her 
anyway. I think that we shall be victimising the woman if 
she has to bear the onus of proof. w (Ibid. c. 155). For 
the Governmentr Lord Crowther-Hunt replied to criticisms of 
the change in the burden of proof from that proposed in the 
White Paperr and addressed the suggestion that the bill 
should revert to an approach where, after an initial showing 
of an alleged act of discrimination, the burden should be 
upon the respondent to show a legitimate reason for the act 
complainted of. His argument bears quoting at some lengtbr 
not least for the disingenuousness of the logic: 
The House will appreciate that [the suggestion] cuts 
right across the principle of our law, both civil and 
criminal, that a person is innocent until be is proven 
guilty. To prove a negative is a-very onerous burden 
and it would not be reasonable as a general proposition 
to require the respondent to do so (Ibid. c. 188). 
However, since the burden in unfair dismissal cases 
under the 1974 Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act was 
identical to that proposed in the white Paper and now 
rejected by the Government, it was necessary for the 
Government spokesman to attempt to distinguish the two 
situations: 
It is perfectly fair and defensible that when an 
employer dismisses an employee he should be obliged to 
see that he had a proper reason for doing so. That is 
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why in dismissal cases the main evidential burden is on 
the respondent. In this situation it should be noted 
that the respondent is not asked to prove a negative. 
He has to show that the dismissal was for a reason 
which the Act says is a legitimate one (Ibid. r c. 189). 
It is difficult to see the distinction that the speaker 
was attempting to make, since the situation he describes as 
acceptable for the purposes of unfair dismissal legislation 
was precisely the one advocated by critics of the 
Government's position, for the sex discrimination 
legislation - where the respondent would be required not to 
prove a negativer but to establish that the differential 
treatment occured for a reason which the legislation allowed 
as legitimate. 
- The government was not, however, persuaded by the 
arguments of those advocating a shift in the burden of 
proof, and the statute that became law, puts the whole burden 
on the applicant. This burden of proof is particularly 
onerous because of the nature of sex discrimination 
complaints. Direct evidence is rarer and the more usual 
situation is the need to prove discrimination by relying on 
circumstantial evidence. The EOC notes that this task can 
be 'particularly onerous, requiring skill and expertise in 
formulating and presenting the evidence to enable the facts 
to be found from which the proper inferences can be drawn. " 
(EOC ýroposed Amendments, January 1981, p. 8) For the 
unrepresented applicantr this task will be a formidable one. 
The EOC did not suggest, in its proposals for changer that 
there should be any provision for making representation more 
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readily available, but it did note that the situation for 
applicants would be ameliorated by reversing the burden of 
proof. 
The EOC pointed out that there were precedents for 
reversing the burden of prooft giving sections 23 and 25 of 
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978 as 
examples. These provisions related to discrimination on the 
basis of trade union membership. In cases involving 
allegations of discrimination on this basist the burden of 
proof mirrors that in unfair dismissal cases, with the 
applicant bearing the initial burden of demonstrating that 
the respondent acted in a particular way, and the burden 
then shifting to the respondent to establish that the act 
complained of was legitimate. This approach does constitute 
a reversal of the normal principle of civil law where it is 
for the plaintiff to show that the defendant has contravened 
the law. The justification for this latter approach is, as 
Lord Crowther Hunt rightly pointed out in the House of 
Lords, that it prevents the defendant from being placed in 
the untenable position of having to prove a negative. 
Lustgarten (1980) argues, howeverr that in discrimination 
cases, the applicant, under the present approach to the 
burden. of proof, is compelled to prove a negative - that the 
employer did not have a legitimate reason for the less 
favourable treatment alleged. (Lustgarten, 1980, p. 206). 
This burden-may become particularly onerous when the 
applicant encounters difficulties in obtaining access to 
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information under the respondent's control. As noted earlier 
it is comparatively rare to find direct and uncontradicted 
evidence of discrimination. An applicant will usually go 
forward by relying on circumstantial evidence, which means 
that credibility becomes a crucial test in deciding whether 
the burden has been met in the particular case. 
The higher courts have given some guidance on the 
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burden of proof. While the formal burden is on the applicant 
in direct discrimination cases, "it would only be in 
exceptional or frivilous cases that it would be right for 
the industrial tribunal to find at the end of the applicant's 
case that there was no case to answer, " Oxford v. DHSS (1977) 
ICR 884,887 (EAT). The EAT suggests that concepts of shifting 
evidential burdens be avoided, as overly legalistic and 
more likely to obscure than illuminate the answer. Rather, 
the tribunal should consider all the evidence, and "take into 
account the fact that direct evidence of discrimination is 
seldom going to be available and that, accordingly, in these 
cases, the affirmative evidence of discrimination will 
normally consist of inferences to be drawn from the primary 
facts" Khanna v. ministry of Defense (1981) ICR 688-9 
(under the Race Relations Act of 1976). Thus, if the primary 
facts indicate that there has been discrimination "the 
employer is called on to give an explanation and, failing clear 
and specific explanation being given by the employer to the 
tribunal, an inference of industrial discrimination from 
the primary facts will mean the complaint succeeds" 
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The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal adopted a similar 
approach in Wallace v. South Eastern Education and Library 
Board (1980) IRLR 193,195. In Wallace the court drew an 
inference of sex discrimination from the failure to promote 
a woman whose qualifications and experience were demonstrably 
superior to those of the successful male candidate, noting 
that if inferences of discrimination could not be drawn in 
cases such as this, "the object of the legislation would be 
largely defeated. " 
Cases from the samole will illustrate these points in 
more detail. Since the burden of proof can be especially 
difficult to meet in cases alleging discrimination in 
recruitment and promotion due to the enormous significance 
in these cases of access to information in establishing the 
prima facie case, examples have been chosen from those com- 
plaints in the sample in which this kind of discrimination 
was at issue. 
out of a total of 65 SDA complaints in the sample, 
nearly half were concerned with either recruitment or 
promotion related discrimination, as the following list 
shows. 
(cont ' d. ) 
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Table 21-, 
Types of discrimination alleged in SDA complaints, samPle. 
Promotion, transfer, and training 15 
Recruitment 14 
Dismissal 9 
Redundancy 8 
Terms and conditions of employment 8 
Reduction in status 
Certification 
Licensing 
Advertising 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Total 60 (+ 5 not known) 
Two contrasting cases will illustrate some of the 
issues that are likely to arise in a promotion or 
recruitment case, and the ways in which tribunals may 
respond to them. 
In Wilkie v. stratbclvde Regional Council (Glasgow 
Industrial Tribunal, 1980), the applicant alleged sex 
discrimination in the respondent's failure to interview her 
for the post of lecturer in social policy. The respondent 
initially denied discrimination and asserted that the 
candidates for. the post who were interviewed were considered 
to be those best qualified for the position. The applicant 
was a temporary lecturer at one of the respondent's colleges 
when a permanent full-time post was advertised. She applied 
for the job, for which the Head of Department received a 
total of. 4 applicantsf 2 male and 2 female. The Head of 
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Department drew up an interview list of 3 candidates; the 
applicant, and the two men who had applied. He submitted 
this list to the College Director who withdrew the 
applicant's name from the list, interviewed the two male 
candidates, and appointed one of them to the post. At this 
point the applicant contacted the EOC for advice, and 
subsequently filed a complaint with the Industrial Tribunal. 
It should be noted here that at the time the applicant 
contacted the EOC, she knew as a matter of fact that her 
qualifications were at least as good as those of the 
candidates who were interviewed. She knew the Head of 
Department who was responsible for drawing up the interview 
list, and he later testified on her behalf at the hearing. 
In light of the issues raised in Nasse, the fact that the 
applicant had this information available to her is of some 
significance in terms of her ability to prepare the case, 
and the quality of evidence she was able to present at the 
hearing. During the hearing the Head of Department 
testified that he had had an opportunity to compare the 
applicant's qualifications with those of the candidates who 
were interviewed, that the applicant would have been a 
"strong candidate, " and in his opinion should also have been 
interviewed. The applicant also presented similar testimony 
from another senior lecturer who had examined the 
candidates' qualifications. In addition to this witness 
testimony, the applicant testified-on her own behalf, and 
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also submitted what the tribunal referred to as "a 
substantial body of helpful documentary evidence. " 
During the evidence of the respondent's witnesses, the 
representative for the respondent conceded that there had 
been an act of discrimination against the applicant, but 
that it was grounded not in sex discrimination, but arose 
from the fact that she had previously lodged an unfair dismissal 
complaint against the College. The applicants representative 
contended that where it was established that there had been an 
act of discrimination against a woman, it was sufficient to 
raise the presumption of discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, and that the burden of proof should shift to the 
respondent at this point to rebut the presumption. In 
support of this contention the applicant's representative 
directed the tribunal's attention to two appellate dqcisions, 
Moberl v. Commonwealth Hall (1977) IRLR 176, and Wallace v. 
SoutheastemEducation and Librar Board (1980) IRLR 193. The 
Tribunal notes in its decision thats 
Resting on these authorities the tribunal had no 
hesitation in finding that the burden of proof in 
this case did shift to the respondents and that it 
was for the respondents to prove that their admitted 
act of discrimination was on ground other than sex. 
This they were required to establish to the normal 
standard of balance of probabilities. (Decision, P-7) 
If the applicant had not had access to the evidence 
that showed that she was at least as well qualified as the 
other condidates sho were interviewed, the case may have 
turned out differently. Because of the evidence that the 
applicant was able to present on hte qualifications issue, it 
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would have been difficult for the respondent to assert that 
it was an obvious lack of qualification for the post that 
constituted the grounds for their refusal to interview her 
Thus, the respondents changed the grounds of their defence 
and admitted discrimination on the basis of a previous 
action against the College by the applicant. This had the 
effect of shifting the burden of proof from the applicant 
the respondent, to dispel the inference of sex discrimination 
that arises in such a circumstance. 
The tribunal's decision as to whether the respondent 
met the burden of proof was essentially a judgement of the 
relative credibility of the parties. The tribunal stated 
that the testimony of the respondent's witnesses was 
unsatisfactory, and that on credibility grounds it preferred 
the testimony of the applicant's witnesses where there 
were discrepancies. The tribunal did not accept that 
the applicant's previous complaint of unfair dismissal was 
the reason for the College's failure to interview her. The 
tribunal noted that this defence was submitted by the respondent's 
solicitor at the end of the presentation of the respondent's 
evidence, and had only been referred to as a peripheral 
matter in the testimony of the respondent's witnesses. 
Further, the respondent had failed to raise this defence 
in response to the applicant's s- 74 questionnaire. The 
tribunal noted that such evasiveness in s. 74 replies 
permits a tribunal to draw inferences that the respondent 
had committed an unlawful act. On the evidence available to 
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it, the tribunal reached a unanimous verdict for the applicant. 
This case demonstrates the application by an industrial 
tribunal of the principles governing the burden of proof 
enunciated in Oxford v. DHSS and Khanna v. Minigjry of 
Defence. It also demonstrates how crucial is the issue of 
weighing credibility when the tribunal is asked to consider 
whether the primary facts permit an inference of discrimintion, 
and whether the respondent's explanation is convincing CD 
enough to dispel it. 
The resolution of the credibility issue is one of six 
variables that the Wilkie case demonstrates, and that the 
sample shows as tending to be important in the 
(cont'd. ) 
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resolution of complaints generally: access to information, 
pre-hearing preparationt the submission of appropriate, 
persuasive, and credible evidence, both documentary and 
testimonial, the presence of a legal representative able to 
direct the tribunal's attention to cases supporting the 
party's positionr the resolution of credibility issues by 
the tribunal in favour of one party or the other, and 
finally the willingness and/or ability of the tribunal to 
draw from the facts the inferences Pecessary for a finding 
of discrimination. In Wilkie, the applicant had access to 
information through friendly contacts with colleagues, 
senior members of the Department who drew up the interview 
list, including her nazie, and subsequently felt that she had 
been badly treated. Her case was well prepared; the 
tribunal commented on the "helpful" documentary material she 
submitt-ed. Her witnesses, employees of the respondent, 
testified directly to the issue at hand from personal 
knowledge. The applicant had the services of an able 
representative, who drew attention of tribunal members to 
cases favouring her position on the issue of the burden of 
proof; the tribunal stated that it relied on the authorities 
cited by the applicant's representative in deciding the 
proper allocation of the burden of proof. The tribunal 
resolved the credibility issue in favour of the applicant, 
noting that the respondent's witness testimony did not 
support the defence on which it restedr and examining the 
entire proceedings, including the respondent's reply to the 
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s. 74 questionnaire, for inconsistencies. From the facts 
presented, the tribunal drew the inference that sex 
discrimination had occurred. Not only was the applicant 
well prepared to present her case, but the tribunal appears 
to have been scrupulous in its approach to evidentiary 
mattersy the determination of legal issues raised by the 
complaint and the inferential leap required to establish sex 
discrimination in the absence of a direct admission. 
A complaint which is in some ways analogous, since it 
also concerns access to promotion, demonstrates how the 
resolution of a complaint may be affected when the important 
variables do not weigh in favour of the applicant, as they 
do in Wilkie. In Mitchell v. Essex Area Health Authoritv, 
(Londony N. 1981)j the applicant was a medical technician in 
one of the respondent's hospitals, who applied for promotion 
to the post of Senior Medical Physics Technician. Six 
candidates were short-listedr three men, and three women. 
This list was then reduced to three--two women, one of whom 
subsequently brought the complaint of sex discrimination, 
and one man. The male candidate was appointed to the post, 
and the woman, who was the 'internal' candidater brought a 
complaint alleging sex discrimination as the reason for her 
failure to be appointed. 
complaint. 
The tribunal dismissed her 
In Mitchell, the applicant represented herself, but the 
respondent was represented by a lawyer. In Wilkie, by 
comparison, both parties had legal representation. In 
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Mitghell., the applicant was unable to rely on the 
sympathetic testimony of colleagues or superiors, the latter 
instead giving evidence supportive of the respondent; nor 
does it appear from the record of the decision that she 
submitted any large volume of documentary evidence helpful 
to her case. The tribunal appeared to be much less rigorous 
in its approach to probing the evidence for inconsistencies 
than the tribunal in Wilkie, and more willing to accept the 
respondent's version of the facts at face value, despite a 
statement that*w... there is seldom direct evidence of 
discrimination, and we must accordingly be prepared to draw 
necessary inferences. w 
In evidence, the applicant submitted a copy of the male 
candidate's application form as the basis for a comparison 
between her qualifications and experience and those of the 
successful male candidate. She also submitted a job 
description for the post as an additional support for her 
claim that she was better qualified for the post than the 
man who was appointed. The tribunal compared the two 
candidates' qualifications and experience in light of the 
written job description, and the respondent's witnesses' 
statements about the managerial qualities required of the 
successful candidate. Comparing the male candidate's 
qualification with those of the applicantr the tribunal 
noted that "[his] academic qualifications are undoubtedly 
less impressive than those of the applicant. " Looking at 
the technical experience of the two candidates the tribunal 
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found that with regard to two of the areas mentioned in the 
job description the applicant had the greater experience, 
and that with regard to one area the successful candidate 
was the more experienced. 
In light of the apparently greater experience, and 
undoubtedly higher academic qualifications of the applicant, 
it might be supposed that an inference of discrimination 
could have been drawn. The respondent removed any doubt 
about its motivation in appointing the male candidate, 
however, by convincing the tribunal that he scored higher on 
managerial capacity and supervisory experience than the 
applicantr and that these factors were of great importance, 
since in making this appointment the hospital was in fact, 
because of a foreseeable retirement, choosing the next Chief 
Technician. Since the. se qualities were advanced as the 
major reason for appointing the male candidate in preference 
to the applicantr it is surprising that the tribunal does 
not appear to have enquired as to the details of his 
supervisory experience. In the written decision there is no 
report of how many employees he had supervised, or for how 
longr although the tribunal records that the applicant was 
told when she first announced her intention of applying for 
the post that her supervisory experience was inadequate. 
Nevertheless, she had filled the disputed position in an 
acting capacity and had been responsible for supervising 
"two or three" other technicians. All that the tribunal 
records of the successful candidate's experience in this 
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field is that he was previously in charge of a smaller 
department than the one in question, in a specialist 
hospital. Beyond this the tribunal records that the 
respondent appointed him to the position because he had 
"suitable management potential and a pleasing personality, 
and (he] would be in a position to act as an able chief 
technician" [emphasis added]. Thus, without any probing of 
the evidence submittedr the tribunal resolved all 
credibility issues in favour of the respondent I and 
dismissed the applicant's complaint. 
It is not the purpose of the foregoing discussion to 
imply that this case was wrongly decided since such a 
determination is outside the scope and competence of this 
examination. Rather it is to show how, in contrast to 
Wilkier the factors identified as tending to affect 
complaint resolution can operate to the applicant's 
detriment and in favour of the respondent. The discussion 
of the tribunal's approach to the evidentiary and 
credibility issues also suggests the wide variation in 
approach between different tr#unals. The written decision, 
in setting out the tribunal's fairly uncritical acceptance 
of the respondent's explanation# also indicates the areas in 
which a skilled representative may have been able to improve 
the applicant's chance of sucqess, through skillful cross 
examination to draw out any inconsistencies that may have 
not been immediately apparent in the respondent's witnesses' 
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testimony and in the respondent's general approach to 
its defence. 
At a tribunal hearing, as in any dispute adjudication 
where there are differing versions of the facts, credibility 
must be a central issue. As Wilkie and Mitchell suggest, 
tribunals appear to vary considerably in the extent to which 
credibility determinations are based upon strict scrutiny 
of all available facts and sources. The Mitchell case also 
indicates that the credibility issue is likely to be a 
difficult one for tribunals to evaluate where recruitment 
or promotion decisions are based on 'soft' criteria, dependent 
on professional judgement, since tribunals recognize that it 
is not a legitimate part of the task to substitute their 
own judgement for that of selection panels or appointment 
committees, except in as much as discrimination appears to 
have been a guiding principle. 
Applicants who complain of discrimination in promotion 
may well have a very difficult task in attempting to persuade 
tribunals of an inference of discrimination when they can 
show only that they were as well qualified as the successful 
candidate, rather than better qualified. In Saunders v. 
Richmond-upon-Thames LBC, for example, (1978) ICR 75,80, 
the EAT. discussing the complaint of an unsuccessful female 
applicant for the post of golf professional, noted that it 
did not find her qualifications "were, or anyhow much, superior 
to those of the successful candidate, " and concluded that her 
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qualifications were not thus "of a kind that the failure to 
appoint a candidate so qualified prima facie gave rise to 
an inference of discrimination. " 
Lustgarten (1980) suggests that tribunals would be better 
able to evaluate the parties' conflicting interpretations of 
events if, in comDlaints of direct discrimination, evidence 
bearing on employer's policies and practices were more widely 
introduced, not to prove the truth of the individual complaint, 
but to aid in determining relative credibility. As Lust- 
garten points out, admission of evidence of this kind 
conforms to the normal principles governing the use of 
'similar fact' evidence in civil cases (Lustgarten, 1980, 
p. 208). For example, statistical data on the relative numbers 
of men and women in a given grade of employment would not be 
dispositive of an individual's complaint alleging sex discrim- 
ination in access to that grade, but it could aid the tribunal 
in evaluating the credibility of the employer's pattern and 
practice of conduct. Lustgarten rightly suggests that such 
evidence would be of particular value in situations like 
that in Mitchell, above, where decisions rest on highly sub- 
jective criteria which are inaccessible to external evaluation. 
The EAT has accepted the validity and utility of 
statistical evidence in cases involving indirect sex 
discrimination (See Price v. Civil Service Commission, 1977, 
IRLR 198). In 1981, in a case arising under the 1976 Race 
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Relations Act, the EAT held that evidence of the employer's 
pattern of conduct may be a relevant factor in deciding whether 
on the evidence presented, sex discrimination occurred, 
Owen and Briggs v. James (1981) ICR 377,382-3.10 Such 
evidence thus may help to establish or rebut an inference of 
direct discrimination. 
The practice of the industrial tribunals with regard to 
the introduction of such evidence appears to have varied 
considerably (Lustgarten, 1980, p. 210). Some cases from the 
sample illustrate the kinds of fact situations where the 
introduction of evidence of systematic conduct might be illum- 
inating, and the approach of the tribunals in the cases 
considered. 
In Healy v. Messrs. Forrester Ketley and Co. (Birmingham, 
1981), the applicant was a chartered patent agent with the 
respondent firm, who was under consideration for promotion to 
junior partner, but was not ultimately one of the two success- 
ful appointees. Four employees were under consideration for 
two junior partner positions, three male 
(cont ' d. ) 
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and one female. When two men were promoted and she was not, 
the applicant brought a complaint of sex discrimination. 
The case involved the tribunal in evaluating the 
respondent's behaviour, which was based on subjective 
criteria of professional judgement. In making this 
evaluation the tribunal considered not only the bearing of 
the respondent's witnesses (*honest and reliable") but also 
made some minimal use of evidence relevant to an overall 
pattern of conduct. The tribunal noted that it bad 
considered the suggestion that there was-a background of 
incidents from which discrimination could be inferred, and 
recounted the factors which appeared to indicate that no 
discrimination had in fact taken place. The tribunal noted 
the total number of partners, and the number of women 
partners and set this information in the context of the 
male/female ratio for the whole occupationr using the 
Register of Patent Agents numbers as a reference point. It 
also considered briefly the numbers of men and women 
employed by the respondent at the lower grade of technical 
assistant and noted that it found no evidence of different 
treatment. The tribunal records all these factors in its 
decision, as well as a detailed account of the steps leading 
up to the incident giving rise to the applicant's 
allegation, and the respondent's rationale for choosing a 
man in preference to the applicant whor it was conceded, was 
'partnership material. ' Thus in assessing the relative 
credibility of the parties' versions of eventsf the tribunal 
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relied not only on its evaluation of witness testimony, 
although this undoubtedly played a partr but also considered 
the position of women in the respondent's firm more 
generallyr in addition to looking at the number of women 
employed in the profession as a whole. 
By contrast, the case of Stewart v. John Haldane Ltd. 
(Glasgowi, 1980) illustrates a decision where the tribunal 
does not appear to have utilized any evidence other than 
witness testimony. In this case, the applicant was a woman 
who applied speculativelyr for a job as a casual coach 
drivery to the respondentr a small firm operating three 
coaches. She was told that there might be casual work 
available and the manager took her details. She heard 
nothing more from the firm, but two months later she saw 
that-they were advertising for a driver. she was not 
interviewed and a man was appointed. The applicant then 
lodged a complaint of sex discrimination. At the hearing, 
there were discrepancies in the respondent's evidence, which 
the tribunal acknowledged, and circumstances which might 
arguably have permitted an inference of discrimination, but 
which were accepted at face value by the tribunal. The fact 
situation as set out by the tribunal is that the applicant 
sought work and was told there was noney but that two months 
later an advertisement for a driver appeared. The 
respondent manager said that business had increased in this 
period. A male driver was then appointed, but between 
accepting the offer and starting workt he changed his mind 
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and did not take up the post. The respondent then decided 
that there was no need for an addtiional driverr although 
only three weeks had elapsed since the job was advertised. 
In addition to this explanationt the respondent also stated 
that the applicant lacked the qualifications necessary for 
the job. In the face of these inconsistent assertions, and 
a version of the facts which appears at best to be 
insubstantial, the tribunal did not attempt to weigh the 
credibility of the version of events presented by seeking 
any evidence relevant to a pattern of conduct, nor did it 
appear willing or able to draw any inferences from the 
inconsistencies which it acknowledged as being present. 
The idea of a greater use of statistical data is an 
appealing one, not least because it focusses attention on 
discrimination as a collectively experienced phenomenon, 
rather than a question only of individual rights. However, 
there are a number of practical matters associated with the 
suggestion that more use should be made of this kind of 
evidence, which must be addressedl albeit briefly. 
First,. the increased use of statistical information is 
likely to intensify the struggle for access to information, 
and may well produce protracted discovery battles. 
Secondly, an unrepresented applicant is less likely to 
benefit from a trend towards the increased use of such 
information than one with representation, since its use 
requires expertise in selecting and obtaining the kind of 
information' necessary to the case. Thirdlyr a trend towards 
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greater reliance on statistical data as a means of proof may 
exacerbate rather than reduce the differences of power and 
resources between applicants and respondents which already 
exist in teims of access to legal representation, and could 
conceivably come to include differences in access to the 
services of data and statistical specialists. In the United 
States where the Federal courts have increasingly relied on 
statistical data of a sophisticated kind, the ability to 
retain and pay for the services of computer experts and 
statisticians has increasingly become anecessity for 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination casesý 
1 
Although it 
seems unlikely that the degree of reliance on experts which 
is to be found in the American courts will develop in the 
tribunal systemy it is worth remembering that evidence of 
systematic conduct may be used to challengeL or support 
respondent credibility, and the interpretation which is put 
on such information by the tribunal is likely to depend to 
some extent on the way in which it is presented. Thusy 
access to the information, and to the services of expert 
presenters is just another way. in which existing differences 
in resources between the parties may again be manifested. 
These issues of discovery *and the burden of proof serve to 
stress how difficult may be the task facing any applicant; 
the problems can only be exacerbated when the applicant 
lacks assistance in preparation of the complaint and 
presentation of the case at the tribunal hearing. To a 
potentially difficult situation must be added the 
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possibility that the tribunal will have had little 
experience in dealing with equal pay and sex discrimination 
complaintst a situation where again, the presence or absence 
of a skilled representative may be of crucial importance, 
particularly if the respondent's defence is conducted by a 
lawyer. 
As this chapter demonstrates, there are, under the 
present system of enforcement, an number of problems for the 
individual contemplating the bringing of-an EqPA or SDA 
complaint. It has been suggested that ameliorating some of 
the procedural burdens that an individual may face may have 
the effect of not only improving the success rate at 
tribunals, but alsor in consequence, of encouraging more 
complaints to be made, and more to be pursued beyond an 
early withdrawal. However, as some of the material on the 
emergence of disputes showsr it is unlikely to completely 
change the situation. There appears to be a particular 
problem in relying on individual complaints of 
discrimination in a world where occupational sex segregation 
is common and where studies suggest that it is in precisely 
this situation that perceptions of discrimination may not 
emerge. In such a situation, reliance on individual 
complaints may not be the most appropriate system of 
enforcement for anti-discrimination legislation. 
It is possible, however, to suggest certain changes in 
the system which would facilitate the process of bringing 
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and presenting complaints, regardless of whether to do so 
would ultimately lead to an increase in the total number of 
complaints adjudicated. Such proposals may be justified 
solely by reference to concepts of fairness for the 
individual, and the public interest in the even-handed 
administration of justice. 
Possible reforms may concern either the tribunals, the 
applicants, or-the law itself. With regard to the 
tribunals, improvements in training and/or changes in 
composition have been suggested. With regard to applicants, 
proposals for change focus on the practical difficulties of 
preparing and presenting a case, and indicate a need for 
increased availability of trained and competent 
representatives. With regard to the law, more liberal 
discovery rulest and a shift in the burden of proof would 
both be advantageous to the applicantr particularly, but not 
exclusively, in difficult recruitment and promotion cases 
under the SDA. These changes together may facilitate the 
development of a process in which it is easier for the 
applicant than it is now to pursue and succeed with a 
meritorious claim. 
The focus of this chapter has been on the 
identification Of important procedural concerns which 
potentially affect the resolution of an eqdal'pay or sex 
discrimination complaint. This is not to suggest that 
substantive factors have no impact on outcome. Equal pay 
claims may be brought, for example, where the jobs compared 
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for pay purposes are clearly outside the scope of the Acts 
'like work' provision; similarly some sex discrimination 
claims may lack a basis in the context of existing legal 
provisions. 
The inability of the legislation to remedy certain 
kinds of disadvantage in the workplace has been well 
documented elsewherer and proposals for substantive charges 
have been advanced. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
suggest that procedural concern sr which have received less 
attention, are nevertheless of considerable, independent 
importance. 
This chapter started with an examination of the 
complaint statistics, and the ensuing analysis and 
discussion has taken place implicitly within that 
statistical context. Ultimately, howeverr the fact of a low 
complaint rate and a lower success rate under the anti- 
discrimination legislation must be considered not just from 
the negative position of the problems posed in enforcement, 
but also from the standpoint of the ideological or symbolic 
message that this situation conveys. To have a weak, 
difficult or under-utilized law is not the same thing as 
having. no law at all. 
While the law existsf it implicitly conveys a number of 
symbolic statements which go beyond the perception that the 
law is relatively ineffective. While a law exists, it is 
possible to assert that the role of public policy is over, 
that the limits of legal change have been reachedl and that 
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if a problem of discrimination persists, then it is the 
responsibility of those victimized by it to seek the 
remedies the law provides. Pressing for changes in the law, 
in this contextr is more than a campaign to help the 
individual victims of discrimination who seek to bring a 
legal complaint. It is an ideological challenge to the 
implicit message or hidden agenda of an 'unsuccessful' law 
-- that victims now have only themselves to blame and that 
the limits of change through law have been reached. 
In this chapter, the focus has been on the enforcement 
process which is available to the individual. In this 
contexty problems like the lack of representation and the 
difficult burden of proof loom large. Proposals for the 
reform of the enforcement system, through the kind of 
changes discussed above, would almost undoubtedly improve 
the chance of an applicant with a legally meritorious claim 
to pursue it successfully to a remedy. The problem would 
remain, however, of attempting to enforce anti- 
discrimination legislation primarily through individual 
complaints. While reform in the individual enforcement 
system is doubtless a worthy policy objectiver it should not 
obscure the fact that perhaps the major obstacle to 
effective enforcement is the individualism which lies at the 
core of the legislative solution. 
Recognition of this fact is importantr and not only 
because it directs the attention to a different order of 
changes from those proposed in this chapter. It also points 
354- 
up the necessity of placing the study of procedural concerns 
within a broader context than that of the enforcement system 
alone. While a close concern to technical details of 
enforcement is necessary to the sociologist's understanding 
of the effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness of a 
particular statute, the enforcement system as a whole must 
be examined with reference both to the nature of the 
underlying phenomenon which gives rise to the complaints 
p rocessed, and to the nature of the remedy that the law 
provides. Thus, if anti-discriminationlaw incorporates an 
approach to discrimination which is essentially 
individualistic, when the fact of discrimination results 
from membership in a social group, then changes that address 
only technical or procedural issues must ultimately faily 
even though their incremental effect may be beneficial to 
individual complainants. Without a recognition of the 
collective nature of discrimination as a pheomenon, and the 
structural situation of the group in questionr and of the 
lack of 'fit' between the problem identified and the legal 
solution offered, changes in procedural matters of the kind 
described here can only offer a partial remedy to the charge 
that the law is ineffective. 
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NOTES 
1 For an extended discussion of remedy, see Chapter 
below. 
2 Interview with Elaine Donnelly, 1982. 
See Appendix A for details of the sample. 
4 The cases referred to in this discussion are i Linton et. 
al v. British Steel Corporation, (Cardiff, 1981) ; Hermolle 
v. Government Communications. -H. 
O., (Gloucester, 1979); 
Waite'v. Thomas Lloyd, (Cardiff, 1978); Herald v. Prestcold, 
TGlasgow, 1977); and Sohove v. John Wyeth, (London Central, 
1979)- 
5 It should be noted that in the circumstances of being 
held to precedent, it is difficult to see how a tribunal can 
avoid a legalistic approach, and it is debetable whether it 
would be desirable to do so. This point is developed below. 
6 
These issues are illustrated below in the discussion of 
the tribunal's approach to the burden of proof and other 
evidentiary issues that the SCA presents. Also see the 
discussion of interpretations of key provisions of the EqPA 
in Chapter 10. 
7 However, as the total number of complaints has fallen, a 
smaller proportion of those reaching the tribunals is 
represented by a union official (See Table 13). 
8 In a case alleging indirect discrimination, the applicant 
must show that there is a requirement or condition that has 
a disproportionate impact on women. The burden of proof then 
shifts to the respondent to 'justify' the requirement. The 
tests established by the appellate courts for the meeting 
of these burdens are discussed in Chapter Six, above. 
9 Consideration of appellate decisions is limited to the 
period covered by the sample, i. e. up to and including 1981. 
10 The approach of the EAT was upheld on appeal to the Court 
of appeals (1982) I'R 618,622-23. 
11 Some of this effect may be due to the availability of 
class actions, but even where the complaint is an individual 
one it may require considerable statistical expertise to 
present a convincing case in terms of demographics, and the 
workforce profile, and to refute the defendent's use of such 
data. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT: 
THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION 
In introducing the Sex Discrimination Bill in 
Parliament, the then Home Secretaryt Roy Jenkins, stated 
that, as to enforcement, "The general approach is to combine 
the right of direct individual access to*County Courts,, or 
Industrial Tribunals in employment cases, with the strategic 
role of the powerful EOC which has the responsibility and 
power to enforce the law in the public interst. " (H. C. 
Debs. March 26 1975r c. 552). In preceeding chapters I have 
examined the process of individual enforcement and some of 
the problems it poses in the context of anti-discrimination 
legislation. In this chapter the focus turns to the EOC in 
its role as strategic agency for the enforcement of the 
legislation. 
The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC)j as 
established by the terms of the SDA, is in many respects a 
hybrid organization. It is the product of a variety of 
experiences in state intervention in the field of race 
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relationsr and the result of compromises between differing 
assumptions as to the desirability and feasibility of the 
legislation itself and as to the appropriate means of 
enforcement. The idea of such an organization, with its 
strategic role, is borrowed from the United States, where 
both state and Federal governments have long used 
administrative agencies as the linch-pin of anti- 
discrimination law enforcement. The British variant of this 
kind of organization differsy however, in some significant 
ways from its American counterparts, and raises important 
questions about the transcultural borrowing of legal and 
administrative concepts and structures, and the subsequent 
efficacy of such transplants outside of their originating 
environment. 
Both the idea of the limitations produced by partial 
transcultural borrowingr and the debates concerning the 
roles of quasi-non-governmental organizations (Quangos), 
inform the analysis presented here, if somewhat 
tangentially. The main purpose of this chapter is to focus 
on the statutory powers"of the EOC (which invites comparison 
with the American originals) and to examine the use that the 
EOC has made of the powers (which invites questions about 
the possible limitations that the social formation places on 
the use of those powers). Initially, however, the purpose 
is an empirical one: to present an accurate account of the 
organization's use of the statutory powers. Such an account 
provides both a basis for short-term-recommendations for 
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improvement or amendment and contributes to the debates on 
the limits of administrative power by examining the factors 
which have had an influential impact on the operation of one 
agency. The ultimate question which lies behind this 
analysis concer ns the extent to which the present system 
provides for effective collective enforcement of the anti- 
discrimination legislation, and the feasibility of amending 
the system in ways which would facilitate this objective. 
To pose this question is to acknowledge the need for an 
empirical investigation of the enforcement powers and the 
record of the EOC, in the context of the insights provided 
by the-broader theoretical debates mentioned above. 
I. THR STATUTORY POWERS OR THE EOC 
The EOC as established by section 53 of the SDA 
combines the ability to assist individuals in certain cases 
with the authority to conduct broad-ranging investigations 
on its own initiative, backed up by statutory powers of 
discovery. In those areas of enforcement which the 
Government deemed to be primarily in the public interest, 
the Commission has the authority to bring proceedings on its 
own behalf. In addition to these responsibilities, the EOC 
is to encourage researchr to monitor the legislation and to 
report to the Government. The Commission was also given 
powers to issue Codes of Practice, in an amendment passed 
under the Race Relations Act. This configuration of powers 
and responsibilities was designed, if government spokesmen 
are to be believed, to en able the new agency to fulfill a 
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strategic role with respect to the enforcement of the 
litigation, a notion based on the recognition that 
individual enforcement could not of itself be sufficient in 
this area. 
The general duties of the Commission are set out in 
S. 53 (1) of the SDR and include: working towards the 
elimination of discrimination; promoting equality of 
opportunity between men and women; keeping the operation of 
the SDA and the EqPA under review; and, where appropriate, 
making recommendations for amendments. Section 55 gives the 
Commission its specific duty in pursuance of its general 
responsibility to promote equality and discourage 
discrimination, to keep under review protective legislation, 
in consultation with the Health and Safety Commission. 
The SDA confers specific powers on the Commission to 
enable it to fulfill its statutory functions. It has wide 
discretionary powers in relation to undertaking or 
supporting research on educational activities thought to be 
necessary or expedient for the general purposes set out in 
s. 53(l). It is empowered under. s. 56 to issue Codes of 
Practice for the purpose of eliminating discrimination in 
the field of employment, or promoting equality of 
opportunity in employment. This provision was added to the 
SDA after a similar authority was conferred on the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) under the terms of 
s. 47 of the 1976 Race Relations Act (RRA). Before issuing 
a Code of Practice, the Commission must consult interested 
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organizations, and consider their representations. Any 
codes issued by the Commission are subject to Parliamentary 
ap proval. If approved, a code issued by the EOC-is not 
enforceable in itself but may be admitted in evidence. 
Both the power to undertake and sponsor research and 
the power to issue Codes of Practice fall within the sphere 
of authority designed to further the Commission's role in 
persuasion and education. Other powers, however, give the 
Commission a direct role in the enforcement of the 
legislation. These enforcement powers comprise the 
authority under s. 75 to assist individual complainants, the 
special enforcement arrangements which exist in relation to 
cases of pressure to discriminate and discriminatory 
practices and advertisements, and perhaps most important of 
all the authority conferred on the EOC under s. 57 to 
conduct formal investigations on its own initiative, "for 
any purpose connected with the Commission's duties. " 
At the heart of the strategic role of the Commission 
lies this power to conduct formal investigations. This 
authority in particular appears to have raised, among 
opponents at leasto, the spectre of unbridled authority, and 
among the Commission's well-wishers the hope that the power 
to conduct formal investigations might be used as a potent 
tool for uncovering and eradicating discrimination. For 
these reasonsf the statutory powers are worthy of a close 
examination. 
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The SDA sets out with considerable specificity the 
power of the EOC to conduct formal investigations, statutory 
bounds within which it must'operate and the limits of its 
authority in this area. The statutory power to conduct 
formal investigations is contained in sections 57 to 61 
of the Act. 
It is entirely within the scope of the Commission's 
authority to decide which matters, if any, to investigate, 
subject only to the right of the Secretary of State to 
require an investigation into any matter he or she considers 
appropriate. Once the Commission has decided to 
investigate, Commissioners (either existing or newly 
appointed) must be nominated to conduct the investigations 
(s. 57). When the EOC contemplates an investigation into the 
activities of a particular person an opportunity must be 
afforded that person to make presentations to the Commission 
concerning that allegation before the investigation begins. 
Before conducting a formal investigation, the EOC must 
draw up terms of reference. At the stage of contemplating an 
investigation however, terms of reference do not exist in the 
strict sense of the term, and the Act "lays down no detailed 
rules for the conduct of the preliminary inquiry" R. v. CRE 
Ex parte Hillingdon LBC (19821 Ac 779,787 (construing 
analagous provisions of the 1976 RRA). Nevertheless, the 
requirement at this stage of the proceedings is to inform 
the person of "any act which the Commission proposes to 
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investigate", including " very such act" Hillingdon [19821 
AC 779,786. Thus, the Commission must inform the individual 
with some specificity of the acts which are the target of 
the contemplated investigation: it cannot merely "throw the 
book at him" (Ibid. at 787-8). 
Where the proposed investigation is of a general nature, 
the Commission must give general notice of the holding of 
the investigation. Where it is confined to the activities 
of named persons, notice must be served upon those persons 
(s. 58). The EOC must draw up terms of reference for a 
general investigation or a named person investigation. The 
terms of reference of an investigation may be amended at any 
time, provided the notification requirements of s. 58 are met. 
If the investigation concerns the activities of named 
persons "the Commission should have formed the belief and 
should so state in the terms of reference, that the named 
persons may have done or may be doing discriminatory acts 
made unlawful by the "act of a kind specified in the terms 
of reference" R. v. CRE Ex parte Hillingdon LBC [1982] 
AC 779, -786. The House of Lords stated in Hillingdon that 
because of the wide scope of the 1976 RRA, "fairness requires 
that the statement in the terms of reference as to the kind 
of acts which the Commission believe the persons named may 
have done... should not be expressed in any wider language 
than is justified by the genuine extent of the Commission's 
belief" ý[19821 AC 779,786). It is the terms of reference 
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themselves that determine the scope of the formal investi- 
gation (Ibid. ). After the preliminary inquiry and the EOC's 
decision to proceed according to express terms of reference, 
the formal investigation may commence. At this stage of 
embarking on a formal investigation, it is not necessary 
for the Commission to show that it is more likely than 
not that there has been an unlawful act of discrimination 
(Ibid. at 791). It is enough if there is material which is 
"sufficient to raise in the'minds of reasonable men, possessed 
of the experience of covert... discrimination that has been 
acquired by the Commission, a suspicion" that there may have 
been acts of sex discrimination of the kind which the Commission 
proposes to investigate (Ibid. ). 
Once the investigation is begun, the Commission may 
collect evidence within the terms of reference. If 
(cont'd. ) 
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necessary, the Commission may use the statutory powers under 
s. 59 to compel the disclosure of information. These powers 
are much the same as those vested in the High Court in civil 
proceedings, with respect to the restrictions on information 
which must be disclosed, or documents produced, and with 
regard to the reimbursement of witnesses' expenses 
(s. 59[3]). Failure to comply with a request for 
information may result in an order from the County Court to 
which penalties will attach for non-compliance. The 
destruction, suppression or alteratioft of material required 
by a notice or order under s, 59 is punishable by fine, as 
is the mamking of a statement which is false as to a 
material particular when complying with an s. 59 notice or 
order (s. 59[61). 
However, the Commission is restricted in the use that 
it can make of information acquired in the course of formal 
investigations. If an investigation reveals evidence of 
discrimination against a particular individual, the 
Commission may not provide the individual in question with 
that evidence to enable her to bring a complaint. Rather, 
the information may only be disclosed in a form that does 
not allow identification of any person to whom it relates 
(s. 61[l][c]). 
Lustgarten (1980, p. 246) points out that both the EOC 
and CRE are prohibited by the disclosure restrictions in 
their res pective statutes from pooling detailed information 
acquired during formal investigations. Thus, if either 
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organization uncovers evidence of discrimination that would 
be of interest to the other, this may be indicated only in 
general terms. An amendment to the Race Relations Act which 
would have permitted more detailed pooling was resisted by 
the Government. 
At the end of the investigationt the Commission must 
draw up a report of its findings, and may either during the 
course of the investigation or at its completion, make 
recommendations based on these findings (s. 60). Section 
60[3] provides that in preparing a report for publication or 
inspection the Commission shall exclude, as far as is 
consistent with their duties and the object of the report, 
any matter which might in the opinion of the Commission 
prejudicially affect an individual or person with regard to 
their private affairs or business interests. 
The EOC has noted that "In conducting a formal 
investigation the Commission must have careful regard not 
only to the strict and explicit requirements of the statute, 
but also to the wider common-law requirements imposed upon 
any statutory body which exercises statutory powers" (EOCI 
1978, p. 21). Specificallyr the Commission addresses the 
requirements of "the rule of natural justice which requires 
that every person should know what allegations are made 
against him or her and be given an adequate opportunity to 
state his or her own case in answer. and notes that 
this requirement is satisfied by the opportunity of the 
potential subject of an investigation to make 
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representations to the Commission in respect of allegedly 
unlawful behavior, before the commencement of an 
investigation. (Ibid. ) Lustgarten, however, notes in a 
discussion of the powers of the CRE, that this right to be 
heard prior to an investigation was added to both the SDA 
and RRA by the opposition, with the hope that 
representations at this stage might deter any further 
proceedings, and that the provision goes "well beyond the 
requirements that the common law would impose. .. in the 
name of natural justice or, as it has increasingly come to 
be understood in relation to administrative gathering of 
evidence, the duty to act fairly. " (Lustgartenr 1980, 
p. 245) Noting that the common law requirement was set out 
some years previously by Lord Denning MR in terms of a 
requirement that administrative investigators must give a 
person the opportunity to correct or contradict what was 
said against him before he could be condemned or criticized, 
Lustgarten notes that the right to make representations 
before an investigation begins is otiose, since the 
opportunity to be heard before a non-discrimination notice 
can issue is guaranteed elsewhere. Thus the additional 
procedural step is undesirable, leading only to unnecessary 
delay. (Ibid. ) 
The procedure governing the issuance of a non- 
discrimination notice is set out in sections 67-70 of the 
SDA. Non-discrimination notices may be issued by the 
Commission only after a formal investigation has disclosed 
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evidence of unlawful acts within either the SDA or the EqPA. 
Non-discrimination notices may not be issued under any other 
circumstances. The statute requires that the Commission 
give notice of its intent to issue a non-discrimination 
notice, specifying the grounds on which such an action would 
be based. (s. 67 [5][a]) The person to whom the notice 
would be addressed then has a period of not less than 28 
days within which to make oral and/or written 
representations to the Commission. The Commission must take 
into account any such representations in deciding whether to 
proceed with the issuance of a notice. 
A non-discrimination notice may direct the respondent 
not to commit unlawful acts, and where compliance with the 
law involves changes in any practices or arrangementst to 
notify the Commission that those changes have been effected, 
and how, and to take reasonable steps to afford this 
information to other persons concerned (s. 67[21). The 
Commission may also require that the respondent furnish such 
other information "as may be reasonably required" in order 
to verify that the notice has been complied with, and may 
S pecify when and how such-information is to be provided, so 
long as the time peri. od does not exceed five years after the 
issuance of the notice. (Sections 67[3] and 67[4]). 
2 Once 
a notice is served, the respondent has the right to appeal 
to an industrial tribunal within six weeks of the date of 
service, to quash the notice entirely or to amend any of its 
requirements, where in the tribunal's opinion, the 
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requirement is unreasonable because it is based on an 
incorrect finding of fact, or for any other reason (Sections 
68[21 and 68[51). There is no right of appeal against the 
amendments to a notice made by a tribunal(s. 68 (41). If 
no appeal to a tribunal is made within the six week period, 
the notice becomes final. 
The same procedure applies to non-discrimination 
notices issued by the CRE pursuant to the 1976 RRA. In this 
context it has been noted that the power to quash or amend a 
notice "seems extraordinarily vague, and gives the tribunal 
wide-ranging and virtually unreviewable powers to substitute 
its judgement for that of a purportedly expert adminis- 
trative body. " (Lustgarten, 1980, p. 246) Given the doubts 
as to the general suitability and preparedness of industrial 
tribunals to determine sex discrimination applications, as 
set out in Chapter 7 above, this provision seems 
particularly inappropriate. Lustgarten (1980, p. 247) 
notes, however, that it seems unexceptional for a tribunal 
to have power of review in' relation to issues of fact, since 
tribunals normally function as fact-finding bodies. Thus, 
Lustgarten concludes that respondents' rights could have 
been adequately protected had tribunal jurisdiction been 
limited to quashing recommendations based on substantial 
mistakes of fact or law. 
The nature of the appeal that may be taken against a 
non-discrimination notice was considered by the Court of 
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Appeal in a case arising under the RRA, CRE v. Amari Plastics 
Ltd. [19821 ICR 304. In Amari Plastics, the Court of Appeal 
considered the argument of the CRE that the appeal cannot 
re-open the findings of fact upon which the Commission based 
their conclusions in the formal investigation. The Court of 
Appeal rejected this argument because it is "clear from the 
language of this statute that such is not the case" (Ibid. at 
315, per Griffiths, Li). The Court of Appeal was plainly 
sympathetic to the logic of the CRE's position, but held, 
regardless, that the statutory language barred the interpreta- 
tion given it by the Commission. 
Thus, a person who is served with a non-discrimination 
notice may appeal the EOC's findings of fact which will then 
be decided anew by the tribunal or court hearing the appeal. 
The EOC must state the facts upon which they relied and the 
person contesting the notice must state which of the findings 
of fact are disputed (Ibid. at 312-13,317). The EAT has 
stated that the burden is on the person contesting the notice 
to show that the true facts are different from those relied 
on by the Commission, so, as to render the requirement of the 
notice unreasonable. CRE v. Amari Plastics Ltd. [1981] ICR 767, 
776 (EAT). This statement of the burden was approved by the 
Court of Appeal in its decision in the Amari Plastics case. 
[1982] ICR 304,312 (per Lord Denning), 317 (per Griffiths, 
LJ). 
That factual findings may be appealed and redetermined 
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poses a problem for the EOC, with regard to its obligation to 
publish or make available for inspection the report of its 
formal investigation. While to delay publication is not 
unlawful in these circumstances, such a decision will mean 
that publication will not occur until the issues are stale, 
as Griffiths LJ noted in his opinion in Amari Plastics 
(Ibid. at 314-15). 
Even more problematic is the fact that the entire pro- 
cedure established by Parliament for a formal investigation 
is "so elaborate and so cumbersome that-it is in danger of 
grinding to a halt" (Ibid. at 313). Lord Denning also remarked 
in Amari Plastics that the Commission was "caught up in 
a spider's web spun by Parliament from which there is little 
hope of their escaping" (Ibid. ). Even if the EOC conducts a 
formal investigation in full compliance with all the procedural 
barriers established under the statute, the availability of 
an appeal against a non-discrimination notice, opening up 
all the findings of fact, destroys much of the value a formal 
investigation otherwisemight have (Pannick, 1958: p. 283). 
As Griffiths LJ stated in Amari Plastics: 
If Parliament empowers a body to carry out a formal 
investigation and hedges the procedure with safeguards 
to ensure that the person investigated shall have 
every opportunity to state his case and then requires 
that body to publish its findings one might be forgiven 
for thinking that Parliament intended that would be the 
end of the matter. ([19821 ICR 304,315) 
Section 68, as it stands, appears to represent two 
factors which are common-place in the system of enforcement 
for the sex-discrimination (and race-discrimination) 
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legislation -- a desire to limit the scope of authority of 
the central enforcement agency; and, wherever an issue is 
employment-related, to defer to the authority of the 
existing industrial relations machinery. Whilst it is 
arguable that there should be some form of review of, or 
appeal from, a non-discrimination notice, the provisions as 
they stand seem only to indicate a lack of faith in the 
ability of the Commission to act fairly and appropriately. 
This response seems particularly inappropriate when the 
Commission's lack of power to enforce a non-discrimination 
notice is taken into account. Non-compliance with a non- 
discrimination notice does not result automatically in the 
imposition of monetary penalties, nor does it represent a 
contempt. The statute makes provision for ensuring 
compliance with a non-discrimination notice under the 
provisions covering 'persistent discrimination, ' but the 
procedure is lengthy, cumbersomer and not backed by 
substantial penalties. 
If a notice has been in force for less than five years 
and there is evidence of non-compliance, the Commission may 
apply to the County Court for an injunction. (s. 71) 
Howeverr in any matter over which an industrial tribunal has 
jurisdiction, the Commission must first seek a ruling from 
the tribunal that the respondent has indeed acted unlawfully 
(s. 72[51). The Commission must make application to the 
tribunal within one month of the alleged act. only armed 
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with a tribunal ruling in its favour can the Commission then 
seek to invoke the injuctive power of the Court. 
. 
Once an injunction has been granted, the respondent may 
be proceeded against for contempt of court, if further acts 
of unlawful discrimination are committed, and may then face 
fines or imprisonment. As one commentator has noted, 
however, "the enforcement procedure is so tortuous and 
protracted that it is probable that the Commission would 
only rarely feel justified in taking it through to the very 
end. Even more to the point, in view of the problems of 
proof (facing the Commission) it is most unlikely that the 
Commission would be able to take such proceeding even if it 
wanted to. " (Creighton, 1979 p. 233) While Creighton 
perhaps overstates the discouraging effects of problems of 
proof to an agency committed to using its powers to the 
full, the point remains that even for a determined 
enforceme nt agency the proceedings are needlessly 
protracted, and even if successful, result only in an 
injunction, i. e., an order that the conduct complained of 
cease. It is difficult to see any incentive in this system 
for a respondent voluntarily to comply with the law, since 
penalties for non-compliance are non-existent up to the 
point that an injunction issues. 
Taken together, these are the powers which aroused such 
hostility among those opposed to the establishment of the 
EOC and which were referred to by their proponents as the 
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basis for a strategic attack on discrimination by an agency 
with a mandate to act in the public interest. 
Although some critics of the EOC have characterized it 
as a "busybody" with "immense powers, " others have 
complained of the agency's lack of forceful action. 
Unfortunately, there has been no detailed study of the EOC's 
statutory powers and the use to which they have been put, to 
place these criticisms in context. Looking only at the 
statutory powers as outlined here, it is hard to concur in 
the assessment that,, when the-SDA became law at the end of 
1975, 
... the EOC had emerged as a body with the r)ower-to force its case upon employers, trade union profes- 
sionals, educators, advertisers, and so on, even though 
in the final analysis enforcement remains in the hands 
of the county courts and tribunals. (Emphasis added) 
(Byrne and Lovenduskir 19781 p. 137) 
A more realistic assessment points out that the EOC's 
powers are not so formidable sýnce "formal investigations 
and non-discrimination notices are subjected to legal 
restrictions designed to safeguard employers' rights... " 
(Gregory, 1974, p. 149) 
A close examination of the EOC's statutory powers can 
only lead to the conclusion that overall# there is little in 
themwhich would enable the Commission to enforce the law in 
the public interest. Its powers to gather information, to 
conduct investigations, to issue Codes of Practice would 
appear to be adequater but it seems unlikely that any of 
these activities would in itself lead a reluctant 
6iscriminator to comply with the law, since the statute 
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provides only a cumbersome and time consuming procedure to 
exact compliance. If legislators genuinely believe that 
employers need to be 'persuaded' of the rationality of 
complying with the lawr then the prospect of penalty for 
non-compliance after a non-discrimination notice has become 
final would seem to be an essential part of an enforcement 
system which purports to balance persuasion and conciliation 
with the need to address "persistent discrimination. " 
Whilst an examination of the statutory powers as 
written is sufficient to sustain the conclusion that the 
much vaunted powers of the EOC are considerably less 
formidable than is often thought, a true assessment of the 
worth of those powers, or proposals for amendments, must 
include an examination of the way in which the Commission 
has utilized the powers that the statute confers. 
Any analysis of the enforcement work of the EOC must be 
predicated on an understanding of the way in which the 
organization itself is organized, and the way it construes 
its powers and functions, 
II. ORGANIZATTQNAL STRUCTURE AND rQ POSITION OF THE EOC 
Section 53 of the SDA provides for the establishment of 
the EOC as a body corporate, consisting of between 8 and 15 
members, appointed on either a full or a part-time basis by 
the Secretary of State. One of these members will be 
appointed as Chairman (sic) and one or more as deputies. 
members are appointed for any period up to five years, may 
be re-appointed at the end of this period, and may have 
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their appointments terminated in specified circumstances. 
The terms of office are set out in Schedule 3 of the Act. 
The initial appointments to the Commission represented 
a very conventional spread of interests, with the majority 
of Commissioners drawn from the two major political parties, 
the trade union movement and employers associations. Betty 
Lockwood was formally the Labour Women's Advisory Secretary 
at Transport House, and her deputy was a Bow Group activist 
and the wife-of a ranking Conservative politician. Thirteen 
part-time members were appointed in addition to the full- 
time chairperson and deputy, and included three each from 
the CBI and the TUC. The remaining positions were allocated 
to members drawn from the spheres of education and the law; 
to one representative each of Scotland and Wales; and to 
three 'others' whom members of Parliament thought should 
include 'someone from family planning. ' (Byrne and 
Lovenduskir 1978, p. 138) Previous writers and feminist 
critics of the Commission have pointed out that none of the 
original Commissioners had taken a leading part in the 
campaign for sex discrimination legislationt and that none 
had been identified with the Women's Movement. Thus, one 
interest that was not represented amongst appointees to the 
Commission was the feminist movement. (Byrne and 
Lovenduski, 1978f p. 138; Ashdown-Sharp, 1977, p. 17; 
Coussins, 1976, p. 109). 
This pattern of appointments with the numerical 
majority coming from the Labour and Conservative partiesi, 
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the TUC and the CBI, mirrors the system of appointments in 
the industrial tribunals, where three separate panels are 
composed of legally qualified chairpersons, representatives 
of labour, and representatives of employers. More broadly, 
both appointments to the EOC and to the tribunals reflect a 
largely unchallenged consensus about the appropriate 
personnel for public organizations in the area of industrial 
relations. What is important about this fact is that it 
reflects an assumption that sex discrimination in employment 
is a phenomenon which should be dealt with, if not by 
existing industrial relations machinery, then by new 
organizations which reflect their conventional pattern of 
representation. This assumption in turn affects the way in 
which organizations so constituted conceive of their role. 
III. HOW THE COMMISSION APPROACHRR TTS OWN ROLE 
The Commission's own attitude to its work and 
responsibilities may be deduced from its Annual Reportst 
which also provide detailed information on the work that the 
Commission has undertaken in various areas of 
responsibility. The Commission's own view of its most 
appropriate role in the employment sphere, as well as 
generally, appears to be that persuasion and consultation 
are likely to be more effective in furthering the aims of 
the SDA than a militant deployment of the powers conferred 
on it by the legislation. In its first Annual Report# the 
Commission argued: 
The Act gives the Commission wide discretion in 
selecting its priorities. .. The very breadth of this 
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discretion places upon the Commission the 
responsibility of choosing its priorities 
Sex discrimination is rooted deep in that 
attitude. Many of its manifestations are 
remedies, frequently, are not. Sometimes 
than one option available; they all have 
carefully. .. it is espegially important 
credibilitv of this Dowerful law should_n 
on Account of-lack of Eorethought ! 2r deli 
Neither the public interest nor the cause 
for women would be served by precipitate 
indiscriminant-use of vower because these 
exist(EOCI 1977, p. 1) (Emphasis added). 
carefully. 
sort of 
obvious; the 
there is more 
to be weighed 
LbAt-tl& 
gt be weakengd 
beration. 
of equality 
action or Jbg 
powers 
Dt; ring the first two years of the Commission's workj, 
the agency attracted some criticism that it was not pursuing 
a forceful enou gh use of the powers it had in the interest 
of women's equality (See e. g. r Coussinst 1976, pp. 111-116). 
In its Second Annual Report the Commission acknowledged, and 
responded to, these criticisms: 
The work of the Commission has attracted a certain 
amount of adverse comment. Where these criticisms are 
legitimate ... we can assure you that the Commission takes them seriously and is prepared to act upon 
them ... We must also, however, record the view that, thege can never be an accurate reply to -the generalized charge-that the Commission has not gone far enough fast 
enogah; especially as for eyegy critic whoL-takgs this 
view. therg is at least one critic on the oppogijý6 gide 
who believgs thgt whatgver thg commission does is too 
mucb. The complexity of the problem which we are 
required to deal with ... make it wholly unrealistic to expect r. apid and dramatic solutions (EOCr 1978, p. 
1) (Emphasis added). 
In defending its record and approach, the Commission 
went on to emphasize that other organizations must also take 
responsibility for sex discriminationr if progress was to 
occur: 
Dealing with sex discrimination and promoting equality 
of opportunity does not lend itself to instant results 
and the results will certainly not come about as a 
consequence of the Commission' s activities alone. We 
wish to stress again our conviction that the Commission 
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does not have an exclusive responsibility in the field 
of sex discrimination -- all of us, from the Government 
and the-powerful organizations on both sides of 
industry to small local voluntary groups and 
individuals are eagally implicated in the task. 
(EOCI 1978, p. 1) (Emphasis added) 
In the next Annual Report the Commission went further 
and suggested that "it is up to the TUC and CBI to set the 
lead. The Commission alone cannot succeed" (EOC 1979, 
p. 4). 
These extracts from the Annual Reports of the 
Commission indicate an organizational approach to the use of 
its statutory powers which is characterized by. caution, a 
desire to inhabit the middle ground between the conflicting 
"extremities" of its critics, and a belief that the 
Commission's primary role is as a persuader and educator of 
those, in government and industry, who must share equally in 
the responsibility for progress toward the elimination of 
sex discrimination. Thusr "[t1he more positive and 
voluntary initiatives are takenj the less need there will be 
for legal compulsion. " (EOC, 1977, p. 46) Given this view 
of its responsibilitiesr it is not surprising that, in 
defining its strategic role the Commission has given primacy 
of place to what may be termed an 'education and 
development' perspective, and to clarifying the lawl rather 
than to a forceful use of formal investigations to expose 
and indict patterns of unlawful discrimination. This nexus 
is made explicit in the Second Annual Report where the 
Commission first defines an essential element of its 
strategy as being to change institutional practices and then 
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goes on to give examples of the kind of work which, in the 
Commission's view, furthers this objective: 
ee. a Commission which is required to act in the 
public interest has a duty wider than the resolution of 
individual grievances. It has a duty, so far as is 
possible, to chance the Dractice which gave rise to the 
isolated complaint; to make management and unions 
a. aware of the ways in which their practices place 
women at a disadvantage and then attempt to change 
these practices, is an essential element of the 
Commission's strategy (EOCI 1978, p. 2) (Emphasis in 
the original). 
Having defined the need to change practices as an 
important part of its strategic role the Commission then 
sets out examples of its work in furtherance of this 
object ive. The examples chosen are indicative of the 
assumptions that seem to underlie the EOC's definition of 
what is the most appropriate form of action for an agency 
charged with responsibility to act in the public interest. 
The Commission chooses four achievements to illustrate what 
has been involved in this attempt to change discriminatory 
practices: the issuing of guidelines on employment 
advertising to the advertising industry; extensive 
consultations with management and unions and the subsequent 
development of guidance on employment practices; the report 
of the Commission's first formal investigation, into 
educational provision in the Borough of Tameside, which is 
"widely regarded ... as providing for the first time, a 
clear map of the educational provisions of the SDA 
and the publication of a consultative document on income tax 
and sex discrimination setting out the EOC's specific 
proposals for reform (EOC, 1978t p. 3). 
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These activities are not'in themselves inconsequential 
but as examples chosen by the Commission itself to 
illustrate the important work it has done in attempting to 
changa discriminatory practicesr the selection reveals a 
good dealabout the importance that the Commission attaches 
to persuasion and conciliation, and the lesser significance 
that has attached to a vigorous use of the powers of formal 
investigation, to identify those engaged in persistent 
discrimination. 
A, closer examination of the Commission's record bears 
out this conclusion. The Commission's annual reports for 
the years 1976-1981 are replete with examples of its 
education and development work, which confirm the emphasis 
given to high level consultation that Byrne and Lovenduski 
noted in 1978: 
a. the EOC's view is that a significant part of its 
work must be making such representations Government 
departments, nationalized industries, employees, 
unions, local authorities and professional 
organizations as are necessary to ensure that these 
bodies give full weight to the importance of the issue 
of Equality of opportunity in their specific concerns 
(Byrne and Lovenduskir 1978, p. 141). 
The Fifth Annual Report provides examples of the kind 
of work the. EOC did in this area in 1980. After 
consultation, the EOC produced a publication giving guidance 
on job evaluation schemes, and on positive discrimination in 
training, under section 47 of the SDA. The Commission also 
launched a survey of trade unions; provided assistance with 
the design of a women-only management training course; made 
oral and written submissions to the House of Lords Select 
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Committee on Long-Term Remedies for Unemployment; provided a 
formal response to the report of the organization set up to 
review the 1973 Employment and Training Act; and engaged in 
consultative work with local authorities, nationalized 
industries and private sector employers. (EOCI 1981, p. 13- 
14) Most importantly of allr perhaps#, the EOC at the end of 
1980 submitted to the Secretary of State for the Home 
office, the organization's proposals for amending the equal 
pay and sex discrimination legislation. At this level of 
consultation the EOC has been consistently unsuccessful, but 
more will be said of this below, in analyzing the EOC's 
relationship to the organs of government. 
Education and development work has not of course 
constituted the entire record of the Commission in the years 
1976-1981. It is, howevert appropriate to emphasize it 
here, as the significance the Commission attaches to this 
work derives from a particular conception of its role, which 
has had implications for the way in which the Commission has 
approached the deployment of its other discretionary powers 
under the statute. Turning to what properly appears as 
powers of enforcement in the statuter the s. 75 authority to 
assist individual complainantsf and the ss. 67-70 powers to 
conduct formal investigations, it is not surprising to find 
that here the EOG has given greater emphasis to 'clarifying 
the law' thro4gh s. 75, than to challenging persistent 
discriminators through ss. 67-70. This is not to suggest 
that the EOC should not attempt to clarify the law; indeed, 
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the Commission appears to have done valuable work in this 
area, and together with its suggestions for amendments to 
the legislation its s. 75 work may arguably constitute its 
greatest concrete achievement. Rather, the point is to 
examine both the Commission's s. 75 work and its use of the 
power to conduct formal investigations, in the context of 
the EOC's overview of its strategic role, remembering that 
the EOC provides the only route in law to collective 
enforcement of the legislation. It is for this reason that 
the degree of importance that the Commission has attached to 
its enforcement power is so crucial, particularly in light 
of the inadequacies of individual enforcement, both 
practical and conceptual. 
A. Section 75 Assigtsiance 
The Commission has construed the existence of the power 
to assist individuals under s. 75 as an important part of 
its strategic role, rightly insisting that there need be no 
contradiction between assisting individual complainants and 
fulfilling its mandate to act in the public interest. 
In its annual reports the Commission has repeatedly 
stressed the 'strategic' element in s. 75 assistance, where 
'strategic' is to be understood as clarifying the law. In 
the Third Annual Report for example, the Commission pointed 
out that in 1978 it had nearly doubled the number of cases 
assisted under s. 75 over the previous year, and stated that 
the Commission is entitled to point to its achievement 
as a record of its strategic role in clarifying the meaning 
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of the law ... Clarifying the meaning and application of the 
two acts is an essential part of the Commission's 
enforcement role. " (EOC, 1979, p. 2) (Emphasis added) 
Since the assistance given under s. 75 is conceived of 
primarily as a part of the EOC's strategic roler the 
Commission is involved in a process of case selection in 
furtherance of that objective. 
The Commission is required to consider all applications 
for assistance under s. 75 although the decision to grant 
assistance is discretionary. Assistance is granted for 
hearings at both tribunal and appellate levels and the 
Commission points out that "Although both stages are 
importantr it is at the second stage where [the Commission] 
acts in a strategic way by helping to clarify the law 
through the establishment of case law. " (EOC, 1977, p. 21) 
Decisions about the granting of assistance in 
particular cases were originally made on behalf of the 
Commission by the Assistance and Monitoring Committee. 
After some internal reorganization these decisions became 
the province of the Legal Committee, which, acting with 
delegated powers, makes decisions about the Commission's 
objectives in clarifying the law, and applies the 
Commission's priorities to individual cases. In rendering a 
decision on whether or not to grant assistance, the 
Committee considers the facts of the case and its legal and 
policy implications. The Committee will also consider the 
needs of the individual applicant and whether she could or 
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should act for herself, in addition to points of law that 
the complaint presents. Elaine Donnelly of the EOC Legal 
Department emphasizes that since the objective is to clarify 
the law, assistance may be granted in a case which has a 
"99% chance of losing" if it presents a legal point which 
the Commission wishes to bring out. Overall, approximately 
one-half of all requests for s. 75 assistance are granted. 
The proportion granted is higher for appellate jurisdictions 
than for industrial tribunal hearings, as the tables below 
illustrate. 
Table 22. 
Section 75 Assistance. Sglected Yearg. 
12= 1978 1981 
Legal Assistance Granted 46 86 68 132 
Advice Granted 7614 11 
No Advice Granted 16 50 63 102 
Withdrawn 7100 
Pending 0 11 00 
Total 16 154 145 245 
(Source: EOC Annual Reports) 
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M-1-1- 1)13 
section 75 Assistance, Tndustrial Trib unals. s elected Years 
1977* 1978 1980 1981 
Leaal AsSistance Granted 29 55 43 95 
Advice Granted 7 5 13 10 
No Advice Granted 16 25 49 86 
Witbdrawn/Pendin, q 7 10 0 0 
Total 59 95 105 191 
* Includes assistance for county court cases. 
(Source: EOC Annual Reports) 
Mmlýlý 1A 
Section 75 Assistance. FAT/ Cour t of A ppealsg Selected Years 
1977 1978 1980 23-u 
Legal Assistance Granted 16 22 15 17 
Advice Granted 0 0 1 0 
No Advice Granted 6 9 8 1 
Witbdrawn/Pendin_q 2 1 0 0 
Total 24 32 24 18 
(Source: EOC Annual Reports) 
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Table 25. 
Section 75 Assistance. House of Lords and Euror)ean 
Court of Justice. Selected Years 
2=* 1978* 2M 2231** 
Legal Assistance Granted 1133 
Advice Granted 0000 
No Advice Granted 0011 
Total 1144 
House of Lords only. 
ECJ only. 
(Source: EOC Annual Reports) 
Using its s. 75 powers, the EOC has supported a wide 
range of issues in recent years. In particular, the 
Commission has supported a line of cases designed to clarify 
the impact of European law on the interpretation of British 
statutes. For example, in 1980, the EOC assisted three 
cases stayed on appeal pending a referral to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) on questions of Community law 
(EOC, 1981r p. 4). 
While the Commission appears to give considerable 
emphasis to s. 75 assistance as an essential part of its 
responsibilities for enforcement of the law, the link 
between clarifying the law and enforcing it is in fact quite 
a tenuous one. once the Commission has clarified points of 
law it still remains primarily the responsibility of 
individual complainants to enforce the law by seeking 
redress, which again brings to the fore the practical and 
conceptual difficulties in reliance on a system of 
387 
individual enforcement for anti-discrimination legislation. 
While some have advocated the extension of the EOC's powers 
to allow it not just to assist individuals but to act on 
their behalf (e. g. Creighton, 1979)r other critics have 
pointed out that the EOC-already has some powers of 
enforcement which it does not fully use, namely its powers 
of formal investigations. 
While the statutory powers are perhaps less formidable 
than is sometimes suggested, -it is nevertheless the case 
that the Commission's record in this area appears to 
substantiate the criticism that the EO .C has been less than 
vigorous in its efforts to deploy them. 
B. Formal Investiaations 
Criticism of the EOC's approach to formal 
investigations usually centres on the small number of 
investigations undertaken. Between January 1976 and the end 
of 1981, the Commission began only seven formal 
investigations, and completed work'in only three of them. 
In its Third Annual Reporti, th6 Commission acknowledged its 
critics, stating: 
The Commission recognizes the importance of its law 
enforcement role but feels that those who criticize the 
Commission for having undertaken comparatively few 
investigations have little appreciation of either the 
legal complexities of a formal investigation or the 
degree of staff expertise and time involved. 
(EOCj 1979f p. 16) 
That the EOC must operate with relatively limited 
resources is indisputable. 
3 However, the point should be 
made that the Commission itself allocates its resources 
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between projects, depending on the significance. it attaches 
to them, and to this extent could increase the resources 
available for formal investigations if the Commission made 
the value judgement that such work should be increased, at 
the expense of another area of involvement. However, as 
previously illustrated, public statements of the Commission 
indicate a much greater commitment to education and 
development work than to law enforcement p_gj qjej, a 
preference which is doubtless reflected in the allocation of 
resources. The Commission for Racial Equality, by contrast, 
appears to have given much higher priority to formal 
investigations; between 1977 and 1980,30 were begun 
(Gregory, 1979, p. 149). 
While the small number of investigations undertaken by 
the Commission appears-to illustrate an organizational 
preference for kinds of work other than formal investi- 
gation, the particular organizations that the Commission has 
chosen as the subject of investigations are also illumin- 
ating with respect to the EOC's priorities. 
The first investigation the Commission conducted was 
concerned with the possibility of discrimination in the 
provision of secondary education by the Tameside Local 
Education Authority. The second investigation of possible 
contraventions of the EqPA and the SDA at Electrolux, Ltd. 
was concerned with the practices of a large industrial 
employer. The possibility of discrimination by a trade 
union against its women members was the focus of a formal 
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investigation of the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 
(SOGAT). Two further investigations inquired into possible 
discrimination between men and women in teaching (at the 
Sidney Stringer Community School, Coventry, and the North 
Gwent College of Further Education) focussing on possible 
discrimination against women employees of the Leeds 
Permanent Building Society represents a concern with private 
sector white-collar employment. A final investigation, into 
the effect of the state pension age on redundanciesat the 
British Steel Corporation's Sholton works, examined 
discriminatio nwhich was the result of government policies 
outside the scope of the SDA. 
While these investigations seem to illlustrate a 
'balanced' approach to choosing subjects for investigation, 
the question arises whether they also represent the most 
appropriate choices for a Commission committed to enforcing 
the law in the public interest. Unfortunately, the 
Commission does not make public the criteria that it applies 
in a particular case in deciding whether to embark on a 
formal investigation into an organization, and any analysis 
must therefore be speculative. 
It is a matter of record that the investigation into 
alleged discrimination at Electrolux Ltd. resulted from a 
suggestion by a member of the Employment Appeals Tribunal 
hearing the case of individual complainants against the 
employer#, Electroluxj that the EOC might be of assistance in 
a complex situation, involving hundreds of individual Equal 
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Pay Act applications. Giving, judgement against the company, 
Mr. Justice Phillips stated that: 
It may well be that in complicated situationsf such as 
that confronting Electrolux Ltd., where there are 
hundreds of claims and the circumstances of the 
applicants are not identical, a process of litigation 
under the EqPA 1970 can never produce a satisfactory 
result. Although the litigation in each individual 
case may produce a theoretically correct answer in 
accordance with the terms of the Equal Pay Act of 1970, 
it is unlikely that the individual answers put together 
can produce a coherent wage structure capable of 
general application in other cases. That can only be 
done by negotiation, applying the current views and 
statutory proscriptions on equal pay and equal 
opportunities. It may be that the-EOC could be of 
assistance in such an exercise (EOCf 1977, p. 22). 
The EOC responded to this hint, after some deliberation, by 
embarking upon a formal investigation in February 1977. 
This investigation is the only one to have resulted in 
the issuance of a non-discrinfination notice, and in 
subsequent monitoring for compliance by the Commission. Of 
the other six investigations that were completed at the end 
of 1981# the Tameside inquiry resulted i. n a finding of no 
discrimination, and the investigation into redundancy at the 
BSC Shotton works concerned a matter outside the scope of 
the SDA (the statutory retirement age) and could not 
therefore result in the issuing of a notice. The Tameside 
investigation, into the allocation of grammar school places 
between girls and boys, was initiated after complaints from 
members of the public and press commented that the selection 
ratio was evidence of discrimination. Whether or not the 
Government also suggested activity in an area in which it 
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was much concerned is not clear (Byrne and Lovenduskil 1978, 
p. 140). 
The investigation into the redundancies at the Shotton 
Works was begun after the Commission received approximately 
130 enquiries from male employees, alleging that they 
received lower redundancy benefits than those which female 
colleagues in the same circumstances received. In addition 
to giving advice to all individual complainants the EOC also 
began a formal investigation during 1980 into the redundancy 
arrangements which were the basis of the complaint (EOCI 
1981, p. 13). The following year the investigation was 
completer and the Commission's findings were incorporated 
into recommendations to the Government, and into evidence 
presented to the Social Services Select Committee in its 
enquiry into the retirement age (EOCF 1982, p. 6). it 
seems that in this case the EOC was using its power of 
formal investigation to gather evidence in support of its 
recommendations to equalize the retirement age. This is 
not, in terms of the statute, an improper use of its power. 
Whether, in the context of the limited resources the EOC 
admits to operating under, it is an appropriate choice from 
an enforcement perspective is another matter, since such an 
investigation from the outset, was unlikely to lead to 
enforcement measures, being an area outside the scope of the 
legislation. 
The EOC's record with regard to formal investigation is 
one of hesitancy, if not inaction. In the First Annual 
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Report the EOC stated that it was important to take stock of 
the priorities so that "in the years ahead its powers of 
enforcment can be deployed with the full force which 
Parliament intended, " (EOCr 1977, p. 5) In the Second 
Annual Report the Commission reported that it was in the 
process of elaborating a five year long-range strategy which 
would "give greater emphasis to the Commission's law 
enforcement activities under the existing legislation 
including a more vigorous use of the power to conduct formal 
investigations, " (EOC, 1978F p. 4). The Commission promised 
that it would "use all its resourcbs to ensure that the law 
is enforced" although noting that "formal compliance with 
the letter of the law will not be enough. " (Ibid. ) With 
regard to the enforcement provisions reýating to formal 
investigations the EOC has not carried through on these 
commitments. It should be noted here however, that the 
public commitment to greater use of the enforcement 
provisions may well have resulted from, internal staff 
pressure, Byrne and Love nduski, (1978, p. 143) note that at 
the July 1977 meeting of the Commission, the Commissioners 
were asked by staff members to commit the EOC to a programme 
of action which would emphasize the use of formal 
investigations. Faced with threats of staff resignationst 
the Commission announced that in principle it would begin to 
place greater emphasis on law enforcement. 
In conclusion, then, the EOCI despite public statements 
to the contrary, has appeared reluctant to use the statutory 
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powers of formal investigation, preferring instead to 
emphasize high level consultationr and the development of 
voluntary initiatives. Where it has embarked upon formal 
investigations the choice of subjects appears to have been 
marked by a similar caution and a desire to 'balance' 
different interests. 
A number of studies serve to indicate that the approach 
chosen by the EOC is inappropriate. The EOC's. own study of 
500 employers revealed that little progress had been made in 
changing either attitudes or practices. An in-depth study 
of 26 organizations conducted between 1974 and lP77 reveals 
that one of the reasons for this lack of progress may be the 
failure of the EOC to utilize, in a forceful manner, its 
existing powers of enforcement. Snell et. al (1981, p. 95) 
state that, according to their study: 
There was evidence that employers would have done more 
had the EOC used its powers of investigation and 
enforcement more fully, despite the difficulties 
involved. Indeed, some employers told us that they had 
expected initially to have to do more than they did, 
and that the possibility of an investigation would have 
proved a strong impetus to action. 
Although it is inadvisable to place too much reliance 
on generalizations based on surveys of a small number of 
employersf these studies suggest that a more active use of 
power of formal investigation may have produced morein the 
way of 'voluntary' compliance than the EOCIs chosen emphasis 
on high level consultation. Whether such a change of 
approach is possible, given the essentially 'tripartite' 
nature of appointments to the Commission, and the present 
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political climate, is necessarily an issue for speculation; 
but on the past performance of the Commission, at least, it 
seems unlikely. 
Even if the EOC were to pursue a more forceful course 
of action there would still remain the question of the 
capacity of the enforcement system to deal with situations 
where a formal investigation does not result in voluntary 
compliance. The question must be asked of how appropriate 
is a system of enforcement which involves a protracted 
process leading only to the ultimate granting of injunctive 
relief, with no penalties for non-compliance, and no damage 
awards to the victims of discrimination. Until the EOC 
attempts to use its powers, howevert it is unlikely that 
there can be a mobilization of support for the granting of 
more direct or more forceful powers to facilitate compliance 
after a formal investigation has shown the existence of 
unlawful discriminatory practices. 
IV. COMPARTN THE IFOr- WITH TTR AMERICAN rOUNTERPART 
The discussion above illustrates that areas of concern 
with respect to the EOC fall into three categories: the 
pattern of'appointments,, the substantive formal powers of 
enforcement, and the use of those powers by the Commission. 
of rel-evance to all of these issues is the overarching issue 
of what can realistically be expected in the area of social 
reform from an organization which is closely tied to the 
machinery of government, through the power of high level 
appointmentr and the control over budget. 
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The question is often posed in general terms as whether 
'conformativel institutionst such as administrative 
agencies, can ever make an effective contribution to social 
change. Stearns (1979, p. 38) in a study of the Swedish 
Labour Inspectorate notes that administrative agencies are 
structures imposed from above, by the forces being 
challenged, rather than by the agents of challenge, and that 
they are by nature "depoliticizing institutions, drawing 
action out of the political sphere into the realm of rules, 
regulations and processing. " Gregory (1979, p. 141) notes 
that the discretionary powers of organizations like the EOC 
enable them to determine the pace and direction of action, 
so that they can respond selectively and with flexibility to 
policy requirements. While it is the government that 
retains ultimate control through appointments and financey 
any hostility is'deflected on to the organization. 
While general theories of 'conformativel institutions 
are doubtless useful in attempting to determine the outer 
limits of effective agency action, there is an intermediate 
set of questions posed-by the comparison, on an empirical 
basis, of particular organizations operating within specific 
contexts.. For this reason it is instructive briefly to 
examine some of the differences between the EOC and its 
American counterpartr the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC). 
The EEOC was established in 1964 under the terms of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of that year. Its 
I 
396 
authority was increased in 1972 when the 1964'Act was 
amendedr and again in 1978 as part of the Carter 
Administration's reform of the federal equal employment 
opportunity structure. Today it stands as the major 
enforcement agency in the field of employment discrimination 
in the United States. 
The EEOC and the British EOC are both modelled upon 
earlier American experiments in the use of administrative 
agencies for the implementation of anti-discrimination 
initiatives. As such, they share some characteristics, but 
each bears the imprint of the political'system in which it 
operates, a fact which results in some significant 
differences between the two organizations. These 
differences can be seen both in the enforcement powers that 
each enjoys, and in the composition of the organizations' 
leadership. 
A. Statutorv Authoritv of the PEOC 
The EEOC was created by Title VII of the 1964. Civil 
Rights Act, and is "empowered .. to prevent any person 
from engaging in any unlawful practice" (42 U. S. C. s. 2000E 
5 (a)). The Commission has responsibility in all areas of 
discrimination covered by Title VII -- sex, race, colourr 
religion, and national origin. In 1979, it also acquired 
responsibilities for the enforcement of the 1967 Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the 1963 Equal Pay 
Act, both previously within the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Labor. 
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The EEOC has responsibility for the processing of 
individual complaints of discrimination, a responsibility 
which, represents a major difference between the British and 
American organizations. Any individual wishing to bring 
suit under one of the statutes within the EEOC's area of 
authority must first file a complaint with the 
Commissioner. 4 The Commission is then under a statutory 
duty to investigate the complaint, and to attempt 
conciliation between the parties upon a finding of 
'reasonable cause. 15 Until 1972, the process of 
investigation and attempted conciliation comprised the full 
extent of the EEOC's enforcement powers. However, in 1972, 
the Commission's authority was increased to allow the 
organization to sue in federal district court when it had 
reached a finding of reasonable cause and had failed to 
achieve a settlement with the discriminator. This power to 
sue directly in court represents a second major difference 
between the British and American commissions. 
The EEOCIs experience of processing individual 
complaints confirms the wisdom of the decision to establish 
the EOC as a strategic agency with only limited 
responsibility to provide assistance to individual 
complainants. The EEOC's large caseload of individual 
complaints has resulted in a considerable volume of 
backlogged casest and has hampered the agency in its pursuit 
of a strategic approach to the elimination of employment 
discrimination. 6 The EEOC's authority to bring suit in 
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court, however, when coupled with the power to initiate and 
investigate charges on its own account, suggests a way in 
which the enforcement power of the EOC could be 
strengthened. 
Between 1972, when it acquired the power to sue 
directly in court, and 1978, when it underwent a process of 
internal reorganization, the EEOC tended to litigate 
npattern and practicen cases which had important 
precedential value, or affected large numbers of 
individuals. Since 197.8,, cases suitable for litigation have 
been identified either through the EEOC's systemic programs 
unit, or through its early litigation identification (ELI) 
program. 
An office of systemic programs within EEOC headquarters 
is responsible for developing standards for the selection of 
systemic respondents and for the identification of potential 
systemic targets. The majority of systemic charges are 
generated by an analysis of data provided to the EEOC by 
employers, under the p. rovisions of s. 709 (c) of the Act. 
7 
Section 709 (c) provides in part that 
Every employer, employment agency and labor 
organization subject to this title shall (1) make and 
keep such records relevant to the determination of 
whether*unlawful practices have been or are being 
committed (2) preserve such records. .. and (3) make 
such reports therefrom as the Commission shall 
prescribe by regulation or order. .. 
Under the regulations issued by the EEOC pursuant to s. 
709 (c), employers with 100 or more employees are required 
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to file annually a form known as the employer information 
report, EEO-l. This form shows the relationship of minority 
and female workers to the total workforce of the employer in 
specified job categories. Section 709 (c) specifically 
authorizes court orders to enforce compliance with the 
reporting requirementst and the Fifth Circuit has strongly 
endorsed the use of injunctive relief against recalcitrant 
employers (Schlei and Grossman, '1983, p. 936). 
8 
The data collected through the s. 709 (c) provisions is 
computer tabulatedr and distributed to all EEOC officesr and 
all contracting offices of Federal, state and local 
government agencies. The data then form the basis of 
statistical investigations to identify possibly 
discriminatory patterns, which may result in the filing of a 
Commissioner's charger and a subsequent investigation. 
Section 709 (a) and s. 710 as amended in 1972, confer 
on the EEOC certain statutory powers of investigation, once 
a charge is filed. The Commission has the right of access. 
to evidence, to require the attendance and testimony of 
witnesses, and to issue subpoenas to this end. The EEOC may 
petition the district court to enforce the subpoenas in the 
event of non-compliance. The EEOC also has similar 
investigatory powers under the Equal Pay Act. 
once a systemic charge is issued, the process of 
investigation, determination, and attempted settlement or 
conciliation begins. 
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The decision to litigate any systemic case that fails 
conciliation will be made by the Commissioners upon 
recommendation of the General Council. Although 
reorganization of the EEOC appeared to make the addressing 
of systemic patterns of discrimination a priority concern, 
the success and effectiveness of the program remains in 
doubt. Prior to fiscal year (FY) 1981, a total of 104 
Commissioner's charges were issued, and investigations were 
completed on 20 percent at the end of FY 1981. During the 
last quarter of that yearr seven decisions were issued based 
on systemic charges; these were the first systemic charge 
decisions to be issued by the EEOC. Decisions were drafted 
in another seven cases with issuance deferred pending 
settlement negotiations. Four more decisions were in the 
process of headquarters review. Thus, more than two years 
after reorganization no systemic charge had re sulted in 
litigation, although the office had litigated carry-over 
'pattern and practice' cases from before the reorganization. 
(Fiscal year end [1981] Report by EEOC Acting Chairman Smith 
197 Daily Labor Report BNA Oct. 13,1981). 
In addition to the System Programs unit, the Commission 
also approved in February 1979 an Early Litigation 
identification (ELI) Program "to identify and process 
changes for which the evidence indicates that litigation 
oriented investigation and conciliation will be another 
vehicle to enfýrce Title VII. " (EEOC Compliance Manuall s. 
1291 CCE [19811). This program exists to provide a 
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procedural structure within district offices to enable them 
to identify charges that warrant expansion of the 
investigation beyond the individual harm to the charging 
party. The program is intended to complement the systemic 
programr and is not a substitute for it. An objective of 
the program is to involve Commission attorneys in the early 
stages of charge processingr and so to ensure that the 
investigation is oriented toward the suit that may follow, 
lqw3i 
if conciliation fails (Schlei and GrossmanrAP- 953). 
A charge may be selected as an ELI on the basis of 
either the issue or the respondent involved. Issue lists 
and respondent lists are developed by the district office 
Top Management Committee, and intake personnel review 
incoming charges against these lists to indentify potential 
ELI cases. Before a new charge is finally designated as 
part of the ELI prpogram the charging party is counseled as 
to the nature of both the regular rapid processing and ELI 
programs, and given the opportunity to decide how she/he 
wants the charge to be processed. EEOC procedures do not 
require that the respondent be informed that the charge is 
being processed as an ELI until the investigation is 
complete (EEOC Compliance Manual s. 12.5 BNA 12: 0004-05, 
Mayr 1979). 
The ELI program thus provides something of a 'half-way' 
house between the basic rapid processing system and the 
systemip processing system, and permits the district offices 
to take a strategic approach to Title VII enforcementr on 
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the basis of an investigation which is nevertheless more 
restricted in scope than a systemic investigation. If an 
ELI charge proceeds to litigation, then the EEOC is able to 
take advantage of the "court-sanctioned doctrine of 
expansion of individual charges into class, and other 
related issues. " (General Counsel Manual Ch 2 s. 1-B BNA 
p. 1110; 00021 July 1980) This doctrine allows the 
litigation to be broader in scope than the initial charge, 
and permits the EEOC to seek relief on a class wide basis. 
The systemic charge approach and the ELI program may be 
compared to the British EOC's power of formal investigation. 
All of these approaches are designed to go beyond the 
resolution of an individual complaint and address the 
underlying conditions whi ch produce individual instances of 
discriminatory conduct in the workplace. Although the 
EEOC's record on the use of its systemic powers is not 
encouraging, particularly under the Reagan administrationr 
it cannot be doubted that it holds out the promise of 
greater effectiveness than the powers of formal 
investigation open to the EOC. Issuance of a systemic 
charge, if not conciliated, may result in direct litigation 
of the issues involved, on a class basis, in the federal 
district courts. The district courts, in passing judgment 
on such cases are not limited to declaratory or injunctive 
relief, but may order the payment of monetary relief in 
theform of back payor front pay. There is, therefore, a 
cost attached to non-compliance after the finding of 
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discriminatory conduct, which is absent in the British 
system. 
Conciliation and Compliance 
The very existence of an ELI program where "The early 
identification of charges susceptible to expansion is 
stressed to permit the investigation to be litigation 
oriented. .. 11 (EEOC Compliance Manual, s. 12.1 CCH 1981) 
raises the question of the role of conciliation in EEOC's 
operations. A consideration of the role of conciliation is 
instructive as it serves as a comparison for the way in 
which conciliation and persuasion is viewed in the context 
of the British system. 
. Prior to 1972, the EEOC had no enforcement powers in 
the Federal Courts. it had the authority ýo investigate 
complaints, to make determinations of 'reasonable causell 
and to attempt conciliation or negotiated settlements. If 
such conciliation failed, only the individual complainant 
could bring suit in the Federal courts, not the Commission. 
In 1972, Congress gave the EEOC the enforcement powers that 
it had denied-the agency in 1964,, by authorizing it to bring 
suit on its own behalf, should conciliation fail. In their 
7th Annual Report to Congress, the Commissioners noted that: 
With the granting of enforcement powers to the EEOCI 
the entire nature of the Commission's operations takes 
on a new perspective. Previously, the Commission's 
specific enforcement methodology concentrated on 
securing conciliation agreements. The ability to 
secure such agreements'is now enhanced-by-the 
Commission's authgrity to compel compliance thrgu_qh 
litigation in the federal courtst if voluntary 
conciliation is not secured. 
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This assessment was borne out by changes in the 
Commission's rate of successful conciliations. In the first 
quarter of FY 1973, the EEOC was successful in about 28% of 
attempted conciliations. By the second quarter of FY 1974r 
the success rate was nearly 50%. The Commissioners 
attributed the rise to their new enforcement powers, noting 
in the Ninth Annual Report that ffAs employers learned that 
the Commission would exercise its new enforcement powers, 
there was a greater incentive for them to settle 
discrimination charges through conciliation" (EEOC, 1975, 
P. 1). 
As noted above, the enforcement power of the Commission 
to bring suit to compel compliance is very different from 
that of the. British Commission to enforce compliance with a 
non-discrimination notice, as it is not limited to 
injunctive relief. If conciliation fails and the EEOC 
brings suit, it will seek not only injunctive relief, but 
quite frequently affirmative relief (which the courts have 
the authority to order under s. 706 (g)), and, if 
appropriate, backpay for the victims of discrimination. In 
bringing suit the Commission is not limited to acting on 
behalf of the individual whose complaint gave rise to the 
finding of discrimination, but may broaden its scope to a 
class action. The EEOC has consistently maintained that in 
bringing a class action, it is not governed by the 
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) which otherwise applies to all class 
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actions. The Commission's view was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in the case of General TeleDhone Co. of the Northwest 
v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318 (1980). The importance of this 
decision is that the EEOC is thereby freed from the 
procedural requirements of Rule 23F including the need to 
seek class certification. 
9 
The case is instructive as it illustrates both the ways 
in which the EEOC's enforcement powers may be used if 
conciliation fails, and the approach to enforcement adopted 
by the Commission and sanctioned by the Court. 
The case originated when four employees of General 
Telephone filed charges with the EEOC complaining of sex 
discrimination. After investigation, the EEOC found 
reasonable cause to suspect discrimination. Conciliation 
failed and in April 1977 the Commission brought a class 
action suit against General Telephone, th. ereby broadening 
the complaint to allege discrimination against women 
employees across four, states. The complaint alleged 
discrimination in the form of restrictions on maternity 
leaver access to craft jobs and promotion to managerial 
positions; and it sought injunctive relief and backpay for 
the women affected by the challenged practices. 
The complaint did not mention FRCP 23 and the EEOC did 
not seek class certification pursuant to that rule. The 
defendant then moved for an order dismissing the class 
action aspects of the complaint on the basis of non- 
compliance with the Federal rule. The Supreme Court held 
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that Rule 23. is not applicable to an enforcement action 
brought by the EEOC in its own namer and pursuant to its s. 
706 authority to prevent unlawful employment practices. In 
reaching this holding the Supreme Court also explained its 
own view of the enforcement powers of the EEOC, noting: 
As Title VII was originally enacted. .. the EEOC's 
role in eliminating unlawful employment practices was 
limited to "informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasionn ... Congress became 
convinced, however, that the "failure to grant the EEOC 
meaningful enforcement powers has proved to be a major 
flaw in the operation of Title VII" (cite omitted). 
The 1972 amendments. .. accordingly expanded the 
EEOC's enforcement powers by authorizing the EEOC to 
bring a civil action in federal district court. .. In 
so doing, Congress sought. to implement the public 
interest as well as to bring about more effective 
enforcement of private rights. .. When the EEOC acts, 
albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific 
individuals, it acts. also to vindicate the public 
interest in preventing employment discrimination. 
(446 U. S. at 318,326) 
Thus,, the EEOCr acting on behalf of individuals, acts 
also in the public interest, a view which is consonant with 
the expansion of the complaint, and the consequent expansion 
of the remedy sought. The EEOC's ability to seek class-wide 
relief in both administrative proceedings and litigation 
serves this function of eradicating systemic discrimination 
in the public interest. The ability to bring suit is seen 
as an additional means to secure compliance, should 
administrative proceedings fail, and the scope of the 
potential court-ordered relief operates as an incentive to 
settlement. 
The contrast between the powers of the American and 
British Commissions is thus noticeable at the level of 
407 
statutory authority to seek monetary and affirmative relief, 
and in the attitudes of the two organizations to the 
relationship of conciliation and compliance. The difference 
in attitude may be explained not only in terms of the 
different political and legal context in which the 
organizations operate, but also by reference to the 
different systems of appointment to the two Commissions. 
EEOC Commissioners are appointed by the President, and 
confirmed in their appointments by the Senate. The 
Commissioners do not represent the traditional spread of 
interests which constitute the British EOC, but instead are 
drawn from what may be termed the civil rights community of 
organized women's and minority groups, nevertheless 
reflecting the political colour 6f the president making the 
appointment. That the president cannot completely ignore 
t he interests of the civil rights community in making 
appointments to the EEOCI was demonstrated by the response 
to President Reagan's chairman-designate in 1981. Reagan's 
choice as his nominee was William Bell, a black Republican 
from Detroit, described as president and owner of an 
executive search firm placing minority members with private 
companies. Black leaders in Detroit told the Senate Labor 
and Human Resources Committee that despite Bell's claims to 
have been involv ed in civil rights activities there, he and 
his company were virtually unknown. (FEP Summaryt BNA, no. 
434, Nov. 19t 1981, p. 1). A Senator on the Committee 
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revealed that the firm had placed fewer than two people a 
year for the preceding two years. In. Novemberr 1981 a 
coalition of nine major civil rights organizations and 
women's groups including the NAACP, the National Urban 
League and the National Organization of Womenf announced 
their opposition to the nominee, on the grounds that he 
lacked "the necessary background, knowledge and 
comprehension" needed to lead the country's major civil 
rights enforcement agency, and had demonstrated "no 
commitment or involvement with civil rights. " (FEP Summary, 
p. 1) With support in the Senate quickly eroding, the 
Administration asked the Senate Committe to postpone 
indefinitely a vote on the nominee's confirmation, a 
strategy designed to avoid the embarrassment to Republicans 
on the committee that calling for a vote could bring. In 
August, 1982 William A. Webb was nominated as Commissioner, 
and later confirmed by the Senate. 
This process of Presidential nomination, with the power 
of confirmation lying with the U. S. Senate is the usual one 
for the appointment of ranking officials of the Federal 
bureaucracy. That it has generally been conducted with some 
deference to the views of organized civil rights and women's 
groups, a situation which contrasts sharply with that in 
Britain, may be explained by reference to the idea of 
'agency capture. t Traditionally this concept has been used 
to describe the 'capture' of regulatory agencies by the very 
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groups whose activities are to be regulated. Empirically it 
seems, however, that agencies may sometimes be captured by 
members of the groups whose interests are to be protected; 
certainly, in the United States, both the EEOC and the 
Federal Civil Rights Commission provide some evidence for 
this tendency. 
What is clear from the pattern of appointments to the 
EEOC is that the range of interests considered to have a 
legitimate interest in representation in the organization is 
very different from that included in the leadership of the 
EOC. This difference points both to the greater political 
strength of the American civil rights. and women's lobbies 
as compared to their British counterparts, and to a 
fundamental difference between the British and American 
political systems with regard to the structuring of the 
representation of interesti'in the public arena. 
While the American pattern of appointment may avoid the 
immobilism which appears to result from the tripartite 
balancing of representation in the EOCr it would be a 
mistake to overstate the advantages of the approacch. While 
it. may result in the appointment, as Chair of the EEOCI of a 
well qualified activist like Eleanor Holmes Norton, 
appointed by President Carter after extensive consultation 
with the EEOC's constituencies, it may also result in the 
substitution of tokenism for qualifications and commitment. 
The Reagan Administration, in its choice of nominees, has 
been only minimally responsive to the civil rights and 
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women's organizations with an interest in the EEOC; these 
interest groups have not had the power, under a Republican 
President and Senatel to insist upon the appointment of 
Commissioners who, like Horton, were committed to an active 
pursuit of their goals. The lesson here is that immobilism 
in the American Commission is also possible, when the 
political winds change direction. Thus, when the climate is 
generally favourable to the EEOC's objectives, it may be 
that the pattern of appointment will enable it to act more 
vigorously then its British couterpart. - On the downside is 
the possibility that when the climate is unfavourable, the 
Commission will be completely robbed of its capacity to act 
through the appointment of a leadership completely attuned 
to the political goals of their patrons, since, unlike the 
EOC, the EEOC does not have a built-in balance which might 
prevent too great or rapid a change of, direction. 
In conclusion, the question that must be posed is 
what the comparison between the two Commissions contributes 
about our understanding of the potential of either as 
effective enforcers of anti-discrimination legislation, and 
thus as agents of social change. 
The EOC and the EEOC have both operated under budgetary 
constraints which hamper effective enforcement efforts. 
Nevertheless, the United States' Commission has over time 
pursued a more aggressive stance than its British counter- 
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part. This more forceful approach stems in part from the 
fact that it has had greater authorityr since 1972 at leastr 
in terms of the ability to act as an enforcement agency. 
The influence of the different systems of appointment should 
also be noted. In Britaint the system of appointments is 
contained by the boundaries of what constitutes legitimate 
interest or the 'tripartite' system of industrial relations. 
By contrast, the EEOC to a much greater extent has been 
'captured' by a civil rights constituency to which it has 
been, at various periods, more or less responsive. 
This difference in the representation of interests on 
the two commissions raises as-a more general question the 
importance not only of the choice of structures of enforce- 
ment, but also of the structuring of representation within 
the institutions established and the potential impact of 
this fact in the propensity of the institution to operate as 
a force for containment or change. 
The issue of financing and the appointment of key 
personnel are, as Gregory points out, key factors in 
allowing the government to keep ultimate control of quasi- 
autonomous institutions like the EOC. Leaving aside the 
question of whether the conformative role of such 
organizations is ultimately unassailable, in the short run 
changes may be proposed in the budget-allocation to the 
. 
Commission and in the pattern of appointments which could 
enhance its effectiveness. Similarly, changes could be 
proposed in the statutory powers of the EOC, to enable it to 
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act more effectively as an enforcement agency by, for 
example, streamlining the cumbersome procedure for enforcing 
compliance with a non-discrimination notice, and providing 
monetary penalties for non-compliance, in addition to 
injunctive relief. 
In conclusion then, an analysis of the British EOC 
shows that its much heralded statutory powers are in fact 
unlikely, without amendment, to produce compliance with the 
law, and that in practice this problem is compounded by the 
Commission's cautious approach to the enforcement role. 
This caution may be attributed at least in part to the 
traditional representation of interests on the Commission, 
and to its precarious position of semi-dependancy, 
particularly at a time when its organizational objectives 
are out of political favour. 
While the record of its American counterpart is not 
unflawed, and it too operates under the constraint of_ 
restricted financing, the EEOC has acted more forcefully 
than its British counterpart. It has more effective powers 
of enforcement at its disposal and has displayed a more 
aggressive attitude towards the deployment of those powers. 
The experience of the EEOC suggests directions in which 
proposals for change could enhance the ability or 
willingness of the British Commission to pursue a more 
active enforcement roler while leaving open the ultimate 
question of how much can be expected from an agency whose 
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ultimate purpose is more likely to be only of containment 
rather than change. 
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NOTES 
1 This provision was not included in the SDA as originally 
enactedr but was added under Schedule 4 Paragraph 2 of the 
1976 RRA, which originated as an Opposition amendment to 
that act. See Lustgarten, 1980, pp. 244-245. 
2 It should be emphasized that the Commission has no power 
to compel a discriminator to take any positive steps to 
encourage equal opportunities. All it can do is require the 
cessation of illegal practices. 
3 The EOC's total budget was approximately h 2.5 million 
for 1981. 
4 Complaints may also be initiated by the Commission; such 
a procedure is known as a Commissioner's charge. 
5 If the Commission has not reached a finding within 60 
days, the individual may request a "right to suen letter, 
allowing her or him to proceed directly in Federal District 
Court. 
6 See*e. g. f U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Federal Civil I Rights Enforcement Effort --1974* Vol. V: To 
Eliminate Emr)lovmgnt Discrimination (1975). 
7 Additionallyr individuals or organizations may request 
the issuance of a Commissioner's charge of a systemic 
violation. i 
8 In EEOC v. Rogers Bros., 470 F. 2d 965 (5th Cir. 1975) 
cert. denied, 409 u. s. 1059 (1975), the court insisted upon 
issuance of an injunction even though the employer had 
belatedly filed the required reports. 
9 For a discussion-of class actions, generally, see Chapter 
9 below. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
LEGAL REMEDIES 
In earlier chaptersf some of the weaknesses underlying 
the individual systems of enforcement have been discussed. 
Underlying those discussions but not addressed in them is 
the important question of the nature and availability of the 
remedies provided in anti-discrimination law. 
Just as earlier chapters have demonstrated that the 
enforcement system incorporates elements of both common law, 
and public or administrative law, so will this chapter 
examine the influence of each of these elements on the 
remedies provided by the-enforcement system. Specificallyr 
the purpose of this chapter is to examine how specific 
remedies address the issue of compliance with the law, 
through emphasizing either compensatory (common-law) or 
regulatory (administrative law) functions. Both functions 
are concerned with compliancer but there are differences in 
emphasis between themr with the latter showing greater 
c oncern for compliance through regulation than the former. 
This distinction between an emphasis on compensation or 
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regulation also involves a distinction between negative and 
p ositive sanctions. The common law has traditionally 
concerned itself with the former, and this common-law 
emphasis pervades the anti-discrimination lawsr despite 
their incorporation of administrative and public law 
structures. 
It should be emphasized-at the outset that although 
there is a distinction between these two approaches, there 
is no necessary contradiction between them, as evinced by 
the American approach to the question of remedies for sex 
discrimination violations. 
The first part of this chapter focuses on the British 
approach to the question of individual compliance, by 
examining the statutory provisions of remedial powers, and 
by analyzing a sample of remedies obtained after successful 
tribunal hearings. 
I. IRD. TVIDUAL REMEDIES -- THE POWER OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS 
In cases under the SeX Discrimination Act (SDA)r 
industrial tribunals are empowered to order any or all of 
the remedies made available to them by statuter that they 
consider "just and equitable" in a particular case. These 
remedies include: a declaration of the rights of the 
parties in relation to the complaint; a recommendation that 
the respondent take certain actions; and an ord6r for 
compensation. 
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Declaration 
Under S. 65 (1) (a) of the SDA, an industrial tribunal 
may make an order "declaring the rights of the complainant 
and the respondent in relation to the act to which the 
complainant relates. " As the statutory language indicates, 
a declaration is no more than a statement that the 
respondent has violated the applicant's statutory rights. 
As such, it makes no compensation available to the applicant 
but represents an authoritative statement of the rights and 
wrongs of. the complaint presented to the tribunal. A 
declaration may also function as the precondition for action 
by the EOC to seek injunctive relief under powers granted 
under s. 71, in the case of "persistent discrimination. " 
A sample of 25 industrial tribunal hearings in which 
the applicant prevailed included five cases where the 
tribunal made a declaration. 1. The 1981 decision in Bath v. 
British Airways Engine overhaul Ltd. (Cardiff, 1981) 
provides a clear illustration of the use, and limitationsr 
of the declaration as remedy, the tribunal in this decision 
having clearly delineated. the scope of the action available 
to them. The applicant in this case was a woman employed by 
the respondents as an aircraft component worker, a job 
graded as "Schedule VI. 1 She applied for a position as a 
Production Assistant (Schedule III) but was turned down 
because of the existence of a union/mapagement agreement 
that limited promotion for this job to personnel in Schedule 
IV. In a 1980 tribunal hearing, the woman alleged indirect 
discrimination since the requirement for promotion was such 
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that the proportion of women who could comply was smaller 
than the proportion of men. The tribunal', in an u nanimous 
decisionr agreed that this was the caser and since the 
requirement was not justifiable, irrespective of sex, made a 
recommendation that the employers use their best endeavors 
to bring about a change in the requirements. 
In 1981, the case again came before the tribunal, as 
the management and unions had failed to meet the terms of 
the recommendation. At this second hearing, the tribunal 
made a declaration as to the rights of the-parties, noting: 
It is common ground that we are not functas officio and 
have jurisdiction to make an order under s. 65 (1)(a) 
of the 1975'Act. The declarations are declarations 
which are limited in extent because of-the limited 
jurisdiction which we have. We are only entitled to 
make declarations and not to order the respondents to 
actually do anything. Moreover, the declarations that 
we are entitled to make are declarations as to the 
rights of the complainant and the respondents. Had we 
the power to do sor we would have unhesitatingly made a 
declaration in the terms of the suggestion which the 
respondents made to the trade union side. We would 
have declared that it is appropriate that with 
immediate effect staff in all E and M Schedules are 
deemed to be appropriate for consideration for 
Production Assistant vacancies. However, to make such 
a declaration would in our view be beyond our 
jurisdiction. 
In the light of this declaration, the EOC pressed the 
employers to open the high-paid grade to all lower grades, 
and considered using its s. 71 enforcement powers to achieve 
this objective. The employers then agreed to comply with 
the Commission's request (EOCI 19811 p. 5). 
The limitations of the declaration as a remedy are 
cogently expressed by the tribunal in BAUI. However 
appropriate the tribunal thinks a particular course of 
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action would ber it may not order the parties to pursue this 
course of action: it is limited instead to a declaration 
concerning the rights of the parties involved. As the 
ultimate outcome in BAth illustrates, the impact of a 
declaration may result in compliance and may indeed go 
beyond the individual complainantr but the fact remains that 
it is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal to assure 
that particular steps are taken. 
Compensation 
Under s. 65 (1)(b) of the SDAI the tribunal may make an 
order requiring the respondent to pay compensation to the 
complainant, in any amount corresponding to the damages that 
could have been ordered by a county court or sheriff's court 
hearing a discrimination complaint in a field other than 
employment. Section 66 of the SDA sets out the guidelines 
for awards of compensation by the county courts (in England) 
and sheriff's courts (in Scotland), and under the terms of 
s. 65 (1)(b) these guidelines also apply to awards made by 
tribunals hearing employment cases. 
-Under s. 66, complaints under the SDA are specifically 
analogized to torts proceedings. The heads under which 
compensation may be awarded are-not enumeratedr with the 
exception of compensation for injury to feelingsr which is 
explicitly authorized, "for the avoidance of doubt. u 
(s. 66 (1)(a)). The guidelines of s. 66 apply to employment 
claims with a couple of extra provisos. Section 66(3) 
provides that where a successful complaint is based on 
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evidence of indirect discrimination, the tribunal may not 
make an order of compensationr if the respondent can prove 
that the discriminatory requirement was not applied with the 
intention of treating the complainant unfavorably. Section 
65(3) establishes that where a respondent fails "without 
reasonable justification" to heed a recommendation made by a 
tribunal, the tribunal may subsequently increase the amount 
of compensation ordered to be paidr or if no compensation 
was initially made, may then make such an order. 
Awards under the SDA may not be duplicative of payments 
received under other statutes (e. g. for unfair dismissal) 
but complainants may simultaneously receive compensation 
under separate statutes for separate wrongs. Where a 
successful complainant has received payments from the state, 
in the form for example of unemployment benefitsf for a 
period properly the responsibility of the respondentr the 
principle of recou pment applies, which allows the tribunal 
to deduct from the complainant's award the amount received 
from the state, and to direct that the respondentrepay this 
sum. directly to the public authority in question. Finally, 
the general tort principle of the responsibility to mitigate 
damages applies to the calculation of awards under the SDA. 
Thus, the basic system governing awards of compensation 
under the SDA is one of a torts damages framework, subject 
to a statutory maximum awardt and with explicit provision 
for the discretionary award of compensation for injury to 
feelings, regardless of whi ch other heads of damages apply. 
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In the sample of successful tribunal decisions which 
provides an empirical basis for this part of the chapter, 
there were 14 awards of compensationt as compared with 5 
declarationst and two recommendations. Clearly, a monetary 
award may have the appeal of a direct and simple remedy, 
conferring immediate and tangible benefits on the recipient. 
An examination of some of the decisions in the sample 
illustrates some of the problems associated with orders of 
compensation in current tribunal practice. These problems 
concern the generally small size of awardsy the lack of 
explicit guidelines, and the corresponding discrepancies 
between tribunals confronted with similar cases, the 
particular calculation problems associated with awards for 
economic loss, and the incapacity of monetary awards as 
present ly constituted to provide any regulatory or deterrent 
effect. 
Both the small size of most compensation awards, and 
the degree of divergence between tribunals are illustrated 
particularly in decisions making awards for injury to 
feelings. In 11 out of the 14 cases under consideration 
here, the tribunal ordered compensation for injury to 
feelings. The awards ranged from 50 p to h 1000, although 
the latter sum was subsequently reduced on appeal. 
In Hurley v. Mustoe (London C. 1981) the tribunalf in 
its discretion, awarded a 'successful' e6mplainant the sum 
of 50 p for injury to feelings at the conclusion of a case 
which had generated considerable local criticism of the 
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respondent. At an initial tribunal hearing the respondent 
prevailed, but on appeal the Employment Appeals Tribunal 
(EAT) reversed the tribunal's original decision and held 
that the complainant, a married woman with 2 children, had 
been discriminated against on the grounds of se* and marital 
statust when a restaurant owner refused her employment as a 
waitress because she was the mother of young children. The 
case was then returned to the industrial tribunal for a 
decision on compensation. 
The counsel heard evidence that while the appeal to the 
EAT was pending, demonstrations and pickets supporting the 
complainant's position had caused the respondent's two 
restaurants to lose business. These demonstrations were 
lawful and peaceful, and the tribunal acknowledged that 
although the restauranteur had called the police several 
-timesr no arrests had been made. The complainant had been 
present as an observer on a couple of occasions, but had not 
actively participated in the protest activity which was 
organized and supported by local community groups. 
Counsel for the complainant contended that such matters 
were irrelevant for the purpose of making an award, but the 
tribunal disagreed, stating: 
aa. we have thought it necessary to receive full 
evidence as to the said demonstrations or picketing in 
that, so far as the principle of awards under 
employmenty and discrimination legislation is 
concernedr the amount shall be Just and ggUitgble. 
From this premise, we consider that he who comes to 
equity must come with clean hands. 
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Counsel for the applicant argued unsuccessfully, in the 
face of this contention, that equitable discretion should 
not apply to questions of compensation, since the statute 
provided, under s. 65 (1)(b), that once a tribunal comes to 
consider an order directing the respondent*to pay 
compensation, the amount should correspond to damages that 
could have been awarded in a. county court (under s. 66). 
Counsel for the complainant also cited Coleman v. Skyrail 
(1981) IRLR 398, to support the proposition that 
compensation in such cases should be as in any other case in 
law. The tribunal countered this argument with an assertion 
that Bdisc retion remains to us in regard to the element of 
compensation applicable to 'injury of feelings' under 
section 66(4)" and that if theý were wrong as to their 
exercise of discretion "then we find in the alternative that 
the position of the applicant in relation to the 
demonstrations against the respondent was such as to reduce 
any injury to her feelings. * In light of what the tribunal 
termed the avarious factual elements' in the caser which 
included the demonstrations against the respondent, the 
complainant's refusal of an offer of employment while the 
appeal was pending, and the "previous experience of the 
adversities of life which the applicant must have gained in 
her employment, " (as awaitress at a London rock club/dance 
hall)p the complainant was awarded only 50 p in compensation 
for injury to feelings, in addition to a sum equivalent to 8 
weeks loss of earnings. 
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The inescapable conclusion in reading this decision is 
that despite the facade of alternative legal arguments to 
legitimate the tribunal's exercise of discretion, the fact 
that it was exercised in such a fashion had little to do 
with the law as such, and a great deal to do with the 
tribunal's distaste for the complainant and her association 
with political activists. Such a case serves to illustrate 
the considerable discretion that a tribunal has, in making 
an award for injury to feelings. 
2 
This discretion is 
emphasized, as is the discrepancy which exists between 
tribunals, by comparing the factors taken into account in 
the Hurley casel with the reasoning advanced by tribunals in 
other cases in the sample. 
In four cases in the sample, the amount awarded for 
injury to feelings appears to have been quite arbitrarily 
determined, with no explanation offered as to how the sum 
was reached. In Dunlop v. Roval Scottish Academv 
(Edinburgh 1977) a woman art student employed as a temporary 
security guard for four weeks for a summer art exhibition 
was denied the opportunity to work the night shift, an 
opportunity which was afforded to all the male students 
employed as guards. She consequently lost the opportunity 
of earning overtime in the amount of h 40. Finding that her 
complaint of sex discrimination was well-founded, the 
tribunal awarded her h 20 for injury to feelings in addition 
to the-L 40 loss of earnings. No explanation was given for 
the choice of that particular amount. 
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In Q'Connell v, Adams Personnel Employment Agencyr the 
respondent refused to interview a male applicant for the job 
of telex operator. The tribunal, finding that sex discri- 
mination had occurred, awarded him h 50 for injury to 
feelings, as his sole remedy. In another case involving a 
male applicantr refused a job as a toy-filler because only 
women were employed, the tribunal calculated his economic 
losses at h 95.40, and'then rounded up the sum to h 100, the 
additional h 4.60 being awarded as compensation for what the 
tribunal viewed as his "minimal feeling of outrage at being 
refused the job because he was not a woman. " Williamson v. 
Dellcourt Ltd. (Manchester 1979). By comparison, a woman 
refused employment as a collection supervisor because she 
was the mother of three children# was awarded S 100 to 
compensate for injury to her feelings in Thorndvke y. Bell 
Fruit (North Central) Ltd. (Liverpool, 1978). 
In contrast to these cases, some tribunals are more 
explicit about the way in which they arrived at a particular 
sum to compensate for injury to feelings. 
In Kerr v. Clyde FaCtors (Electrical) Ltd. (Newcastle- 
Upon-Tyne 1981) a case involving a discriminatory dismissalt 
the tribunal awarded fi 50 for injury to feelings, noting 
that this was approximately one week's wages for the 
applicant. In Railton v. S. O. S. Bureau Ltd. (Liverpool 
1979) the standard was much less objective, but the tribunal 
did at least make an attempt to explain its award. This 
case involved an unfair dismissal for which an award of 
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k 1377 was made. In addition to this sum, the tribunal 
awarded h 123 for the separate grievance of sex 
discriminationt explaining that: 
We consider the discrimination involved to be not of a 
serious degree but rather merely a description of the 
manner in which the applicant was generally treated 
leading up to her dismissal. . from our joint 
experience we have come to a conclusion that a sum in 
the region of 3h 120 is proper. .. (and) -L 123 for the Sex Discrimination would bring the total compensation 
up to the round sum of L 1500. 
In Wilýe v. Strathclyde Regional Council (Glasgow 1980) 
the tribunal gave a very high award of Ei 1000t in a case 
involving a discriminatory failure to interview a woman 
applicant-for a post as Lecturer in Social Policy. The 
h 1000 was given for injury to feelingsr loss of opoortunity 
and injury to reputation, and represents a composite award 
for all three injuries. Although the amount awarded for 
each injury suffered is not explicit, nor is the basis for 
the total made clear, it is apparent from the tribunal's 
decision that professional standing was an important factor 
to be taken into account. Noting that the award includes 
compensation for injury to reputationi, the decision states 
that "it is the Tribunal's impression from the evidence in 
the case that the academic world is such that reputation is 
extremely important. ' 
Finally, the case in the sample in which the reasoning 
on the determination of remedy is most explicit is Coleman 
v. Skyrail OcCanic (London 1979) in which the tribunal, 
drawing explicitly on other tort analogies, made a high 
award for injury to feelings, only to see that award reduced 
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on appeal. In ColCmanr the applicant was a clerk employed 
by the respondents, a firm of travel agents. When she 
married a man employed-by a rival travel agency she was 
dismissed. The tribunal found her complaint of sex and 
marital discrimination well-founded, and awarded her h 1000 
for compensation for injury to feelings, stating, 
We find that the applicant's reputation must inevitably 
have suffered. Knowledge of that and the abrupt method 
of dismissal caused a substantial injury to her 
feelings. We award on the above consideration-ir 1000. 
In arriving at this relatively high figure, the 
tribunal had noted a "substantial similarity" between awards 
in defamation cases. The tribunal statedt however, that it 
would welcome "guidance by a higher tribunal on the proper 
method of assessment. " 
on appeal by the respondenty the EAT reversed the 
industrial tribunal's finding of discriminationr and noted 
anyway that. even if there had been discrimination, the sum 
of 3b 1000 as an award for injury to feelings was too high, 
and that 3b 250 would have been more appropriate. The 
complainantr supported by the EOCr appealed the EAT's 
decision to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the industrial tribunal's 
finding of unlawful discriminationr and addressed explicitly 
the issue of compensationr considering what factors a 
tribunal should take into account when making an award for 
injury to feelings, and on what principles an appellate 
court should interfere with a tribunal's calculation. 
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Lawton, Wr set out a relatively narrow standard for 
assessing injury to feelings, asserting that, 
Any injury to feelings must result from the knowledge 
that it was an act of sex discrimination which brought 
about a dismissal. Injury to feelings unrelated to sex 
discrimination such as, in this case, the circumstance 
that leakages of information had taken place. .. and that others might reasonably have suspected Mrs. 
Coleman to have been responsible for them is not 
properly attributable to an unlawful act of sex 
discrimination. The Industrial Tribunal thought that 
the circumstances in which Mrs. Coleman was dismissed 
may have damaged her reputation. This would not have 
been a consequence of sex discrimination and should 
have been disregarded ( oleman v. Skyrail oceanic Ltd. 
[1981]'ICR 864, 'P71,.. -per, Lawton, LJ)-. 
Using this narrow and formalistic reasoning, the Court 
of Appeals reduced the amount of damges for injury to 
feelings to h 100. 
The Court of Appeals asserted the right of appellate 
courts to overturn tribunal awards, on the basis that they 
should be treated in the same way as awards made by judges 
sitting alone. Such awards are subject to appellate review, 
while those made by juries are not. Lawton, LJ reasoned: 
Industrial Tribunals are presided over by chairmen who 
have legal qualifications. Reasoned decisions are 
givenr including reasons for making awards. The giving 
of reasons distinguishes their decision from the 
verdicts of juries. If they have acted on a wrong 
principle of law or have misapprehended the facts or 
for other reasons have made a wholly erroneous estimate 
of the damage suffered,,. an appellate court can 
interfere. (Ibid. ) 
This reasoning appears to ignore the reality of 
tribunal decision-making as evidenced by the sample, where 
often no explanation is given for the figure awarded, or the 
criteria are 'soft' and ambiguous. Nevertheless,. the effect 
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of this assertion of the power of appellate review may 
further encourage caution in the'tribunals which would 
reinforce the practice of making minimal awards for injury 
to feelings, since awards under this head appear to be the 
most common form of remedy in discrimination complaints. 
As has been suggested earlier, 
3 the small sums awarded 
in successful discrimination cases may discourage potential 
complainants from pursuing their grievance. Furthermorer 
the small sums in question can have no deterrent or 
regulatory effect on the discriminators. Although it has 
been suggested that it would be improper for compensation 
for injury to feelings to be used as a means of regulation 
(Lustgarten 1980, p. 228) it-does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that larger amounts, in keeping with the sums 
awarded in defamation cases, would serve a dual function#, 
primarily-in making an appropriate award of compensation to 
the injured party, secondarily in increasing the cost of 
discrimination to-the perpetrator. 
In addition to awards for injury to feelings, many of 
the tribunals in the sample also awarded compensation for 
economic loss. Whilst the calculation of loss of potential 
earnings involves few difficulties in a case involving 
discriminatory dismissal, complaints of discrimination in 
hiring or promotion do present a probl6m for a tribunal 
making awards for economic losses, absent a showing that the 
complainant would definitely have been awarded the position 
sought, but for the impact of discrimination. Tribunals 
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approached this problem in different ways as the examples 
below will illustrate. 
In Crocker V. J. S. Bamford-Excavators (Nottingham, 
1980) the tribunal held that the respondent had unlawfully 
discriminated against the complainant, by passing her over 
for promotiont in favor of a male employee. Having reached 
this conclusion, the tribunal left it to the parties to 
reach a remedy, noting: 
e. we have been very sensible throughout our deliberation in this matter, that it is not for us to 
substitute our judgement for that of the board as to 
which of the candidates was the most suitable for 
employment. 
This statement is a good example of the 'hands-off' 
approach that many tribunals bring to recruitment and 
promotion cases. Whilst appearing as an apparently 
reasonable deference to managerial perogative, the inner 
logic of such statements is in fact convolutedr in the 
context of discrimination cases. In Crogker, the 
complainant alleged discrimination whenr in a contest for 
promotiont a less qualified male applicant was appointed and 
she was rejected. The man appointed for promotion had only 
half the experience of the complainant, nor were his annual 
appraisal reports as good as hers. The tribunal obviously 
took these factors into account in reaching a conclusion 
that discrimination occurred. In this context the logic of 
the 'hands-offl*approach is that appointment of a lesser 
qualified male over a better qualified woman constituted 
evidence indicating discrimination: nevertheless, it is the 
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perogative of the employer to appoint the lesser qualified 
manr although they must also avo. id contravening the 
provision of the anti-discrimination legislation. Having 
placed itself in this positiony it is small wonder that the 
tribunal left the parties to reach an agreementr merely 
noting that in the event of the parties failing to reach 
accord, the case would have to be re-listed for a 
determination of remedies. 
In Wilkýe v, Strathclyde Rggional Council, (Glasgow, 
1980) a woman applicant was denied an interview for a post 
of college lecturer, and the tribunal found that unlawful 
discrimination had occurred. In making an order of 
compensation,. howevers, the tribunal confined itself to a 
large award (h 1000) for injury to feelings, injury to 
reputation, and loss of opportunity. The tribunal felt 
itself unable to make any award for economic lossr 
explaining that: 
*. while the Tribunal can say without -hesitation that the applicant should have been interviewed for the 
post. . '. there is no way in which the Tribunal can say that she should have been appointed to the position. 
It might very well appear to the Tribunal that the 
applicant was by far the best qualified candidate for 
the jobf but it is not the person who in the Tribunal's 
view is best qualified. who will necessarily be given 
the job. The right to make the selection and make the 
appointment must always lie entirely with the 
appointing panel. 
other tribunals have been prepared to calculate an 
award on the assumption that the applicant would have been 
hired or promoted, then reducing the amount to take into 
account the uncertainty involved. 
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In Clements v. Gospgrt Borough Council (Southampton, 
1978), for exampler the tribunal faced a situation where a. 
woman employed by a local council was denied promotion on 
t he grounds that the job applied for was not suitable for a 
woman. Finding that discrimination had occurredr the 
tribunal awarded 1 400 for injury to feelings, and then 
entered into a complex calculation of the actual economic 
loss suffered by the complainant. In this calculation, the 
tribunal took into account the salary level in the post 
applied for, the effect on damage calculations of either a 
six month or three year multiplier, and the possible effect 
of losing access to a cheap car loan as one of the fringe 
benefits of the job sought. The tribunal also took into 
account "the fact that in any event the complainant may not 
have been able to hold down the job, she may not have the 
necessary qualities. .. we have to make a substantial 
discount in respect of that aspect in view of the 
uncertainties involved. " In con6rete terms the tribunal 
arrived at a figure of -L 600 representing actual lossest and 
then halved this figure to make allowances for the 
uncertainties involved. 
In Braine-Hartnell v. Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth 
Area Health Authority (London S. 1978)* the tribunal adopted 
a different approach from the tribunal in ClemCnts, when 
dealing with the same issue of compensation after a 
discriminatory denial of promotion. The tribunal in this 
case calculated the economic loss on the implicit assumption 
433 
that the complainant would have been given the post. 
Therefore the award was based on the difference in salary 
that existed between the post she sought and the post she 
was offered, over a one year period. 
These examples illustrate the wide discrepancies in 
approach between tribunals on the important question of 
calculating economic loss. There is no agreement as to what 
constitutes the appropriate period of time for the assess- 
ment of damages in various circumstances, nor is there 
agreement as to how to resolve the question of uncertainty. 
Some tribunals make no award for economic loss, because of 
the uncertainty factor, others take it into account by reduc- 
ing the sum awarded, others ignore its effect completely 
although this last appears to be a minority approach. 
In Skyrail Oceanic the Court of Appeal, per Lawton J 
(with Sir David Cairns in agreement) held that compensation 
for economic loss could be awarded "for foreseeable damage 
arising directly from an unlawful act of discrimination. It 
follows that an applicant can claim for any pecunary loss 
properly attributable to an unlawful act of discrimination" 
[19811 ICR 864,871. This formulation does not however address 
the question of how tribunals should deal with the 'uncer- 
tainty factor' when considering the economic loss of a 
complainant discriminatorily denied a job opportunity or 
promotion. 
Lustgarten (1980, p. 230) suggests a solution to this 
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problem in the form of a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
the complainant. once discrimination was established, the 
complainant could rely on the presumption that she would 
have been awarded the job in question, absent discrimina- 
tion, for the purpose of assessing compensation. The way 
would be open for the respondent to rebut the presumption 
by a showing to the contrary. This presumption would have 
the effect of reversing the present burden of proof, and 
placing it on the party with the most access to information. 
4 
It would clarify the assessment procedure, and open the way 
for the operation of a consistent standard between tribunals. 
(cont ' 
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It would increase the likelihood of a reasonable compen- 
sation for economic injury suffered by the individual 
complainant, and would allow the easy computation of 'front 
pay' damages. 
5 
Such an effect would have the advantage not 
only of greater compensation for the individual victim of 
discriminationt but by making an award for economic injury 
more likely, and by increasing the possible amountr would 
also have the desirable effect of increasing the possible 
cost of discrimination to the perpetrator. 
The calculation of compensation for both injury to 
feelings and economic loss share certain features. Both are 
characterized by the award of relatively small sums, and the 
absence of computation guidelines, leading to considerable 
discrepancies between tribunals. Both also compensate the 
individual for a proven grievance; they do nothing to ensure 
compliance in the future. Larger sums awarded not only to 
the individual victim but to others similarly situated (as 
in America's 'class action' below) might have some deterrent 
effect, but it is unlikely that the present system and 
practice has any such effect at all, since the present costs 
of discrimination to the perpetrator are negligible. 
Tribunals are empowered under s. 65 (1)(c) of the SDA 
to make a recommendation that the respondent take such 
action as is "practicable for the purposes of obviating or 
reducing the adverse effect on the complainant of any act of 
discrimination to which the complaint relates. " 
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The Court of Appeal considered the power of an 
industrial tribunal to make recommendations in Prestcold Ltd. 
v. Irvine (1981] ICR 777, holding that a tribunal may not 
make a recommendation concerning wages, as the power to 
make recommendations relates to non-monetary matters. In 
Prestcold the tribunal found that the employer had discrim- 
inated against the complainant by denying her promotion. 
The tribunal awarded her damages under s. 65(l)(b), and made 
a recommendation under s. 65(l)(c) that she be seriously 
considered for the post as soon as it became available, and 
that she be given career development opportunities in the 
meantime. In the alternative the tribunal recommended that 
she should continue to receive the difference in salary 
between her job and the post for which she applied, until she 
was promoted to the position sought or one of equal status. 
The Court of Appeal held that recommendations under 
s. 65(l)(c) do not extend to those which recommend monetary 
compensation. Rather, it is s. 65(l)(b) which gives tribunals 
the power to award compensation to cover economic loss. 
Section 65(3) provides, however, that if a respondent 
fails to comply with a recommendation "without reasonable 
justification" then the tribunal may, if they think it just 
and equitable, increase the amount of compensation ordered 
to be paid under s. 65(l)(b), or make such an order for 
compensation under s. 65(l)(b) if none was originally made. 
See Nelson v. Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive 
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[19781 ICR 1183 (EAT). Although s. 65(3) appears to give 
the tribunal a means of encouraging compliance with its 
recommendations, two points must be made. First, if an 
employer chooses to pay the increased compensation rather 
than comply with the recommendation, that is the end of the 
matter and there is nothing more the tribunal can do. 
Secondly, and more importantly in practical terms, the use of 
a compensation award as a means of encouraging compliance 
with a recommendation effectively leýLves the tribunal power- 
less in most cases involving indirect discrimination. 
Section 65(3) provides that in cases of indirect discrimin- 
ation "no award of damages shall be made if the respondent 
proves that the requirement or condition in question was not 
applied with the intention of treating the claimant 
unfavorably on the grounds of his sex or marital status. " 
(Emphasis added. ) In such cases, the tribunal, barred from 
ordering compensation, may only make a recommendation or 
declaration. If a recommendation is made, and the respondent 
fails to 
(cont ' d. ) 
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complyr the tribunal is barred by s. 66(3) from utilizing 
the powers to award or increase compensation under s. 65(3). 
The only recourse open to the tribunal then is to make a 
declaration of the rights of the parties, which is the 
course of action taken by the tribunal in Bath v. B. A. 
Engine overhaul, suRra. This in itself will not produce 
compliance although it may open the doors to the EOCIS use 
of its s. 71 powers against persistent discrimination. 
Section 71 confers on the Commission the authority, in cases 
of persistent discrimination as defined by the Act, to apply 
for injunctive relief. Thus the final measure in the 
lengthy and cumbersome process would be an order by the 
court that the discriminator refrain from his discriminatory 
behaviour. As the BAth caser supral demonstrates, a 
successful complaint of indirect discrimination may take two 
tribunal hearings, (over a period, in BAth, of 18 months), 
and intervention by the EOC to affect compliance with a 
recommendation. This case illustrates how important it is 
for the EOC to monitor tribunal decisions, especially in 
cases alleging indirect discrimination, since the 
intervention of the Commission may be crucial to the 
achievement of compliance. 
This lack of enforcement power which is inherent in the 
device of a 'recommendation' is consonant with the way in 
which the common law has defined the limits of intervention 
in the contractual relationship, through the 
ancient doctrine that a contract of employment 
cannot be specifically enforced against either side -- 
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because an order for specific performance against the 
worker would savour of compulsory labour, and the rule 
of mutuality demands that if no such order can be made 
against the employee it cannot be made against the 
employer either. 
(Kahn-Freudr 1974r p. 24) 
This tenet underlies the reluctance with which 
employment legislation in Britain approaches the positive 
sanction of reinstatement, and illustrates the extent to 
which statutory law in Britain is overshadowed by common-law 
concepts. In the United States, by comparisonr statutory 
law is not bound to the same degree by-the influence of 
common-law theory. Legislators have not hesitated to 
provide remedies like reinstatement, and judges have 
interpreted these statutory provisions with reference to the 
demands of public policy rather that the traditional 
shibboleths of private law. 
A second problem with the use of recommendations by 
tribunals is that, as with compensation and declarations, 
the remedy is formally limited in scope to the removal of 
the discriminatory impact on the complainant. Particularly 
in cases of indirect discrimination, a whole group of 
potential victims of the alleged discriminator may be 
implied, but it is outside the scope of the tribunal's 
jurisdiction to fashion a recommendation that would take 
this factor into account. While even an individual 
recommendation, limited as it may be in scope and intenty 
may have some carry-over effect on other employees, evidence 
from the sample suggests that the tribunals in practice make 
but little use of the powers they have to make 
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recommendations. In the entire sample of successful SDA 
complaintsf only four decisions involved recommendations by 
the tribunal. The decision of the tribunal in Clements v. 
Gosport Borough Councilt supra illustrates the kind of 
recommendation that a sensitive and conscientious tribunal 
might make. In this caser the complainant was refused 
promotion for a job considered unsuitable for a woman. The 
tribunal made an a ward of compensation totalling-fs 100 for 
economic loss and injury to feelings and in addition made 
the following recommendations: that the complainant be 
given a chance to take on the job sought on occasions when 
the incumbent was absent; that the applicant be considered 
for any suitable promotion when it arose; and that the 
respondent encourage the complainant to take any relevant 
day release course to qualify her for promotion. Whilst 
these recommendations at least display some sensitivity to 
the possible needs of the aggrieved complainant, they also 
illustrate the limits of the individual remedy, when placed 
in the context of a case involving a respondent which 
intentionally discriminated against a woman applicant for 
promotion, on the grounds that a man would be preferable for 
the job. The tribunal decision states, "we think that the 
minds of the employers were. . opposed right from the start 
to the taking on of a woman. . as the post was not 
considered suitable for a woman. w The recommendations 
devised by the tribunal seem unlikely to bring about the 
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necessary change of attitude among the council managers, to 
bring the repondent into compliance with the law. 
The sample shows that on average, where monetary 
compensation was allowed, the sums of money awarded for sex 
discrimination were small. Where indirect discrimination 
is involved, no monetary compensation is allowable under 
the statute if there was no intent to discriminate against 
the applicant. Since tribunals are reluctant to act positively 
to recommend that an individual be hired, promoted or re- 
instated, then the victim of indirect discrimination who 
brings a successful complaint to the tribunal may effectively 
be left without any remedy. 
6 Further, the available remedies 
appear to provide little incentive for compliance with the 
law. 
II. INDIVIDUAL REMEDIES: THE EQUAL PAY ACT 
The remedy available to the industrial tribunals under 
the Equal Pay Act (EqPA) shares with the remedies available 
under the SDA the characteristic that it is unlikely to 
encourage compliance with the law. By concentrating, however, 
on the award of compensation for economic loss within a 
statutorily defined time period, the EqPA remedy does 
avoid the uncertainties of calculation, and the exercise of 
discretion, which account for the divergent practices of 
tribunals hearing SDA complaints. 
Section 2(5) of the EqPA sets out the remedy for a 
successful equal pay complaint before an industrial tribunal, 
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by providing for arrears of remuneration or damages for a 
period not exceeding two years before the date on which 
proceedings were instituted. 
As with the remedies under the SDA, the regulatory 
impact of a back pay award is lessened by the fact that it 
is limited to the individual complaint, and does not extend 
to other employees who may be similarly situated, unless 
they too have presented complaints to the industrial 
tribunal. However, because of the realities of industrial 
relations and personnel practices, a successful case under 
the EqPA may "indirectly affect large numbers of persons 
other than parties to the particular complaint" Eaton Ltd. 
v. Nuttall (19771 ICR 272,274 (EAT). 
Thus, in a successful EqPA complaint the employer is 
not obliged to raise the wages of other women receiving 
unequal pay, only to guarantee equal pay for the complainant, 
and to pay such arrears as the tribunal orders. 
(cont I d. ) 
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The statute makes no provision for any kind of punitive 
award against employers, nor does it allow for awards to 
compensate for injury to feelings. Since the SDA makes a 
specific provision for such awards, in addition to any other 
compensation orderedr and since unequal pay represents sex 
discrimination in the payment of wages, it would seem 
reasonable to compensate women who have successfully pursued 
an 6qual pay claim for the injury to feelings caused by the 
ongoing underevaluation of their service. A punitive award, 
or a provision allowing compensation for injury to feelings 
would have the additional advantage of increasing the cost 
to the employer of unequal pay. Under the present systemr 
it is rational for the employer to pay unequal wages until 
challenged, since even if the complainant prevails, the 
respondent will only have to pay arrears owing and no 
additional penalty attaches. 
In the sample, there were twenty successful complaints 
under the EqPA. In all but one of these cases, -the tribunal 
either calculated the amoun t of back pay due, or directed 
the parties to do so. In the one case in which no award was 
made, the male applicant had not suffered any quantifiable 
financial loss. In five of these decisionst the remedy was 
directed to multiple complainantsy where separate complaints 
had been considered and heard together. Amongst the cases 
in which the back pay award was calculated by the tribunalr 
the highest award wasefor. 6 2,845 in back pay awarded to a 
sales executive in Welch v. Venteck-Ltd. (London, 1981). 
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This sum represented arrears for just under one year, and 
indicates that, for the individual, quite considerable sums 
of money may be at stake in a claim for equal pay. 
While calculations for compensation under the EqPA 
presented few of the uncertainties intrinsic to monetary 
remedies under the SDAI the remedies available under both 
Acts demonstrate the same failure to encourage compliance 
with the law, through their focus on the individual, and the 
absence of any meaningful sanctions for non-compliance. As 
shown in earlier chapters, both the EqPA and the SDA make 
some provision for enforcement'outside of the individual 
tribunal remedy system through the arbitration powers of the 
Central Arbitration Committee, (CAC)r and the power of the 
EOC to issue non-discrimination notices and to seek 
injunctive relief in the county courts. However, as 
illustrated earliery the possible impact of the CAC has been 
limited by the small number of cases brought to its 
attention by trade unionslwand by the decision in the Hymac 
case which effectivelyýlimited the scope of its 
jurisdiction. The EOC's powers are essentially formalistic 
and do not adequately address the need either for 
compensation or for deterrence. 
The problems in the remedial provisions of the 
leglislation are not inherent in the idea of anti- 
discrimination law, but rather, represent conscious choices 
about the nature of enforcement and the functions that 
remedies are seen as appropriately addressing. Although the 
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British legislation borrowed a number of ideas and 
structures from the United States, it did not incorporate 
the same approach to remedy. In the second part of this 
chapter# the American approach is examined for the purpose 
of comparison. 
III. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO REMEDY 
The American approach to remedy overcomes to a 
considerable extent two of the problems associated with the 
British approach: the failure to address the need for 
remedies to fulfill regulatory as well as compensatory 
objectives, and the focus only on individual rather than 
group remedy. These problems are necessarily inter-related 
in practice, since an approach which allows a broad form of 
remedy, encompassing more than the individual complainant, 
is more likely to achieve some degree of deterrence through 
its remedial provisions. However, it is useful to examine 
each of these issues separately, as the arguments 
surrounding each question are distinct. 
Earlier in this chapter the question of remedy was 
presented in the context of the British legislation as 
involving a choice be. tween compensatory or deterrent 
functions, although it was acknowledged that all remedies 
address the question of compliance to a lesser or greater 
degree. In Amerian anti-discrimination lawi,. the line 
between the two kinds of remedies has blurred, with the 
legislato rs conferring on the court's broad powers to frame 
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remedies, and with the courts explicitly recognizing the 
legitimate regulatory function of the remedies devised. 
This development has occurred within a context in which the 
role of judges as policy makers in contemporary American 
society has gained legitimacy with regard to a wide range of 
social concerns (Chayesr 1976; Hurst, 1980-81; Horowitzr 
1977; Sarat and Cavanaghr 1978). 
Title VII provides by way of remedy, in s. 706(g), (42 
U. S. C. s. 20006 -5[g]), that the courts may issue 
inju nctions forbidding illegal practices, and may 
additionally: 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, 
which may include, but is not limited tot reinstatement 
or hiring of employeesr with or without back pay -- or 
any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate. 
In deciding cases in which the kind or extent of remedy 
has been been an issuer American courts have affirmed that 
the primary purpose of Title VII is to eradicate employment 
discrim-ination, and have designed remedies with that 
objective in mind. A landmark case in the area is Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975), a Supreme Court 
decision on a class action by black emploýees seeking 
injunctive relief from Title VII violationst and an award of 
back", bay to compensate for lost earnings opportunities. on 
the question of whether back pay was appropriater the Court 
noted that: 
The power to award backpay was bestowed by Congress as 
part of a complex legislative design directed at a 
historic evil of national proportions. A court must 
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exercise this power in light of the large objective of 
the Act. (422 U. S. at 416). 
Asserting that the courts' discretion in awarding or 
refusing back pay must be measured against the purposes 
which inform Title VIII and not as the appellant argued 
against some standard of good faith or intentionality, the 
Court quoted its own prior decision in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Ca. 401 U. S. 424 (1971) to the effect that the primary 
objective of Title VII was a prophylactic one: 
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities 
and remove the'barriers that have operated in the past 
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees (Griggs cited in Albermarle 422 U. S. at 
417). 
The Court in Albemarle goes on to state that: 
Backpay has no obvious connection with this purpose. 
Dractices of dubious legality (Ibid. ) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court continuest 
The reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award 
provides the spur and catalyst which causes 
employers. . .' to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices, and to endeavor to 
eliminatey so far as possible, the last vestiges of 
discrimination (Ibid. ). 
The Court. found no contradiction between this explicit 
deterrent purpose of an award of back pay and the objective 
of, -compensating 
individuals for injuries suffered. On the 
general nature of compensation for legal injuries of an 
economic character, the Court cited a 19th Cenýury case, 
Wicker v. HoRpsak (6 Wall. 94y 99t 1867) to the effect that: 
a. the general rule is that when a wrong has been done and the law gives a remedy the compensation shall 
be equal to the injury. The latter is the standard by 
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which the former shall be measured. The injured party 
is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he 
would have occupied if the wrong had not been 
committed. 
In the context of Title VII, of which "it is also the 
purpose. .. to make persons whole for injuries suffered on 
account of unlawful employment discriminationf" this 
principle enables the court to award backpay for injuries 
suffered, without a showing as to each individual before the 
court that they would have been promoted to a higher paying 
position, absent discrimination. Rather, the conclusive 
showing of practices illegal under Title VII triggers the 
award of back payt at the Court's discretion, but in light 
of the twin objectives of deterrence and compensationr 
there is no contradiction in this view, between the purposes 
of remedy. - a monetary award may fulfill simultaneously both 
purposes, and both are legitimate. 
7 
Expanding the Scope of-the Remedy -- class Actions 
The history of the American class action can be traced 
to the English 'bill of peace' in the seventeenth century. 
This 'bill' was a procedural device used by the Courts of 
Chancery to allow an action to be brought by or against 
representative parties when three conditions could be met: 
t. he number of persons involved had to be too large to permit 
joinder, all members had to have a joint interest in the 
matter adjudicatedr and the named parties had to adequately 
represent the interest of those members not present. If 
these conditions were met the judgement issued would be 
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binding on all members of the represented group (Cound, 
Friedenthal and Millerr 1980, p. 561). 
Provisions for class actions modelled on the old 
English procedure existed, prior to 1938, in various state 
codes and in the Federal Equity Rules. In 1938, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were adoptedr and Rule 23 
provided for a class action that would be available in both 
legal and equitable actions in the Federal courts. In 1966, 
the Federal Rules were amended, and some significant changes 
made in the rule governing class actions. 
Class. actions are particularly appropriate where those 
who have allegedly been injured "are in a poor position to 
seek legal redress either because they do. not know enough or 
because such redress is disproportionately expensive" 
(Kalven and Rosenfield, 1941, p. 686). Furthermore, the 
"historic mission" of the class action has been "to take 
care of the smaller guy* (Frankelf 1966, p. 299). In a 
decision on a class action by stockholders against a 
corporation, Judge Weinstein noted thatr "It is the duty of 
the Federal courts to render private enforcement 
practicable. Other than the class action, the procedures 
available for handling proliferated litigation - joinder, 
intervention, consolidation, and the test case - cannot 
serve this function in a situation like the one presented 
hereff (Dolglow v. Anderson, 43 F. R. D. 472,484F E. D. N. Y. 
1968). The judge explained that the. alternative devices 
presuppose a group of economically powerful parties able and 
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willing to take care of their own interestsf through 
individual suits or individual decisions about joinder or 
intervention. Where the parties lack these attributesr the 
class action nevertheless provides an avenue for redress of 
grievances. 
A second function of the class action is its deterrent 
effect. Again Judge Weinstein, in his decision in the 
Dolglow case, pointed to the prophylactic effect of the 
class action. Noting that the Federal securities laws under 
which the case was brought have a deterrent function, the 
judge stated that the class action served to effectuate this 
objective by making real the threat of exposure and civil 
liability. A 1973 article in the business periodical 
Fortune made the same point. Quoting the Dean of the 
plaintiffs bar in class action suitst the author explained 
that the big problem that class actions posed for 
corporations was "the enormously increased legal exposure. 
That class suit really strikes at the pocketbook. In some 
cases the corpdrationls*very existence is at stake. " 
(Carruthr 1973y p. 66). 
These arguments about the impact of class actions 
generally apply with particular force in the area of 
employment discrimination litigation, where the individual 
harm suffered is usually part of a pattern and practice of 
discrimination, affectingr potentially or actuallyr a much 
larger group than the individual plaintiff. 
I 
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The utility of the class action as a means of 
vindicating the rights of small claimants has inevitably led 
to its increasing use by social activists and their 
advocates, and this phenomenon has in turn led to increasing 
criticism of the device on the grounds that it imposes large 
burdens on already overburdened courts (Cound, Friedenthal 
and Miller, 1980, p. 564), and that it is a form of 
Rlegalized blackmail" (Handlerr 1971, p. 9). In recent 
years, this counter-attack has achieved some success, as the 
courts' interpretation of the procedural requirements for a 
class action have become more stringent. Courts have 
rejected putative class actions on a number of grounds, 
including unmanageability, and the existence of dissimilar 
interests within the class. 
To understand the ways in which defendants may attack 
the validity of a class actiont it is necessary to 
understand the procedural requirements of Rule 23. The rule 
establishes four prerequisites for a class to be certifiedr 
to which the courts have in practice added two more. Under 
Rule 23 (c) (1) a suit brought as a class action must be 
certified as fit to proceed on a class basis. Typically 
there is a hearing on this question, often accompanied by 
extensive documentation and sometimes by oral testimony 
198q 
(Cound, Friedenthal and MillerrAp. 579). It is at this 
stage that challenges to the validity of the class may be 
made by the defendant. 
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The two requirements developed by the courts are that 
there must be a class, and that the class representative 
must be a member of the class. Although th ese matters 
appear to be self-evidentr the court's requirements address 
in the first instance the need for a class to be described 
in such a way as to be ascertainable, and secondly to meet 
the technical standing requirement by providing that the 
class representative be a present member of the class. 
Challenges to the validity of a class are more likely 
to be made with reference to one of the express provisions 
of Rule 23, or on the grounds that the suit does not fall 
within one of three categories of class action described in 
the rule. 
The first of the four express prerequisites is Rule 
23(a)(1) which requires that the class be so numerous that 
joinder of all members ig-0impracticable. " This requirement 
tends to be interpreted according to a formula. If a class 
has more than forty members, the Inumerosityl requirement is 
usually satisfied; if it has less than twenty-five, it 
usually fails to satisfy the requirement. In a putative 
class of between 25 and 40 members, the court will examine 
such variables as geographic dispersion, and the size of the 
individual's claimr in order to determine whether joinder 
would be more appropriate than a class action. 
The second of the express prerequisites is the 
'Commonality' requ irement of Rule 23(a)(2). The action must 
raise issues of law or fact common to the class. one 
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significant common question is enough. The third of the 
express requirements is the requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) 
that the claims of the representative party be typical of 
those of the class. Neither of these requirements is likely 
to raise any significant issues'during the certification 
hearing. Indeed, the 'typicality' requirement appears to be 
redundant, serving no further purpose beyond that achieved 
by the requirement of commonality, and adequacy of 
representation, the latter being the fourth requirement, as 
set out in Rule 23 (a) (4) . 
The fourth requirementr that of adequacy of 
representation is probably the single most important 
requirement, and the one that is most heavily litigated. 
The Rule req uires that the court find that the 
representative party will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class, and it derives its importance from 
two factors, one philosophical and one more pragmatic. on 
the philosophical level the rule embodies a concern for 
ensuring the due process rights of the members of the class 
who will be bound by the judgement in the action. On a more 
pragmatic level the rule seeks to minimize the chance of a 
collateral attack on the judgement on the grounds of a 
defect in the adequacy of representation. The test for 
adequacy of representation includes three factors. First, 
the representative party must ýe adequate in the sense of 
having a substantial stake in the litigation. Second, the 
court will enquire into the adequacy of the class lawyer. 
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As with the class representative, the main focus of the 
enquiry is on the attorney's bona fides, but technical 
competence is also important, given the complex nature of 
class action litigation. Thirdt the court has the 
responsibility of examining the proposed class for evidence 
of any internal-antagonisms. 
In addition to meeting the express requirements of Rule 
23(a), the proposed class action must also fall within one 
of the three categories of class actions enumerated in Rule 
23(b). The first categoryt the 'prejudice' class action, 
covers situations in which individual actions which might 
cause prejudice to either class or non-class members can be 
avoided by the use of a class action. The second category 
includes suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. More 
actions are-brought under this category than under either of 
the other twor and one of its primary applications is to 
employment discrimination actions. For an action to fall 
within this category, it is sufficient that the defendants 
conduct be "generally applicable" to the class; there is no 
requirement that the conduct is damaging or offensive to 
every class member. Finally, there is the "damage" class 
action where the only tie among members of the class is that 
they claim to have been injured in the same way by the 
defendant, There are two prerequisites for an action to 
A- 
fall under this provision: first, common questions of law 
and fact must "Predominate" over questions involving only 
individual members and second the coýrt must find that "a 
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class action is superior to other available methods for fair 
and efficient. adjudication of the controversy" (FRCP 23 
(b) (3. ). 
Employment discrimination suits tend to fall within the 
second two categories of class action. A suit might allege 
discrimination in recruitment, for exampler and seek 
injunctive relief, under 23 (b) (2), and damages under 23 
(b)(3). Although the action could be maintained under 
either of these provisions, it will be certified only under 
one of them. Some courts have adopted the practice in such 
a situation of certifying the action under 23 (b)(2) to 
avoid the procedural complexities which attach to an action 
under 23 (b)(3). 
Rutherglen (1980, p. 696) notes that the difference 
between the minimal requirements of 23 (b)(2) and the more 
extensive procedural safeguards of 23 (b)(3) has become 
particularly important in Title VII litigation, He notes 
that plaintiff's lawyers have persuasively argued for a 
liberal interpretation of Rule 23 in Title VII cases in 
light of the weight to be accorded to the substantive policy 
against discrimination. Commenting on what he appears to 
view as an excessively pro-plaintiff approach he notes that: 
Ironically, the fear týat the EEOC would enforce the 
statute too vigorously led Congress to grant the power 
to interpret and apply the statute to the federal 
courtsr which enforced it as vigorously as any 
administrative agency couldr but with the greater 
prestige of the federal judiciary. 
Although some Circuits have in recent years adopted a 
more restrictive approach to class c, ertification, it is 
11\ 
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still true to state as a generalization that the federal 
courts have favoured a liberal approach towards class 
certification in Title VII cases* The liberal trend was 
halted but not reversed by the Supreme Court decision in 
RQdriguez vý Taylor 431 U. S. 395 (1977) in which a more 
restrictive attitude towards class certification was 
approved. The precedential significance of this decision 
has been limited, but it has nevertheless signalled to some 
lower courts to depart from the trends towards liberal 
certification. others have continued as-before (Rutherglen, 
1980 p. 723). 
Even where the attitude of the courts is reasonably. 
favorable., litigating a class action produces problems of 
considerable magnitude for plaintiffs.. Defendants almost 
invariably oppose certification in order to limit their 
exposure to monetary and injunctive relief, and the process 
of certification will therefore represent an additional and 
probably quite burdensome stage in the proceedings. 
8 
one study has shown. that relief benefiting a class of 
employees has only been awarded in a minority of Title VII 
actions. Dunlap (1977, pp. 62-63) states that reported 
c. ases for the years 1965 through mid-1970's indicate that 
courts awarded class relief in only 13% of all Title VII sex 
discrimination casesr and 24% of race discrimination casesP 
It would be a-mistakej, however, to focus only on the 
procedural difficulties potentially attendant upon a class 
action suitr without restating the advantages of this kind 
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of action. The class action provides a way of expanding the 
scope of relief, and thereby promoting compliance with the 
law through deterrence; it helps to spread the cost of 
litigation; and it is a procedure suited to the achievement 
of the broadr r emedial objectives. 
The development of some kind of system of class relieff 
going beyond the aggregation of the claims of individual 
named plaintiffs,, would appear to suggest one direction in 
which the British leglislation might be amended to secure 
more compliance with the law. Such a proposal must, 
however, confront a number of difficulties. First, there is 
no provision for a class action in current British civil 
procedure; and proposing the development of such a system 
for discrimination law is therefore likely to run aground on 
the shoals of political opposition, and judicial inertia. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to frame such a 
recommendation in a way that would maximize its 
acceptability, by seeking its introduction in a relatively 
, limited contexty thus avoiding the charge that it would 
cause disruption throughout the legal system. The ability 
to bring suit on behalf of a class, seeking a class-wide 
remedy, could for example only be granted to the EOC, which 
organization is already entrusted with powers of formal 
investigation that extend beyond individual complaints. 
Introducing class action suits in this way would have 
the advantage of making the procedure available to an 
organization with sufficient resources to use it. Private 
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class actions are becoming increasingly rare in the United 
Statest as their cost and complexity increases. The EEOC 
has the authority to bring class action suits, and private 
and charitably funded litigation groups in the United States 
have also borne much of the brunt of pursuing class action5; 
groups like the ACLU Women's Project, Equal Rights Advocater 
NOW Legal Defense Fundl the League of Women's Voterst and 
the Center for Law and Social Policy have all contributed to 
the development of Title VII class action litigation. In 
Britain, which lacks a developed litigation network, and 
where the idea of introducing a class action procedure would 
be at odds with established legal procedures, a proposal 
which sattght at least initially to introduce the procedure 
as part of the administrative branch of enforcement, might 
mitigate the degree of resistance to be expected while 
conferiing the authority on an organization which could 
bring institutional resources to bear on its use. Since the 
EOC already has powers of formal investigation which may be 
company wide and do not have to be triggered by an 
individual complaint, the proposal could be prbsented as an 
incremental change, but one which would put real weight 
behind the idea of the strategic agency. 
This proposal represents only one*idea as to how some 
variant of class action procedure could be introduced into 
the British system of anti-discrimination enforcement. That 
such a change is desirable, if not necessarily politically 
feasiblet is illustrated by the empirical data on the 
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present approach to remedyr and on the social literature 
which links compliance to deterrance. 
Whether a proposal for class action is introduced or 
notr the present remedy system should provide a major focus 
for efforts to amend the legislation. The American system 
provides an example of a system in which the regulatory and 
compensatory functions of legal remedy are synthesized in a 
way which is not apparent in Britain. Within a theoretical 
framework which sees no contradiction between those two 
functions, the statutory provisions have allowed courts to 
order a wide range of remedies, including back payl front 
pa y, reinstatement, affirmative action, and equitable 
remedies. To introduce a broader range of remedies, and to 
break down the compensation/deterrence dichotomy should be 
high on the agenda of those seeking to improve the 
effectiveness of the British leglislation. 
A concern with remedy is not one which appears 
frequently in the literature on British anti-discrimination 
law, perhaps because of its connotation as an essentially 
legalistic and therefore limited concern; but until 
attention is focussed on the shortcomings of the British 
remedy systemr as well as on the conceptualr definitionalf 
and. procedural inade, ý! aciesj widespread compliance is 
unlikely. 
460 
NOTES 
1 See Appendix A for details of the sample. 
2 The complainant in Hurley v. Mustoe appealed again to 
the EAT. The EAT held that the tribunal has the discretion 
whether or not to award any compensation, since its duty 
is to award such of the available remedies as is "just and 
equitable. " However, if the tribunal exercises its discretion 
to award compensation, it must compute the amount on the 
basis of what would be recoverable in county court, not 
on the basis of what the industrial tribunal thinks is just 
with regard to damages recoverable at common law. Further, 
the EAT explained, the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" 
has no application to the assessment of damages in the 
county court. 
3 See Chapter 7, above. 
4 The common-law has traditionally allocated the burden of 
proof between parties, with a consideration for who has 
access to information, so this proposal would not represent 
any radical departure from customary procedures. 
5" Front pay" is an American concept which refers to 
monetary relief for any future loss of earnings resulting 
from past discrimination. See e. g. Patterson v. American 
Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied; 
492 U. S. 920 (1976). 
6 In this context it is worth re-emphasizing that no costs 
are available to the complainant at tribunal hearings, so 
the expense of the proceeding can be borne without any 
monetary recompense. 
7 
This view of the remedial provisions of Title VII was 
reasserted in a more recent case, Ford Motor Company v. 
EEOC, 458 U. S. 219 (1982). Although the effect of this 
decision is, according to the minority opinion by Justices 
Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, to reduce the employer's 
liability, and hence his incentive to comply with the law, 
the majority decision does nevertheless reassert the two 
legitimate purposes of Title VII as ending discrimination 
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and providing compensation. 
8 It should be noted that Rule 23 does not apply to class 
actions brought by the EEOC, and thus such suits are not 
hampered in the same way by the procedural requirements 
outlined here. (Shee Chapter 8, supra. ) 
9 The small percentages should, however, be read in light 
of the scope of the awards made in actions that result in 
class relief, which can be very far-reaching. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN 
THE ADJUDICATION OF DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 
In preceeding chapters I have examined both the legal 
definitions which provide substantive meaning to the equal 
pay and sex discrimination legislation, and the structural 
and procedural characteristics which provide a framework 
for implementation. The procedural and substantive character- 
istics of the legislation are, of course, intertwined in 
numerous ways. It is a truism to assert that procedural 
factors will determine, at least in part, the impact of a 
specific law. It is nevertheless useful to emphasize this 
point by empirical analyses of implementation. My concern 
here is to illustrate the interrelationship of substantive, 
structural and procedural factors in thýýspecific context of 
an examination of the way in which key elements of the Equal 
Pay Act have been operationally defined in the process of 
adjudication. Cases in the sample provide the basis for an 
Cases in the sample provide the basis for an examin- 
ation of the way in which tribunals adjudicate cases in light 
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of: their understanding of the statute and judicial precedent. 
Two elements have appeared as being of prime importance 
in tie adjudication of claims under the original provisions 
of the Equal Pay Act by the tribunals and the appellate 
courts: the factors that are significant in determining "like 
work" for the purposes of a claim for equal pay, and the 
factors that will successfully constitute the defense of 
a material difference or factor other than sex. 
These two issues illustrate the burden of proof borne 
by the respective parties, the kind of evidence adduced by 
them and the significance attached to it by tribunals, and 
the range of situations which fall within, and outside of, 
the scope of the Act. 
I. LIKE WORK 
Section 1M of the 1970 EqPA, as amended, provides 
that: 
A woman is to be regarded as employed on like work with 
men if, but only if, her work and theirs is of the same 
or a broadly similar nature, and the differences (if 
(cont'd. ) 
( 
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any) between the things she does and the things they do 
are not of practical importance in relation to terms 
and conditions of employment; and accordingly, in 
comparing her work with theirsf regard shall be had to 
the frequency or otherwise with which any such 
differences occur in practice as well as to the nature 
and extent of the differences. 
This section not only provides a definition of 'like 
work' (work that is of the same or broadly similar nature) 
but also offers guidance in how to assess the weight that 
should be given to any differences that exist between the 
jobs sought to be compared. Thust the extent and nature of 
any differences is to be consideredr and attention is to be 
paid to the frequency with which they occur in practice. 
Applying section 1(4) to the facts of a particular case 
involves the tribunal in_a two-stage process of determining 
firsty whether the jobs are the same or broadly similar, and 
second what import should be attached to any differences 
that exist. The burden of proof is on the applicantr at 
this state of proceedings, to demonstrate that she is 
engaged in 'like work' with the chosen comparator. In Capper 
Pass v. Lawton, (1976) IRLR 366f the EAT set out guidelines 
for the way in which tribunals should approach these two 
issues. on the question of whether the work'involved is the 
same or broadly similar, (Mr. Justice Phillips) noted: 
This question can be answered bygeneral considerations 
of the type of work involved and of the skill and 
knowledge required to do it. It seems to us to be 
implicit in the words of subsection (4) that it can be 
answered without a minute eiamination of the details of 
the differences between the work done by the man and 
the work done by the woman. (Ibid. at 367) 1. ) 
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If the work being compared is the same or broadly 
similarf 
it is then necessary to go on-to consider the detail 
and to inquire whether the differences between the work 
being compared are of practical importance in relation 
to terms and conditions of employment. In answering 
that question the Industrial Tribunal will be guided by 
the concluding words of the subsection. But it seems 
to us trivial differences or differences not likely in 
the real world to be reflected in the terms and 
conditions of employment ought to be disregarded. 
The only differences which will present work which is 
of a broadly similar nature from being like work are 
differences which in practice will be reflected in the 
terms and conditions of employment. 
Thus the EAT directs the attention of the tribunals to 
the wording of the statute, and for guidance in inter- 
pretation asserts that a broad approach is to be taken, a 
general assessment rather than a minute examination, to 
determine whether the work is the same or broadly similar; 
and that in considering differences between jobs, "trivial" 
differences should be ignored, and only those that could be 
exp4LN. -cted in the real world to be reflected in the terms and 
conditions of employment should be taken into account. 
Guidance of'this kind leaves the industrial tribunals 
discretion in applying these standards to concrete 
situations. 
In the sample, most tribunals hearing equal pay 
applications are involved in making a determination as to 
whether the work of the complainant and a comparable man are 
'like work' under-the terms of the Act* Unless a complaint 
is brought on the basis of a job evaluation study under 
S1(5) of the Act, the burden of proof is on the complainant 
466 
to show that she and her comparator are employed on like 
work under the terms of S 1(4). 
There is, however, considerable variation between the 
tribunals in the way they approach the task, the specificity 
with which they spell out the statutory and interpretive 
basis of the conclusion they reach, and in their assessment 
of what jobs are similar enough to come within the scope of 
the Act. 
In some cases, the job of the tribunal is concluded 
with a determination of whether the work sought to be 
compared is similar. If they find that the jobs in question 
are completely dissimilar, then there will be no need to 
address the question of the importance to be attached to any 
differences between them. However, for many tribunals, this 
second question does arise and again there is considerable 
variation between tribunals on the kinds of differences that 
are of sufficientpractical importance to justify a wage 
differential between men and women otherwise engaged on 
broadly similar work. 
Although the determination of whether jobs are broadly 
similar, and the issue of whether differences between the 
jobs are of practical importance, may be conceptualized as a 
two-part enquiry, in practice, some tribunals reach a 
decision on the merits of a case without formalizing their 
enquiry in this way. Consequently, the empirical data on 
tribunal decisioh-making presented here is set out in the 
form of brief case description and analysist rather than by 
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addressing the two topics separately, and attempting to 
extract from the decision the part of the reasoning which 
applies to each issue. Presenting brief descriptions of 
some decisions provides a fuller picture of tribunal 
reasoning on the general question of comparatibility and a 
clearer sense of the diversity in the process, than would 
otherwise be gained from the material. The cases presented 
here were chosen from the sample because of the complexity 
of their fact situations, the illuminating nature of the 
tribunal reasoning, and because together they provide some 
idea of the extent of discretion and diversity which 
characterizes this area. 
The-first case, Hancock V. L. C. Plant Hire (Manchester, 
1977),, characterizes the 'easy' pay case: there are no 
differences in the jobs performed by the applicant and the 
comparable male, the comparable male gave evidence as to the 
discrepancy between his job description and the actual job 
performed, the respondents made clumsy attempts to fabricate 
evidencer and their managing director stated to the indus- 
trial tribunal that he did not believe in equal pay for 
woman. 
The applicant was employed as a hire desk clerk at one 
of the respondent's depots. She earned less than men doing 
the same work at other depots, and after raising the matter 
with her employer, contacted the EOC. The EOC in turn 
contacted the employers who replied that differences in pay 
were related to differences in responsibility and ability. 
I 
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At the hearing the employers asserted that the men 
received more pay as they were 'managers' whereas the 
applicant was a 'clerk'. Howevert the tribunal found that 
the work of each was broadly similar and noted that "whether 
the job which the applicant was doing or which the other men 
referred to were doing is described as being 'a clerk' or 
'manager' in our view makes no difference. " 
In order to bolster their case the respondents put in a 
document purported to be the job description of one of the 
comparable men. nThe Tribunal finds that it was nothing of 
the kindl It was prepared a week or so before this case 
and ... it was most misleading. " The applicant requested, 
and was granted, an adjournment to call this man as a 
witness. At the adjourned hearing it became clear to the 
Tribunal that "the so-called job description. . was a 
figment of somebody's imaginationt" as it set out qualifi- 
cations and work experience that the job holder testified 
that he did not have. not. that he was any the worse 
for thatlu noted the Tribunal. "We were most impressed by 
him as a witness and to his ability. ") 
The Tribunal was also given as evidence by the respon- 
dents a document stated to be the firm's grading system and 
salary scale, prepared in November 1976. The Tribunal found 
that this data was false, and that it had in fact been pre- 
pared after the applicant raised her claim for. equal pay. 
The Tribunal was "not very happy" about the falsification. 
Both the chief accountant/company secretary and the managing 
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director of the company gave evidence to the tribunal. The 
tribunal rejected the evidence of the former as 
"demonstrably falsey" while the managing director "made it 
perfectly clear beyond peradventure_ to us that he did not 
believe in equal pay for equal work and had no hesitation in 
telling us. -such, his reason being that men are 
breadwinners. " 
In reaching this conclusion that work done by the 
applicant and the male 'manager' were broadly similar the 
tribunal relied heavily on the testimony of the comparable 
man himself, "a patently honest witness with no axe to 
grind, " and on the evidence of the respondents regional 
manager. They rejected the evidence given by the senior 
officer of the firm, and the documents produced by theml 
labelling these last as patently false. 
The decision in this case turned almost entirely upon 
credibility issues, and in this respect it is unusual. The 
tribunal did not have to weigh whether certain differences 
between jobs took them outside of the meaning of "broadly 
similar#* but only to consider whether there was any 
credible evidence of differences, and they concluded there 
was not. 
The next case encapsulates a more common situation, 
where some differences do exist between jobs sought to be 
compared, and the crucial task of the tribunal is to examine 
these differences in light of the statutory-provisions. 
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In Linton et. al. v. British Steel Corpgration (Cardiff,, 
1981), the applicants were-four women working as vending 
assistants/drivers. Their job was to replenish, clean and 
repair some 80 vending machines at 20 locations on siter and 
to checkr count and bag money, and to refill the machines' 
change givers. This job had always been done by woment 
working in pairs. The applicants compared their job to that 
of the catering supplies officers (CSO's), who were all men. 
In reaching their decision, the tribunal compared 
written job descriptions for the two jobst and heard 
evidence from the parties. They found that CSO's worked 
alone, unlike the women who worked in pairs, but under the 
supervision of a senior supervisor. Their job involved 
transporting catering supplies to site buffets. They had no 
responsibility for cash handling, their shift pattern 
differed from that of the women, and they did more loading 
and unloading of supplies than the vending assistant/ 
drivers. After considering the evidence the tribunal 
dividedr with the majority, concluding that the women were 
entitled to equal pay, and the minority (the chairman) 
disagreeing. 
The majority found that the jobs were broadly similar. 
Both men and women drove vehicles, and although the vans 
driven were not the same sizer both came within the-same 
license group. Both groups worked on the same site, and 
drove approximately the same distances in the same weather 
and site conditions. Both groups loaded and unloaded their 
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own materialsf and were responsible for checking deliveries 
and keeping records. Both groups supplied the same 
customers. Both men and women were responsible for basic 
maintenance duties for their vehicles. 
The majority conceded that there were some differences 
between the jobsr but concluded that they were not of 
practical importance. The major differences lay in the fact 
that the men carried heavier weights than the women in the 
course of their dutiest and that only the women had 
responsibility for the handling of cash. The majority 
decision weighs these factors against each other, noting: 
It is true that there were some differences, since the 
ladies had additional responsibilities for cash and for 
security. The fact that that made their roles more 
valuable ought not to disentitle them to their remedy. 
The extra weight carried by the men was compensated in 
work value by the extra responsibilities for cash 
security and technical skills in repairing machines. 
The chairman's minority decision found that the 
differences between the mens' and womens' jobs took them 
outside the scope of like work. He attached particular 
importance to the differences in the size of van driven, and 
in the amount of heavy lifting undertaken. 
The CSO would spend a typical shift loading and 
unloading bulk supplies at various points, and for the 
rest of his time he would be driving a 30 cwt. van. 
The ladies on the other hand would spend the bulk of 
their time replenishing, cleaningr and maintaining 
vending machines. It is true that by generalising one 
can find a formula which would describe both jobs in 
similar terms. That however is not the test. One has 
to look at what the individuals actually did. In the 
Chairman's view the men did tasks which were different 
from those of the ladies ... He has some sympathy for the view of his colleaguest that in some ways they had 
a more difficult and responsible jobf and on that 
account ought arguably to have been paid more than the 
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men. That, howeverl in itself is an argument which 
impliedly acknowledges that the two jobs were 
different. 
The majority and minority views in this decision 
encapsulate the kind of differences which are often found 
between tribunals. In Linton, the majority decision was 
that the women applicants were entitled to equal pay with 
their comparators. In a second case involving a similar, 
although not identical fact situation, a unanimous tribunal 
found no basis for an award of equal pay. In this case, 
Young v. Beecham Qrouv Ltd. (Glasgow 19.77), a female vending 
assistant claimed equal pay with male vending stewards. The 
tribunal found that the work of both was broadly similar, 
but that differences of practical importance explained the 
pay differential. The tribunal examined the job description 
of the applicant and her comparators, and heard evidence on 
behalf of both parties. The tribunal explicitly used the 
decision in Capper Pass to guide their determination, 
looking at the frequency, naturer and extent of the dif- 
ferences. The tribunal found a difference in respon- 
sibility, between the applicant and her male colleagues, 
with*respect to the maintenance and repair of machines. 
Male vending stewards were given "at least a week's 
training" in the job and were then supervised by an 
experienced steward while they learned how to carry out 
their duties. The job was graded semi-skilled. The 
applicantr whose job was graded unskilledy was not 
responsible for repairs or maintenance of machines. The 
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tribunal also took into account the fact that because the 
applicant worked only day-time hourst there was always 
available a supervisor to handle complaints. The male 
stewards, when working on the night shift were expected to 
handle complaints themselves, and in the event of a machine 
breakdown in these hours, to decide whether food in the 
machine would have to be discarded. The tribunal appears to 
have heard no evidence on the frequency with which male 
stewards had to make repairst handle complaints, or make 
decisions following a machine breakdown, but concluded 
nevertheless that, "These differences seemed to the Tribunal 
to be differences of considerable importance" and refused 
the application for equal pay. 
These two decisionst Linton et, al. and Young,, 
illustrate how quite similar fact situations, decided by 
tribunals on the basis of the same guiding statutory 
provisions, may result in dissimilar outcomes. The point is 
not to suggest that either of the tribunals was wrong in the 
decision it reached, but rather, to indicate the leeway the 
statutory provisions confer, and the difficulty in estab- 
lishing an objective test for what constitutes like work. 
Even where the statute and the EAT offer what appears 
to be more detailed guidance, on what constitutes a dif- 
ference of 'practical importance, ' the process of tribunal 
decision-making appears to be infinitely variable. Some 
tribunals examine*much more closely than others the question 
of how frequently differences which exist between the jobs 
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actually occur in practice. The approach of the tribunal in 
Young above may usefully be compared with that of the 
tribunal which heard Butler v. E. H. Booth and Co. -Ltd. 
(Carlisle. 1977). In this case a woman counter assistant in 
a grocery store claimed equal pay with a man employed as a 
provisions assistant. The tribunal made findings of fact as 
to the work done by each of these employees, paying 
particular attention, in the case of the male provisions 
assistant# to the alleged differences between his work and 
that of the complainant. out of six alleged differences put 
fo rward by the employerr the tribunal found that four of 
them were in fact differences between the work of the 
employees. They th en went on to consider, in the light of 
the findings of fact about the two jobs whether the 
differences were such as to be reflected in terms and 
conditions of employment, noting "for this purpose we stress 
that we have regard to the frequency with which such 
differences occurred. ". Using this test, with regard to all 
four job differencess, the tribunal found that the male 
employeeslinvolvement was minimal, and that the applicant 
had therefore satisfied the b urden of showing like work. " 
In Cassidv et al v. Edward Gardiner and Sons, Ltd. 
(Edinburghj, 1977), the tribunal took the unusual step of 
paying an observational visit to the work site to help them 
in their determination of. whether there was like work. The 
case involved three women weavers claiming equal pay with 
men weavers employed at the same textile mill. Jobs in the 
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mill were segregated by sex to a considerable extent. The 
applicant was a weaver in a department in which all 
employees were women, and she claimed equal pay with men 
working in a department in which no women were employed. It 
-was common ground between the parties that the quality of 
tweed produced in the two departments was the samer but that 
the quantity produced differed: women weavers, who looked 
. after only one or 
two looms, produced fairly small lengths 
of material for use as samples and patternst whereas male 
weaver, s, responsible for up to four or five looms, produced 
saleable lengths of material. The women worked only day 
shifts, whereas the men worked either a rotating shift or 
permanent night shift (for a shift allowance). There were 
some differences in process between the two loomsf although 
the tribunal noted that the National Agreement dealing with 
minimum wages did not distinguish between types of looms 
Taking all the factors into account, and applying the tests 
of Capper Passr the tribunal found that the applicant was 
employed on like work and was entitled to equal pay. In 
reaching this decision the tribunal noted that "we must 
confess that we would not have been able to reach this 
decision with such confidence if we had been required to do 
so purely on the basis of the oral evidence, " and thanked 
the employers for allowing them to carry out an inspection. 
In particular it seems that the on-site visit was invaluable 
to the tribunal in reaching their conclusions as to the 
respondent's argument that the different looms used by the 
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men and women involved different degrees of responsibility. 
The employers asserted that since the men and women were 
employed on different types of loomr the male workers 
employed worked under greater pressure than the womeny since 
the looms they used were much faster. The tribunal rejected 
this argumentr not on the oral evi dence alone, but from 
their own observations during the visit to the mill: 
our own firm impression gained from watching the men 
and women at work was that the men showed no sign of 
being under greater pressure than the women. Seeing 
the highly automated machines which the men had in 
operation our impression was exactly to the contrary. 
The decision in Cassidy is an interesting one since it 
shows the successful application of equal pay for like work 
in an industry in which sex segregation is common, and 
belies the argument that the 'like work' standard is 
necessarily limited in its ability to redress inequities in 
such situations. The case of Harris v. Duramin Engineering 
L2A. (Gloucester 1979) provides a similar illustration. 
In Harris, the respondent employers were manufacturers 
of plastic components for food containers. The applicant, a 
woman, was a chargehand in a section in which-the only other 
chargehand was male. The applicantr who was classified as 
semi-skilled, supervised 25 women, also semi-skilled. The 
male chargehand was classified as skilled and supervised 12 
male employees, seven skilled and five semi-skilled. The 
male chargeband earned h8 per week more than the applicant, 
and asserting that they were both engaged in like workt she 
brought a claim for equal pay. - 
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The respondents conceded that the work of the two 
chargehands was similar but asserted that there were two 
differences which justified the pay differential: the fact 
that the man arrived 1 1/2 hours earlier than the applicant 
in the morning to supervise the lifting of heavy components, 
and that he had the ability to read technical drawings. The 
tribunal ascertained that the latter involved no more than 
the ability to measure componentsl that the male chargehand 
had acquired his ability on the job, and that the applicant 
had not been given the opportunity to do so. The tribunal 
rejected the employer's contention that these factors were 
differences of practical importance within the meaning of 
the Act, explaining that: 
The heavy lifting which was done early in the morning 
was compensated by overtime rates. The opportunity of 
reading technical drawings could have been given to 
(the applicant) but it was not. We do not think that 
these two differences are of practical importance. .. One would not normally expect a difference in rates of 
pay or hours in a contract of employment because of 
these two factors. 
The tribunal in reaching this decision attached no 
importance to the difference in skill labels between the 
applicant and the male chargehand, noting earlier in the 
decision, 
In connection with the meaning of the word 'skilled' in 
the context of this case, we were in a certain 
difficulty. On the evidence put before us it was 
difficult to ascertain any concrete criteria by which 
the company distinguished skilled and semi-skilled and 
unskilled employees. 
What is'important in both Harris and Cassidy is the 
willingness and ability of the tribunals to consider the 
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effect in-11-Dractice of any differences which the respondents 
offer as a defence*to the assertion that work is broadly 
similar. 'In both casesi, the tribunal found a basis for an 
award of equal pay despite a quite rigid segregation by sex 
in the employer's labour force. 
In Garden v. Ministry of Defense (Edinburgh 1977) the 
equal pay claim also arose in the context of a segregated 
labour force, but here the differences between jobs compared 
were considered by the tribunal to be substantial enough to 
justify in law a pay differential between men and women 
workers. In this caser a woman upholsterer employed by the 
Ministry of Defense claimed equal pay with male 
upholsterers. The applicant, despite having completed an 
apprenticeshipiwas employed as a semi-skilled worker. The 
male upholsterers were employed as craftsmen. According to 
the applicant's evidence, the male workers spent about 70 
per cent of their time in cutting materials and making 
templates. The applicant on the other hand was employed 
almost totally in sewing on different machines. The 
applicant conceded that there was no doubt that the nature 
of the work done by the male upholsterers was quite 
different, but she felt that s. he was engaged in like work 
with themr within the meaning of the Actr because both jobs 
involved equal skill and were of equal value to the 
respondents. on the evidence presented and the job 
descriptions submittedr the tribunal held that there was not 
'like work, ' stating, "No matter how broad a view we were to 
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take we could not see any way in which the jobs in this case 
would be described as vaguely similar. " The situation in 
this case differs from that in Cassidy and Harris above, in 
that here not only was the workforce segregated, but the job 
process was divided into two separate but related components 
as between the male and female occupations. In this 
respectl the case illustrates the classic situation in which 
an equal value approach to equal pay couldr if properly 
implemented, provide a remedy which is not available under 
the 'broadly similar' approach. 
The above cases show the range of situations which may 
be presented to tribunals as the basis for an equal pay 
claim, as well as the varying degrees of rigour and 
precision with which the tribunals approach the question of 
what constitutes 'broadly similar' work. As the dissenting 
chairman in Linton notedr it is often true that "by 
generalizing one can find a formula which would describe 
both jobs in similar terms. " The extent to which tribunals 
are willing or able to generalize in this way becomes a 
crucial factor in those situations in which'some differences 
between jobs exist, and the question the tribunal must 
address is whether they are of practical importance. At 
this stage of the proceedings the burden of proof is on the 
applicant. Particularly in the absence of an objective 
test, the ability of the applicant to meet the burden of 
proof will depend not only on the context of the jobs under 
consideration and the predisposition of the tribunal to a 
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particular kind of approach, but also on her ability to 
adequately prepare her case and to present the evidence in 
the most compelling manner. 
Thus, the factors noted as significant in Chapter Seven 
again come to the fore: the need for expert representation 
and adequate preparation of the case will enhance the ability 
of the individual complainant to make the most compelling 
demonstration of the similarity between her work and that of 
the male comparator. 
In Capper Pass, Phillips J explained that there were a 
number of courses open to the legislators responsible for 
enactment of the EqPA in seeking "to define the test which is 
to be applied in determining whether discrimination exists" 
[19771 ICR 83,87. The definition of like work or work rated 
as equivalent represented a "middle course" between the test 
which would be "least favourable from a women's point of 
viewl"of equality of treatment for the same work, and that 
which would be more favourable to women, ofrequiring equal 
treatment for work of equal value [Ibid. ]. 
The limited scope of the like work definition is beyond 
doubt, and the sample includes cases which illustrate its 
limiting effect. Perhaps of equal importance, however, is 
the fact that within a given definition, apparently quite 
similar factual cases may be decided in dissimilar ways. The 
discretion that the tribunals must exercise in interpreting 
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the statutory criteria emphasizes the impact of non- 
definitional factors on the outcome of cases involving 
similar fact situations and the same legal grounds of action, 
particularly where, as here, the test to be construed is 
essentially subjective. A change in the statutory definition 
of when equal treatment is required, to broaden the scope 
of the Act, will bring within the compass of the law some 
cases which would otherwise be excluded. The way in which 
a new definition is drafted, and its subsequent interpre- 
tation by appellate courts and tribunals, will however determine 
the parameters of the statutory amendment in practice. 
once the applicant has demonstrated that she is engaged 
in like work with a man, the burden shifts to the respondent 
to establish that any difference in pay is genuinely due to a 
material difference other than sex. 
2 The burden of proof is 
the ordinary burden of proof in civil cases - that is, the 
employer must show, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
difference is-due to some factor other than sex. National 
Vulcan Engineering Insurance Group Ltd. v. Wade [1979] ICR 800.3 
The defense to an equal pay claim of the existence of a 
material difference other than sex is found in section 1(3) of 
the EqPA. Unlike section 1(4), which spells out some of the 
factors to take into account when deciding whether a 
difference is of practical importance, section 1(3) does not 
give any guidance as to the range of factors that might consti- 
tute a material difference. The appellate courts have, however, 
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stepped into the breach, and have set out with some 
specificity the kinds of factors that tribunals might 
consider. 
In Methven v. Cow Industrial Polymers, Ltd., (1980) ICR 
463, the Court of Appeal analysed section 1(3) and set out 
the decision process that tribunals should undertake: 
An analysis of section 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act shows 
that three questions arise for decision; one, was 
there a variation between the woman's contract and 
the man's; two, was there a material difference 
(other than the difference of sex) between her case and 
his, and thirdly, had the employers proved on the balance of 
(cont'd. ) 
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probability that the variation in wages was due to the 
material difference. (Ibid. at 468) 
other decisions have set out the kinds of factors that 
tribunals might consider in answering the second of these 
three questions. In Claý Cross (Quarry Servicgs) Ltd. v. 
Fletcher, (1979) ICR lF Lord Denning explained that: 
The issue depends on whether there is a material 
difference (other than sex) between her case and his. 
Take heed to the words "between her case and his. " 
They show that the Tribunal is to have regard to hpl, 
and to hiM - to the personal equation of the woman as 
to that of the man - irrespective of any extrinsic 
forces which led to the variation in pay. 
The facts of Clay Cross involved An employer who 
defended a higher payment to a male employee employed on 
like work with a woman, on the basis that the higher sum was 
necessary to attract the man to the job. He was the only 
suitable applicant for the post, and, the employer arguedr 
it was necessary to offer him a sum comparable to that paid 
by his former employer in order to secure his services. The 
Court of Appeal rejected this argumentr Lord Denning 
explaining that: 
&. the tribunal is not to have regard to any 
extrinsic forces which have led to the man being paid 
more. An employer cannot avoid his obligations under 
the Act by saying "I paid him more because he asked for 
more" or "I paid her less because she was willing to 
come for less. " If any such excuse was permitted, the 
Act would be a dead letter. These are the very reasons 
why there was unequal pay before the statute. They are 
the very circumstances in which the statute was 
intended to operate. (Ibid. at 5) 
Lord Denning proceeds to enumerate the kinds of factors 
that would be acceptable as material differencesr drawing on 
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his earlier decision in Shields v. Coombes (Holdings) Ltd., 
(1978) ICR 11559: 
As I said (in Shields), section 1(3) applies when "the 
personal equation of the man is such that he deserves 
to be paid at a higher rate than the woman. " Thus, the 
personal equation of the man may warrant a wage 
differential if he has much longer length of service, 
or has superior skill or qualifications, or gives 
bigger output or productivity or has been placed, owing 
to downgrading in a protected category, or to other 
circumstances personal to him doing his job. 
Thus, any factor which may come within the scope of the 
personal equation may constitute a material difference for 
the purposes of an equal pay defence, but extrinsic factors, 
such as the operation of market forces, may not. 
4 
It should be noted however that the language of the 
Court of Appeal's decision in Clay Cross wrongly suggests that 
only differences in the personal equation may constitute a 
s. 1(3) defence, and that an employer may not succeed in such 
a defence when it establishes that a man was paid more than a 
woman for an insubstantial but non-discriminatory reason (Pannick, 
1985, p. 109). As the EAT noted in a case subsequent to Clay 
Cross, "if there is a sufficient explanation for the different 
wages paid which has nothing to do with the sex of the 
employees, the purpose of the legislature is not going to be 
achieved by insisting on equal wages, " Albion Shipping Agency 
v. Arnold [1982] ICR 22,28. 
That the factor must be "material" means that it must 
be "real" Navy, Aýmy and Air Force Institutes v. Varley [19771 
ICR 11,15 (EAT). It does not mean that the tribunal must 
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approve of the explanation given, only that it must be 
satisfied that the pay difference was not due to sex dis- 
crimination, either direct or indirect. 
5 
It should be emphasized that the enumeration of accept- 
able and unacceptable factors does not constitute the 
description of an objective test to be mechanically applied 
by the tribunals. Rather, following Methven, the tribunals 
must examine not only the character of the alleged material 
factor, but also the relationship between the factor and the 
pay differential. The employer must show that all of the 
variation in pay, not only part of it, is attributable to 
the material difference. NCB v. Sherwin [19781 ICR 700,703 
(EAT). However, tribunals will not examine this with "mathemat- 
ical precision" Boyle v. Tennent Caledonian Breweries Ltd. [19781 
IRLR 321 (EAT). Cases from the sample of tribunal decisions 
illustrate how in practice the question of what constitutes 
a material difference may be determined within the context 
of specific fact situations. 
Skill and Experience as a Material Difference 
Two cases from the sample, one successful and one 
unsuccessful, provide examples of the way in which skill or 
experience may provide the basis for a defense to a claim' 
for equal pay. In Welch v. Ventek Ltd. (London, C. 1981), 
the applicant, a computer sales representative, claimed 
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equal pay with a man employed on the same work, but 
receiving a higher basic salary. The respondents conceded 
the issue of like work but relied on an alleged difference 
in experience to justify a pay differential between the two 
employees. 
The tribunal examined the-work record, training and 
experience of the applicant and the comparable mant and 
concluded that "They are totally different peopler" although 
they declined to comment on whether the experience of either 
appeared superior. Rather, they examined the context in 
which the difference in experience was assertedy stating: 
*. what the tribunal has to look at is not whether they are different people, but whether the difference 
between them was material and such as would justify in 
the circumstances .. a difference in salary. The tribunal are satisfied that it would not. .. it seemed 
to the tribunal that if there had been a material 
difference that would justify the difference in salary. 
. at the time that the applicant was engaged she would have been told that she was receiving a lesser salary 
because of her lack of experience in selling. 
The applicant had not been so informedf and the 
tribunal concluded that the difference in pay had arisen 
because the applicant was prepared to take the salary 
offeredr whereas the comparable maler employed later, had 
insisted on a higher figure. The tribunal concluded that: 
This is not a case where the applicant has been picked 
on and discriminated against in a deliberate way. She 
has accepted a lower salary for like work and the 
respondents have offered her a salary which they 
thought she would take. It seems that it is one of 
those cases which the Eqqal Pay Act and Sex 
Discrimination Act were actually legislated for. 
In reaching its decision, the tribunal starts with the 
respondent's assertion that a material difference exists 
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between the two employees with respect to the experience 
that each brings to the job. The tribunal examines the 
evidence that bears upon this argument but does not reach a 
conclusion on this basis. Insteadr the tribunal implicitly 
addresses a pretextual justification, and looking at the 
circumstances in which each employee was hired, findsy again 
implicitlyr that an extrinsic factor was at work to produce 
the variation in pay. The applicant's claim for equal pay 
was successful. 
The decision in Welch represents a broad or liberal 
approach to the evaluation of the importance of an alleged 
material difference; the tribunal were concerned not only 
with examining evidence as to the existence of the material 
factor and its relationship to the pay differential, but 
were also concerned with the important question of how the 
pay differential first arose, by concentrating on what 
happened in the hiring process as it affected both the 
applicant and the comparable male. It is this latter 
concern that leads the tribunal to the 'hidden' extrinsic 
factor, which they labelled chance, but which might equally- 
accurately be described in terms of the operation of market 
factors, or differential expectations in light of such 
factors. 
In exposing the hidden extrinsic factory the tribunal 
in Welch would appear to go further that many other 
tribunals confronted with similar situations. Another way 
of expressing the difference would be to say that the Welch 
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tribunal took a more critical approach to the evidence than 
some of the other tribunal-s in the sample. In Grace-Walsh 
v. Andrew Pagg Ltd., (Leeds 1981) the tribunal considered 
the claim of a sales representative for equal pay with a 
male colleague who was younger than she, and it was agreed, 
had less experience in selling. Its approach to the 
question of experience as a material factor illustrates, 
through comparison with Welchr how. tribunal decision-making 
may varyl even in the face of quite similar fact situations 
and legal questions. 
The applicant began working for the respondent employer 
in 1977F at a basic salary of h 50 per weekr initially as a 
van driver, but subsequently as a sales representative. She 
had years of sales experience with a former employer. The 
man with whom she compared herself was employed in 1980l and 
began at a basic salary of h 60 per week. In 1981 salaries 
were reviewed, and the applicant was given a basic weekly 
wage of h 75.50, compared with the man's basic wage of B 78. 
The employer employed other male sales representatives; all 
were receiving a higher weekly basic than the applicant. 
The tribunal admitted that this situation suggested 
that there might be discrimination against the applicant, 
but felt that this suspicion was mitigated when the'question 
of commission was taken into account. The applicant came 
third in a league of six, in terms of the amount of 
commission earnedr and far exceeded the comparable male in 
this respect. The tribunal explained why this fact operated 
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to dispel the suspicion of discrimination, reasoning that 
". . if the company (consciously or unconsciously) were out 
to get female labour on the cheap, one would have expected 
them to rig her target figure for commission unduly high to 
keep her commission down. " 
6 
The tribunal found that the applicant had more years of 
sales experience than the comparable man, and that she was 
very successful in her work which was with "high volume 
outletsr such as accessory shops. " The tribunal went on to 
argue however that "there is evidence that, although Mr. H. 
had had shorter experience. .. the work done had been of a 
different kind from what the applicant had done, and gould 
have demanded greater competence. " (emphasis added) 
Attention should be drawn to the tentative nature of this 
finding. The tribunal. is comparing the. experience of the 
applicant and-the comparable man before they entered 
employment with the respondent. Lacking direct evidence as 
to the nature of this experience, the tribunal resorts to 
the speculativer but nevertheless proceeds to the conclusion 
-that this possible difference in the nature of the prior 
experience of the two employees constitutes a material 
difference for the purposes of the Act. 
This conclusion is corroborated by the male employee's 
I 
performance since he joined the respondents: 
He has studied the catal6gues, taken them home and made 
himself familiar with the goods which he was selling, 
whereas the applicant has not a similar detailed 
knowledge. (His) ability is. shown by his success with 
(outlets) to whom it is not as easy to sell as the high 
volume outputs with which the applicant is successful. 
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The tribunal states that they are aware that a 
variation in pay due to a personal appraisal must be 
scrutinized even more carefully than one that results from 
the operation of a grading system, but that, neverthelessy 
they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the 
variation in pay was due to the comparable man's personal 
skill and experience. The applicant's claim for equal pay 
was denied. 
Together, the decisions in Grace-Walsh and 1jelch 
demonstrate the highly subjective component in tribunal 
decision making, and how this may operate to produce quite 
different results in seemingly similar situations. This 
variance emphasizes how important may be the factors of pre- 
hearing preparation, access to evidence, and competent 
presentation and cross-examination during the hearing. 
Grading Systems as the Basis for a Material Difference. 
in Welch and Walsh-Grace above the question of material 
difference between two jobs revolved around an assessment of 
the relative skills and experience of two employees. In 
neither of those cases did the employer have in effect a 
formal grading system to support the assertion that one 
employee had more skill or ability than another. It is well- 
settled that an employer may be able to rely upon a grading 
system to justify a pay difference, as long as it is based 
on factors such as skill and experience, and is "fairly and 
genuinely applied irrespective of sex" National Vulcan 
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Engineering Insurance Group Ltd. v. Wade [1979] ICR 800, 
808, per Lord Denning. A grading system is not therefore an 
automatic s. 1(3) defence; the tribunal must assess the 
factors on which it is based, and determine that it is applied 
fairly without regard to the sex of employees. In the two 
cases from the sample discussed in this section, the tribunals 
considered a purported material difference based on the dif- 
ferential ranking of employees within a formal grading system. 
They are two rather different cases, chosen to illustrate 
the scope that is covered by 
(cont I d. ) 
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this particular factor as the basis for a defence of 
material difference. 
In Hoare v. British Aerosi)ace Dvnamics Grow) 
(Cambridge,, 1979), the applicant was a 'quality inspector 
and test assistant' who sought equal pay with a man employed 
as a senior quality inspector. The respondents had a 
grading system, although there were no formal job 
descriptions, and job evaluation techniques were not in use. 
Employees in the applicant's department were divided among 
four grades, of which the top two were classified as 
skilled, and were composed only of men. The man with whom 
the applicant sought to be compared was in the top grade. 
The remaining two grades were classified as semi-skilled and 
were composed of both men and womenr with women in the 
majority. Thus: 
Skilled: 
Senior quality inspector 85 men 0 women 
Quality inspector 25 0 
Semi skilled: 
Quality inspector and test 
assistant 11 19 
Quality inspector and test 
assistant 2 10 30 
The grading system is reproduced here since its 
contours were important in the tribunal's decision as to 
whether it justified a pay differential between the 
applicant, a grade 1 quality inspector and test assistant, 
and the male senior quality inspector she chose as her 
comparator. 
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The respondents argued that there were differences in 
the range of duties of the two employees and offered them as 
constituting a material difference. This argument indicates 
some confusion as to the application of sections 1(3) and 
1(4) of the Actr since a difference in the range of duties 
should have been asserted as differences of practical 
importance, rather than a material difference, the former 
applying to job contentr and the latter to the 'personal 
equation. ' The tribunal considered this argument in the 
context of section 1(4)r and concluded that the differences 
were not of practical importance in relation to the terms 
and conditions of employment. 
With like work thus established, the tribunal turned to 
a consideration of the different grades of the two employees 
as a possible material difference, and concluded that the 
grading system was "not genuine and not fairly applied. " 
The tribunal elaborated by stating that, "We find as a fact 
that a situation where all the female employees are in the 
bottom two grades and all the male employees in the top two 
grades is discrimination. which cannot be justified by the 
sort of distinction drawn by (the respondent)w (i. e. r by 
reference to differences in job content which do not qualify 
as differences of practical importance for the purpose of 
the EqPA). 
This decision illustrates the way in which a tribunal 
may look behind the facade of a grading system to the 
discriminatory reality behind it, and make an award of equal 
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pay for like work even where the employer has attempted an 
artificial segregation by sex in the labour force. 
A second case illustrates for comparison a situation in 
which a tribunal held that differences in grading did justify 
a pay differentialy since the grades reflected a real differ- 
ence in the personal equation of the two employees. In Hare 
v. Scammell Motors. British-Lavland (London N. 1980), the 
applicant was a male order clerk in the respondent's Parts 
Department, claiming equal pay with a woman employed at the 
same job. The respondents conceded like work, but relied on 
the existence of an alleged material difference, ability as 
reflected in a different job grade, to justify the pay 
differential. 
The respondents employed four clerks in the Parts 
Department, of which only one was a woman. All were employed 
on the same grade, Grade III. In 1979, the respondents 
installed a computer in the Department, and began discussions 
with union representatives as to the possible upgrading of the 
Order Clerks. It was ultimately agreed to upgrade them, not 
according to their involvement with the computer, but on the 
basis of ability. Two clerks were immediately upgraded to 
Grade IV, one man and one woman. The other two clerks, both 
male were given a two month probationary period to determine 
whether they qualified. At the end of this period, one, whose 
work had improvedt was upgraded, but the other was not. The 
clerk who remained on Grade III then brought a complaint to the 
tribunal claiming equal pay with the woman clerk who had been 
upgraded. 
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As evidence, the tribunal considered the job description 
of the employees, and the history of the upgrading exercise. 
They also heard assessments of the abilities of the four 
clerks from the Parts Manager. On this evidence they con- 
cluded that the distinction between the applicant and the 
comparable woman had nothing to do with sex, and the equal 
pay claim was dismissed. 
These two cases show that a difference in grading may 
or may not constitute a material difference under section 
10). The question to be determined in each case is whether 
the grading system is genuine and fairly applied. In Hoare, 
the tribunal found that the grading system was pretextual and 
lacking in justification. The differences in pay that resulted 
from this system did not reflect an underlying distinction in 
the personal equation of the two employees. In Hare, by 
contrasto the employees' difference in pay resulted from their 
different positions in the grading system, which in turn 
reflected an underlying difference in ability. There was no 
evidence of the grading system being used to legitimate sex 
based differences through the device of relegating all or most 
members of one sex to particular grades within the hierarchy. 
The'first case falls within the rubric of material difference, 
the second does not. 
Superior Qualifications as the Basis for a Material Difference 
Although the existence of a superior qualification may 
appear as a relatively objective distinction between employees, 
when it is advanced as the basis for a difference in pay, the 
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tribunal may consider not only the existence of the 
qualification, but its relationship to the job done. 
This approach is illustrated in the decision in Bavnham v. 
Hoover (London C. 1978)- In this case, a woman employed as 
a payroll manager claimed equal pay with a man employed in 
the same capacity at a different location. The applicant 
was the older of the two, she had longer service with the 
company, and earned L 1000 per annum less than the 
comparable man. The tribunal found that there was like 
work, rejecting the minor differences between the two jobs 
as of no practical importance. 
The respondents argued that the man the applicant 
compared to herself, had an accountancy qualification that 
she lacked, and that this difference constituted a material 
difference. The tribunal rejected this argument, explaining 
that: 
99. without playing down that qualification, we find that it was not of such a grade as to make a 
material difference. We find that (the applicant) 
in dealing with a wider class of people who in 
fact raised queries, matched any difference that 
could have worked in Mr. P's favour due to having 
the qualification .. which was one of the less 
well-known qualificaiions in accountancy. It was 
not established to our satisfaction that (she) 
had less ability to manage than (him). 
In this reasoning the tribunal looks not just at the 
existence of a qualificationg but at the type of qualifi- 
cation and its relationship to a_difference in practical 
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ability, and goes beyond the formal existence of a superior 
qualification to the question of whether it was reflected in 
a difference in competence. 
'Red Circle' Cases 
Employers sometimes agree to protect the existing pay 
levels of workers who have been re-graded or re-employed in 
lower-grade work through no fault of their own. This practice 
is referred to as "red-circling. " 
The question then arises of whether a woman who is not 
red-circled may claim equal pay with a man doing like work 
who is. In Snoxall v. Vauxhall Motors Ltd. (19771 ICR 700, 
the EAT held that an employer may not rely on red-circling 
as a s. 1(3) defence where the red-circling itself originates 
in discrimination. Where, however, "it can be demonstrated 
that there is a group of employees who have had their wages 
protected for causes neither directly nor indirectly due to 
a difference of sex, and assuming that the male and female 
employees doing the same work who are outside the red circle 
are treated alike, " then a 2.1(3) defence may exist. 
(Ibid. 
at 72J. 
In determining whether the red-circling itself was sex- 
based, the tribunal should take into account the relevant 
factors of how long a time has elapsed since the protection 
was introduced, and "whether the employers have acted in 
accordance with current notions of good industrial practice 
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in their attitude to the continuation of the practice" 
Outlook Supplies Ltd. v. Parry [1978] ICR 388,393 (EAT). 
When the original. reason -f-or the pay 
difference ceases 
to exist, the red circle may continue to give a s. 1(3) 
defence, so long as it was not initially based on sex 
discrimination. Avon and Somerset Police Authority v. Emery 
[19811 ICR 229 (EAT). The employer may not, however, rely 
on red-circling as a defence when he admits into the red 
circle a man whose higher pay cannot be justified and a 
woman employed on like work claims equal pay, even though 
the red-circling may be justified for all other men doing 
that work United Biscuits v. Young [1978] IRLR 15 (EAT). 
Thus, as the appellate cases demonstrate, red-circling 
is to be treated as any other defence under s. 1(3), and will 
only succeed where the employer can establish that there is 
a reason, other than sex, for the variation in pay between a 
woman's pay and that of a male comparator. 
The principle is illustrated in the sample in the case 
of Roberts v. Wright and Green (Holdings) Ltd., (Hull 1978). 
The applicant was a non-food manager at the respondent's 
Scarborough depot, claiming equal pay with a man employed 
in the same position at another depot, and receiving MOO per 
year more in salary. The respondents conceded that the two 
employees were doing the same work, but asserted that they 
reason for paying the man more than the woman lay in his- 
torical circumstances. He had originally been paid more for 
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the responsibility of supervising an additional, but now 
defunct, depot. The respondents testified that the man was 
now receiving lower percentage increases than other managers 
to bring the salaries of all managers into line. 
(cont'd. ) 
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The tribunal accepted this argument, and held that the 
pay differential was a result of anomalies due to historical 
circumstance, which constitutes a material difference other 
than sex. 
The 'Personal Eauation' 
Some cases in which respondents raise a section 1(3) 
defence do not fit easily into such categories as 'skill' 
'qualification' or 'experience. ' In such cases respondents 
rely on a highly individual constellation of circumstances 
and abilities to support a claim that a material difference 
exists. In Sohove v. John Wveth and Brotheg Ltd. (London, 
C. 1979) the respondents resisted a claim for equal pay by 
pointing to the superior adaptability, flexibility and 
interest of the comparable male. 
In Sohover the applicant was an Accounts Assistant, 
claiming equal pay with a male colleague. The respondents 
contested her claim that she was employed on like work with 
the comparable man. The tribunal found that for a one year 
period there had been like work under the Act.; although 
subsequently the content of their two jobs had diverged with 
the man taking on more responsibility. For that period the 
applicant was entitled to equal pay unless the respondent 
could show a material'difference other than sex as the basis 
for the difference in pay. on this question the tribunal 
was divided with the chairmano,. and the male lay member 
finding that there was a material differencer and the women 
lay member disagreeing. 
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The tribunal considered in detail the events that led 
up to the applicant's claim, and the duties and responsibil- 
ities of each of the employees. on-this basisr the majority 
found a material difference due to the difference in the 
personal equation of the applicant and her comparator. The 
male employee had joined the staff after the applicant but 
had rapidly acquired a knowledge of the job which allowed 
him to take on new responsibilities. The acquisition of new 
responsibilities ended the similarity between his work and 
that of the applicant, but before that F in the period in 
which the two jobs were broadly similar, the same attitude 
to his work which subsequently led to his promotion 
justified a higher salary than that which the applicant was 
receiving. The majority explained that: 
When you look at the relative performance of Miss S. 
and Mr. A. r divorced from the content of specific tasksr the reason for the difference can be found in 
the personal equation. Miss S. performed her allotted 
tasks and was unwilling to extend the range of her 
duties; Mr. A. had a keen interest in his job, and was 
always willing to take on extra duties and 
responsibilities ... the premium reflected Mr. *A's 
superior adaptability or flexibility at work and his 
potential for taking responsibility, and accordinglyr 
he was of greater utility within the Department. 
This reasoning raises a number of interesting questions 
if two employees are engaged in work which a tribunal 
finds is like work, then should a difference in the 
employee's attitude to that work justify a difference in 
pay, r if it does not in some measurable way affect his output 
or ability to do the work? Are extra payments for 
'potential' within the scope of exceptions to the Act? 
i 
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Should a willingness to take on extra work be compensated 
by higher pay, even where the work actually done is the 
same or broadly similar? Unfortunately, the minority op- 
inion did not discuss these issues, but based an opposition 
to the majority's finding of material difference in a 
seemingly unexplained rise in salary given to the comparable 
man during the period of comparability. 
Assuming that in some circumstances it will be 
legitimate for employers to pay employees higher salaries 
if they manifest superior attitudes to their work, then 
then particular application of section 1(3) raises some 
difficult evidentiary problems. Since it is an area fraught, 
of necessity, with reliance on highly subjective assessments 
for evidence, then the burden on an applicant of contesting 
such assertions will be a difficult one. In this sense the 
problem is similar to that which often confronts SDA applicants 
pursuing claims that they have been discriminated against in 
access to promotion, particularly in professional and 
higher managerial settings. 
As the cases chosen from the sample illustrate, a broad 
range of factual settings may give rise to the employers' 
assertion of a s. 1(3) defence. Some of the factors put for- 
ward as a material difference to explain a variation in 
pay are perhaps generally easier for tribunals to evaluate 
than others. Cases involving grading systems or red circles, 
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for example, may hinge on factors more susceptible of objec- 
tive evaluation than those involving relatively subjective 
criteria in the personal equation. However, whichever kind 
of factor is at issue, the degree of scrutiny which a tribunal 
(cont I d. ) 
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brings to bear on an alleged material difference may be 
crucial to the outcome of the application. 
The variation that exists between tribunals has been 
noted not only with regard to the determination of what 
constitutes a material-difference in a given set of 
circumstances, but also with relation to the whole issue of 
what constitutes like work. In its review of the operation 
of tribunals after one year of, implementing the EqPA and 
SDA, the NCCL commented on the same phenomenon, but 
expressed the hope that with timer and more guidance from 
courts of record, the amount and extent of variation would 
diminish (Coussins, 1976). Examination of a sample of 
tribunal decisions seems to indicate however that broad 
discrepancies between tribunals continue to exist. 
It is likely that a number of factors contribute to 
this situation: the fact that tribunal decisions are not 
publishedf and are not therefore subject to scrutiny, the 
fact that tribunal decisions do not constitute precedent,, 
and may not. therefore be relied on, the fact that a majority 
of applicants appear to be without legal representation, and 
the fact that the percentage of decisions that is appealed 
is low. In addition to these factors must be added the 
suggestion that some tribunal members may not be as 
knowledgeable ab*out the legislation as others, and may lack 
experience in hearing Equal Pay Act complaints. An improved 
programme of training in the law, and in its application, 
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might provide a partial solution. Increased availability of 
trained and competent representatives for applicants may 
also go some way to improving the situation. 
This small study of tribunal decision-making illustrates 
the complex relationship between interpretation of statutory 
provisions, the facts that are presented as the basis of a 
legal claim, and the processes of implementation. The sub- 
stantive provision contained in the statute is only one element 
in the adjudication, and the divergent outcomes of factually 
similar complaints demonstrates that it is not determinative. 
In light of this circumstance, the question must be 
posed of what can be expected of a change in the substance 
of the law, when unaccompanied by procedural amendments. 
The initial point is that by broadening a substantive 
definition, a whole range of potential complainants 
previously outside the scope of the Act are brought within 
it. The unsuccessful applicant in Garden,, (above), 
is an example. With a broader definition of equal pay to 
encompass situations where work is dissimilar but of equal 
value, her complaint would have come within the'scope of the 
legislation. Thus, a change in substantive definitions will 
re-define the situations and individuals who come within the 
purview of the legal regulation, but does not in itself say 
anything about the actual effect of the law on those newly 
included in its scope. 
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The EqPA, although perhaps on its face a relatively 
simple statute, is one which has required considerable 
judicial interpretation to fill in the statutory outline, 
as Phillips J noted in NCB v. Sherwin [1978] ICR 700,703. 
Lord Ormrod in the Court of Appeal stated that the Act "has 
to be applied by hundreds and thousands of ordinary people 
who are not lawyers, and it should therefore be kept as simple 
and as free from legalistic complications as is possible" 
National Vulcan Engineering Insurance Group v. Wade [1979] 
ICR 800,808. As early as 1979, Lawton LJ noted however that 
"legalism has started to take over" Clay Cross (Quarry) 
Services v. Fletcher [1979] ICR 1,8. 
That "legalism" should develop in the context of a complex 
and somewhat ambiguous statutory scheme is to be expected. 
That it has so develýped emphasizes the need for representa- 
tion and expert assistance in the preparation and presentation 
of discrimination complaints. 
of equal significance, however, is that these complaints 
involve fact-finding of a particular kind, a process which 
Parliament entrusted to bodies thought to have expertise in 
the area of industrial relations, the industrial tribunals. 
The examples taken from the sample demonstrate how difficult 
thatprocess may be, and how it requires sensitivity to social 
facts from outside the traditional realm of. industrial rela- 
tions. Hepple (1983, pp. 74-75) notes that the courts and 
tribunals were expected to accomplish their tasks by adopting 
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methods offact-finding and evaluation which are outside 
the usual compass of civil adjudication in Britain, and that 
this "mis-match" between the structure of the judicial 
process and the kind of purposive social engineering 
required by the discrimination legislation provides a key 
to understanding the performance of the courts and tribunals. 
To summarize, both the procedures enacted for imple- 
mentation and the structure of the enforcement system have 
a significant impact on the way in which key elements of 
the statute are interpreted and applied. Any substantive 
change in the law will be limited to the parameters of what 
it is practicable to expect of tribunals and courts used to 
operating within the traditional forms of civil adjudication 
and industrial relations practice. Reforms may be feasible 
of course, with respect to both procedural and structural 
factors, but in the absence of attention to these problems, 
it is unlikely that merely býoadening the scope of the 
legislation can have a substantial effect. on the capacity 
of the legislation to reflect and address the material 
conditions of women workers. 
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NOTES 
1 The focus here is on the provisions of the original 
statute, in force during the-time period covered by the 
statute. I do not therefore include any discussion of the 
possible effect of the 1983 equal value amendments, 
2 The 1983 Regulations amending the EqPA have substituted 
a new s. 1(3). Prior to 1983 the section provided that "An 
equality clause shall not operate in relation to a variation 
between the woman's contract and the man's contract if the 
employer proves that the variation is genuinely due to a 
material difference (other than the difference of sex) between 
her case and his. " It is this form of the defence that is 
under discussion here. Para. 2(2) of the 1983 Regulations 
provided that in cases involving like work or work rated as 
equivalent, the equality clause would not operate "if the 
employer proves that the variation is genuinely due to a 
material factor which is not the factor of sex and that factor.. 
must be a material difference between the woman's case and 
the man's. " The Regulations provide that in a case of 
work of equal value, the factor "may be such a material 
difference. " 
3 Earlier decisions of'the EAT had stated that the burden 
was a "very heavy" one, but this interpretation was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal in Vulcan v. Wade. 
4 Under the 1983 Regulations, the operation of market 
forces may constitute a s. 1(3) defence when a case of work 
of equal value is involved, as the employer in such cases 
is not confined to pointing to a material difference 
between the woman's case and the man's. See Pannick, 1985, 
pp. 112-114. 
5 For a discussion of the concept of indirect discrimination 
and its incorporation into the EqPA see Chapter 5 above. 
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6 The tribunal correctly noted that the fact that with 
commission the applicant had gross earnings in excess 
of the comparable man did not preclude an equal pay claim 
when basic pay is one term of the contract, and commission 
another. 
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CONCLUSION 
The female labour force in Britain possesses certain characteristics that 
distinguish it clearly from the male; the women's average earnings are lower 
than men's; women are concentrated in a relatively small number of 
occupations and industries relative to men; women comprise the 
overwhelming majority of part-time workers; and jobs which are performed 
in the main by women tend to be classified at a low level of skill or to lack 
prestige. But these relatively quantifiable factors do not tell the whole story. 
In addition there is a nexus for the majority of women between waged work 
and familiar roles and responsibilities which has both a material and an 
ideological component. The question posed in this reserach is the capacity of 
the Equal Pay Act (EqPA) and the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) to affect these 
seemingly entrenched practices, relationships, and attitudes. The conclusion 
to which this research points is that the law in its present form provides only 
a partial solution; and that fundamental changes would be required if terms 
of both the substance of the law and the system for its enforcement if the 
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legislation is to address the social and economic factors which lie beyond the 
legal concept of discrimination. 
The purpose of this study was to examine both the historical 
emergence of the statutes and their central concepts, and the subsequent 
interpretation and implementation of the legislation. As such it is concerned 
with the legal meaning as an emergent phenomenon, constructed on the basis 
of statutory provisions. and developed and interpreted within the parameters 
of particular legal and social processes and structures. The study also poses 
the question of the congruence between the legal definition of the problem of 
discrimination (and the concomitant legal solutions) and the actuality of the 
underlying phenomenon. 
The issues that the study seeks to address fall into three categories: the 
effect of social, historical and political factors on the kind of legal solution 
enacted in the discrimination statutes, and the nature of the concepts that are 
central to the legislation as enacted and interpreted; the fit between the legal 
concepts and the phenomena they seek to address, and the social impact of 
the legislation; and the feasibility of changes in the law. 
In the first part of this study I examined the historical context in 
which the anti- discrimination legislation emerged, the key features of the 
legislation and the particular concept of equality that underlies the 
legislation. In the second part I examined the structures and processes of 
implementation. Although separable for purposes of analysis. these issues are 
not at bottom discrete: the historical process of emergence has affected both 
the substantive and procedural aspects of the legislation: and substantive 
legal meaning develops within the -parameters of a procedural and structural 
process. Thus, in a critique of the legislation it is necessary to consider the 
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system as a whole. While individual aspects of the system may, and indeed 
must, be discussed in close focus, proposals for change must take into account 
the interlocking structural, historical, and conceptual factors which have 
given the legislation shape and meaning. 
With that caveat, this chapter summarizes the conclusions that may be 
drawn from the analysis of the legislation with regard to the three categories 
of issues posed above. These conclusions operate at two distinct levels of 
conceptualization. the first concerned with a social policy perspective, 
identifying issues that may be addressed through amendments to the law, 
and the second concerned with those features of the legislation that may be 
less amenable to change, either because they involve core values of liberal or 
juridical ideology, or because they would necessitate far-reaching structural 
changes. 
Statutory provisions do not develop in a social or historical vacuum. 
Both what is included and what is excluded in a legislative enactment is 
moulded by a policy process which extends beyond the immediate policy 
debates at the time of the passage of a bill. In examining the emergence of 
the anti- discri min ation legislation, three factors appear to be of considerable 
significance in shaping the form and content of the statutes: the impact of an 
industrial relations model for legislative intervention; the experience of 
previous state interventions in the area of race discrimination on the way in 
which sex discrimination legislation was comprehended and defined, and the 
formalistic and individualistic approach to the concept of equality which is 
central to the liberal philosophical tradition. These factors together implied 
certain assumptions about employment rights, the nature of discrimination, 
and the role of law that coloured both the substantive concepts which defined 
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the parameters of the problem, and the enforcement system established to 
provide the legal remedy. 
When the EqPA was enacted the influence of the industrial relations 
model was manifest in the enforcement structure chosen for the new 
legislation, which included the existing industrial tribunals, whose personnel 
included representatives of both sides of industry. Legislative intervention 
was viewed as a necessary response to the failure of collective bargaining but 
the limited role that the law could be expected to fulfill was, in the tradition 
of industrial relations intervention, quiet explicit. These influences carried 
over into the SDA, which utilized the same enforcement structure for 
individual complaints as the EqPA. 
The effect of the industrial relations model goes further, however, than 
influencing the choice of enforcement structures. It also permeates the 
approach to enforcement, which emphasizes the conciliation of claims. and 
defines the parties whose interests are properly represented when resort to 
legal remedy is sought. The predominance of the structures, processes and 
personnel of the industrial relations model means, on a practical level, that 
the institutions of the enforcement system are not well-adapted to the 
resolution of discrimination issues. Further, on an ideological level, this 
predominance reinforces the notion that discrimination against women 
workers is essentially an employment issue, and serves to de-emphasize the 
broader societal factors which give rise to and perpetuate the specific 
position of women as a group. 
The second significant influence on the legislative scheme is the 
previous experience of race discrimination legislation, and a model which 
borrows from American experience in this area. Both race and sex 
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discrimination legislation in Britain have transplanted some American 
concepts and structures, in modified form. The modifications, and the fact 
that the American transplants are expected to operate in a quite different 
judicial and political environment from that in which they originated, means 
however that there are substantial differences between the British and 
American approaches, even where the former has expressly borrowed from 
the latter. The borrowing is also very selective. The British legislation 
incorporates the concept of indirect discrimination, expressly following a 
doctrine judicially created by the American courts. British legislators chose, 
however, not to incorporate the American courts' equitable approach to the 
question of remedies, and expressly rejected the idea of affirmative action as 
either a voluntary or a court-ordered remedy for past discrimination. The 
idea of an adminsitrative enforcement agency is borrowed from the United 
States, but again with significant differences in the powers given to the 
agency and with personnel of the British agency gain reflecting the 
traditional represntation of interests of the industrial relations model. 
The primary effect of using a race discrimination model to address sex 
discrimination, regardless of whether that model is home-grown or borrowed 
from elsewhere, is that discrimination is treated as an undifferentiated 
phenomenon. Discimination as a concept thus operates at a level of 
abstraction that cannot but fail to address the specificity of women's position 
in the labour force. Discrimination in the present scheme is constituted as an 
abstract category, independent of the social practices which constitute the 
social relations of gender. Because of the particular nature of women's 
relationship to the labour market, and the nexus between women's wage 
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labour and their domestic and familial roles, this abstraction is of crucial 
importance. 
The third factor that emerges from a consideration of the statutory 
scheme is the persistence of a particular approach to the concept of equality. 
central to a traditional liberal philosophy, which is individualistic, formalistic, 
negative rather than positive, and which is premised on the notion of treating 
like with like. This approach to equality has informed a number of important 
historical interventions in the area of civil rights. When directed at such 
issues as the franchise, jury service, and the removal of legal disabilities, the 
concept is clearly appropriate, since it requires that simlilarly situated 
individuals be treated alike, on a one-by-one, basis. In discrimination law, the 
concept is less appropriate however. / 
The e ssence of the problem is that men 
and women are not similarly situated for the purpose of equality of 
employment opportunity, because of the social relations of gender, and thus 
the indenticality equation as a basis for equal treatment is insufficient. 
Further the emphasis on individual rights which is at the heart of this 
approach, is inadequate to address the problem of discrimination as a group 
or collective phenomenon. 
In light of this critique, the question must be asked of whether those 
-who, like Coote and Campbell 0 982), assert that the law has failed' are 
correct, or whether there remains a possibility that through modification the 
legislation can be made to work, as Seear ( 1982) suggests. To assert that the 
law has failed because of its internal contradictions, and weaknesses in the 
system of enforcement, leaves unanswered important questions about the 
emergent nature of rights, and the continuing effect of the legislation as a 
focus, negative or positive. in that process. To assert that the law might be 
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made to work through modification requires that questions be asked about 
the scope and feasibility of the necessary changes. 
For instance, while the individualism which is a primary feature of the 
enforcement process appears as a fundamental problem, changes may be 
proposed which would go some way to mitigating the problems encountered 
in practice by individual complainants; while other proposals, perhaps more 
difficult to implement would have a more radical effect on the legislation, 
moving it towards an approach which recognizes the collective dimension to 
discrimination. 
The system of enforcement reflects and reinforces the individualistic 
focus of the legislation. Individual complaint procedures have provided the 
primary method of enforcement, but the empirical study of the tribunal 
process suggests a number of procedural issues that have weakened the 
individual enforcement efforts. These issues may be categorized as having to 
do-ýv-ith' the 
I 
applicants, (or potential applicants), with the tribunals, and with 
the lawiiself. 
An examination of the complaint rate and the hearing rate led to a 
number of questions concerning the public's knowledge of the law, and 
confidence in the law. The information available suggests that knowledge of 
the law's existence and basic provisions may be limited, and that the 
perceived difficulties of pursuing a complaint may discourage potential 
applicants from pursuing discrimination claims. However, the information 
available on thes issues from other studies and secondary souces is sparse 
and somewhat speculative, and further research is necessary before firm 
conclusions can be reached. 
517 
The study of the hearing rate raised questions about the high 
proportion of complaints withdrawn before a tribunal hearing. The available 
information suggests that the role of the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) would bear further investigation here. 
ACAS'own statistics point to a discrepancy in the withdrawal rate 
between the discrimination legislation and other statutes within its field of 
authority. However, ACAS is not under any obligation to publish even the 
most minimal of details of how and why cases are withdrawn. A requirement 
of record-keeping and publication would surely increase the accountablility 
of the organization, and make easier the monitoring-of its activities by the 
EOC and the Race Relations Commission. A full study of withdrawn 
complaints, interviewing the complainants, would be useful here to confirm 
or deny the conclusions suggested by the few available sources of 
information. With hindsight, I feel that more emphasis on work in this area 
would have been useful in understanding the practical limitations of the 
individual complaint process. 
Similarly, my analysis of the representation of both parties at tribunal 
hearings tentatively points to the conclusion that discrepancies in legal 
representation between them may correlate with successful or unseccessful 
outcomes. The numbers in the sample were small, and there was no 
attemmpt to control for the operation of external factors. Since the legislation 
does not presently provide for the legal representation of applicants, a 
showing that lack of such representation affects case outcomes would have 
significant policy implications. This area would be a fruitful one for further 
research. 
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The study of the tribunal decision-making process revealed a 
considerable diversity in the adjudication of factually comparable cases. This 
finding suggests that training in the concepts of discrimination law and their 
interpretations might be appropriate for tribunal members. It also suggests 
that increased legal representation might benefit not just the parties, but also 
might have a beneficial effect on tribunal adjudication, by making available 
within the context of the adversary process, the contributions of legal 
representatives expert in the field. 
In terms of the composition of tribunals and the role of chairpersons as 
against lay members, and men as against women, the sample yielded only a 
tiny number of non-unanimous cases for study. A useful subject for follow- 
up research would be to select a larger sample of non-unanimous decisions 
for analysis, and to combine this study with a systematic observation of 
tribunal hearings, in order to evaluate the roles and contributions of the 
various members, lay and legal, male and female. 
These previous recommendations are concerned with the personnel of 
the tribunal hearings: applicants, lawyers. and tribunal members. The 
research also points to some procedural changes in the law that would 
fascilitate for the applicant the process of individual enforcement, and would 
improve the capacity of the legislation to encourage compliance. The first 
change concerns the burden of proof in SDA cases. The sample confirms the 
statements of other commentators that the present burden of proof makes it 
exceedingly difficult for applicants to prove sex discrimination, particularIv 
in employment situations where the recruitment or promotion criteria are 
. soft. 'Second, the system of remedies as presently constituted provides little 
in the way of compensation for the victims of proven discrimination, or as an 
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incentive to compliance. The examination of remedies in the study points to a 
considerable difference between the British and American approaches, and 
this again goes to the issue of individual versus collective enforcement. 
In sum, the study points to a number of procedural and practical 
difficulties which underlie the individual remedy provisions for enforcement 
of the anti- discrimination legislation. At bottom, however, there is a more 
complex issue to be confronted than the practical problems which an 
individual applicant may encounter, and this is the very choice of individual 
complaints and remedies as the primary mechanism for enforcement. The 
practical problems may be ameliorated by, for example, more legal aid for 
applicants, changes in the composition of tribunals, or more training in the 
field of anti- discrimination law for tribunal members. None of these policy 
measures, however, even if fully implemented, would address the core 
contradiction of establishing individual complaint as the major remedy for a 
wrong which by definition emerges from the relative structural positions of 
social groups, collectivities, a wrong which is itself defined by reference to 
concepts which are meaningless in a context limited to the individual. There 
thus appears to be a lack of fit between the fundamental approach in the 
legislation to the concept of discrimination, and the material reality of 
women's position. This disjuncture between the individual and the collective 
is central not just to sex discrimination legislation, but to race discrimination 
law as well. In the case of the sex discrimination legislation the problem is 
exacerbated by an essentially formalistic and ungendered approach to 
discrimination which through its use of conceptual abstractions obscures the 
fact that women as women experience discrimination as a specific group, 
distinct in some impotant respects from other disadvantaged minorities. 
520 
A central question is the extent to which this individualism, and this 
lack of group specificity, is susceptible to change. The question is relevant on 
the policy level, since such changes appear to be necessary for a more 
effective, more situationally relevant piece of legislation. It is also relevant to 
the question of the limits of law, and its relatioship to social change, posed as 
an underlying theme at the beginning of this study. 
American experience suggests that some progress towards collective 
enforcement is possible within the confines of a legal framework, but 
whether this experience is transferable to the British legal system remains an 
open question. The borrowing of American approaches to the administrative 
enforcement of discrimination legislation suggests that some procedural 
innovation is possible within the British legal framework, but also clearly 
indicates the need for the political will to innovate. before any such change is 
likely. 
It is also possible to conceive of ways in which specifically British 
structures and institutions might be reformed so as to provide a more 
effective route to collective enforcement. The EOC's powers could be 
increased, its composition changed, for example. Further, the EOC, in its 
proposed amendments to the laws, suggested ways in which existing 
institutions could be given additional powers under the EqPA, (EOC, January 
198 1). The EOC suggested, for example, that the Central Arbitration 
Committee be given the authority to review any discriminatory provision. 
direct or indirect, in a collective agreement or pay structure, rather than as 
now being limited to the review of provisions specifically referring in terms 
to "male" and/or "female" conditions, (EOC, January 198 1, p. 6). The EOC 
further suggested that the Commission itself be given the authority to refer 
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such provisions to the CAC, in addition to the parties to the agreement, or the 
Secretarv of State as under the current section. Lastly, the EOC suggested 
amending s. ' )(6) of the EqPA so that when an individual complaint to an 
industrial tribunal appeared to affect employees not party to the application, 
the ACAS would have the authority to refer the case to the CAC. without 
prejudice to the individual complaint. Such seemingly modest changes could 
lead to real improvements in the capacity for collective enforcement, without 
the difficulties inherent in the attempt to introduce procedures like the class 
action into the British legal system. 
Thus, there are seemingly a number of fairly specific changes that 
could be wrought which would go some way towards redirecting the 
discrimination legislation towards a more collecticve approach to enforcement 
and one which would therefore be more appropriate in terms of the 
underlying phenomenon. While such changes may appear politically to be 
most unlikely, the case of the recent changes in the legal definition of equal 
pay is instructive. The British legislation now incorporates the definition of 
equal pay for work of equal value, a definition which equal pay activists 
advocated from the start. This amendment to the equal pay definition was 
introduced, reluctantly, by a Conservative government, only under the threat 
of infringement proceedings by the European Commission for Britain's failure 
to comply with Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, and Article I of the Equal 
Pay Directive. Here is a case of the law being used to remedy a fundamental 
flaw in the law. While the impact of the new definition will depend to a large 
extent upon procedural and structural factors, and is therefore subject to the 
limitations discussed above, it nevertheless constitutes an ideological shift of 
some magnitude and one which indicates that the law can be pushed closer to 
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definitions which more realistically reflect the underlying material 
conditions. 
One further set of questions remains. The study began with some 
questions about the role of law in effecting social change. Some degree of 
change is clearly possible; and short-run, non-fundamental changes may 
positively affect the capacity of the legislation to provide redress for 
employment discrimination. At the same time, it must be recognized that the 
law as it stands provides a specific structured system for the negotiated 
settlement of conflicts, and as such operates as an ideological form which may 
mask social reality, in that the adjudication of individual rights, a process 
central in the present legislation, has profound ideological implications for the 
definition of the problem itself, the substance of the matter. Discrimination is 
manifested through legal process as an individual wrong, forcing a direct 
relationship between the individual and legal redress. Thus, the deeper roots 
of the problem are masked and at the same time the paradigm of law as the 
mechanism for dispute resolution is fostered. 
At the same time, the legal approach to sex discrimination fails to 
address one of the most significant characteristics of women's participation in 
the labour force, their structural differentiation from male workers in terms 
of the nexus between paid employment and domestic and familial 
responsibilities. Because of this failure, the legislation does little to 
reconstruct the ideology of gender relations. By regulating discrimination in 
the workplace, but defining other factors which affect women's tabour force 
participation as being outside the reach of law, the legislation in fact 
reinforces the public/private dichotomy, and fragments women's experience. 
In both practical and ideological terms, it validates a system in which women 
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may compete equally with men in paid employment, but where the 
employment sphere is not expected to change in material ways to reflect 
women's different structural position. 
The power of law to mask reality is not, however, absolute. It may be 
argued that the enactment of legislation changes the terms of debate, and 
that subsequent demands for the reform of the law, or for more effective 
enforcement, may mask more important developments in raising political 
awareness, and securing broader definitions of the rights in question. The law 
itself as it presently stands also makes some inroads in terms of addresing 
women's relative disadvantage, on both the ideological and the practical 
levels. The recent introduction of a definition of equal pay for work of equal 
value, for instance, breaches the identicality equation, and recognizes the 
structural fact of a high degree of occupational segregation between men and 
women workers. While the legislation is predominantly individualistic in its 
approach, some key provisions recognize the group nature of discrimination, 
particularly those dealing with indirect discrimination. 
It must also be recognized that law may bring real, if limited gains to 
some groups and individuals -- there are certainly women whose earnings 
have increased because of the Equal Pay Act or who have benefited under 
the Sex Discrimination Act. That these women may be relatively few in 
number should not blind us to their existence. 
Thompson (1975, p. 265), in his study Of law in eighteenth century 
England, writes: 
The rhetoric and rules of society are a great deal more than a 
sham. In the same moment they may modify in profound ways 
the behaviour of the powerful and mystify the powerless. They 
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may disguise the true relations of power, but at the same time, 
they may curb that power and check its intrusion. 
For the sociologist, these multi-faceted dimensions of the law point to a 
need for a more sophisticated approach to the inter -relationship of the 
substantive definitions of the law, legal process, and both instrumental and 
ideological effects, in the context of specific investigations. 
Legislation which reconstitutes and redefines rights is a particularly 
interesting subject in the context of a debate on the limits of the role of law, 
and the consequences of the legal form. If this study raises more questions 
than it answers, it may at least provide a direction for further research in 
this area. While this study is capable of indicating some of the more 
immediate policy changes that might increase the capacity of the legislation 
to address the position of women in the labour market, it can do no more 
than speculate about the likelihood of such changes being introduced, or of 
their possible effect. Consequently, while indicating some of the limitations 
in the law as presently constituted, I am reluctant to conceded that such 
problems represent the limits of the law in any fundamental sense. 
The particular forms and concepts adopted in the British legislation 
may seem ill-adapted in some fundamental ways to address employment 
practices and problems which arise in the context of the social relations of 
gender. Some incremental changes appear feasible which might improve the 
operation of the statutory scheme while leaving major problems unresolved. 
The form of law, however, arises from the confluence of historical and social 
factors. A particular confluence has influenced the form that anti- 
discrimination legislation has taken in Great Britain. Whether that legislation 
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will be susceptible to amendment of a fundamental and far-reaching kind 
will also depend on such factors. It is premature to conclude therefore that 
the limits of law have been reached in addressing social discrimination. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Sample of Industrial Tribunal Decisions 
The sample of 125 industrial tribunal decisions 
provides the primary data base for the second part of the 
preceding study, constituting the major source of informa- 
tion on aspects of tribunal adjudication, the representation 
of parties, the allocation of the burden of proof, and 
the remedies available in successful cases. 
Constructing the Sample 
The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) maintains 
a register of all cases heard by Industrial Tribunals, 
listed by year. This register provided the population 
from which the sample was selected. Given the time constraints 
of a study of this kind, and the desire to engage in an in- 
depth analysis of the content and method of tribunal 
decision-making, I decided fairly arbitrarily that. the 
largest sample size that was feasible was somewhere in the 
region of 120 complaints. 
I decided to select the sample. from a population 
consisting of all the complaints registered over a five year 
period 1977-1981, rather than concentrating the research 
within a narrower time frame. In this way, I hoped to 
minimize the possibility that a relatively small sample 
might be skewed by a particular external factor or event. 
Similarly, in order to minimize the possible skewing 
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effect of selecting decisions from just one or two tribunal 
offices, I decided to select them randomly from all those 
listed in England, Scotland and Wales. 
The period 1977-1981 was chosen as including five 
of the six years of implementation of the Act completed 
at the tim4 this part of the study was undertaken. The 
first year of implementation was omitted for two reasons. 
First, Coussins (1976) study had analysed a number of 
decisions for that year, and had pointed to a certain 
amount of confusion, and lack of expertise in tribunal 
decision-making, while expressing the hope that the 
accumulation of guidance from the Employment Appeals 
Tribunal (EAT) and other appellate courts would improve 
the situation. Secondly, it was to be expected that in 
the very first year of implementation the process of 
adjudication might be unrepresentative of later years in 
other ways. A higher number of complaints might be ex- 
pectbd initially, for example; representatives were likely 
to be less well-informed and less well-prepared than later 
when the parameters of the law became clearer. Consequently, 
because of the prior study by Coussins and the likelihood 
that the first year of implementation would be aberrational 
in some respects, I decided to begin the research with the 
year 1977. 
The sample was stratified by year in order to provide 
the same number of cases for analysis in each year in the 
research period. I elected to take this approach to ensure 
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a minimum number of cases for each year, in order to 
compare the internal process of decision-making across 
the research period. I decided twenty-five complaints 
each year as representing both the minimum necessary for 
any kind of meaningful analysis, and the maximum that I 
would analyse in-depth in the time available. Thus, twenty- 
five cases were randomly sampled from the register for 
each year in the research period, using a random number 
table, for a total sample of 125 cases. 
One effect of stratifying the sample in this way 
is that the sample does not consistently represent the 
same proportion of the total population, as the total 
population changes for each year but the number sampled. 
remains the same. Table A-1 shows the total population 
for each year, and the proportion represented by the sample. 
Table A-1 
Complaints under the EgPA and the SDA heard by Industrial 
Tribunals, 1977-1981. 
EqPA SDA TOTAL SAMPLE AS % OF TOTAL 
1977 363 77 440 5.6% 
1978 80 67 147 17.0% 
1979 78 59 137 18.2% 
1980 26 69 95 26.3% 
1981 27 89 116 21.5% 
(Source for numbers of complaints: Annual Reports of the 
EOC). 
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Details of the SamDle 
The saMDle consists of 60 EqPA and 65 SDA complaints 
occurring over a five year period. Table A-2 show s the 
breakdown of the complaints by statute, and year. Table A-3 
shows the breakdown by statute, year, and disposition. 
Table A-2 
Sample of Industrial Tribunal Decisions-, by Year and Statute 
19?? 19? 8 19? 9 1980 1981 Total 
EqPA 18 14 10 99 60 
SDA ? 11 15 16 16 65 
Table A-3 
Sample of Industrial Tribunal Decisions by Year, Statute and 
Disposition 
197? 1978 1979 1980 1981 Total* 
EqPA 
Successful 4 4 3 3 3 17 
Dismissed 14 8 7 6 6 41 
SDA 
Successful 3 3 5 5 5 21 
Dismissed 3 6 10 11 11 41 
Total* 
Successful 7 7 8 8 8 38 
Dismissed 17 14 17 17 17 82 
*Totals 
, 
do not match the sample as set out in Table A-2 be- 
cause of the exclusion here of 5 interlocutory decisions. 
Interlocutory decisions are limited to preliminary points 
of law and do not go to the substance of the complaint. 
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The sample includes decisions from 31 different 
tribunal offices throughout England, Scotland and Wales 
with the largest number coming from London (23), Birmingham 
(14), Manchester (13) and Glasgow (10). Table A-4 shows 
the number of COMDlaints in the sample originating from 
each of the 31 tribunal offices. 
Table A-4 
Tribunal Offices, Showing Number of Sample Decisions 
London* 23 
Birmingham 14 
Manchester 13 
Glasgow 10 
Southampton 7 
Liverpool 7 
Leeds 6 
Cardiff 5 
Nottingham 5 
Brighton 4 
Gloucester 3 
Middlesborough 3 
Edinburgh 3 
Hull 2 
Newcastle on Tyne 2 
Leicester 2 
Cambridge 2 
Sheffield 2 
Reading 2 
Bedford 2 
*The total for London includes cases sampled from each of 
the three London tribunal offices, South, Central, and North. 
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Table A-4 (Cont'd. ) 
Exeter 1 
Grimsby 1 
Colwyn Bay 1 
Inverness 1 
Plymouth -1 
Bury St. Edmunds 1 
Bristol 1 
Carlisle 1 
Total 125 
The sample's-60 EqPA decisions comprise 59 concerned 
with wages or salary, and 1 concerned with fringe benefits. 
Of the 59 concerned with pay, 8 were also concerned with 
the issue of job grading and evaluation. 
The 65 SDA decisions fall into nine categories, as 
shown in Table A-5. 
Table A-5 
Sample SDA Decisions, by Issue 
Promotion, transfer 
and training 15 
Recruitment 14 
Dismissal 9 
Selection for redundancy 8 
Terms and conditions of 
employment 8 
Reduction in status 3 
Certification 1 
Licensing 1 
Advertising 1 
Total 6o* 
*Does not include 3 interlocutory decisions, and 2 dismissed 
for want of prosecution in which it was not possible to ascertain 
the basis of the complaint. 
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Analysis of the SaMDle 
A copy was obtained of the full text of the tribunal 
decision for each case in the sample. The tribunal. is 
required by law to render a decision in writing and the 
vast majority of them clearly detail the reasons for arriving 
at the result reached. The decision is written by the 
chairman or chairwoman of the tribunal and so represents 
his or her view of the case more than that of the lay members. 
Each decision also contains the name of the parties, the 
-names of their representatives, if any, the names of the 
tribunal members, the place and date of the hearing, and 
whether the decision of the tribunal was unanimous. 
As such the decisions contain two basic kinds of 
information: that which may be easily tabulated and 
categorized, such as the type of complaint, SDA or EqPA, 
the gender composition of the tribunal, and the representa- 
tion of the parties, and that which is less susceptible to 
easy categorization, the textual content, and tribunal 
reasoning. An initial step in analyzing both these kinds 
of information was to read each decision carefully, noting 
the main features on a pre-prepared summary analysis chart. 
This chart contains the basic identifying information 
of date, statute, names of parties, and place of hearing. 
It also includes the disposition of the case, and whether 
the decision was unanimous, the remedy, where applicable, 
and the representation of the parties. The chart also 
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contains the applicant's occupation, salary, and length of 
service, where known. The members of the tribunal, both 
the chair and the lay members, are identified as to gender. 
Additionally, the chart allows for a preliminary legal 
analysis of the decision, through columns which identify 
the sections of the statute considered in the decision, 
and the princip al legal issues (e. g., 'job evaluation, ' 
'material difference, ' marital discrimination in hiring). 
Two further columns allow for a notation as to whether 
there was a'discrepancy in the evidence, (as opposed to 
its interpretation) and if so, the party in whose favour 
it was resolved. The chart also contains two columns for 
information relating to the citation of precedent by the 
Tribunal. Finally, space was provided in the summary chart 
for comments on interesting or unusual aspects of the case. 
This chart provided a means of identifying cases 
for further analysis and for illustration in the text. 
Groups of cases were then re-read, re-analysed, summarized 
and annotated in terms of specific issues like the avail- 
ability of remedy or the burden of proof. 
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APPENDIX B 
List of Tribunal Decisions In Sample 
Equal Pay Act Decisions 
Arnold v. Beecham Group Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
(Brighton), 1981. 
Bryantv. Brunnings Advertising and Marketing, 
(Birmingham), 1981. 
Grace-Walsh v. Andrew Page Ltd., (Ijeeds), 1981. 
Joshi v. G. E. C. Machines Ltd., (Birmingham), 1981. 
Linton, et al. v. British Steel Corp. (Cardiff), 1981. 
Phillips v. Glass Reinforced Concrete (GRC) Ltd., 
ILiverpool), 1961. 
Simpson v. S. Smales and Son, (Hull), 1981. 
Vickers v. N. W. Electronics (Bradford) Ltd., (Leeds), 1981. 
Welch v. Ventek, (London C. ), 1981. 
Clement v. Russ Hill Hotel Ltd., (Brighton), 1980. 
Hare v. Scammell Motors, British Leyland Ltd., (London N. ), 
1980. 
MaGuire v. Newage Marine Propulsion Ltd., (Manchester), 
1980. 
Goy v. Clifton Bingo Club, (Grimsby), 1980. 
Subow v. Carr Tanning Co. Ltd., (Gloucester), 1980. 
Harper v. Lonsdale, (Southampton), 1980. 
Wakefield v. Newickton Ltd., (Nottingham), 1980. 
Smith v. Oldham Borough Council, (Manchester), 1980. 
McCabe v. International Computers Ltd. (Djanchester), 1980. 
Dietrich and Whitmill v. Odhams Press Ltd., (London N. ), 
1979. 
B-2 
Harris v. Duramin Engineering Co. Ltd., (Gloucester), 
1979. 
Hoare v. British Aerospace Dynamics-Grou , (Cambridge), 1979. 
Bramwell v. Chesire County Council, (Liverpool), 1979. 
Douglas v. Kraft Foods, (Liverpool), 1979. 
Hill v. Polo Committee of North Yorkshire County Council, 
TIUdalesbrough), 197-9-. 
Keelty v. Scapa-Porritt Ltd., (Manchester), 1979. 
Sohoye v. John Wyeth and Broter Limited, (London C. ), 1-979. 
Troup v. N. E. I. Thompson Cochran Ltd., (Glasgow), 1979. 
Wilson v. Grootcon (UK)_Ltd., (Middlesborough), 1979. 
Scott v. Waverly Vintners Ltd., (Edinburgh), 1978. 
Emery v. Triplex Foundry, (Birmingham), 1978. 
Black v. Pollastra Packers Ltd., (Bury St. Edmunds), 1978. 
Baynham V. Hoover Ltd., (London C. ), 1978. 
Roberts v. Wright & Green, (Hull), 1978. 
Waite v. Thomas Lloyd, (Cardiff), 1978. 
Smith et al. v. Alldays Peacock and Co. Ltd., (Birmingham), 
1978. 
Burrows v. Salisbury Transmission Ltd., (Birmingham), 
1978. 
Willets v. Beans Engineering, (Birmingham), 1978. 
Cotton v. Beans Engineering SU Butec Ltd., (Birmingham), 
1978. 
Mincher et al. v. Marston Excelsior Limited, (Birmingham), 
197T. - 
Methven and Musiolik v. Cow Industrial Polners Ltd., TUndon), 1978. 
Stone et al. v. Kent Meters Ltd., (Bedford), 1978. 
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Wilkinson v. Butterworth and Co. Ltd., (London C. ), 1978. 
Underwood and Green v. Lesney UK Operations Ltd., 
(London N. ), 19777- 
Barnes, et al. v. CaDe Insulation Ltd., (Liverpool), 1977. 
Dukes et al. v. GEC Machines Ltd., (Birmingham), 1977. 
Poynor v. GEC Yachines Ltd., (Birmingham), 1977. 
Febery v. Redditch Controls Ltd., (Birmingham), 1977. 
Garden v. Ministry of Defense, (Edinburgh), 1977. 
Rozarowszczyk and Brown v. P. and S. Textile Ltd., 
TTri-anchester), 1977. - 
Herald v. Prestcold (Scotland) Ltd., (Glasgow), 1977. 
McLoughlin v. Gordons (Stockport)_Ltd., (Manchester), 1977. 
Ford v. National Coal Board, (Sheffield), 1977. 
Young v. Beecham Group Ltd., (Glasgow), 1977. 
McGill v. Honeywell Ltd., (Glasgow), 1977. 
Neilson et al. v. Burroughs Machines Ltd., (Glasgow), 1977. - 
Butler v. E. H. Booth and Co. Ltd., (Carlisle), 1977. 
Hancock v. L. C. Plant Hire, (Manchester), 1977. 
Ruddock v. Plessey Radar Limited, (Southampton), 1977. 
Nicholas v. AB Electronic Components Ltd., (Cardiff), 
1977. 
Cassidy v. E. Gardner & Son Tweed Mills, (Edinburgh), 1977. 
Sex Discrimination Act Decisions 
mead v. DCA Industries Ltd., 
_t/a 
"Colchester Oven Door, " 
(London N. ), 1981.1 
O'Connell v. Adams Personnel Employment Agenc , 
(London C. ), 
1981. 
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Hurley v. Mustoe, (London C. ), 1981. 
Bath v. British Airways, (Cardiff), 1981. 
Kerr v. Clyde Factors, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne), 1981. 
Latiff v. SAS Catering Ltd., (London), 1981. 
Bowman v. Data Logic Ltd., (London C. ), 1981. 
Cornwall v. Eurogage Co. Ltd., (Brighton), 1981. 
Heal y v. Forrester Ketley & Co., (Birmingham), 1981. 
King scote v. H. T. Mann, (Exeter), 1981. 
O'Hagan v. H. Diamond Construction Ltd., (Manchester), 1981. 
Roberts v. Tate and Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd., 
(Liverpool) . 198"IT. 
- 
Thomas v. Standard Soap Co. Ltd., (Leicester), 1981. 
Waller v. Boston Park Ltd., (Middlesbrough), 1981. 
Mitchell v. Essex Area Health Authorit , (London N. ), 1981. 
Butcher v. Cambridge City Council, (Cambridge), 1981. 
Wilkie v. Strathclyde Regional Council, (Glasgow), 1980. 
Petty v. British Judo Association, (London S. ), 1980. 
Marshall v. Sout 
Health Authorit ,, 
iampton and South West Hampshire District 
. (Southampton), 1980. 
Wallwork v. Brytallium Castings (Bolton) Ltd., (Manchester), 
19,80. 
Slater v. National Travel (West) Ltd., (Manchester), 1980. 
Vernon v. Irvine Sellars Ltd., (Sheffield), 1980. 
Pratt v. Coles Cranes Ltd., (Newcastle-upon-Tyne), 1980. 
Manning v. Wallop Industries Ltd., (Southampton), 1980. 
McNally v. Chef & Brewer Ltd., (Manchester), 1980. 
MacDonald v. Rolls Royce Ltd., (Glasgow), 1980. 
Crocker v. J. C. Bamford Excavators Ltd., (Nottingham), 1980. 
Oxenbury v. Contract Clean Ltd., (Reading), 1980. 
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Dungworth V. Colnoll Engineering Ltd., (Leeds), 1980. 
Campbell v. J. H. Dewhurst Ltd., (Bedford), 1980. 
Stewart v. Haldane, (Glasgow), 1980. 
Snowdon v. Rhuddlan Borough Council, (Colwyn Bay), 1980. 
D'Angelo v. 
_Highlands 
Fabricators Ltd., (Inverness), 19? 9. 
Hounsell v. Hunslet Ltd., (Leeds), 19? 9. 
Levene v. Sibri Coiffure Ltd. , (London C. ), 19? 9. 
Munroe v. M. F. I. Furniture Centres Ltd., (Southampton), 
19? 9. 
McKelvey v. Mace Deck Chair Services, (Bright. on), 19? 9. 
Sharkey v. Batemans Catering Organisation Ltd., (Leeds), 
1979. 
Simon v. G. K. N. Contractors, (Birmingham), 19? 9. 
Stanford and Elliot v. Simpson. Wrightand Lowe, Ltd., 
(Nottingham), 1979. 
Wilkinson v. Dellcourt Ltd., (Manchester), 19? 9. 
Coleman v. Sky Rail Oceanic Ltd., (London C. ), 1979. 
Equal Opportunities Commission v. C. M. Robertson et al., 
(Plymouth), 1979. 
Hermolle v. Goyt. Communications H. Q. (Gloucester), 19? 9. 
Pattison v. Commonwealth Holiday Inns of Canada Ltd., 
(Reading), 1979. 
Railton v. S. O. S. Bureau Limited, (Liverpool), 19? 9. 
Sohoye v. John Wyeth and Brother Limited, (London C. ), 
1979. 
Lee v. Lambeth Southwark and Leewisham Area Health Authorit 
(London S. ), 19? 9-. 
Ashworth v. NottinghamshireCounty Council, (Nottingham), 
1978. 
Grieg v. Community Industr , (Manchester), 1978. 
Baker v. Soil-Less Cultivation Systems, Ltd., (Southampton), 
1978. 
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Barnard v. Hextall Erskine & Co., (London S. ), 1978. 
Kaur and Begumv. Firth Bros. Ltd., (Leeds), 1978. 
Thorndyke v. Bell Fruit Ltd., (Idverpool), 1978. 
-Hartnell v. Merton-Sutt 
Authority, (London S. -T 
d Wardsworth Area 
Clements v. Gosport Borough Council, (Southampton), 1978. 
Pitt v. B. L. Cars Ltd., (Birmingham), 1978. 
Farrar V. Greater London Council, (London S. ), 1978. 
O'Rourke v. Grandmet Scottish Site Services Ltd., 
7-Glasgow), 1977. 
Royds V. Grandmet Scottish Site Services Ltd., (Glasgow), 
1977. 
Dunlop v. Royal Scottish Academ , 
(Edinburgh), 1977. 
Sullivan v. Trist Draper Ltd., (Bristol), 1977. 
Wallace v. Nabisco Limited, (Leicester), 1977. 
Harris v. The Kingsway Casino, (Cardiff), 1977. 
Nasse v. Science Research Council, (London), 1977. 
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APPENDIX C 
The Central Arbitration Committee 
The Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) was given 
powers under the Equal Pay Act to remove discriminatory 
provisions in collective agreements, employer's pay structures, 
and statutory wage orders. 
Under S. 3 (1) of the EqPA any party to a collective 
agreement, or the Secretary of State for Employment can 
refer to the CAC any agreement which "Contains any provision 
applying specifically to men only or women only. " The CAC 
has the authority to amend such provisions so that terms 
previously applying to one sex extend both to men and women, 
provided that no-one shall be treated less favourably than 
they were before the amendment. 
The CAC adopted a liberal approach to the interpreta- 
tion of S. 3 (1) reviewing agreements referred to it that 
were indirectly as well as directly discriminatory. The CAC 
explained the rationale for its position, noting that: 
It would be unusual to find a current collective 
agreement with a clear discriminatory provision. 
Yet problems still exist and the cases the 
Committee has had indicate plainly that an agree- 
ment which at first sight looks fair may not 
produce real equality and may in fact conceal the 
absence of any change in the position at all. Two 
powerful factors emerge--the actual rate of pay, 
which may still be affected by the old, lower, 
'women's rate, ' and the distribution of the sexes 
in a grade which may be real evidence that the 
rate paid is not truly unisex--that is to say, 
as attractive to men as to women. 
(CAC, 1980, pp. 12-13) 
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Consequently, the CAC approached cases with the intent to 
"discover and evaluate the actual position, rather than to 
rely on the superficial description in the collective agree- 
ment or the apparent intent of the pay structure" (ibid. ). 
This approach was at odds with that of the Department of 
Employment, who held that the CAC could only intervene when 
a provision made reference in its terms specifically to 
"male" and/or "female" conditions, (EOC, 1979, P. 16). 
The dispute over the correct interpretation of the 
CAC's authority under S. 3 (1) was resolved in the case of 
Regina v. CAC ex parte Hy-mac Ltd. (1979) 1 RLR 614, and 
it was the narrow interpretation that was upheld. For the 
reason set out by the CAC itself, that, after 1975 agreements 
tended to eschew explicitly discriminatory provisions, the 
Hy-mac decision effectively signalled an end to the CAC's 
role in the enforcement of the statute. The EOC has suggested 
an amendment to the EqPA which would re-instate the pre- 
Hy-mac interpretation of S. 3 (1) by allowing review of all 
discriminatory provisions in collective agreements, whether 
directly or indirectly so. The EOC has also proposed that 
the Commission itself should have the power to refer 
discriminatory provisions to the CAC, (EOC, January 1981, 
p. 6). 
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